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Two types of object representations in the brain, one nondescriptive process of reference fixing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2004

Athanassios Raftopoulos*
Affiliation:
Department of Educational Sciences, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1678, Cyprus

Abstract:

I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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