Skip to main content
Log in

Is Imagination Introspective?

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The term imagination has been used very widely. It is often used for suppositional purposes, e.g. imagine the number of primes to be finite. It can also mean to put oneself into someone else’s shoes, e.g. kids imagine themselves to be tigers and crouch on the floor. But I will only discuss imagination in the sense of sensorily imagining X, e.g. imagine a chocolate bar floating in front of you, imagine the beats of a load drum. In the visual sense we often use verbs like ‘to picture’ or ‘to visualize’ synonymously for ‘to sensorily imagine’.

  2. It remains of course possible for authors like McGinn and Tye to use a different notion of introspection to make sense of the claim that we can introspect our imaginative states. However, Tye (2003, p.32) thinks of introspection very much like Rosenthal and Dretske as a matter of focusing on how things appear to be. McGinn states that “Introspection is the name of the faculty through which we catch consciousness in all its nakedness. By virtue of possessing this cognitive faculty we ascribe concepts of consciousness to ourselves.” (1993, p.8) It thus seems to me that reportability of inner states does encompass McGinn’s conception of introspection.

  3. It is important not to confuse the distinction of appearance and reality with a possible difference in content between an appearance and reality. In other words, the veridicality of experience E is not at stake. In hallucinations, dreams and sensory imaginations, objects are usually not located where they are represented as being, whereas in perception, objects exist where they are represented in one’s experience.

  4. Lucid dreams provide further support for the thesis of introspective imagination. Lucid dreams are considered by many to be introspective in nature. Moreover, the state of dreaming resembles the state of imagination in that both dream experiences and imaginative experiences are caused endogenously and not through outside stimuli. The main difference between them is that dreams are not subject to the conscious will whereas imagination usually is. However, this difference is nullified when people dream lucidly because then people can steer their dreams. So it seems that if people think of lucid dreams as introspective, they should also consider classifying imagination as a kind of introspection.

  5. The Dependency Thesis of imagination states that if a person sensorily imagines x then he imagines an experience of x. I do not endorse the dependency thesis: On my account, if a person sensorily imagines x, then he simply imagines x. However, the imagining person is aware that the content of the imaginative experience only appears to him and is thus distinct from reality.

References

  • Bisiach, E., Luzzatti, C., & Perani, D. (1979). Unilateral neglect, representational schema and consciousness. Brain, 102, 609–618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. London: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94, 263–278.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1739-40). A treatise of human nature. In: Selby-Bigge (Ed.) (1896). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Husserl, E. (1965). Philosophy as rigorous science. In: Q. Lauer (Transl.), Phenomenology and the crisis of philosophy. New York: Harper and Row.

  • Keil, F. (1979). Semantic and conceptual development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In: D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 347–480). Chicago.

  • Kosslyn, S., & Thompson, W. (2003). When is early visual cortex activated during visual mental imagery? Psychological Bulletin, 129(5), 723–746.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1993). The problem of consciousness: Essays towards a resolution. Blackwell Publishing.

  • McGinn, C. (2004). Mindsight. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (2003). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 353–393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noordhof, P. (2002). Imagining objects and imagining experiences. Mind & Language, 17(4), 426–455.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piaget, J. (2007/1929). The child’s conception of the world. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perky, C. W. (1910). An experimental study of imagination. The American Journal of Psychology, 22(3), 422–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, D. M. (2000). Meta-cognition and higher-order thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 231–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J. P. (1950). The psychology of imagination. London: Rider and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1991). The mental imagery debate. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (2003). Representationalism and the transparency of experience. In B. Gertler (Ed.), Privileged access: philosophical accounts of self-knowledge (pp. 31–44). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wellman, H., & Estes, D. (1986). Early understanding of mental entities: a reexamination of childhood realism. Child Development, 57(4), 910–923.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, A. (1990). The language of imagination. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Zettel. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I thank the participants of the Summer Graduate Conference (London) and the BPPA Conference (Durham) for their helpful comments and discussion. Special thanks to Sarah Patterson, Michael O’Sullivan and an anonymous referee of Philosophia for detailed comments on previous versions of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kevin Reuter.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Reuter, K. Is Imagination Introspective?. Philosophia 39, 31–38 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9275-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9275-4

Keywords

Navigation