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Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters: Part II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Jonathan Riley
Jonathan Riley
Affiliation:
Tulane University
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Extract

A claim that certain purely private matters should be beyond the reach of society's laws, moral rules, and other customs is central to the distinctive liberalism of John Stuart Mill. On Liberty, perhaps the most eloquent defense of individual liberty ever written, laments the hostility allegedly displayed in modern mass societies toward “the right of each individual to act [in private matters] as seems good to his judgement and inclinations” (1859, p. 271n.). In Mill's view, a free society must design its institutions with due regard for what he terms “individuality.” That is, public authority, whether in the form of law, customary opinion, or economic power, must be self-limiting so that it does not interfere with the rights of individuals to choose as they like with respect to such private concerns as religious faith, reading materials, living companions, and consumption of drugs and alcohol. Individuals and voluntary groups should be permitted to do whatever they prefer within their private spheres even if everyone else in society dislikes what they do, is annoyed by them, and actually chooses not to be around them or to befriend them (1859, pp. 276–91).

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , April 1990 , pp. 27 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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