¹ Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, Peter (Cambridge, 1960Google Scholar; repr. 1988), II.25–51. Henceforth TT, followed by (Roman) treatise and (Arabic) paragraph numerals.

² Brett, Annabel, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 196–99.

³ Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962Google Scholar; repr. 2011), 194–221.

⁴ Ibid., 210–11; for Locke's use of “political society” see, in particular, TT II.77–94; on the political city, or civitas, in early modern natural law see Brett, Changes of State, passim; see also, more generally, Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge, 1997); and also Brett, “Scholastic Political Thought and the Modern Concept of the State,” in Annabel Brett, James Tully and Holly Hamilton-Bleakley, eds., Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), 130–49.

⁵ Macpherson, Political Theory, 203; for a reading of Locke which takes up this view and unspools its political implications see Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, 1974)Google Scholar.

⁶ Macpherson, Political Theory, 222–62.

⁷ Dunn, John, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for readings of Locke on property which follow in Dunn's wake see Olivecrona, Karl, “Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 35/2 (1974), 211–30;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Olivecrona, “Locke's Theory of Appropriation,” Philosophical Quarterly, 24/96 (1974), 220–34; Lemos, R. M., “Locke's Theory of Property,” Interpretation, 5/2 (1975), 226–44;Google Scholar Tuck, Richard, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tully, James, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993); Ryan, Alan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford, 1984)Google Scholar; Buckle, Stephen, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford, 1991)Google Scholar; Waldron, Jeremy, The Right to Private Property (Oxford, 1988)Google Scholar.

⁸ For a historical account of how Locke became—in Britain and America between the 1930s and 1950s—the figurehead of a newly invented “liberal” political tradition see Bell, Duncan, “What Is Liberalism?” Political Theory 42/6 (2014), 682–715CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 698–705.

⁹ James Tully, “Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights,” in Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, 137–79; Armitage, David, “John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government,” Political Theory 32/5 (2004), 602–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, recently reprinted in Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge, 2013), 90–114; Armitage, “John Locke: Theorist of Empire?” in Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2012), 84–111, also reprinted in Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 114–35. Henceforth references to both essays are to Foundations.

¹⁰ Locke, “Morality” (n.d.), Bod. MS Locke c. 28, fols. 139–40; later published in Sargentich, Thomas, “Locke and Ethical Theory: Two MS Pieces,” Locke Newsletter, 5 (1974), 24–31;Google Scholar and again in Locke, Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1997), 267–69. Henceforth all references are to Goldie's collection.

¹¹ TT II. 25–51.

¹² Tully, “Rediscovering America,” 145.

¹³ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 105–10; Armitage, “John Locke: Theorist of Empire?”, 126–27. For the article of the Constitutions in question (§102) see Locke, Constitutions of Carolina, in Locke, Political Essays, 180.

¹⁴ The dating of the Two Treatises is contested. Peter Laslett's 1960 critical edition rubbished its reputation as post-Revolutionary apologetic by pinning its composition to 1679–81, for which see Laslett, “Introduction,” TT, 3–93. Laslett also claimed, however, that Locke wrote the Second Treatise before the First Treatise—an order reversed by Ashcraft, Richard, “Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government: Radicalism and Lockean Political Theory,” Political Theory, 8/4 (1980), 429–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar There is now a consensus that Locke wrote the First Treatise in 1680, after buying a copy of Filmer's Patriarcha in January that year, for which see Milton's, John helpful article, “Dating Locke's Second Treatise,” History of Political Thought, 16/3 (1995), 356–63.Google Scholar Debates over the Second Treatise continue. David Wootton, in his edition of Locke, Political Writings (Harmondsworth, 1993), 54, dates it to 1681; Ashcraft, Richard, Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London, 1987), 286–97Google Scholar, to 1681–2; Marshall, John, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994), 230–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar, to 1682; and Mark Goldie, in his edition of Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London, 1993), xxi, to 1681–3. Milton, “Dating Locke's Second Treatise,” 389, sets his boundaries between the winter of 1680 and the summer of 1682. In dating “Of Property” to the summer of 1682, Armitage follows Richard Tuck's rejection of Milton, the latter of whom argues that the chapter was composed in the early 1670s and inserted into the Second Treatise at an indeterminate point in writing or revision. See Milton, “Dating Locke's Second Treatise,” 374; Tuck, Richard, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Cambridge, 1999), 168 n.Google Scholar; Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 109.

¹⁵ Armitage acknowledges, however, that although Locke's argument has “identifiably colonial origins,” it need not have “exclusively colonial applications,” for which see Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 111.

¹⁶ Ibid., 95, 112; see also Mehta, Uday Singh, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Eighteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999), 4.Google Scholar

¹⁷ This pared down definition of sacred history is particularly relevant for this case, and comes from Pocock, J. G. A., “Classical and Civil History: The Transformation of Humanism,” Cromohs, 1 (1996), 1–34Google Scholar, at 22.

¹⁸ For an erudite overview see Levitin, Dmitri, “From Sacred History to the History of Religion: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity in European Historiography from Reformation to ‘Enlightenment,’” Historical Journal, 55/4 (2012), 1117–60;CrossRefGoogle Scholar see also Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c.1640–1700 (Cambridge, 2015); more generally see Katherine Van Liere, Simon Ditchfield and Howard Louthan, eds., Sacred History: Uses of the Christian Past in the Renaissance World (Oxford, 2012).

¹⁹ Robertson, John, “Sociability in sacred historical perspective, 1650–1800,” in Kapossy, Bela and Sonenscher, Michael, eds., Markets, Morals, and Politics in Enlightenment Thought (Cambridge, MA, forthcoming)Google Scholar; Robertson, “Sacred History and Political Thought: Neapolitan Responses to the Problem of Sociability after Hobbes,” Historical Journal, 56/1 (2013), 1–29; and John Robertson and Sarah Mortimer, “Nature, Revelation, History: Intellectual Consequences of Religious Heterodoxy c.1600–1750,” in Robertson and Mortimer, eds., The Intellectual Consequences of Religious Heterodoxy, 1600–1750 (Leiden, 2012), 1–46.

²⁰ Brett, Changes of State, chap. 8, “Re-placing the State,” 195–224; for a typically pathbreaking article along similar lines see Pocock, J. G. A., “Time, History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes,” in Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (London, 1971), 148–201.Google Scholar

²¹ The question of human sociability had preoccupied natural lawyers since the later Middle Ages, but became increasingly central to thinking about politics in the wake of Thomas Hobbes. For an up-to-date overview of how it came to underpin many of the (apparently) diffuse strands of eighteenth-century political, philosophical, economic and historical thought see Piirimäe, Eva and Schmidt, Alexander, “Between Morality and Anthropology: Sociability in Enlightenment Thought,” History of European Ideas, 41/5 (2015), 571–88;CrossRefGoogle Scholar for attempts to plot the importance of the concept of sociability from the mid-seventeenth century onwards see Hont, Istvan, “The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the ‘Four-Stages’ Theory,” in Pagden, A., ed., Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1986), 253–76Google Scholar, later reprinted in Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 159–85; Moore, James and Silverthorne, Michael, “Natural Sociability and Natural Rights in the Moral Philosophy of Gershom Carmichael,” in Hope, V., ed., Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1984), 1–12;Google Scholar Hundert, E. J., The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society (Cambridge, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Force, Pierre, Self-Interest before Adam Smith (Cambridge, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Robertson, John, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–1760 (Cambridge, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² In around the middle of 1679, a collected octavo edition of Filmer's political works was published under the title The Freeholder's Grand Inquest (London, 1679). It contained the Observations concerning the Originall of Government, upon Mr Hobs Leviathan, Mr Milton against Salmasius, H. Grotius De Jure Belli, which had first been published in 1652. In January 1680, this collected edition was printed again. So too, for the first time, was Patriarcha, or, the natural power of Kings (London, 1680). Locke then bought the collected edition with a copy of Patriarcha bound up inside, and referred to both Patriarcha and the Observations repeatedly throughout the Two Treatises. All references to Patriarcha below are to the version contained in Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and other Writings, ed. Johann Sommerville (Cambridge, 1991), 1–64. All references to Observations below are also to the version contained in the same Sommerville collection, 184–234. For commentary on Locke's own edition of Filmer see Laslett, “Introduction,” TT, 57; for further bibliographical information on Filmer see Laslett's introduction and notes to his edition of Patriarcha and other Political Works of Robert Filmer (Oxford, 1949); see also Schochet, Gordon, Patriarchalism in Political Thought (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar; Daly, James, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sommerville, Johann, “From Suarez to Filmer: A Reappraisal,” Historical Journal, 25/3 (1982), 525–40;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 (London, 1986); Cuttica, Cesare, Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653) and the Patriotic Monarch: Patriarchalism in Seventeenth-Century Political Thought (Manchester, 2012).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Pocock, J. G. A., The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, 1957), 235Google Scholar.

²⁴ Grotius, Hugo, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Tuck, Richard, 3 vols. (Indianapolis, 2005)Google Scholar, 2: 2.2.2–3. Henceforth DJB, followed by volume, chapter, section, and paragraph number.

²⁵ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 109.

²⁶ Sargentich, “Locke and Ethical Theory,” 24; for “Ethica A” (1692) see Locke, Political Essays, 318–19.

²⁷ “Morality is the rule of man's actions for the attaining happiness . . . Happiness and misery consist in pleasure and pain.” Locke, “Morality,” 267–8.

²⁸ See Locke's journal entry for 16 July 1676, a fragment of which has been published under the editorial title “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions” in Locke, Political Essays, 237–45, at 241.

²⁹ Kelly, Patrick, “‘All Things Richly to Enjoy’: Economics and Politics in Locke's Two Treatises of Government,” Political Studies, 36/2 (1988), 273–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 281.

³⁰ Locke, “Morality,” 268; this is the extent of the passage taken by Tully and Armitage to comprise Locke's early account of property.

³¹ Ibid., 268.

³² Ibid., 268–9.

³³ Ibid., 269.

³⁴ Ibid., 269.

³⁵ The argument of Thomas Hobbes. See Hobbes, Thomas, On the Citizen [1642], ed. Tuck, Richard (Cambridge, 1998)Google Scholar; and Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1991).

³⁶ Nicole, Pierre, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais of Pierre Nicole, ed. Yolton, J. S. (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar; on Locke's engagement with Nicole see Kelly, Duncan, “The Propriety of Liberty and the Quality of Responsible Agency,” in Miqueu, Christophe and Chamie, Mason, eds., Locke's Political Liberty: Readings and Misreadings (Oxford, 2009), 97–127Google Scholar, at 99–110, later reprinted in Kelly, The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgment in Modern Political Thought (Princeton, 2011), 20–58, at 24–40. For further commentary see von Leyden, Wolfgang, “Locke and Nicole,” Sophia, 16/1 (1948), 41–54Google Scholar; Marshall, Religion, Resistance, and Responsibility, 131–7, 178–86; Harris, Ian, The Mind of John Locke (Cambridge, 1994), 282–4Google Scholar, 287–8.

³⁷ See Locke's journal entry for 30 September 1676, printed in Lough, John, Locke's Travels in France, 1675–79 (Cambridge, 1953), 111Google Scholar.

³⁸ See Locke's journal entry for 15 August 1676, published by Wolfgang von Leyden in his edition of Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature (Oxford, 1954; repr. 2002), 252–54.

³⁹ See Yolton's editorial introduction to Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 11–12; see also von Leyden, Essays on the Law of Nature, 252–4.

⁴⁰ Bod. MS Locke c. 28, fol. 42; the note was transcribed and published in von Leyden, Essays on the Law of Nature, 254–5; it is also reproduced by Yolton in Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 1.

⁴¹ Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 1.

⁴² Nevertheless, I will indicate below if Locke deviates markedly from Nicole's sense.

⁴³ The former approach to natural law cannot be characterized more capaciously as Catholic (rather than specifically Jansenist) as Nicole pitted himself against the Jesuitical strain of natural law practised by Francisco Suárez and others. On the other (Protestant) side, Recknagel's recent book has underlined the difficulties encountered when trying to characterize a particular branch of natural law as Protestant: Grotius, he argues, lifted important elements of his thought wholesale from Suárez. See Recknagel, Dominik, Einheit des Denkens trotz konfessioneller Spaltung: Parallelen zwischen den Rechtslehren von Francisco Suárez und Hugo Grotius (Frankfurt am Main, 2010)Google Scholar; for commentary on the historical development of confessional divides in natural-jurisprudential enquiry see Brett, Changes of State, 66, 71 and passim.

⁴⁴ James, E. D., Pierre Nicole: Jansenist and Humanist (The Hague, 1972), 118CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ Pierre Nicole, “Discourse of the Weaknesse of Man,” trans. John Locke, in Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 93; cf. Nicole, “Traité de la faiblesse de l'homme,” published in parallel to Locke's translation in Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 92, which renders Fallen man rather “comme un vaisseau sans voile [sail] & sans Pilote.” The edition used by Yolton is Nicole, Essais de Morale, Contenus en divers Traittez sur plusiers devoirs importans, vol. 1 (Paris, 1672); voile is also translated as “sail” in Nicole, Moral Essays, Contain'd in Several Treatises on Many Important Duties, trans. anon., vol. 1 (London, 1677), 43.

⁴⁶ Nicole, “Discourse,” 65.

⁴⁷ James, Pierre Nicole, 118.

⁴⁸ Nicole, “Treatise concerning the way of preserving peace with men,” trans. John Locke, in Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 191; Locke here renders Nicole's société as plural. Nicole, “Traité des moyens de conserver la paix,” in Nicole, John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais, 190; the contemporary translation is more accurate: “Men are link'd together by an infinite number of wants, obliging them out of necessity to live in Society.” Nicole, Moral Essays, 238–9.

⁴⁹ Nicole, “Treatise,” 191.

⁵⁰ Grounding social interaction in material needs was not a move original to Nicole: in Aristotle, households were bound to one another by the principle of mutual need (chreia or indigentia). The society this formed (koinonia), however, was non-political. See Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker, rev. and ed. R. F. Stalley (Oxford, 1995), 1252b17; for commentary see Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley, 1993)Google Scholar; Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, 99 (1979), 57–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵¹ Nicole, “Treatise,” 191.

⁵² Ibid., 191; Locke here renders témoignages as “marks,” rather than “tokens,” or—another possibility—“testimonies.” Nicole, “Traité des moyens de conserver la paix,” 190.

⁵³ Nicole, “Treatise,” 191.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 191.

⁵⁵ Nicole, “Traité des moyens de conserver la paix,” 192; Nicole, “Treatise,” 193.

⁵⁶ Nicole, “Treatise,” 247; “civilitys” is a rendering of les civilités. Nicole, “Traité des moyens de conserver la paix,” 246; the contemporary translation also renders les civilités as “civilities.” Nicole, Moral Essays, 285.

⁵⁷ Nicole, “Treatise,” 247; “equall, & punctuall returns” is a rendering of “une égalité réciproque de devoirs.” Nicole, “Traité des moyens de conserver la paix,” 246. In neglecting to translate devoirs as “duties,” Locke was followed by Nicole's contemporary translator: civility “is a kind of commerce and traffick,” he wrote, “where self-love sits as Judge, and this Judge obliges us to a reciprocal equality of returns.” See Nicole, Moral Essays, 285; for commentary on Nicole's theory of sociability see Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 47–50; Wootton, David, “Introduction,” in Wootton, ed., Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England (London, 1986), 21–91, at 74–5;Google Scholar Hollis, Martin, “Economic Man and Original Sin,” Political Studies, 29/2 (1981), 167–80;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Schneewind, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, 1998), 275–9;Google Scholar Force, Self-Interest, 71.

⁵⁸ Locke, “Morality,” 269.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 268; on the relation between civility and the civitas in Nicole see Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 48.

⁶⁰ Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, 68; on Locke's engagement with Filmer more generally see Waldron, Jeremy, God, Locke, and Equality (Cambridge, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zuckert, Michael, Launching Liberalism: on Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence, KS, 2002), 129–47.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Filmer, Patriarcha, 14.

⁶² Filmer, Observations, 218.

⁶³ Ibid., 218.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 218.

⁶⁵ In making this claim, Vitoria and De Soto drew in turn on the distinction between “permissive” and “prescriptive” (or “preceptive”) natural law, which had commonly been used to think about property since at least Aquinas. Going further back, it had roots in the distinction made by the twelfth-century Italian canon lawyer Rufinus between “command” and “demonstration.” For discussion of these (and other) distinctions in relation to thinking about property in Roman, canon, and natural law see Tierney, Brian, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625 (Atlanta, 1997), 131–70Google Scholar, 138–45; Tierney, “Kant on Property: The Problem of Permissive Law,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 62/2 (2001), 301–12; Tierney, “Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 62/3 (2001), 381–99; Tierney, Liberty and Law: The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100–1800 (Washington, DC, 2014); see also Anthony Parel, “Aquinas’ Theory of Property,” in Anthony Parel and Thomas Flanagan, eds., Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present (Waterloo, 1979), 89–115.

⁶⁶ On Vitoria and de Soto's formulation of the argument see Brett, Changes of State, 197.

⁶⁷ Filmer, Observations, 210–11; in the section of Observations dedicated to Grotius, the jus gentium was the object of Filmer's first, and most extended, attack. See ibid., 208–17.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 234.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Filmer's tract was published—about forty years after it was composed—to bolster the Tory case in the Exclusion Crisis. Locke and his friend James Tyrrell (both of whom were Whigs) immediately set about refuting it—the latter producing the full-length rebuttal Patriarcha non monarcha: The patriarch unmonarch'd: being observations on a late treatise and divers other miscellanies, published under the name of Sir Robert Filmer Baronet. In which the falseness of those opinions that would make monarchy jure divino are laid open: and the true principles of government and property (especially in our kingdom) asserted by a lover of truth and of his country. (London, 1681); for commentary on why Locke (and Tyrrell) thought it important to address Filmer see Peter Laslett's introduction to TT, 59, 61, 67, 68–71.

⁷² For biography see Döring, Detlef, Samuel Pufendorf in der Welt des 17. Jahrhunderts: Untersuchungen zur Biographie Pufendorfs und zu seinem Wirken als Politiker und Theologe (Frankfurt am Main, 2012)Google Scholar; Palladini, Fiametta and Hartung, Gerald, eds., Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung: Werk und Einfluss eines deutschen Bürgers der Gelehrtenrepublik nach 300 Jahren (1694–1994) (Berlin, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁷³ See Locke's journal entry for 3 July 1678, printed in Lough, Locke's Travels in France, 203; see also Lough, “Locke's Reading during His Stay in France (1675–79),” The Library, 5/8 (1953), 229–58, at 250.

⁷⁴ Journal entry for 9 June 1680, Bod. MS Locke f. 4, fols. 114–15; on 26 May 1681 Locke also bought a late edition of Pufendorf's Dissertationes academicæ selectiores (Uppsala, 1677), along with his Elementorum jurisprudentiæ universalis, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1672). Bod. MS Locke f. 5, fol. 62.

⁷⁵ DJB 2: 2.2.1.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2: 2.2.2.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 2: 2.2.3.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 2: 2.2.5.

⁸¹ Pufendorf, Samuel, The Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennet, 5th edn (London, 1749)Google Scholar, IV.4.2. Henceforth DJN, followed by book, chapter, and section number. Here and henceforth (unless otherwise stated) original emphasis has been preserved.

⁸² Ibid., IV.4.5; for discussion of Pufendorf's “negative” community, see Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff, Michael, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations,” in Hont and Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1–45, at 32–4, later reprinted in Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 389–443, at 426–8. Henceforth all references are to the version of the essay in Jealousy of Trade.

⁸³ Pufendorf, Samuel, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. Tully, James (Cambridge, 1991)Google Scholar, I.12.2. Henceforth DOH, followed by book, chapter, and section number.

⁸⁴ DJN IV.4.4.

⁸⁵ DOH I.12.2.

⁸⁶ Ibid.; for an expanded version of this story, see DJN IV.4.5–6.

⁸⁷ DJN IV.4.6.

⁸⁸ On the vexed issue of Pufendorf's attempted synthesis of the projects of Hobbes and Grotius see Hochstrasser, T. J., Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2000), 40–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 79–106; Hont, “The Language of Sociability,” in Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 163–84; Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice,” 424–31; Palladini, Fiametta, “Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The Doctrine of Socialitas,” History of European Ideas, 34/1 (2008), 26–60;CrossRefGoogle Scholar though it is beyond the scope of this article to intervene, there is a sharply distinguished debate on Grotius's theory of sociability. Tuck has long argued that it is thin enough to be labelled Epicurean, for which see Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651 (Cambridge, 1993), 190–201; and Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 78–109, 89. Brooke has recently contested this reading, arguing that Grotius's concept of sociability is thicker, and closer to that of the Stoics, for which see Brooke, Christopher, “Grotius, Stoicism and Oikeiosis,” Grotiana, 29/1 (2008), 25–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and recently reprinted as part of Brooke, Philosophical Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton, 2012), 37–59; Brett leans toward the Stoic reading, for which see Changes of State, 70–71, 199.

⁸⁹ On this point, see Hont, “The Language of Sociability,” 173; Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 98; Tully, Discourse on Property, 98.

⁹⁰ Hont, “The Language of Sociability,” 178–80; Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, 98–103.

⁹¹ On the development of Hobbes's distinctive view of the temporality of human agents see Edwards, Michael, Time and the Science of the Soul in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden, 2013), 11–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 163–206, 182; see also Pocock, “Time, History and Eschatology,” 148–201; more generally see Porro, Pasquale, ed., The Medieval Concept of Time: The Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden, 2001)Google Scholar.

⁹² On the social problems caused by the temporality of human agency in Hobbes’ state of nature see Edwards, Time and the Science of the Soul, 204.

⁹³ TT I.16. The importance of the Old Testament to Locke's thought has only recently begun to emerge. For a preliminary investigation see Oz-Salzberger, Fania, “The Political Thought of John Locke and the Significance of Political Hebraism,” Hebraic Political Studies, 1/5 (2006), 568–92;Google Scholar more recently, two articles in the same vein have narrowed their focus to Locke's use of the Book of Judges, for which see Rehfeld, Andrew, “Jephthah, the Hebrew Bible, and John Locke's ‘Second Treatise of Government’,” Hebraic Political Studies, 3/1 (2008), 60–93;Google Scholar Moyn, Samuel, “Appealing to Heaven: Jephthah, John Locke, and Just War,” Hebraic Political Studies, 4/3 (2009), 286–303Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ TT I.24.

⁹⁵ Ibid., I.40.

⁹⁶ Ibid., I.24.

⁹⁷ Ibid., I.24–7.

⁹⁸ Ibid., I.39.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Filmer, Observations, 217–18.

¹⁰² TT I.39.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. By denying that the world was given exclusively to Adam and that the Fall could of itself reveal the conditions of God's grant of the world to man, Locke implied that Adam could not be held to represent mankind. This is consonant with the scepticism he later ladled onto the doctrine of original sin. The Fall, he wrote in 1695, had made men mortal; but God could not be supposed, “as a Punishment of one sin wherewith he is displeased, to [have] put man under the necessity of sinning continually.” Though “all die in Adam,” he concluded, “none are truly punished but for their own deeds.” John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. John Higgins-Biddle (Oxford, 1999), 8, 10. This claim left Locke unable to render Christ's death as a ransom paid to God as a satisfaction of sin. Having thereby failed to affirm the full divinity of Christ, he left himself open to the charge of Socinianism. On Locke's later view of the Fall see Stanton, Tim, “Locke and the Politics and Theology of Toleration,” Political Studies, 54/1 (2006), 84–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 97–8.

¹⁰⁷ TT I.40–43. They have been taken us such, most significantly, by Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 214–30. There is a well-worn debate over whether Locke's original community should be designated “positive” or “negative.” For the former, and in addition to Harris, see Tully, A Discourse on Property, 125–30; Arneil, Barbara, John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford, 1996), 135;CrossRefGoogle Scholar for the latter see Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, 67; Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice,” 432.

¹⁰⁸ TT I.41. This quotation is the central item of Harris's reading of Locke on original community. Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 215.

¹⁰⁹ TT I.42.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.; see also I.23, II.26, 32, 34, 35; for commentary on these passages see Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 214–15; Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 160, 169.

¹¹¹ For Harris, The Mind of John Locke, 215, the presence of the directive in both Genesis 1:28 and 9:2 shows that, for Locke, God gave “people a right to the means of self-preservation,” and by doing so, had “given the earth to all mankind.”

¹¹² TT I.43.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ DJB 2: 2.2.3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 2: 2.2.4.

¹¹⁷ DJN IV.4.9.

¹¹⁸ Brett, Changes of State, 199; cf. James Tully, whose discussion of the passage neglects to mention either distance or space. See Tully, Discourse on Property, 81.

¹¹⁹ Brett, Changes of State, 199.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 199–200.

¹²¹ Ibid., 200.

¹²² TT I.37.

¹²³ Ibid., II.4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., II.6.

¹²⁵ TT II.31; for Pufendorf's rejection of natural abundance, see DJN IV.4.6.

¹²⁶ TT II.27.

¹²⁷ Ibid., II.31; on the spoliation proviso, see Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice,” 432.

¹²⁸ DJB 2: 2.2.2.

¹²⁹ DOH I.12.2; see also DOH II.5.2.

¹³⁰ TT II.32.

¹³¹ Ibid., II.33.

¹³² Ibid., II.34.

¹³³ Ibid., II.36; compare “straitned” here with the “straightening” of property at TT I.37.

¹³⁴ Ibid., II.38.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., II.36.

¹³⁸ Ibid., II.51.

¹³⁹ Ibid., II.48; for a tight depiction of Locke's analysis of money see Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice,” 432–3; for a looser one see Tully, Discourse, 144–50; see also, exhaustively, Kelly, Patrick, ed., John Locke on Money, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁰ For Locke's discussion of juridical equality see TT II.54.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., II.50.

¹⁴² Ibid., II.45.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Pitts, Jennifer, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005), 4;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mantena, Karuna, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, 2010), 2Google Scholar; Kelly, Duncan, ed., Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought, Proceedings of the British Academy, 155 (Oxford, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bell, Duncan, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁴⁶ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” in Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought, 90–114.

¹⁴⁷ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina.”

¹⁴⁸ Grafton, Anthony, What Was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2007)Google Scholar; the innovations of Göttingen and Edinburgh were as yet some way off. See Reill, Peter, German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley, 1975)Google Scholar; Pocock, J. G. A., Barbarism and Religion, vol. 2, Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.