Value Relations Revisited
(2012) In Economics and Philosophy 28(2). p.133-164- Abstract
- In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we... (More)
- In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we can think of it as a difference of degree between 'monadic' attitudes of favouring. Each such monadic attitude has just one item as its object. Given this re-interpretation, permissible preferences can be modelled by the class of permissible assignments of degrees of favouring to items in the domain. From this construction, we can then recover the old modelling in terms of the class of permissible preference orderings, but the previous objections to that model no longer apply. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3139788
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Economics and Philosophy
- volume
- 28
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 133 - 164
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000308847600002
- scopus:84865730808
- ISSN
- 0266-2671
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0266267112000144
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- c4880844-59b4-49d1-abdf-0d236c76f115 (old id 3139788)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:13:20
- date last changed
- 2022-04-12 03:07:29
@article{c4880844-59b4-49d1-abdf-0d236c76f115,
abstract = {{In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we can think of it as a difference of degree between 'monadic' attitudes of favouring. Each such monadic attitude has just one item as its object. Given this re-interpretation, permissible preferences can be modelled by the class of permissible assignments of degrees of favouring to items in the domain. From this construction, we can then recover the old modelling in terms of the class of permissible preference orderings, but the previous objections to that model no longer apply.}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
issn = {{0266-2671}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{133--164}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Economics and Philosophy}},
title = {{Value Relations Revisited}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000144}},
doi = {{10.1017/S0266267112000144}},
volume = {{28}},
year = {{2012}},
}