Volume 43, 1992
Alan Richardson
Pages 45-72
Metaphysics and Idealism in the Außau
The received view of the anti-metaphysics of Camap's Aufbau finds that it rests exclusively on verificationism. Alberto Coffa has recently put forward an interpretation of the antimetaphysical stance that claims that Camap was confusedly moving from ontological to semantical ideahsm. After raising objections to both of these views another interpretation is put forward. The crucial aspect of Camap's rejection of metaphysics rests on his reinterpretation of epistemology as the logic of objective knowledge. This leads to a rejection of metaphysics inasmuch as the peculiar status of logic as the framework constitutive of the possibility of rational inquiry means that it neither needs nor allows of completion or interpretation by traditional metaphysics. This view of Camap's is compared to the views of the Marburg and Southwest NeoKantians.