Abstract
This paper offers a close reading of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra through the concepts of abhyāsa and vairāgya, “repetitive practice” and “dispassion,” drawing on Patañjali’s classical commentators and on Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s “Studies in Yoga Philosophy,” an (almost) forgotten chapter of his corpus. I open with a critical examination of Patañjali’s citta-vṛtti scheme, his attempt of “mapping” the contents of consciousness. Thereafter, I discuss the “procedure of yoga,” based on the mutual operation of abhyāsa and vairāgya for the sake of nirodha, cessation of the vṛttis, or “movements” of consciousness. A close analysis of Patañjali and his commentators indicates that both abhyāsa and vairāgya are depicted as consisting of a strong reflective dimension. This is to say that the radical meditative act of “emptying” the consciousness of its objective content is in fact a rational conclusion of the mind, as it reflects upon itself. This reflection is both sensitive to the “limitedness” of the objective world and “receptive” to the silent presence of the “unlimited” selfhood beyond, which Patañjali, following the Sāṃkhya tradition, refers to as puruṣa. It is implied here that the yogic act of disengagement from the worldly and objective (conveyed by the notions of pratyāhāra, vairāgya, and kaivalya) is as much an act of will (emphasized and “taken forward” by Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya), as it is an act of self-sacrifice. Finally, the analysis offered here reveals substantial “philosophical threads” in the Yogasūtra, a text which is usually considered as too “practical,” or “therapeutic,” or “spiritual,” to be “really” philosophical.
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Notes
YS 1.3: Hence (when mental activity ceases), the seer is established in his “real essence” (tadā draṣṭuḥ sva-rūpe 'vasthānam). [Unless stated otherwise, the translations from Sanskrit are mine].
Mahāvākya—By referring to Descartes’ famous statement as mahāvākya, “great sentence,” a phrase which “belongs” to Śaṅkara’s “tat tvam asi,” my intention is not just to argue that both sentences are culturally significant, each in its own context, but also that Descartes’ maxim, like Śaṅkara’s, has a transformative quality. Śaṅkara’s sentence, extracted from the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad is supposed to enable the listener to cut through the veil of avidyā and to transcend the “phenomenal I.” Descartes’ sentence has had enormous impact on Western formulations of self-identity, emphasizing the importance of, and encouraging the identification with the thinking faculty, with the “I think.” It is not about transcendence of one’s phenomenal existence as in Śaṅkara, but about the definition of one’s phenomenal existence primarily in terms of thinking, marginalizing every other aspect.
Descartes (1911) Third Meditation, p. 12
Aranya (2012) p. 28
Personal communication, September 2015
Bhattacharyya (2008) p. 263
It would be an interesting exercise to read closely the different examples given by Patañjali’s commentators to the language uses which belong to the category of vikalpa. The first example given by Vyāsa is “Caitanya (consciousness) is the nature of puruṣa” (caitanyaṃ puruṣasya svarūpamiti). For him, this sentence is a tautology. Thus tautology can be listed as the first instance of vikalpa, at least according to the Bhāṣya-kāra.
YS 1.16, 1.24, 3.36, 3.50, 3.56, 4.18, 4.34
YS 1.11: anubhūta-viṣaya-asaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ
As quoted in Larson (1993) p. 375
Larson (1993) p. 376
Vyāsa is the author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, or at least, this important commentary is ascribed to a scholar by this name, about whom, just like Patañjali, we know literally nothing. Most scholars believe that he was Patañjali’s contemporary or lived shortly after him. Philipp Maas, the praiseworthy compiler of a critical edition of the first chapter of what he refers to as Pātañjala Yogaśāstra, namely Patañjali’s Yogasūtra and Vyāsa's commentary together, argues that Patañjali and Vyāsa are two names of a single author, who assembled sūtras from different sources (Buddhist, Sāṃkhyan, bhakti sūtras on Īśvara etc.) and commented upon them. See Maas (2010).
sukham aham asvāpsam prasannaṃ me manaḥ prajñāṃ me viśāradīkaroti duḥkham aham asvāpsam styānaṃ me mano bhramaty anavasthitam gāḍhaṃ mūḍho 'ham asvāpsam gurūṇi me gātrāṇi klāntaṃ me cittam alasaṃ muṣitam iva tiṣṭhatīti (YSb 1.10). Text and translation are Rukmani's (ibid.)
Bhattacharyya (2008) p. 26
YS 1.12: The cessation of these (vṛttis) is accomplished through repetitive practice and dispassion (abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṃ tan-nirodhaḥ)
YS 1.13: tatra sthitau yatno'bhyāsaḥ
YS 1.14: sa tu dīrgha-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-āsevito dṛḍha-bhūmiḥ
YS 2.33: vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam
YS 2.34: vitarkā hiṃsā-ādayaḥ kṛta-kārita-anumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhya-adhimātrā duḥkha-ajñāna-ananta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam.
I found this question-answer session in Hebrew translation in the book Awareness and Deathlessness: Questions and Answers with Ramana Maharshi (1935–1939), Gal Publishers, Tel Aviv, 1994. I translate Maharshi’s words from Hebrew into English. Despite the “long distance” (Tamil to English, English to Hebrew, Hebrew back into English), I feel that Ramana’s point is not (totally) “lost in translation,” especially since he uses a simple (but profound) illustration to elucidate the notion of abhyāsa. It should be noted that the context of Ramana Maharshi's discussion is not necessarily Patañjali’s Yogasūtra. The notions of abhyāsa and vairāgya also occur in Bhagavadgītā 6.35.
Ramana Maharshi, Ibid.
Sāṃkhya-kārikā (SK) 19: tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddhaṃ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca (Therefore, since [puruṣa is] the opposite [of the unmanifest], it is established that puruṣa is a witness, possessed of isolation or freedom, indifferent, a spectator and inactive). Larson 1979, pp. 261–2. The translation (including the square brackets) is his.
I’m writing “to isolate puruṣa,” having in mind the term kaivalya (literally “isolation”), depicted in SK 19 as one of puruṣa's “inherent traits.”
SK 59: raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nṛtyāt, puruṣasya tathā'tmānaṃ prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ (As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the audience; so also prakṛti ceases after having manifested herself to puruṣa). Larson, ibid. p. 273; the translation is his.
I am not delving into the differences between the Upaniṣadic-Advaitic notion of the ātman and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga notion of puruṣa. Despite the obvious differences, such as the oneness of the ātman, as against the manyness of puruṣa (puruṣa-bahutva), both notions refer to a metaphysic essence or selfhood, transcending the phenomenal, worldly self.
Up-Sā 19.2: tataś ca yuktaḥ śama eva te manaḥ (Swami Jagadananda 2001, pp. 288–289)
Tapas is listed both as a component of kriyā-yoga in YS 2.1 and as one of the niyamas in YS 2.32 and YS 2.43; brahmacarya is listed as one of the yamas in YS 2.30 and YS 2.38; śraddhā is mentioned as one of the means of attaining asaṃprajñāta samādhi (“trans-cognitive” samādhi) in YS 1.20; regarding śraddhā, Vyāsa beautifully writes (in YSb 1.20) that it protects the yogin “like a good mother” (jananīva kalyāṇī).
Smṛti is initially memory. However in YS 1.6 Patañjali lists memory among the vṛttis or mental activities which the process of yoga aims at stopping. Vācaspatimiśra therefore suggests (Mishra 1998, p. 62) that in the present case, the term smṛti is synonymous with dhyāna, a preliminary state of meditation which paves the way to samādhi. I translate dhyāna (and smṛti in the sense of dhyāna) as “mindfulness.”
See YS 2.5: anitya-aśuci-duḥkha-anātmasu nitya-śuci-sukha-ātma-khyātir avidyā (avidyā is misidentification of the impermanent as permanent, the impure as pure, the painful as joyous, and non-selfhood as selfhood).
yama-niyamādi-yoga-sādhana-anuṣṭhānam-abhyāsa-iti (Rukmani 2001, p. 77)
YS 3.9: vyutthāna-nirodha-saṃskārayor abhibhava-prādur-bhāvau nirodha-kṣaṇa-citta-anvayo nirodha-pariṇāmaḥ
Pātañjalayogadarśana with the Rājamārtaṇda of Bhojarāja et al. (1930)
YS 1.15: dṛṣṭa-ānuśravika-viṣaya-vitṛṣṇasya vaśīkāra-saṃjñā vairāgyam
YS 1.16: tat-param puruṣa-khyāter-guṇa-vaitṛṣṇyam
See YS 1.19: bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām ([In the case of] “bodiless” and “merged into prakṛti” yogins, [samādhi] occurs from birth [hence the “path” depicted by Patañjali becomes redundant]).
KCB’s “Studies in Yoga Philosophy” (unpublished in his lifetime) is included in his collected essays Studies in Philosophy (1958, 2008) edited by his son Gopinath Bhattacharyya. It is the text of one of his last lecture series and is hardly referred to by those who write on KCB’s philosophical work. They usually focus on his earlier writings on Emmanuel Kant and Advaita Vedānta, as well as on his acclaimed essay “The Subject as Freedom.” The important place of “Studies in Yoga Philosophy” in KCB’s corpus is yet to be highlighted.
Bhattacharyya (2008) p. 303
KCB works with freedom in the realm of knowledge through Advaita-Vedānta and Sāṃkhya. He thinks of freedom in the emotive realm through Rasa aesthetics. And through Pātañjala-yoga and Kant’s philosophy, he conceptualizes freedom in the realm of action.
Tattvavaiśāradī 1.15 (Mishra 1998 p. 62)
Rukmani (2001) p. 79
See for example Vijñānabhikṣu (Rukmani 1981, p. 98), who quotes an unknown source, or paraphrases a general saying, according to which doṣa-darśanena vaitṛṣṇyam bhavati (it is the observation of a flaw, or a defect, which leads to thirstlessness).
Bhattacharyya (2008) p. 306
BG 6.35: asaṃśayaṃ mahābāho mano durnigrahaṃ calaṃ |abhyāsena tu kaunteya vairāgyeṇa ca gṛhyate || (see Śrīmadbhagavadgītā Śankara-bhāṣya, 1976)
Berlin (1969)
Mishra (1998), p. 52; the three guṇas or “forces”, which “activate” prakṛti, namely sattva, rajas and tamas, are referred to by Patañjali (in YS 2.18) as prakāśa (brightness), kriyā (action) and sthiti (inertia).
Bhattacharyya (2008) pp. 303–304
YS 2.54: sva-viṣaya-asaṃprayoge cittasya sva-rūpa-anukāra iva-indriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ
YS 2.55: tataḥ paramā vaśyatā-indriyāṇām
SK 62: tasmān na badhyate 'addhā na mucyate nā 'pi saṃsarati kaścit, saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ (Larson 1979, p. 274; the translation is his, the square brackets are mine).
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Raveh, D. Rethinking Pātañjala Yoga Through the Concepts of Abhyāsa and Vairāgya. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 32, 319–333 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0036-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0036-4