Abstract
A new Arrovian impossibility is obtained without invoking independence of irrelevant alternatives type assumptions. The new conditions leading to the impossibility are based on the concept of power of enforcement, and specify how this power can (see A3) or cannot be expanded (see A1, A2 and A4).
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Quesada, A. Power of Enforcement and Dictatorship. Theory and Decision 52, 381–387 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020269501495
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020269501495