Abstract
In a time when we as a society are in the process of deciding what our basic rights to health care are, it is critically important for us to have a full and complete understanding of what constitutes health. We argue for an analysis of health according to which certain states are healthy not in themselves but because they allow an individual to reach actual goals. Recognizing that the goals of an individual considered from the point of view of biology and the goals of the same individual considered as an agent in the world might be different, we introduce a distinction between the health of an individual qua organism and the health of an individual qua person. We then argue that this distinction characterizes the evaluations made by patients and healthcare providers better than the widely discussed distinction between disease and illness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. United States Code. Vol. 42, Section 12101ff.
Caplan AL. The concepts of health, illness, and disease. In: Bynum, WF and Porter R, eds. Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine. London: Routledge, 1993: 233–248.
Wartofsky M. How to begin again: Medical therapies for the philosophy of science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting 1976; 2: 109–122.
Nordenfelt L. On the relation between biological and social theories of health: A commentary on Fulford's praxis makes perfect. Theoretical Medicine 1993; 14: 321–324.
Quine WVO. Reply to Morton White. In: Hahn LA and Schilpp PA, eds. The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1986: 663–665.
Laudan L. Normative naturalism. Philosophy of Science 1990; 57: 44–59.
Aristotle. (McKeon R, ed.) The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941.
Giere RN. Scientific rationality as instrumental rationality. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 1989; 20: 377–384.
Siegel H. Naturalism, instrumental rationality, and the normativity of epistemology. Protosoz 1996; 8/9: 97–110.
Sade RM. A theory of health and disease: The objectivist-subjectivist dichotomy. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1995; 20: 513–525.
Pörn I. An equilibrium model of health. In: Nordenfelt L and Lindahl BIB, eds. Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Boston: D. Reidel, 1984: 3–9.
Pörn I. Health and adaptedness. Theoretical Medicine 1993; 14: 295–303.
Nordenfelt L. On the Nature of Health: An Action-Theoretic Approach. Boston: D. Reidel, 1987.
Holden C. Random samples. Science 1999; 285: 1007.
Sacks O. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
Boorse C. Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science 1977; 44: 542–573.
Boorse C. On the distinction between disease and illness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1975; 5: 49–68.
Mordacci R, Sobel R. Health a comprehensive concept. Hastings Center Report, 1998; 28(1): 34–37.
Fulford KWM. Praxis makes perfect: Illness as a bridge between biological concepts of disease and social conceptions of health. Theoretical Medicine 1993; 14: 305–320.
Culver CM, Gert B. Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and Psychiatry. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Clouser KD, Culver CM, Gert B. Malady: A new treatment of disease. The Hastings Center Report 1981; 11(3): 29–37.
Nordenfelt L. Mild mania and the theory of health: A response to 'mild mania and well-being'. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 1994; 1(3): 179–184.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Richman, K.A., Budson, A.E. Health of Organisms and Health of Persons: An Embedded Instrumentalist Approach. Theor Med Bioeth 21, 339–354 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009994806758
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009994806758