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Tarski and the Metalinguistic Liar

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Abstract

I offer an interpretation of a familiar, but poorly understood portion of Tarski’s work on truth – bringing to light a number of unnoticed aspects of Tarski’s work. A serious misreading of this part of Tarski to be found in Scott Soames’ Understanding Truth is treated in detail. Soames’reading vies with the textual evidence, and would make Tarski’s position inconsistent in an unsubtle way. I show that Soames does not finally have a coherent interpretation of Tarski. This is unfortunate, since Soames ultimately arrogates to himself a key position that he has denied to Tarski and which is rightfully Tarski’s own.

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Ray, G. Tarski and the Metalinguistic Liar. Philosophical Studies 115, 55–80 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024908230635

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024908230635

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