5 Miller, Ronald B. “Violence, Force and Coercion,” in Violence, “Award Winning Essays in the Council for Philosophical Studies Competition.” Edited by Jerome A. Shaffer, David McKay Company, Inc.: New York, 1971, pp. 11-44, especially pp. 41-44. Miller attempts to show that Narveson’s objections against pacifism can be raised against “any moral principle that asserts that an action is wrong,” (p. 143). According to Miller, since it is true, not only in the case of pacifism, as Narveson argues, but in any case in which an act is declared wrong, that “it is always logically possible that in order to prevent any given wrongful act we may have to do that act itself” (p. 44), it follows that Narveson’s line of argument, when generalized, shows not that pacifism alone is self-contradictory, but that “any moral principle that asserts that an action is wrong is self-contradictory.” And this. Miller concludes, is “patently absurb.” (Ibid).
Miller’s argument will not stand careful examination. Narveson’s argument does not lead to the conclusion that “any moral principle that asserts that an action is wrong is self-contradictory.” When Miller’s interpretation of Narveson’s argument is applied to principles of prima facie duty, for example, these principles do not emerge as self-contradictory, despite the fact that it is “logically possible that in order to prevent any given (prima facie) wrongful act we may have to do that act itself.” Our prima facie duty not to lie, for example, may always be overridden, but the assertion expressing this duty is not self-contradictory simply because it is conceivable that in order to prevent future lies, we may have to tell one now. Miller, therefore, is rash to suppose that Narveson’s argument has the consequences he attributes to it.
In response to this, Miller might say that what he means by “any moral principle” is “any absolute moral principle. . .” —i.e., “any principle declaring of an identifiable action that it is always, without exception wrong.” But this, even if it is what Miller means, exposes his argument to two further objections. For now Miller’s claim that the belief that all such principles are self-contradictory is “patently absurb” is gratuitous and question-begging. What we want to know is if there are such principles that are not self-contradictory, especially since, as Miller concedes, “it is always logically possible that in order to prevent a given wrongful act that we may have to do that act itself.” The question is, “In such a case, ought we to do the wrongful act?” And what we want is some well thought out answer to this question, not a begging leave of it. My argument in the sequel, I think, goes some way toward satisfying this demand.
However, even if it is “patently absurd” to believe that all principles that assert that a given action is wrong are self-contradictory. Miller fails to show that Narveson is guilty of this particular absurdity. At the very most Narveson’s analysis can be generalized to apply, not to all moral principles of the type in question, but to those only according to which (a) a given action. A, is declared to be absolutely wrong, and (b) actions of type A are thought to be wrong because of the consequences of performing them—namely, because they lead to greater evil, and, in particular, to greater A-ing, in the future, than would result from not A-ing. Now, it is consistent with the belief that not all absolute moral prohibitions are self-contradictory, that all absolute moral prohibitions satisfying conditions (a) and (b) are. Accordingly, even if we were to concede the former belief to Miller, nothing whatever would follow concerning the “absurdity” of the latter one. And since it is this latter belief which Narveson’s argument against pacifism, when generalized, can be argued to imply, conceding Miller the former belief could go no way toward exposing the “absurdity” of Narveson’s analysis.
