Notes
See Sen (2009).
For some, his most important contribution in this arena was his attempt to shift the emphasis away from Rawlsian bundles of primary social goods to human capabilities, understood as alternative combinations of functionings that a person may choose to develop and achieve. See, e.g., Sen (1993). Cf. Sen, The Idea of Justice, 231 and following. For others, it is Sen's argument purporting to formally demonstrate that liberalism may be Pareto-suboptimal. See Sen (1970). Cf. Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 309–314.
See Sen, The Idea of Justice, page ix.
See Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 12–15 and 201.
See Rawls (1971). The emphasis is added.
See Sen, The Idea of Justice, page 85.
See Nozick (1974).
See Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 145–148. See also, as Sen notes, Partfit (1984).
See for instance Sen, The Idea of Justice, page 148.
See Sen, The Idea of Justice, page 400.
See Cohen (2008).
References
Cohen, G. A., Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008)
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy State and Utopia, (Basic Books, 1974)
Partfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, Revised Edition, 1999 [1971]), page 119
Sen, Amartya, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”, Journal of Political Economy, 78 (1970), pp. 152–157
Sen, Amartya, “Capability and Wellbeing” in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen eds. The Quality of Life, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 30–53
Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009)
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Riley, E. Amartya Sen. The Idea of Justice . Hum Rights Rev 12, 139–141 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-010-0167-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-010-0167-6