Search
Close
Search
Advanced Search
Search Menu

Abstract

A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value.

Impersonal value, personal value, good-for, fitting-attitude analysis, for-someone's sake attitudes, Logical Consequence Argument, mood of an attitude
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews.
This article is published and distributed under the term of oxford University Press, standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)
Issue Section:
Article
You do not currently have access to this article.
Download all slides