Abstract
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”
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Rizzieri, A. Pragmatic encroachment, stakes, and religious knowledge. Int J Philos Relig 70, 217–229 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9294-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9294-5