

Finally, Kierkegaard's use of the term "aesthetic" has caused Kosch some unnecessary concern (142). It was wasted labor, for Kierkegaard expanded an ordinary adjective into a major concept for existential analysis. Post Kierkegaard, the word can never be the same, although the basic notion of feeling and experiential involvement will still be present. Kierkegaard considerably thickened the concept by expanding it to include a certain form of life that may depreciate reflection or even debauch it by showing how reflection can also be used as a tool for the control and destruction of other human beings through, for instance, a maniacal manipulation and seduction. What he does with the term is philologically responsible, and respect for the growth and history of concepts even finds it exciting.

Professor Kosch's well-ordered and detailed exposition is stimulating and provocative.

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John McDowell, *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars*.
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Among readers enthused by John McDowell's justifiably widely discussed *Mind and World* (1994) were those who combined interests in Kant and German idealism with an unwillingness to accept the idea of an unbridgeable gap separating these topics from contemporary analytic philosophy. Starting with Wilfrid Sellars's well-known critique of epistemologically *foundationalist* forms of empiricism (the "Myth of the Given"), McDowell had initially focused upon the *Kantian* dimension of Sellars's critique. For perceptual experience to be epistemologically relevant, it must be *conceptually* articulated because only something with conceptual content can stand in appropriately *rational* relations to empirical claims. But McDowell was equally concerned to avoid the familiar "coherentist" (and relativism-threatening) alternatives, a position identified there with Donald Davidson. McDowell thus lamented this "seesawing" between appeals to, and critiques of, regress-stopping "Givens" characterizing modern analytic epistemology. But while this story would have been familiar to analytic

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philosophers, many surely would have been puzzled by McDowell's suggestion as to its solution. If we want to "dismount the seesaw," we should *think through* Kant's idea of the "conceptual shaping" of experience all the way to its *Hegelian* conclusion.

In the fourteen essays making up the excellent collection under review, McDowell continues to work at the various interfaces set up in *Mind and World*—first, that between a post-Sellarsian approach to analytic philosophy and the reconstruction of Kant's transcendental idealism, and next, that concerning the vexed question of the relation of the respective "idealisms" of Kant and Hegel. The essays range roughly over a decade, starting (textually, and seemingly, chronologically) with McDowell's three "Woodbridge Lectures" delivered at Columbia University in 1997 and first published in *Journal of Philosophy* in 1998. These three essays are grouped under the section heading "Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality," and the headings of the other three sections—"Kantian Themes in Hegel and Sellars," "Reading Hegel," and "Sellarsian Themes"—convey something of the way these essays interrelate and develop McDowell's thought beyond *Mind and World*. Combined, they provide a context within which McDowell's subtle and complex approach to philosophy can itself "come into view." Given the period over which they were written, it is understandable that there are some changes and adjustments as McDowell responds to objections, tries out new tacks, and revises and develops interpretations of passages from the difficult writings of Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.

In *Mind and World*, Sellars's philosophy had really been represented by only a few central ideas from *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1997), first published in 1956—the critique of the "Myth of the Given," the approach to the content of perceptual states on the model of their linguistic expressions, and the pragmatic idea of assertions as the placing of declarative sentences within the public and normatively structured "space of reasons." Here, starting with the opening three essays, Sellars is given a much more substantive presence. McDowell regards the direction taken by Sellars in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1997) as not merely relevant to epistemology but more broadly as an attempt to solve the puzzle of the intentionality of mental states. And as McDowell makes explicit in the first of these essays, what he sees himself sharing with Sellars is the belief that "there is no better way for us to approach an understanding of intentionality than by working towards understanding Kant" (3). In these three essays, the focus is therefore primarily directed to Sellars's more explicitly Kantian text, *Science and Metaphysics* (2002), from 1967.

While McDowell's way into understanding Kant is *via* Sellars's approach, he is nevertheless critical of the details of Sellars's own interpretation. (In the context of McDowell's reading of *Hegel* in section 3, there is a hint of the same attitude toward Robert Pippin, who has pursued a "post-Kantian" interpretation of Hegel. That is, McDowell seems simultaneously inspired by Pippin's approach and critical of Pippin himself for being insufficiently true to his

own interpretation.) McDowell sees Sellars's interpretation of Kant as needlessly fighting against the pull of Hegel and seemingly feels that he can take Kant in the direction of Hegel *in a Sellarsian spirit* for a number of interconnected reasons. *Sellars himself* misunderstands the nature of the philosophical commitment awaiting at the Hegelian terminus (McDowell's Hegel, like Pippin's, is not the metaphysical bogeyman traditional to the analytic tradition). Sellars's own attempt to avoid the Hegelian path takes him ("Sellars of all people," 40) back into the grip of the "Myth of the Given." And, finally, the *scientistic* coloring of Sellars's Kant sits poorly with Kant's fundamental thought.

As in *Mind and World*, McDowell here insists that not only is perceptual content *conceptual* but that it is *entirely* so, raising the question (for example, in Hanna, 2005) of what has happened to Kant's "intuitions"—the *nonconceptual* representations that supposedly combine with concepts in perception. It is thus that we find throughout the essays (in section 2 especially) McDowell's attempts to find in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (its rewritten second edition, in particular) evidence against the textbook distinction between concepts and intuitions. Historically, McDowell finds the elements of this reading of Kant in Hegel, and, more recently, in Sellars, who interpreted intuitions as belonging to a subclass of concepts. But while for Sellars this testified to the *ambiguity* of Kant's notion of intuition—sometimes meaning a type of demonstrative concept, a "this such," and sometimes something nonconceptual and more like the empiricist's sensation or sensory impression—McDowell dismisses both the claimed ambiguity (an idea "foisted on Kant by Sellars," 24) and the *limited* conceptuality of the "this-such." In contrast, McDowell insists that intuition is "judgment-shaped" and not "a fragment of judgmental content" (35). Sellars had originally developed the intuition-as-sensation idea so as to conceive of the application of empirical concepts in perceptual judgments as somehow "guided" by something nonconceptual; but according to McDowell, this sins not only against Kant's text but also against Sellars's own critique of the Myth of the Given.

McDowell's criticism of Sellars here takes him into the territory of recent debates within the philosophy of perception that will be familiar to readers of *Mind and World*. For example, McDowell's insistence, contra Sellars, that perceptual content is propositional has given rise to the objection that he has an implausibly "quasi-linguistic" idea of perceptual experience (135). McDowell's various defenses of his idea, which unfold mainly through the essays in section 2, are ingenious; however, just as Kantians may worry over the fate of intuitions, Hegelians may wonder if this approach to perceptual content is the right way to understand Hegel. (Indeed, there are many aspects of McDowell's interpretations of Kant and Hegel that will provoke more conventional readers of these philosophers.) McDowell's defense of the propositional claim is pursued with such vigor that it comes as a surprise when, in the final essay, he seems, apparently on the urgings of Charles Travis, to give it up without much of a fight. One might wonder just where this leaves McDowell and wonder why

Sellars's "this such" alternative, although hinted at, does not explicitly come back into consideration.

Regardless of whether one agrees with his various claims and interpretations, it is a joy to follow McDowell's illuminating and thought-provoking journey through this philosophical terrain.

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Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection*.
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The core notion of Godfrey Smith's account is that of a "Darwinian population," which is "a population—a collection of particular things—that has the capacity to undergo evolution by natural selection" (6). A "Darwinian individual" is a member of such an evolving population. This sounds very broad, but the aim is a general characterization of the features that an ensemble of objects must have to be able to undergo selection-guided change. Indeed, Darwinian populations exist on different levels of organization. While some Darwinian populations are made up of organisms, others are collections of genes, cells, or organism groups.

In addition to a general construal of evolving things, Godfrey-Smith devotes substantial attention to marginal cases. There is not really an essence of Darwinian-population-hood. Rather, there are paradigmatic cases that clearly exhibit change by natural selection but also borderline instances. To capture this conceptually, Godfrey-Smith considers five quantitative properties with respect to which Darwinian populations can differ. The three most important ones are the heritability H (the degree of parent-offspring similarity), the continuity and smoothness of the fitness landscape C (to which extent a small change in an