Abstract
When we mention an expression, do we use it? It depends on how we mention the expression in question. We can mention an expression A by using another expression B which names it. In such a case we are not using A, but its name (“heterony-mous mention”). But we can also use A itself in “suppositio materialis”, that is, autonymously. That is what is ordinarily called “mention” as opposed to “use”. This traditional contrast between use and (autonymous) mention should not make us forget that in autonymous mention, the mentioned word itself is used, though deviantly.
My thanks to Brian Loar for helpful comments on this paper.
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Recanati, F. (2000). Opacity and the Attitudes. In: Orenstein, A., Kotatko, P. (eds) Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 210. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_20
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