

“On Experiencing High-Level Properties”

Indrek Reiland

Introduction

Which properties can we perceptually experience?¹ Some philosophers have held that we can perceptually experience only the following “low-level” properties, that only these can make a difference to what it is like to have perceptual experiences: color properties, illumination properties, motion properties, shape properties, and spatial location properties for visual experience, volume, pitch, and timbre for auditory experience, sweetness, sourness for

¹ On our use of ‘perceptual experience’, a perceiver *P* perceptually experiences an object *O*’s having the property of being *F* only if *P* isn’t under an illusion or hallucinating. We thus focus on the successful cases to keep things simpler (contrast Siegel 2006, 2011). For the purpose of staying neutral about the metaphysics of perceptual experience we can define what it is for *P* to perceptually experience an object *O*’s having the property of being *F* as follows, it is either:

- (i) for *P* to perceptually experience *O*’s being *F* (*Naïve Realism*); or
- (ii) for *P* to perceptually experience that *O* is *F* (+ to satisfy further cond.) (*Representationalism*); or
- (iii) for *P* to perceptually experience [a *F O*]-ly (+ to satisfy further cond.) (*Adverbialism*).

As we construe it here, *Naïve Realism* claims that *P*’s perceptual experience of *O*’s having the property of being *F* consists of his perceptually experiencing *O*’s being *F* where to perceptually experience something is to be presented with – to stand in an intentional, but non-representational relation to – a fact, an entity consisting of an object’s having a property (For arguments for why this is the best way to think of this view, see Fish 2009). As we construe it here, *Representationalism* claims that *P*’s perceptual experience of *O*’s having the property of being *F* consists of his perceptually experiencing that *O* is *F* (+ maybe satisfying some further, perhaps causal, conditions), where to perceptually experience something is to have a *sui generis* propositional attitude towards a proposition. (For arguments for why this is the best way to think of this view, see Byrne 2009, Pautz 2009). As we construe it here, *Adverbialism* claims that *P*’s perceptual experience of *O*’s having the property of being *F* consists of his perceptually experiencing [a *F O*]-ly (+ maybe satisfying some further, perhaps causal, conditions), where to perceptually experience [x]-ly is to have one’s consciousness modified [x]-ly. (For arguments for why this is the best way to think of this view, see Sellars 1975, Tye 1975). The inclusion of only the above three views in the definition is justified the assumption that we can perceptually experience at least some properties that objects can instantiate, but sense data cannot. It rules out the inclusion of the *Sense Datum Theory* and its analogues according to which for *P* to perceptually experience an object *O*’s having the property of being *F* consists at least partly of *P*’s perceptually experiencing a sense datum *D*’s being *F** (+ maybe satisfying some further, perhaps causal, conditions), where *F** ranges over predicates that express properties that sense data can instantiate.

gustatory experience, and so on (Byrne 2009, Carruthers & Veillet 2012, Dretske 1995, Lyons 2005, Price 2006, Smith 2002, Tye 1995).² Others have held that we can also perceptually experience the following “high-level” properties, that these can also make a difference to what it is like to have perceptual experiences: natural kind properties like *being a pine tree* or *being a tomato*;; functional kind properties like *being a stethoscope* or *being a cathode ray tube*, and even semantic properties (Bayne 2009, Fish 2009, Johnston 2004, 2006, Masrour 2011, McDowell 1994, Nanay 2011, Peacocke 1992, Searle 1983, Siegel 2006, 2011, Siewert 1998).^{3,4}

Both Tim Bayne and Susanna Siegel have recently offered interesting arguments in favor of the high-level view (Bayne 2009, Siegel 2006, 2011).⁵ We will first argue that Bayne’s simpler argument fails (Section 1). However, our main aim in this paper is to show that Siegel’s more sophisticated argument for her version of the high-level view can also be resisted if one adopts a view that distinguishes between perceptual experiences and seemings

² Some hold that we can only perceptually experience determinate color properties like *being red21*; others hold that we can perceptually experience determinable color properties like *being red*. For discussion see Price 2006.

³ There are both more restrictive and more promiscuous views than the low-level and the high-level view, although they are not as widespread. For a good overview of the continuum of possible views see Lyons 2007.

⁴ Jack Lyons and Tim Bayne call the supporters of the low-level view conservatives and the supporters of the high-level view liberals (Lyons 2007, Bayne 2009: 385-386). We don’t like the evaluative connotations of those terms and will therefore use the more cumbersome, but neutral ‘low-levelists’ and ‘high-levelists’.

⁵ Since both arguments rely on the thesis known as *Intentionalism* or *Minimal Intentionalism*, here stated in a way that’s neutral about the metaphysics of perceptual experience, we will assume it as well:

(*Intentionalism*)

If *perceptual experiences E1* and *E2* differ in *phenomenal character*, the property of a mental state that types it according to what it is like to have it, then they differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them.

Notice that given our use of ‘perceptual experience’, *Intentionalism* concerns only the successful cases and is silent about illusions or hallucinations. If we couple the three views mentioned in fn. 1 with *Intentionalism* then we arrive at views on which the phenomenal character of a particular perceptual experience of *O*’s having the property of being *F* is somehow determined by the fact that while having it *P* is either being presented with *O*’s being *F*, or has the *sui generis* propositional attitude towards the proposition that *O* is *F*, or has his consciousness modified [a *F O*]-ly. For further discussion of *Intentionalism* in general see Byrne 2001, Speaks 2009.

(Sections 2-4). Our discussion of her argument enables us also to make explicit what is at issue between the low-level and high-level view in a way that shows that the debate isn't merely terminological, and to propose a more fine-grained way of thinking about the possible views one could hold.

1. Bayne's Argument

Bayne presents a simple contrast argument which takes off from a case where the phenomenal characters of two *perceptual experiences* had before and after the loss of a particular ability supposedly differ (Bayne 2009: 391).⁶ Consider the following pair of situations. In *S1* you are a normal perceiver and have a perceptual experience of a stethoscope, *E1*, while recognizing that it is a stethoscope. In *S2* you have fallen prey to the impairment known as *associative agnosia*, a condition which robs you of the ability to recognize objects as belonging to common categories, and have a perceptual experience of the same stethoscope, *E2*, while not recognizing that it is a stethoscope. Bayne thinks that it is evident that the phenomenal characters of *E1* and *E2* differ. Taking himself to have established (1), his argument proceeds as follows (our reconstruction):

Bayne's Argument

- (1) *E1* and *E2* differ in phenomenal character.
- (2) If *E1* and *E2* differ in phenomenal character, then *E1* and *E2* differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them.
- (3) Therefore, *E1* and *E2* differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them.

⁶ For general discussion of how contrast arguments work see Siegel 2007, 2011; Tolliver 2007.

(4) If $E1$ and $E2$ differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them, then $E1$ and $E2$ differ in whether one perceptually experiences the property of *being a stethoscope* while having them.

(5) Therefore, $E1$ and $E2$ differ in whether one perceptually experiences the property of *being a stethoscope* while having them.

The conclusion entails that we can perceptually experience at least one high-level property, *being a stethoscope*. Since the argument could be run for other high-level properties in a similar way, Bayne thinks that we are entitled to conclude that we can perceptually experience these as well.

Let's focus on (1), granting the other substantive premises, (2) and (4).⁷ As I mentioned above, Bayne thinks that it is evident that (1) is true. He cites a case study of a patient with associative agnosia:

For the first three weeks in the hospital the patient could not identify common objects presented visually...When shown a stethoscope, he described it as 'a long cord with a round thing in the end', and asked if it could be a watch. (Bayne 2009: 391);

and then claims about him that "it is extremely plausible to suppose that the phenomenal character of his visual experience has changed." (Bayne 2009: 391) However, this is far from clear. What is extremely plausible is that the phenomenal characters of the overall experience $O1$ had in $S1$ and the overall experience $O2$ had in $S2$ differ. But this is compatible with the view that the phenomenal characters of $E1$ and $E2$ are the same. That is, it might be that the

⁷ If one rejects *Intentionalism* (see fn. 6), for example, by accepting *Fregean Representationalism*, the view that propositions consist not of objects and properties, but modes of presentation of them, one will think that (2) is false (Chalmers 2004, 2006, Thompson 2009). Curiously, Bayne himself seems to accept *Fregean Representationalism* in the same paper where he presents the argument (Bayne 2009: 398). Thanks to Jeff Speaks for discussion. Furthermore, if one thinks that it's not the property of *being a stethoscope*, but the property of *being a medical tool* etc. that makes the difference, one will think that (4) is false. Nevertheless, this isn't really important because the conclusion would still be similar unless one is able to find some low-level property to make the difference. Thanks to James Genone for discussion.

properties that the normal perceiver perceptually experiences while being in *S1* include ***being long, being round*** etc. and *not being a stethoscope*, and, as is clear from the case study, these are the properties that the impaired perceiver experiences while being in *S2*. The difference between the phenomenal characters of *O1* and *O2* might be due to differences in their other parts: for example, because only *O1* has as a part the judgment that this is a stethoscope, whereas *O2* doesn't. Hence, Bayne fails to establish (1), the claim that the phenomenal characters of *E1* and *E2* differ. And this means that his simple contrast argument fails.

2. Siegel's Argument

Siegel presents a contrast argument that is an improvement over Bayne's because it takes off from a case where the phenomenal characters of two *overall experiences* had before and after the acquisition of a recognitional disposition clearly differ. Consider the following pair of situations. In *S3* you lack the recognitional disposition that would enable you to distinguish pine trees from non-pine trees and have the perceptual experience of a pine tree, *E3*. In *S4* you have acquired the recognitional disposition and have the perceptual experience of the same pine tree, *E4*. Siegel thinks that it is evident that the phenomenal characters of the overall experience *O3* had in *S3* and the overall experience *O4* had in *S4* differ. Having thus established (0), her argument proceeds as follows (our reconstruction):

Siegel's Argument

(0) *O3* of which *E3* is a part and *O4* of which *E4* is a part differ in phenomenal character.

(0.5) If *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character, then *E3* and *E4* differ in phenomenal character.

(1) Therefore, *E3* and *E4* differ in phenomenal character.

- (2) If $E3$ and $E4$ differ in phenomenal character, then $E3$ and $E4$ differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them.
- (3) Therefore, $E3$ and $E4$ differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them.
- (4) If $E3$ and $E4$ differ in which properties one perceptually experiences while having them, then $E3$ and $E4$ differ in whether one perceptually experiences the property of *being a pine tree* while having them.
- (5) Therefore, $E3$ and $E4$ differ in whether one perceptually experiences the property of *being a pine tree* while having them.

Again, the conclusion entails that we can perceptually experience at least one high-level property, *being a pine tree*. Since the argument could be run for other high-level properties in a similar way, Siegel thinks that we are entitled to conclude that we can perceptually experience these as well (Siegel 2006: 502, Siegel 2011: Ch. 4).

We want to focus on (0.5), granting the other substantive premises, (0), (2), and (4).⁸ Siegel supports it by arguing that the best way to explain why $O3$ and $O4$ differ in phenomenal character is by assuming that $E3$ and $E4$ differ in phenomenal character. Her argument for this proceeds by eliminating two other possible explanations, first, that $O3$ and $O4$ differ in phenomenal character because $O4$ includes a part with a *non-sensory* phenomenal character, X , that $O3$ lacks; and, second, that $O3$ and $O4$ differ in background phenomenology. (Siegel 2006: 492-497) We will focus on her elimination of the first explanation because we agree with her that an explanation in terms of background phenomenology is not promising. Siegel has two objections against the first explanation. The first objection is best construed as consisting in the claim that the most natural account of X

⁸ For responses to this argument that rely on the rejection of *Intentionalism* and thus denying (2) see Brogaard 2013a, Logue 2013, Price 2009. For a response that relies on the rejection of (4) see Nanay 2011.

doesn't work. The second objection consists in the claim that there is good reason to doubt that *O4* includes *X*. In the next two sections we will examine these objections more closely and argue that they can be answered if one thinks of *X* in terms of seemings.

3. Siegel's First Objection

To recap, the alternative explanation we're focusing on consists in the claim that *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O4* has a part with a non-sensory phenomenal character, *X*, that *O3* lacks. Siegel's first objection is best construed as consisting in the claim that the most natural account of *X* doesn't work. She thinks that in order to give a plausible account of *X* one must take it to be an event in the stream of consciousness and give an account of:

- a) the mental attitude it involves;
- b) the content it involves;
- c) its non-sensory phenomenal character. (Siegel 2006: 492-493)

She further thinks that the following is the most natural account:

(*Natural*) *X* is the event of *judging* that this (the object perceptually experienced) is a pine tree. It has a cognitive phenomenal character.

On this account we can explain why *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character as follows: *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O3* doesn't involve the event of judging that this is a pine tree whereas *O4* does. However, Siegel argues, this natural account and other ones that involve a committal attitude like judging don't work. Consider the following situation: in *S5* you have the recognitional disposition that enables you to distinguish pine trees from non-pine trees, are told that you're looking at a hologram of the same pine tree you looked at before, and have an overall experience *O5* which includes a perceptual

experience of the hologram, *E5*. Intuitively the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O4*. However, explanations that invoke *Natural* or other accounts that involve a committal attitude predict falsely that the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O3* because if you're told that you're looking at a hologram, you wouldn't judge that it is a pine tree. (Siegel 2006: 494)⁹

We think that there are at least two ways of revising the natural account so that it predicts correctly that the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O4*. The first way involves revising the content by claiming that we don't judge that this is *F*, but instead that it seems to be *F*:

(*Revised Content*) *X* is the event of *judging* that this (the object perceptually experienced) seems to be a pine tree. It has a cognitive phenomenal character.

On this account we can explain why *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character as follows: *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O3* doesn't involve the event of judging that this seems to be a pine tree whereas *O4* does. It's also clear that explanations that invoke *Revised Content* predict correctly that the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O4* because there's no reason why, even if you're told that you're looking at a hologram, you wouldn't judge that it *seems* to be a pine tree.

The second way of revising the natural account involves revising the attitude by claiming that we don't judge anything, but rather just that it *seems* to us that this is *F*:

(*Revised Attitude*) *X* is the event of it *seeming* to us that this (the object perceptually experienced) is a pine tree. It has a proprietary quasi-sensory/quasi-cognitive phenomenal character. (More on this below)

⁹ As Siegel points out, if we take the attitude to be the non-committal attitude of *entertaining* this problem doesn't arise (Siegel 2006: 493). Although this is an option, we don't think low-levelists should pursue it. First, there seems to us to be something forceful involved in cases where our overall experience is like *O4* or *O5*. Second, as we will show below, if one accepts this story then Siegel's second objection becomes hard to resist.

On this account we can explain why *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character as follows: *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O3* doesn't involve the event of its seeming to us that this is a pine tree whereas *O4* does. It's again clear that explanations that invoke *Revised Attitude* predict correctly that the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O4* because there's no reason why, even if you're told that you're looking at a hologram, it couldn't seem to you that it is a pine tree.

Since *Revised Attitude* posits a new attitude of seeming we need to say more about it. Let's first clarify the relevant sense of 'seems'. Berit Brogaard has recently discussed the distinction between epistemic and phenomenal uses of perceptual verbs. An example of an epistemic use is 'It looks like Rose is honest' whereas an example of a phenomenal use is 'Rose looks tall'. Brogaard suggests that epistemic uses tell us about the subject's cognitive state concerning what is subjectively probable conditional on her evidence. As such, they cease to exist in the presence of a defeater. (Brogaard 2013b) Thus, if you say that 'It looks like Rose is honest' because it's subjectively probable conditional on your evidence, you're likely going to retract that when you acquire some evidence that she's dishonest. In contrast, phenomenal uses tell us about how things seem in a more robust sense. And as such, they don't cease to exist in the presence of a defeater. For example, when you look at the Müller-Lyer illusion the lines seem unequal despite the fact that you know that they are equal. *Revised Attitude* must be understood in terms of *phenomenal* seemings because the posited seemings are not supposed to cease to exist in the presence of a defeater.

What's the nature of *phenomenal* seemings like the seeming that this is a pine tree? We propose that phenomenal seemings are *sui generis phenomenal* events that are *passive, conceptual*, and *represent* objects as having properties. They are *sui generis* in that they're irreducible to other mental states or events.¹⁰ They're *phenomenal* events in that they're individuated by what it's like to undergo them. They're *passive* in that they just occur, in contrast to judgments

¹⁰ For support of the *sui generis* claim and arguments that seemings can't be reduced to beliefs or inclinations to believe or like see Bealer 1998, Cullison 2011. A lot of such proposals fall because they fail to respect the sense in which seemings are occurrent events rather than dispositional states. Of course, they normally bring dispositional states in their wake. For example, seemings almost inevitably bring with it dispositions to judge and believe. If it phenomenally seems to you that *x* is *F* then you're disposed to judge that *x* is *F* and to believe that *x* is *F*, even if you don't go on to actually do it.

which are *active* in that they are made as a result of deliberation and involve making up our mind.¹¹ However, they're *conceptual* like judgments in that how things can seem to us is constrained and aided by what we can think about. In other words, they involve the employment of our conceptual capacities. When we perform the judgment that x is F we're employing our concept of F . If we lacked that concept and were unable to think of things as being F 's we couldn't perform the judgment. Similarly, if it *seems* to us that x is F our concept of F is employed. If we lacked that concept and were unable of things as being F 's things couldn't seem to us to be F 's.¹² Finally, they *represent* objects as having properties. In other words, as applying concepts in the case of judging results in our representing an object as belonging to a conceptual category and in the presenting of a proposition as true, so with employment of our conceptual capacities in case of seemings.

What about the phenomenal character of seemings? We take *sensory phenomenology* or phenomenology of perceptual experience to be at least partly characterized by its *passivity*. In contrast, we take the *cognitive phenomenology* or phenomenology of thought in general to be distinctive in involving active concept application and representing something as being some way. In metaphorical terms, it's a phenomenology of *activity* and *conceptual representation*. The phenomenology of *judgment* is furthermore different from that of mere entertaining of a proposition in that it involves an *active affirmation* of a proposition as *true*. Now, seemings are like perceptual experiences in being passive, but like judgments in involving employment of our conceptual capacities and being representational. We therefore propose that they have a proprietary, *quasi-sensory* and *quasi-cognitive* phenomenology in involving *passive* employment of conceptual capacities and representing something as being some way. In metaphorical terms, theirs is a phenomenology of *passivity* and *conceptual representation*. Furthermore, it's somewhat

¹¹ We distinguish here between judging as a mental act and an event of acquiring a belief. We think judgments are always performed after considering a question and as a result of deliberation whereas one can acquire beliefs without having considered any questions or deliberated.

¹² This is something John McDowell likes to emphasize with his distinction between conceptual capacities being *operative* in perceptual experience (passive) versus the *exercising* of conceptual capacities in judgment (active). (McDowell 2009: 251).

like the phenomenology of judgment and less like entertaining in that it involves a *passive presentation* of a proposition as true.¹³

Let's take stock. We've proposed that there are at least two ways of revising the natural account so that it predicts correctly that the phenomenal character of *O5* is like that of *O4*. The first way involves revising the content by claiming that we don't judge that this is *F*, but instead that it seems to be *F* (*Revised Content*). The second way involves revising the attitude by claiming that we don't judge anything, but rather just that it *seems* to us that this is *F* (*Revised Attitude*). We think that low-levelists should not accept *Revised Content*, but *Revised Attitude*. The first reason why low-levelists should not accept *Revised Content* is that judgments are plausibly made as a result of deliberation and involve voluntarily making up our mind. However, it is implausible that every time one's overall experience is like *O4* or *O5* it is so because one deliberates and makes up one's mind. The second reason is that one presumably judges that things seem to one as being thus and so on the basis of its seeming to one that things are thus and so. However, then the judgment presupposes the seeming and is explanatorily superfluous. Finally, as we will see below, if we think of *X* in terms of judging Siegel's second objection becomes hard to resist. Thus, low-levelists should think of *X* in terms of seemings.¹⁴

¹³ Michael Huemer calls this aspect of seemings' phenomenology forcefulness, whereas Chris Tucker calls it assertiveness. (Huemer 2007: 77-79, Tucker 2010).

¹⁴ One might wonder whether accepting *Revised Attitude* doesn't amount to accepting the high-level view. After all, one might think that what is normally called perceptual experience encompasses also seemings. However, no low-levelist has ever wanted to deny that things can perceptually seem to us as having high-level properties or that we can see things *as* pine trees (see Tye 1995: 140, Lyons 2005). What he wants to deny is either that these seemings have any phenomenology or that they have a *sensory* phenomenology. For example, Michael Tye seems to claim that they have no phenomenology of their own (Tye 1995: 140, see also Carruthers & Veillet 2012). Others like Jack Lyons and us here claim that they have a quasi-cognitive phenomenology. Accepting *Revised Attitude* amounts to denying Tye-style *No-Phenomenology* low-level view, but it doesn't amount to accepting Siegel-style *Sensory-Phenomenology* high-level view. Instead it amounts to a sort of a middle ground. Whether one considers it a low-level or a high-level view depends on what one cares about. (One suspects that Tye would consider it a version of the high-level view, whereas Siegel would consider it a version of the low-level view). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.

4. Siegel's Second Objection

To recap, the alternative explanation we're focusing on consists in the claim that *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O4* includes a part with a non-sensory phenomenal character, *X*, that *O3* lacks. Siegel's second objection against it is that there is good reason to doubt that *O4* includes *X*. Since the argument is somewhat tricky, let's quote her in full:

Here it is important to keep in view the aspect of the proposal that posits an event (supposedly a 'cognitive' event) occurring in the stream of consciousness. This proposal predicts that there will be a phenomenological difference between your experiences of seeing the pine tree before and after you learn to recognize trees, only to the extent that such an event is occurring. If no such event is occurring, then, this proposal predicts, there will be no phenomenological change of the sort invoked in the original example.

The second objection targets this aspect of the proposal. An event's occurring in the stream of consciousness is not akin to having a tacit recognition (or misrecognition) of something as a tree. It is something explicit, rather than tacit. But the phenomenological change in the original tree example seems to be the sort that does not always involve an explicit entertaining of a proposition [judging it to be the case etc.] (Siegel 2006: 495)

What she seems to be saying is that there could be cases where we notice phenomenological changes between overall experiences like *O3* and *O4* without noticing any entertainings or judgments. And this gives us good reason to think that *O4* doesn't include *X* construed as entertainings or judgments.

We think that she's right. However, she hasn't done anything to show that there could be cases where we notice phenomenological changes between overall experiences like *O3* and *O4* without noticing any seemings. In fact, we think it is plausible that what's

changed from *O3* to *O4* is that in the latter case the pine tree *seems* to be a pine tree. Thus, she has given us no reason to think that *O4* doesn't include *X* construed as seemings.

Let's take stock. The weight of Siegel's argument rested on (0.5), the claim that if *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character, then *E3* and *E4* differ in phenomenal character. She supported it by arguing that the best way to explain why *O3* and *O4* differ in their phenomenal character is by assuming that *E3* and *E4* differ in their phenomenal character. We focused on an alternative explanation she rejects, namely that that *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character because *O3* lacks a part with a non-sensory phenomenal character, *X*, that *O4* has. And we showed, first, that, contrary to Siegel's claim, there is an attractive sort of account of *X* in terms of *seemings* that does work. We then also showed, second, that her argument for the claim that there is good reason to doubt that *O4* includes *X* doesn't work if *X* is thought of in terms of seemings. Hence, she fails to establish (0.5), the claim that if *O3* and *O4* differ in phenomenal character, then *E3* and *E4* differ in phenomenal character.¹⁵ We thus conclude that Siegel's argument can be resisted by adopting a version of the low-level view which distinguishes between perceptual experiences and seemings.

Conclusion

It's sometimes said that it's not entirely clear what is at issue between the low-level and the high-level view. After all, it is said, low-levelists don't usually deny that we can experience things *as* pine trees or stethoscopes, and some of them don't deny that this makes a difference to what it is like to have those experiences. It has therefore even been suggested that the debate might be merely terminological, due to different uses of 'perceptual experience' or 'what it is like' (Bayne 2009: 389). We think that our discussion of Siegel's argument makes clear what is at issue in a way that shows that the debate isn't merely terminological.

¹⁵ For doubts about Siegel's argument which concentrate on the fact that it is presented as being about natural kind properties, see Byrne 2009: 449-450, Brogaard 2013a, Logue 2013, Nanay 2011, Pautz 2009: 505-506, and Price 2009: 516-518. Our way of responding to the argument doesn't depend on which high-level properties it is presented as being about.

Everybody agrees that the events that give us access to low-level properties have a sensory phenomenology. It's clear from our discussion of Siegel's argument that what's at issue is whether the events that give us access to high-level properties are phenomenologically on a par with the events that give us access to low-level properties. More precisely, what's at issue is whether they have any phenomenology of their own and if they do, whether it's cognitive or quasi-sensory/quasi-cognitive, or, as Siegel argues, sensory.

We should therefore distinguish between four types of interestingly different possible views one could hold:

No-P: the mental event that provides us with access to high-level properties doesn't have a phenomenology of its own. (Carruthers & Veillet 2012, Tye 1995: 140)

Cog-P: the mental event that provides us with access to high-level properties has a cognitive phenomenology.

Sen/Cog-P: the mental event that provides us with access to high-level properties has a quasi-sensory/quasi-cognitive phenomenology. (Lyons 2005, our view)¹⁶

Sen-P: the mental event that provides us with access to high-level properties has a sensory phenomenology. (Siegel 2006, 2011)

We've argued that Siegel's argument for her version of high-level view can be resisted because although she argues effectively for the claim that the relevant phenomenal contrast can't be explained by adopting *Cog-P*, she hasn't done anything to undermine the possibility that it could be explained by adopting *Sen/Cog-P* instead of *Sen-P*.

¹⁶ As we've seen, some of the people listed in the beginning as holding the low-level view like Tye hold *No-P*, whereas others like Lyons hold *Sen/Cog-P*. It's entirely possible that some of the people listed as holding the high-level view, perhaps even Bayne, would be entirely happy to accept *Sen/Cog-P* with quasi-cognitive phenomenology as well. As we said before, whether one wants to consider this view a low-level or a high-level view depends on what one cares about.

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