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The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence

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Abstract

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, U.K.

    Adam Rieger

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  1. Adam Rieger
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Rieger, A. The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 54, 195–203 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005600831298

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