Abstract
The paradox of new members occurs when the addition of one or more new members to a weighted voting body increases, rather than decreases, the voting power of some of the old members. Extending the computational work of Brams and Affuso (1976), the mean size of the paradox and the relative frequency of its occurrence are presented for small and moderate-size weighted voting bodies. Computational results are presented and conclusions are drawn for the two power indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf, three different decision rules, and voting bodies with or without dictator. Although the paradox cannot be dismissed as either contrived or improbable, its mean size in moderatesize voting bodies is sufficiently small to question its practical significance.
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Rapoport, A., Cohen, A. Expected frequency and mean size of the paradox of new members. Theor Decis 17, 29–45 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140054
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140054