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ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2015

Stefan Reining
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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to propose a way to resolve a supposed dilemma currently troubling the debate about rational belief formation in cases of peer disagreement. In section 1, I will introduce the general debate in question as well as the kind of view figuring in the supposed dilemma. In section 2, I will describe how the supposed dilemma arises. In section 3, I will consider the replies that have hitherto been offered and explain in how far these replies should be regarded as unsatisfying. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I will propose and defend a new reply to the supposed dilemma. This reply consists in rejecting the intuitively appealing view that one should be conciliatory in the relevant kind of case, and in endorsing a more careful position, which respects the intuitions behind conciliationism and which, in contrast to the latter, does not give rise to the kind of dilemma in question.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 305 - 328
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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