Journal of the History of Philosophy

418 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY accord objective existence to such an abstraction characterizes only the short-sighted" (p. 173). e) A proposition is true if the conditions which it prescribes correspond to the actual situation. In Yolton's words: ... it is not the assertion which corresponds with existence, but the conditions prescribed by the assertion. Every truth situation involves three factors: the truth claim, the confirming conditions, and the existential actualization of the confirmingconditions. [p. 183] Yolton expounds these viewpoints with vigor and with fertility in offering examples. The neatness of his arrangement of the things that there are, however, leaves something to be desired. For one thing, he pulls the rug out from under reified entities by admitting that for all practical purposes they "depend upon a concept system for their reality" (p. 170) and therefore lack ontological objectivity. But later he seems to regret (or forget) this concession , for he chastizes as unfair those who designate certain postulated entities (categories, forms, monads, prehensions, schemata, etc.) as "only theoretical constructs" or as having "only an explanatory status," and he insists that "what there is in the world need not, even by careful philosophical standards, be restricted to... what can be verified through scientific procedures" (pp. 174--175). Moreover, although (as noted above) Yolton sharply distinguishes between "existence" and "inexistence" in one part of the book, he also seems to merge them in another part where he defends a sense of "existence" which could embrace "inexistence." In the latter passage, he suggests that all the categories of things that there are "exist," but they "exist" in different ways: "It is wrong to think of the philosopher as supposing that gods, universals, forms, sense-data, or monads exist in the same way that coloured, extended tables and chairs exist" (p. 204). Thus, Yolton expertly defends and clarifies the legitimacy of making metaphysical (and not merely language-based) truth declarations about segments of reality, but he leaves unsettled the question of the most fruitful way of grouping and categorizing the multipicity of things and kinds of things that there are. WILLIAMGERBER University o] Maryland The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacint~ma.ni. By C. Goekoop. (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.; New York: Humanities Press; 1967.Pp. x ~ 162) The Tattvacintdmani is an important contribution to Western understanding of what is called the Neo-togic of India. Gaflge~a, the author of Tattvacintdma~i (twelfth century), is generally regarded as the founder of this school. The present work is a translation with commentary of his definitions and discussions of inference and of the major premise, the Sanskrit word for which is vydpti, often translated as "pervasion," which to my mind is misleading and confusing to Western students. For to say, "Wherever X is present, Y is present," does not mean that Y pervades X just as space pervades all physical objects or the Brahman pervades the world. Long ago when I was studying Neo-logic with Mah~mahop ~dhy~ya Sri Sankar Tarkaratna without any knowledge of Western logic, his explanations did not even suggest to me the word "pervasion." Another troublesome translation is that for upam(~na. Upamdna is explained differently by the Mim~msa and the Ny~ya. And even for the Ny~ya it is not any identification but that which is made through the cognition of similarity. Otherwise, even recognition will be identification. To give primacy to the sense in which the Sanskrit logicians themselves used a term is more important than taking its etymological and philological meanings, although they are helpful now and then. However, if "pervasion" is used as a technical term with the meaning fixed by definition and if no conclusions are drawn from the literal and associated usages of the term, this translation may perhaps be continued. But it will also continue to puzzle and mislead Western readers unacquainted with the Sanskrit originals. BOOK REVIEWS 419 It is perhaps necessary to warn against another possible misunderstanding. Indian Neologic can be formalized, but it is not formal logic in the sense that Indian logicians envisioned a "logic without existence" or without metaphysics. In spite of protestations of existentialists, one may symboloze existentialism in the...