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Functionalism and thinking animals

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Abstract

Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many thinkers.

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Notes

  1. In places, Shoemaker gives a very similar characterisation of what he calls thick properties, but his notion of a thick property is stronger than the notion of a rich property just given. Thus, Shoemaker builds it into the notion of a thick property that it cannot be shared by objects with different persistence conditions (e.g. 2003, p. 1), and this does not follow from richness alone.

  2. See Olson (2002) for a complaint along these lines, though his construal of Shoemaker’s argument, as well as his response to it differ significantly from the ones given here.

  3. This research was carried out while holding a Jacobsen Fellowship at the Royal Institute of Philosophy. I am grateful to Tim Crane and Colin Johnston for their comments on earlier drafts.

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  1. University College London, London, England

    Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir

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  1. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir
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Correspondence to Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir.

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Árnadóttir, S.T. Functionalism and thinking animals. Philos Stud 147, 347–354 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9287-0

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