Abstract
In this paper I attempt once more to solve the thorny issue of the interaction of semantic and pragmatic aspects in the interpretation of attitude reports.I will here approach the subject in a sort of (relatively) “naive” way. In particular, I will not go at all into the technical aspects of the proposals that will be put forward. I will be concerned mainly with reports that use sentences having as grammatical subjects of the subordinates either definite descriptions or other kinds of noun phrases, such as noun phrases with possessive pronouns, personal pronouns and demonstratives.
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Notes
This work is part of the research project PB87–0834-CO3–01 supported by the DGICYT.
As explained-although with a different terminology-by D. Man inVisionch. 1. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1982.
The distinction was first argued in connection with demonstratives by D. Kaplan inDemonstratives (unpublished, 1977).J. Perry argued it for personal pronouns in “Frege on Demonstratives,”Philosophical Review,86(1977), and “The Problem of the Essential Indexical,”Nous, 13 (1979).
Thus we are clearly taking from the outset a realist position on the semantics of attitudes reports.
“The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs,” Report No. CSLI-88–128. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
The hypothesis that semantic contents can have such unarticulated constituents has currently wide currency in the work of Perry and his co-workers. See, e.g., “Thought without Representation.”Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1986).
S. Kripke, “A Puzzle about Belief,” in A. Margalit (ed.)Meaning and Use(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 248–249.
“The Prince and the Phone Booth,” pp. 21–22.
The conceptual analysis that leads to maintain that mental states are “constitutively” semantic and what makes us explain action “semantically” must have a common source.
Let us assume, for the sake of the example, I am really a competent speaker of English.
Note however that this test is not used to define the two kinds of reports, but is only meant to supply some criteria for helping to decide to which kind does a particular report belong.
Emphasis in this classificatory viewpoint is due to Perry. See his “Language, Mind, and Information,” report no. CSLI-85–44, Stanford University, 1985.
See footnote 5.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Quesada, D. (1992). The Labyrinth of Attitude Reports. In: Ezquerro, J., Larrazabal, J.M. (eds) Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 52. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2610-6_8
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