SUNY Series in Ethical Theory: The question of objectivity

accept action actual agent-neutral agreement answer anthropocentric appear argue argument argument from queerness assertibility categorical imperative causal claim colour concerns constraint desires disagreement in attitude disposition distinction emotivism ethical evaluative exactly example existence experience explanatory G. E. Moore Gilbert Harman Harman human idea interpretation intrinsic nature J. L. Mackie John McDowell justification kind of value logical Mackie Mackie's meaning ment merely moral beliefs moral explanations moral facts moral judgements moral principles moral properties moral realism moral scepticism moral theory naturalistic non-cognitive non-cognitivist non-moral objective values objectivism Oxford perception perhaps person phenomenology philosophical plausible pleasure possess possible practical predicate prescriptive primary qualities projectivism proton question R. M. Hare rational relation relevant scientific secondary qualities secondary-quality seems sense simply Sisyphus sort subjective supervenient suppose things Thomas Nagel thought tion true truth University Press weaker conception wrong