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Corporate governance predictors of adoption of anti-takeover amendments: An empirical analysis

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Abstract

This study of 481 corporations provides an assessment of the relationship between several corporate governance variables (board composition, type of board leadership, officer and director stock holdings, institutional stock holdings, number of majority owners, existence of severance agreements) and adoption of anti-takeover amendments. The results of analysis suggest that the two groups (adopters/non-adopters) differ significantly in regards to these variables.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Business Administration, University of Houston, 77204, Houston, TX, USA

    Paula L. Rechner, Chamu Sundaramurthy & Dan R. Dalton

  2. College of Business and Economics, Dept. of Management, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

    Paula L. Rechner, Chamu Sundaramurthy & Dan R. Dalton

  3. Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

    Paula L. Rechner, Chamu Sundaramurthy & Dan R. Dalton

Authors
  1. Paula L. Rechner
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  2. Chamu Sundaramurthy
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  3. Dan R. Dalton
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Additional information

Paula L. Rechner is an Assistant Professor at the University of Houston. She received her Ph.D., her research interests include corporate governance and executive succession/compensation. Her articles have appeared inAcademy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Executive, andOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, among others.

Chamu Sundaramurthy, an Assistant Professor of Management at the University of Kentucky, is interested in corporate governance. Her dissertation examines board governance within the context of antitakeover corporate charter amendments adopted between 1984–1988. Her other research interests include executive succession and corporate social responsibility.

Dan R. Dalton is the Dow Professor of Management and Director of Graduate Programs, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University. Formerly with General Telephone & Electronics (GT&E) for thirteen years, he received his Ph.D. from the University of California. Widely published in business and psychology, his articles have appeared in theAcademy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Business Ethics, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business Strategy, Behavioral Science, andHuman Relations, as well as many others.

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Rechner, P.L., Sundaramurthy, C. & Dalton, D.R. Corporate governance predictors of adoption of anti-takeover amendments: An empirical analysis. J Bus Ethics 12, 371–378 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00882027

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