Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ethics as a Beneficial Trojan Horse in a Technological Society

  • Published:
Science and Engineering Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This article explores the transformation of ethics in a globalizing technological society. After describing some basic features of this society, particularly the primacy it gives to a special type of technical rationality, three specific influences on traditional ethics are examined: (1) a change concerning the notion of value, (2) the decreasing relevance of the concept of axiological hierarchy, and (3) the new internal architecture of ethics as a net of values. These three characteristics suggest a new pragmatic understanding of ethics. From a pragmatic perspective, the process of introducing ethical values into contemporary society can be regarded as a beneficial Trojan horse, a metaphor that will be developed further.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. We refer to technological determinism because it is always an obstacle for the development of social ethics: if a strong determinism exists, ethics would then be very difficult to be sustained. Therefore, it is necessary to criticize technological determinism in order to defend human ethical capacity.

  2. References on this issue are innumerable. As key books: Beck (1999), Altvater and Mahnkopf (1997), Castells (1996–1998).

  3. The impact of technologies on society has been formerly analyzed by distinguished scholars from different points of view. For example Winner (1986), argued that technologies constitute “forms of life”, and Heilbroner (1967) connected technological development with historical change in society.

  4. To this respect, we point out the many different forms of religious rationality in our world. Undoubtedly it possesses a decisive influence on daily life. On this issue, see Mitcham and Richardson (1999).

  5. From an elementary particle accelerator to the so called techniques for behaviour modification, also including an immense range of “intermediate” technological products, for example computer technology, cybernetic instruments, etc.

  6. Galilei pointed out that Science “could not do any other thing but to increase” (Galilei 1929, VII, 62).

  7. Either at the level of social welfare or at the level of personal privacy. See for example: Gergen (1991), López Cerezo and Luján (2000), Bustamante (1993), Turkle (1995).

  8. For recent efforts to analyze the connection between ethics and happiness, see Almeder (2000), Annas (1993), McCabe (2005), Queraltó (2004), Sunner (1996).

  9. For Dewey’s philosophical works, see Dewey (1967–1991, 1998).

  10. In this line of reasoning, many works on Dewey have been published in recent years. See Boisvert (1997); Seigfried (1996), Hickman (1990, 2007), Hickman (1998), Sleeper and Burke (2001), Welchman (1997).

  11. In fact, there are “new” operating values in our society, such as environmental values, ecological values, feminist values, etc. Undoubtedly, it requires a balanced integration of them for human decisions, which are now more difficult to accomplish than in other historical periods because of the increase of social values.

  12. This view has been commonly used to criticize ethical views. An attack on religious ethics from “scientific” ethics has been that religious ethics did not take into account the results of scientific knowledge, which was considered the only “reliable” knowledge. Without scientific references, according to scientism, the human condition was “ignored”; consequently religious moral rules became unattainable (that is to say, perhaps the worst word to be applied to ethical mandate).

  13. Of course this does not mean we reject these reasons, either philosophical, religious, or scientific. On the contrary, we largely appreciate them in their respective fields. What we only want to remark now is that their way of justifying moral rule does not correspond to pragmatic ethics here described.

References

  • Almeder, R. (2000). Human happiness and morality. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Altvater, E., & Mahnkopf, B. (1997). Grenzen der globalisierung. Münster: Westfäliches Dampfboot.

    Google Scholar 

  • Annas, J. (1993). The morality of happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, U. (1999). What is globalization?. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boisvert, R. (1997). John Dewey: Rethinking our time. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bustamante J. (1993). Sociedad informatizada, ¿sociedad deshumanizada? Madrid: Gaia.

  • Castells, M. (1996–1998). The information age. Vol. I, The rise of the network society. Vol. II, The power of identity. Vol. III, End of millenium. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

  • Dewey, J. (1929, 1st ed.). The quest for certainty. New York: Minton & Balch.

  • Dewey, J. (1967–1991). The collected works of John Dewey, 1882–1953. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), Early works: 1882–1898; Middle works: 1899–1924; Later works, 1925–1953. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

  • Dewey, J. (1998). In L. Hickman & Th. M. Alexander (Eds.), The essential Dewey (2 Vols). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

  • Echeverría, J. (2003). La revolución tecnocientífica. Madrid: FCE.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galilei, G. (1929–1939). Opere, 20 Vols. Ed. nazionale a cura di A. Favaro, A. Garbasso, G. Abetti; Firenze: Barbera. Vol. VII.

  • Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self. Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heilbroner, R. L. (1967). Do machines make history? In Technology and culture, 8. (pp. 333–345).

  • Hickman, L. (1990). John Dewey’s pragmatic technology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickman, L. (Ed.). (1998). Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a postmoderm generation. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickman, L. (2001). Philosophical tools for technological culture: Putting pragmatism to work. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hickman, L. (2007). Pragmatism as post-modernism: Lessons from Dewey. New York: Fordham University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jonas, H. (1984). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • López Cerezo, J. A., & Luján, J. L. (2000). Ciencia y política del riesgo. Alianza: Madrid.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCabe, H. (2005). The good life. Ethics and the pursuit of happiness. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitcham, C., & Richardson, M. Eds. (1999). Science, technology and the spiritual quest. In: Technology in society journal [Special Issue], 21(4).

  • Mitcham, C., & Frodeman, R. Eds. (2004). Toward a philosophy of science policy: approaches and issues. In Philosophy today, 48(5), Supplement.

  • Mitcham, C., & Cutcliffe, H. (Eds.). (2001). Visions of STS. Counterpoints in science, technology and society studies. Albany, NY: The SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (1999). Cómo introducir vectores éticos eficaces en el sistema científico-tecnológico. Arbor, 162(638), 221–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (2002). Ética y sociedad tecnológica: Pirámide y retícula. Argumentos de Razón Técnica, 5, 39–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (2003). Ética, tecnología y valores en la sociedad global: El Caballo de Troya al revés. Madrid: Tecnos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (2004). Ética de la felicidad. Madrid-Sevilla: Grupo Nacional Editores (GNE).

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (2008a). La estrategia de ulises o Ética para una sociedad tecnológica. Madrid-Sevilla: CICTES/Doss Ed.

    Google Scholar 

  • Queraltó, R. (2008b). Science and technoscience: Values and their measurement. In E. Agazzi (Ed.), Science et Éthique: Contexte Axiologique de la science. Berlin-Bern: P. Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seigfried, C. H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sleeper, R. W., & Burke, T. (2001). The necessity of pragmatism: John Dewey’s conception of philosophy. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sunner, L. W. (1996). Welfare, happiness and ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turkle, S. H. (1995). Life on the screen: Identity in the age of internet. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Welchman, J. (1997). Dewey’s ethical thought. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winner, L. (1986). The whale and the reactor: A search for limits in an age of high technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winner, L. (2001). Where technological determinism went. In C. Mitcham & S. H. Cutcliffe (pp. 11–17).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sevilla, Alcalde Isacio Contreras 6, 2°C, 41003, Sevilla, Spain

    Ramón Queraltó

Authors
  1. Ramón Queraltó
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ramón Queraltó.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Queraltó, R. Ethics as a Beneficial Trojan Horse in a Technological Society. Sci Eng Ethics 19, 13–26 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-011-9287-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-011-9287-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation