

Erratum to: An abstract analysis of ethical dilemmas

Roberta M Berry: The ethics of genetic engineering. New York: Routledge, 2007, xiii+226 pp, US \$140 HB

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Erratum to: Metascience (2009) 18:417–420
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The following lines are wrong.

p. 417, Berry argues that the issues related to genetic engineering are ‘fractitious problems’, which means that they are generated by novel advances in science and technology, challenge our understanding, tap into our deep secular or religious beliefs, are of public concern, and are unavoidably divisive (pp. 1–2).

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pp. 417–418, Reductionist pluralists, such as utilitarians and deontologists, view ethical and policy issues as “amendable to similar methods of reduction and revolution, by calculation of risks and benefits or by application of principles establishing rights and duties (p. 4).”

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:[10.1007/s11016-009-9294-6](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-009-9294-6).

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