Filozofija i drustvo 2015 Volume 26, Issue 3, Pages: 540-564
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1503540R
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The paradox of imperfect duty in Kant's moral philosophy: A problem in 'applying' ethics'
Richter Phillip (Internationales Zentrum für Ethik in den Wissenschaften (IZEW) Tübingen, Germany)
The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application
of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially
problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes
the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping
others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown
that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory
results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to
help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To
overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are
not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if
it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome
the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this
paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be
found in Aristotle or Descartes.
Keywords: applied ethics, application, duty of helping others, imperfect duty, Kant, Aristotle, judgment, prudence, moral philosophy