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Free Will and Contextualism

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Abstract

This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible, the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, 33 Gilmer Street, Atlanta, GA, 30302, USA

    Steven Rieber

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  1. Steven Rieber
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Correspondence to Steven Rieber.

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Rieber, S. Free Will and Contextualism. Philos Stud 129, 223–252 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7829-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7829-7

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