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Natural Beauty, Fine Art and the Relation between Them

  • Aviv Reiter EMAIL logo and Ido Geiger EMAIL logo
From the journal Kant-Studien

Abstract:

We defend three principal claims concerning natural beauty, artistic beauty and the relation between them. 1) Aesthetic pleasure in nature is typically and paradigmatically occasioned by the spatial form of natural kinds. 2) Breaking with a long-standing tradition, Kant claims that the presentation of such beautiful natural forms is not the end of the representational visual arts. Most art presents aesthetically the idea of humanity in our person. This is Kant’s Copernican revolution in the philosophy of fine art. 3) Although the representation of nature is not a sufficient condition of beauty in the representational visual arts, it is nonetheless a necessary condition of it.

Appendix: Free and Adherent Beauty / Nature and Art

Kant’s Examples:

1 - For multiple examples of natural kinds, see: KU, AA 05: 207, 215, 216, 229, 233, 281, 285, 299, 347, 348 f.

2 - The existence of works of fine art that are free beauties constitutes an exception to the claim that in judging art “the perfection of the thing will also have to be taken into account” (“[wird] die Vollkommenheit des Dinges in Anschlag gebracht werden müssen”, KU, AA 05: 311.27-28). Such works do not present to us aesthetically ideas of reason.

For mention of the non-representational painting of landscapes and its affinity with pleasure gardens, see KU, AA 05: 323 note. For mention of beautiful views related to the former, see KU, AA 05: 243. For mention of the latter, see also KU, AA 05: 242.

2, 3 - Kant’s conception of music deserves detailed discussion of its own. Even if we limit ourselves to the third Critique, it is difficult to square everything that he says. The following points are of importance for our concerns:

  • Music as Free Beauty: Certain works of music are examples of free beauty, specifically musical fantasies and music without text more generally (KU, AA 05: 229). The classification of musical compositions as free beauties implies that they are not enjoyed as examples of a particular type of musical composition; this seems to describe a naïve or uneducated response to music. Kant does not say in this passage whether certain such works might be thought of as works of fine art, nor does he reveal what he thinks of music accompanied by text (cf. Anth, AA 07: 247).

  • The Possibility of Viewing Music as a Fine Art: Kant seems undecided whether our pleasure in musical compositions - apparently without text - is merely an agreeable play of sensations or whether certain works might be considered fine art. Taking into account what can be said of the formal-mathematical structure of compositions gives us reason to think that what we enjoy is reflection upon the spatio-temporal form of the play of sensations (KU, AA 05: 325). It is on the strength of this last argument that we make room for music as beautiful and free in the table.

  • However, if such a work of music is to be viewed as fine art, it nevertheless does not present to us aesthetically ideas of reason (see 2). This would be another exception to the crucial claim that in judging the beauty of works of art “the perfection of the thing will also have to be taken into account” (“[wird] die Vollkommenheit des Dinges in Anschlag gebracht werden müssen”, KU, AA 05: 311). In other words, as fine art, a musical composition would be both beautiful and free. Furthermore, because music is a play of sensations, it would hold the lowest place among the beautiful arts (KU, AA 05: 329).

  • Music as a Mechanical Art: Kant clearly thinks that at least some works of music are merely agreeable art, probably the result of mechanical, rule-governed production. Table music (Tafelmusik) is an obvious example (KU, AA 05: 305; cf. Anth, AA 07: 281). Viewed as merely agreeable, the form of the play of sensations in music evokes not thought but a natural corporeal feeling of unity (see: KU, AA 05: 328 f., 332). He nevertheless says that agreeable music evokes aesthetic ideas (KU, AA 05: 332).

3 - Kant distinguishes between the free beauty of ornaments (Zierathe, Parerga) and merely charming decoration (Schmuck) (KU, AA 05: 226). For examples of the former, see: KU, AA 05: 207, 229, 230, 233. For mention of the free beauty of tasteful utensils, see KU, AA 05: 242.

2, 3, 5, 6 - We assume that Kant is implying that horticulture and architecture exist as mechanical arts too when he speaks of their being considered fine arts (KU, AA 05: 225). Examples of architecture as a mechanical art include, perhaps, the arsenal and garden-house (KU, AA 05: 230), and in some cases a residence (KU, AA 05: 233; see: 5, 6 below). Horticulture as a mechanical art - say, in French gardens - might be implied by his mention of the English taste in gardens as an example of free beauty (KU, AA 05: 242).

5,6 - We suggest that in a passage discussing architecture in § 51, Kant’s first examples might be works of architecture that are beautiful art, while his subsequent examples might be architectural works that can be either works of beautiful art or works of mechanical art. The progression is from the expression of rational ideas in a functional work of architecture, where the ideas do not fully determine the form, to works of architecture the beautiful form of which is determined by the human ends the works serve. Thus, examples of architecture as fine art include “temples” and “magnificent buildings for public gatherings” (“Tempel, oder Prachtgebäude zum Behuf öffentlicher Versammlungen”, KU, AA 05: 322.26), and works of architecture that can either be beautiful or mechanical art would include “dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected as memorials” (“Wohnungen, Ehrenbogen, Säulen, Kenotaphien u. dgl., zum Ehrengedächtnis errichtet”, KU, AA 05: 322.27-28). There might be a similar progression from church and palace to arsenal and garden-house (KU, AA 05: 230).

4 - We take it that a judgment of the beauty of a horse is dependent, because our appreciation of its beauty is dependent upon our concept of the ends it serves (KU, AA 05: 230, 311).[52]

6 - For mentions of subjects of sculpture, see KU, AA 05: 312, 322.

For mention of subjects of painting, see KU, AA 05: 312.

Kant mentions Homer and Wieland in KU, AA 05: 309. For examples of the poetry of Friedrich the Great, Johann Philipp Lorenz Withof and Johann Andreas Segner, see KU, AA 05: 315 f. For mentions of subjects of poetry, see KU, AA 05: 314.[53]

Published Online: 2018-3-21
Published in Print: 2018-3-8

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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