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47 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:3 JULY 1997 the (extensive and quite useful) bibliography, where for example Sprigge is indexed after Steenbakkers. The above points are truly minor, and De Dijn's study is both majestic and important . His style is clear and captivating throughout, and he succeeds in giving the student an introduction to Spinoza through the iatter's own text, and the researcher an important survey of the extensive literature in other languages devoted to this important work. LEE C. RICE Marquette University Stephen Darwall. The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': x64o-x74o. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi + 352. Cloth, $59.95, Paper, $18.95. Stephen Darwall finds among the British Moralists a unique form of moral internalism , the thesis that a rnoraljudgment or moral obligation itself is necessarily motivating . The internal "ought" to which the title of Darwall's book refers is moral obligation seen as partly constitutedby the motivating state produced in a self-legislating agent who finds herself under such an obligation. Darwall's book is an attempt systematically to reveal this account, which he claims originated in the seventeenth century and describes the only form of internalism that illuminates the concept of normativity or obligation itself. Darwall outlines his taxonomy of internalisms in the first chapter. (i)Judgment internalism says that a necessary condition of the normative conviction "one ought to x" is that the judger have a motive to x; such an account is concerned with distinguishing the moral from the nonmoral, and is consistent with noncognitivist views. (2) Existence internalism is the view that it is necessary to the truth of the normative proposition "one ought to x," or to the existence of a normative fact, that the person to whom the "ought" applies have a motive to x. Darwall finds incipient in some of the British moralists an existence internalism, one in which normativity is "realized in" the motives of a deliberating agent. Situating the nine philosophers Darwall subsequently discusses within the mapped terrain requires concentrated effort. Their views are complicated, and Darwall takes no shortcuts. For instance, he takes heroic measures to make Locke's views, which variously deny internalism (with motivation supplied by divine sanction), and then imply internalism under two descriptions, coherent. This can prove challenging for even the tough-minded specialist and perhaps too daunting for the novice. In early modern philosophy, Darwall sees internalism developing within two traditions , divided by their respective characterizations of reason. The empiricistnaturalist internalists--Locke (perhaps), Hobbes, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume--attempt to account for normativity in natural terms and see reason's powers as only those needed for discovery of empirical facts; thus, reason is wholly theoretical. The autono- BOOK REVIEWS 47; mist internalists--Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Buder, and Locke, in certain contexts--see norrnativity as constituted by "conclusive motives raised through the exercise of autonomous practical reasoning" (16). Finally, however, only Shaftesbury and Butler have the informative view which explains normativity itself, since for Cudworth and Locke it is not necessary to obligation that the pertinent motive be regarded by the agent as authoritative, but only as the motive that would be strongest if the agent were fully rational. (Culverwell, whose role is to illuminate Locke's view by comparison, does not clearly fit in either category.) Stephen Darwall has produced a scholarly study, about which I can only raise general questions. First, so little qualifies as categorically externalist that one may wonder whether all the fine subcategories within (broad) internalism are really enlightening, and it is unclear how the empiricist naturalist line fits into the original internalist taxonomy. Further, the thesis of the empiricist naturalists--that all reason is theoretical--is typically thought compatible only with an instrumentalist theory of practical reasoning (that we reason about means to our ends, a factual matter, but the ends are determined by something more than reason--e.g., desire). Nonetheless, Darwall finds in Cumberland and Hutcheson a noninstrumentalist view, which he calls "the calm deliberative view." Darwall says of this position that it agrees that by itself reason dictates no ends, but holds that the psychological nature of human beings is "such that discovery of some...

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