Abstract
This paper discusses Jessica Flanigan’s book, Pharmaceutical Freedom. The paper advances two main claims. First, the paper argues that, despite what Flanigan claims, there is a coherent way to endorse the Doctrine of Informed Consent while resisting the view that there is a right to self-medicate. Second, the paper argues that Flanigan is committed to a more radical conclusion than she acknowledges in the book; namely, that under some conditions it is morally permissible for people to take medications from drug manufacturers or pharmacies without paying the full price for those medications. The paper concludes by suggesting that this thesis about permissible theft, when combined with some further premises regarding the morality of defensive force, implies some even more radical conclusions regarding the use of force to obtain these medications.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
“My thesis is that the same considerations that justify rights of informed consent justify rights of self-medication” (Flanigan 2017, p. 3).
I do not provide an argument for the right to bodily integrity here but, along with many others, I assume that this right is not without limits. For example, it does not exempt someone from the requirement to take reasonable precautions to ensure that his or her body does not pose an undue risk of harm to others. For a detailed discussion of the right to bodily integrity in various contexts, see Fabre (2006).
This paragraph makes several assumption about the nature of rights and the conditions under which rights can be waived or forfeited. These assumptions will not be shared by all readers, but a full defense of these assumptions is not possible here. But, I believe the assumptions that I make are consistent with the way Flanigan discusses rights in her book. The same is true concerning the presumption that at least some forms of taxation can be legitimate.
To be clear—this is not an argument that Flanigan advances.
I don’t necessarily endorse Permissible Theft since I wouldn’t endorse the first of the three claims as formulated above: I think more has to be shown before we can conclude it’s permissible to disobey unjust laws.
For a discussion of this issue as it pertains to contract law, see Rebecca Stone’s manuscript, Normative Uncertainty, Normative Powers, and Limits on Freedom of Contract (unpublished).
For further discussion of this distributive question, see Quong and Stone (2015).
References
Fabre, C. (2006). Whose body is it anyway?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fabre, C. (2012). Cosmopolitan war. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Flanigan, J. (2017). Pharmaceutical freedom: Why patients have a right to self-medicate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frowe, H. (2014). Defensive killing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McMahan, J. (2009). Killing in war. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quong, J., & Stone, R. (2015). Rules and rights. In D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (Eds.), Oxford studies in political philosophy (Vol. 1, pp. 222–249). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quong, J. (2020). The morality of defensive force. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schloedorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 NY 125 (1915).
Funding
Not applicable.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
Author declares no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Quong, J. On Flanigan’s Pharmaceutical Freedom. HEC Forum 34, 257–268 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-020-09419-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-020-09419-3