Abstract
The present study explored several dispositional factors associated with individual differences in lay adult’s interpretation of when an arguer is, or is not, committed to a statement. College students were presented with several two-person arguments in which the proponent of a thesis conceded a key point in the last turn. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which that concession implied a change in the proponent’s attitude toward any of the previous statements in the argument. Participants designated as ‘liberal’ used the concession to infer substantial change in commitment to earlier statements in the argument. A group designated as ‘conservative’ were reluctant to make any such inferences. A discriminant analysis indicated that variables assessing participants’ attitudes toward argument as well as their cognitive and communication styles jointly predicted their liberal or conservative status. The discriminant function and follow-up group comparisons indicated that liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in argument. This included a greater tendency to use argument as a source of knowledge. Liberals also employed a more sophisticated message design logic than conservatives on a communication task. The groups did not clearly differ with respect to participants’ implicit theory of argument, though trends were present that merit attention in future research. Implications of these findings for future research on lay interpretations of commitment are discussed.
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Appendix
Appendix
Turn | Arguer | Statement |
---|---|---|
Pro-death-penalty argument | ||
1. | Bob | The death penalty should be adopted by all states |
2. | Ed | Why do you say that? |
3. | Bob | It’s punishment that fits the crime—a life for a life |
4. | Ed | No. It’s punishment that is no better than the crime. Killing is wrong whether its by a criminal or the State |
5. | Bob | You can’t compare execution of a violent criminal in the name of justice with the murder of innocent life |
6. | Ed | Yes, you can. If its wrong to kill, then it doesn’t matter what the circumstance is |
7. | Bob | Okay, you’re right about that |
Con-death-penalty argument | ||
1. | Bob | The death penalty should be banned in California and other states |
2. | Ed | Why do you say that? |
3. | Bob | It’s a cruel and unusual form of punishment |
4. | Ed | It’s not cruel. It’s punishment that fits the crime—a life for a life |
5. | Bob | No. It’s punishment that is no better than the crime. Killing is wrong whether its by a criminal or the State |
6. | Ed | You can’t compare execution of a violent criminal in the name of justice with the murder of innocent life |
7. | Bob | Okay, you’re right about that |
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Ricco, R.B., Sierra, A.N. Individual Differences in the Interpretation of Commitment in Argumentation. Argumentation 25, 37–61 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-010-9191-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-010-9191-6