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Behavioral Control Ethics
A new foundation

Table of Contents

[Introduction: A new ethic is needed!](#)

FIRST PART

[About values and norms and the limits of ethics](#)

- [1. The categorical imperative \(Cat. Imp.\): Prototype of an ethics of behavior control? _____](#)
- [2. Criticism of Kant's ethics _____](#)
- [3. Normative ethics of values? And what's the good \(about it\)? _____](#)
- [4. Change of values: end of all norms? _____](#)
- [5. From value to norm - despite all *conflicts* ? _____](#)
- [6. Limits of ethics _____](#)

SECOND PART

[Traditional ethics of behavior control](#)

- [7. Early tribal religions _____](#)
- [8. Early values _____](#)
- [9. The Ten Commandments _____](#)
- [10. Values in religions _____](#)
- [11. The golden rule _____](#)
- [12. Hinduism and Buddhism _____](#)
- [13. Ancient Greek metaphysics _____](#)
- [14. Christianity _____](#)
- [15. Christian values and norms from antiquity to the present _____](#)
- [16. Philosophical values and norms since the Middle Ages _____](#)
- [17. Further positions of the 20th century _____](#)
- [18. Core principles of a dialectical-materialistic ethics _____](#)
- [19. Eco-ethics \(I\) _____](#)

THIRD PART

[Re-establishment of an ethics of behavior control](#)

- [20. Conclusions _____](#)
- [21. How is ethics created? An overview. _____](#)
- [22. Discussion of the terms behavior, control and behavior *control behavior*. _____](#)
- [23. On the relationship between ethics, the philosophy of history and anthropology _____](#)
- [24. On the relevance of the philosophy of history and anthropology for an ethics of behavior control _____](#)
- [25. Value syntheses that \(can\) control behavior _____](#)
- [26. Eco-ethics \(II\) _____](#)
- [27. "Abolition" of ethics in the concrete utopia of a democratic eco-socialism _____](#)

Bibliography 351

Notes.....

At escort:

The essence of time and the essence of space-time.

Life
trusts
in
the
eternal,
uncreated
Primal force. (Tribal religion)

"It remains the ultimate moral agent of the revolution: faith, love, hope in human relationships; this music only becomes flesh when all the guests have sat down at the table. Happiness is simple and obvious, but its ways are complicated, and the content that it displays is mysterious." (Ernst Bloch)

Introduction: A new ethic is needed!

People have long believed that morality and ethics are necessary: morality as a set of rules of practical principles for a prosperous coexistence of people and the preservation of their communities; Ethics as observation, evaluation and the philosophical science of morality. - With regard to morality, religions have always made similar claims. But since their influence is waning more and more in many places, philosophical ethics is gaining in importance and practical relevance.

Ethics and morals always referred to the possibilities of behavior control, apparently worked out prototypically by *Kant*, in particular in his 'Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals' of 1785 and in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' of 1788. It is therefore necessary to check whether and how far as Kant's ethics of behavior control is still theoretically tenable and practically applicable today.

In addition, or in advance, the question arises as to whether we still need such ethics at all in the current situation. In fact, today we are in an acute threat situation, especially under the following aspects:

1. The ecological catastrophe, i.e. the destruction of the basis of life in the environment, nature and climate, is spreading, even if countermeasures are occasionally taken.
2. In its globalized form, neoliberal turbo-capitalism exacerbates social inequalities, contradictions and conflicts around the world and allows right-wing radicalism, nationalism and populism to grow to a dangerous extent.
3. Digitization threatens a "digital dictatorship"^[1] switch hit, for example as a result of increasing data theft and abuse, cyber - war, illegal drone use, etc.
4. The ideology of *transhumanism*^[2] also favors the misuse of digitization ("big data") and artificial intelligence.
5. *Posthumanism*. As *Ray Kurzweil*, among others, asserts, mankind gives itself up in the "singularity" of the year 2045, in favor of super-intelligent, "immortal" robots.^[3]
6. Also not to be forgotten is the fact that people have lived in fear of the *danger of nuclear war* since 1945, that is, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki .

The extent to which the latter perspectives have become a problem can be seen from the assessment made by the physicist and neuroscientist *Christoph von der Malsburg* in a video on YouTube. Accordingly, the basic problem of AI cannot be solved at all technologically, i.e. with the means of technology. This is why Malsburg calls for a new "ethics of behavior control", which means that clear ethical standards must be found for all actions, including and especially with regard to artificial intelligence.

I find the following astonishing: It seems that the ethics demanded by Malsburg can also be derived from the philosophical tradition, and in particular from Kant's ethics. However, only under the condition that the acute threats I mentioned under points 1) to 6) are taken into account. However, this makes the demand for the new ethics almost irrefutable, and indeed to a far greater extent than was ever the case in earlier times. Kant considered his ethics to be unconditionally and unconditionally ("categorically") valid. He justified it above all with the reference to an original freedom of the human being, based on the "original sin" ("peccatum originis" instead of the "peccatum originale", the conventional "original sin"), a freedom that allows the human being to decide, in certain circumstances, not for the good and valuable, but for evil and for Vile. A reason that at first glance hardly differs from the Christian one.

It seems all the more important to subject Kant's claims to absoluteness, for example in the form of the categorical imperative, to a thorough critical analysis. If these claims are still valid, there is no need for further considerations. If not, the philosophical tradition of ethical demands must be questioned for alternative concepts and a new foundation of behavioral ethics must be attempted.

FIRST PART

About values and norms and the limits of ethics

1. The categorical imperative (Cat. Imp.): Prototype of an ethics of behavior control?

Kant presented his Cat. Imp. in at least four different versions, which is all the more astonishing as he considered this ethical requirement to be categorical, i.e. absolutely valid and generally binding.

This probably explains the fact that he occasionally tries to emphasize the alleged unity of his concept, for example when he explains: "The categorical imperative is therefore one, namely this: *only act according to the maxim through which you at the same time can want it to become a general law.*"^[4]

Where one immediately has to ask how one should be able to judge whether one's own maxim, i.e. the respective subjective moral concept, can attain the validity of a "general law" at all. Does anyone have an overview of all laws and every type of legislation, e.g. also outside of one's own cultural area? Certainly not! A particularly unfortunate circumstance in view of the fact that Kant claims that the Cat. Imp. is "one and only" in the quoted formulation. As such, it should be immediately understandable and plausible, which is not the case.

It is therefore hardly surprising that a few years later, in 1788, Kant returned to the above-mentioned basic formula in his *Critique of Practical Reason* by slightly changing

the Cat. Imp., declaring it to be a "Basic Law of Pure Practical Reason" and demanding:

"Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can also serve as a principle of general legislation at any time."^[5]

It should be noted here that Kant understands the will here as "independent of empirical conditions" and "objectively determined". In this respect, the will is determined "by the mere form of the law" and should therefore be thought of as part of "pure practical reason" and consequently as "directly legislative" (ibid.). Which seems contradictory, because - according to Kant - not the will as such, but its "maxim" should be able to acquire the force of law, that is, the purely subjective should become directly "objective". - Kant promises a way out of the dilemma in his "conclusion" from his "Note" to the newly formulated basic formula of the Cat. Imp., according to which "Pure reason is practical in itself and gives (man) a general law, which we call the *moral law*". (op. cit., p. 37), whereby it should be noted that here too Kant postulates for the "pure will" the ability to obtain immediate *force of law*. Which can only be understood if one considers what Kant understands by the moral law. Kant connects it, according to Old Testament tradition, especially the Ten Commandments, with the "highest good", that is, with God. In addition, the moral law corresponds to the quintessence of any norm. In Art. 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, it applies as the limit to the "free development of personality", whereby it should be remembered that Kant considers the personality as the ideal form and actual goal of being a person, not least by means of the connection with the highest good.

By which the will is put in a position not to obey inclinations, but only to obey *duty*; Duty understood as "necessity to act out of respect for the law"^[6]. Such respect can never arise from inclinations, whereas duty belongs to the realm of "pure practical reason" and is therefore to be seen as an indispensable and immovable guide for the will.

Nevertheless, Kant considered it necessary to further specify his construct, namely in the so-called "purpose formula" (or also "self-purpose formula", in Kant: "the practical imperative"). This formula is:

"Act in such a way that you use humanity, both in your person and in the person of everyone else, at the same time as an end, never just as a means."^[7]

This formula applies on the condition that Kant assigns "unconditional dignity" to every *sane person (or personality)*; this according to his derivation of dignity from the end in itself, in which he says: "... but: what constitutes the condition under which something can be, at all, an end in itself, has not only a relative value, i.e. a price, but an intrinsic value, i.e. dignity."^[8]

This condition consists in *morality*, and only through it can "a rational being be an end in itself", so that it is able to "be a legislative member in the realm of ends" (ibid.) and thus to participate in general legislation.

With the "general law" Kant means above all the *moral law*. The moral law demands that not only our own will, but also that of our fellow human beings, ie of all "reasonable beings", must be respected. This is also the respect for the person or personality of every person, not least as a *legal entity* (i.e. "Rechtsperson" : *legal person*). As a reasonable person, man not only has an end in itself, so that he can set ends for himself; he even has unconditional "intrinsic value, that is, *dignity*". This view of the end in itself of every individual is impressively confirmed by the results of modern genetic research. Genetic code and DNA determine the individuality of the highest complexity, up to the neural combination-possibilities of the brain which are neither manageable nor mathematically ascertainable.

Incidentally, the moral law also implies *equality before the law* and "*respect for the law*"; which is probably the reason why Kant, in the formulation of the basic formula of the Cat. Imp., does not use the term "moral law", but rather that of "general legislation". Seen as a whole, the formulations of the Imp category complement each other harmoniously to form a by no means merely normative *ethics of values*. The value is the decisive factor here, not the mere norm. On closer inspection, Kant's so-called "duty and ought ethics" turns out to be *ethics of values* at the same time.

This ethics is unique, among other things, because in and with it for the first time the dignity of the person recognized as unconditional is justified and secured not only moral-philosophically, but also legally and politically, which, among other things, already guarantees a right of *petition* : on the basis of the comparison of subjective Maxim with generally applicable legislation, loopholes in the law can be identified, the closure of which the individual can demand from the state, if necessary. - Those are provisions which fully confirm Kant's view of the intrinsic worth of the person, its *end in itself*; from which the principles of the dignity of man, the rule of law and the separation of powers as indispensable, can easily be derived.

Kant also explains the connections between personality and morality using the dialectic of 'man' and 'humanity' by stating : "The moral law is *sacred* (inviolable). Man is indeed unholy enough, but *humanity* in his person must be holy to him. In the whole of creation, everything that one wants and what one can do something about, can also be used *merely as a means* ; only man, and with him every rational creature, is an *end in himself* . For he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy, by virtue of the autonomy of his freedom."^[9] So the moral law is "holy" because humanity as a whole can be considered "holy". With this, Kant also solves the dilemma between the supposedly innate tendency to evil (the "original sin") on the one hand and the ability to be moral on the other. The gap can be overcome as soon as the person's *end in itself* - including the autonomy of its *freedom* - is recognized and respected, so that the self-formula of the Cat. Imp. is fully effective.

In addition, it should be noted that Kant occasionally formulates the Cat. Imp. in analogy to *natural law*, namely as follows:

"The generality of the law according to which effects occur, constitutes what actually means *nature* in the most general understanding (according to form), i.e. the existence of things, insofar as it is determined by general laws; so that the general imperative of duty could also be: *handle as if the maxim of your action should become, by your will, general law of nature.*"^[10]

In other words: the Cat. Imp. as such cannot itself be a law of nature because it is not anchored in the world of phenomena, but - transcendently - in general legislation. Nevertheless, the Cat. Imp. contains probably as much 'power of law' ('Gesetzeskraft') as a law of nature, which Kant claimed as "described" to nature by the *subject human being*, whereas in Cat. Imp. the *subjectivity* of the maxim is combined with the *objectivity* of the moral law.

2. Criticism of Kant's ethics

The Cat. Imp. with its manifold implications has been heavily criticized as early as Kant's lifetime and thereafter until today. However, I cannot go into this in the necessary detail here, so that, in the meantime, I will have to be content with an analysis of a controversy that has flared up in the recent past.

In an article published online in November 2017, *Walter Stindt describes* Kant's ethics as "brilliant ethics for people who do not even exist."^[11] In order to establish this steep thesis, Stindt relies essentially on the *Libet-experiments*, which he, however, like others before him, refers to in an inadequate manner. Similar to some renowned brain-researchers, Stindt concludes from the experiments that we were "not masters in our own house." If our decisions are made decisively and finally in the subconscious, the consciousness loses its control function, so that Kant's conception of humans as being guided by understanding and reason is sidelined. Stindt writes on this: "He certainly recognizes that a person's instincts do not belong to conscious thinking, but he still assigns a control function to consciousness. But we now know that this picture is incorrect. And with that the entire concept collapses." (Ibid.) - However, Stindt did the math without the landlord named *Benjamin Libet*. Libet admits (2005, pp. 181 et sequ.) quite a control function to consciousness. In any case he reserves to the awareness, especially represented by understanding and reason, the final word on the proposals supplied by the subconscious, bearing in mind that reason, understanding and standards, together with the experience gained with them, are subconsciously stored up, too, even if sometimes in a different form, for example as a result of the recurring dream work, in which the subjective and the objective are compared with one another and brought into harmony.

The opposite position taken by *Andreas Beyer* (2018) towards Stindt is therefore entirely plausible: Kant did not claim that all problems could be solved or had already been solved with his Cat. Imp. Rather, it is about something completely different: "KANT derives an ethic, systematically, formally and stringently. In doing so, he takes ethics out of the grip of religion, customs and common law, So it is about the foundation and justification of ethical principles and guidelines - not about the supposition that they could be automatic and effective for everyone."^[12] - It is absurd to claim that it is not the individual himself, but "the brain" who makes the decisions, although the brain is undoubtedly always that of a certain I. In contrast, *not new* is the realization cited by Stindt that our will is based on *causes* and reacts to them. If people could not even recognize these causes, all laws would also become superfluous. And with it also Stindt's text, because all arguing would be void if it were consistently and completely determined by the subconscious.

The critical analysis of Cat. Imp. does not come to its end here, especially since essential aspects have to be taken into account that apparently many critics, including Stindt and Beyer, have missed. I mean the following: For Kant, the indispensable basis of ethics is *freedom*, which can be represented, among other things, as the *original freedom of the will* to distinguish between good and bad and to act accordingly. But why and how can a person choose what is good? For this purpose, Kant has constructed the Cat. Imp. on the basis of a transcendental, not an empirical, concept of freedom, so that freedom of will alone is not sufficient as the basis of a Cat. Imp. Rather, Kant gains his transcendental concept of freedom through the following distinction from mere sensory experience: "Independence from the determining causes of the sensory world (such

as those which reason must at all times settle for itself) is freedom."^[13] Only as such is freedom then suitable as a prerequisite and basis of the Cat. Imp.: "And so categorical imperatives are possible because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world ..." (ibid. P. 80).

That seems logical and understandable. It is therefore all the more astonishing that Kant himself massively questions his foundation of the Cat. Imp. at the very end of the *Foundation for the metaphysics of morals*, by first emphasizing again that morality is based on the supreme "law of freedom", but then finally stating: "And so, though we do not understand the practical necessity of the moral imperative, we understand its *incomprehensibility*; which is everything that can reasonably be demanded from a philosophy that strives in principles to the limit of human reason." Does Kant fail here because of his own claim to be able to offer binding ethics, on the basis of "principles"? What is the basis of this unexpected, unexpectedly deep skepticism about freedom? It should be noted that a few pages before his spectacular final volte-face, Kant expresses himself equally skeptical about freedom, which cannot be "explained" but only "defended" because it cannot be determined as an absolute: "But where determination by natural laws ceases, all *explanation* ceases, and nothing remains but *defense* ..." ^[14] And with a similar claim Kant, in the preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, referred to freedom as *incomprehensible*, yet *indispensable*, which is a scandal for every empiricist (ibid p.8).

In addition, it is noticeable that Kant accepts freedom as a prerequisite for the Cat. Imp. in connection with two *beliefs*, which he also presents as "postulates of pure reason": God and the immortality of the soul.^[15] In this combination, Kant tries to bridge the gap between belief and knowledge. Similar to the moral law, he attributes a divine origin to freedom. What can really be *known*, however, is only the togetherness of freedom and autonomy in the "practical freedom of will" ("... what else can freedom of will be other than autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself?" ^[16]).

Due to such determinations, the question arises why Kant nevertheless considers the Cat. Imp., which is based on freedom, to be "incomprehensible". Answers to this question arise from a number of unsolved problems raised by Kant's concept of freedom. After all, there are at least three different, incompatible concepts, among them

1. freedom as the determining factor of the moral law,
2. vice versa: the moral law as the ground of freedom,
3. freedom and "own legislation of the will" only seemingly interdependent in the moral law.

Kant notes to

- 1) A Cat. Imp. is possible only under the precondition of the "Idea of Freedom" (op. cit., p. 80), but: "We ultimately traced the specific concept of morality back to the idea of freedom; but we could not even prove this as something real in ourselves and in human nature; ..." (loc. cit. p. 74).
- 2) On the contrary, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he wants to substantiate freedom by the moral law, that means "... to connect the concept of causality with that of freedom (and what is inseparable of which, with the moral law as designing ground thereof) ...; ..." (loc. cit. p. 66).
- 3) "... Freedom and own legislation of the will are both autonomy, hence interchangeable terms, one of which, however, cannot be brought to explain the other and give reasons for it, but at most, only for logical purposes to bring seemingly different ideas of the same object to a single concept (like different fractions of the same content to the smallest of expressions)."^[17]

These provisions contradict each other. If 1) applies, 2) cannot be valid. If 1) or 2) applies, 3) cannot be true. Which are in fact "incomprehensible" contradictions, which probably stem primarily from Kant's attempt to additionally justify freedom "transcendentally", although it can easily be empirically proven as *free will*.

Kant apparently sees a solution of the dilemma in connecting freedom transcendentally not only with the beliefs 'God and immortality of the soul', but also with his cognition-theoretical concept of the *thing in itself*, claiming: "... if phenomena are *things in themselves*, freedom cannot be saved".^[18] Freedom, so this is Kant's thesis, can only exist if appearances are not "things in themselves". And why? Kant's argument was this: Since *conditions* can be identified, the *unconditioned* can be thought. The world of appearances is consistently conditioned; not conditioned, therefore unconditioned, is the thing in itself. The unconditioned can be equated with the absolute. In addition to the thing in itself, the kingdom of the unconditional includes: God, freedom and the immortality of the soul. God is to be accepted not only as the highest good and ultimate end, but also as the creator who is present in all his creations and thus also in the soul of man. Therefore God, freedom and the immortality of the soul apply in the *Critique of Practical Reason* as logically deducible *postulates* of "pure practical reason".^[19] Since these postulates are connected with one another by the unconditioned, the thing in itself, as the absolutely unconditioned, can be understood as a necessary presupposition of freedom.

This seems plausible, but becomes completely questionable, if not invalid, due to the weaknesses and imponderables of the construct 'thing in itself'. Because Kant assumes the thing-in-itself as *unknowable* and therefore *indefinable*, but nevertheless repeatedly indicates what could be understood by it, for example when he uses the verb "affecting" ("affizieren") for the relationship between the thing-in-itself and the perceiving or understanding subject. The (possible) object of knowledge "touches" the subject by "affecting the mind in a certain way"^[20]. Sensation is the "effect of an object on the imagination, provided we are affected by it" (ibid.). - But where and why does such "affecting" actually take place? On the one hand, the subject does not itself produce the object emanating from the thing-in-itself, but is "touched" by it; on the other hand, the ego affects a part of its own self, namely its "inner sense" (ibid.). And he even admits: "The objects of the senses, metaphysically speaking, are appearances; for physics, however, the things themselves affect the senses."^[21] In other words, Kant is well aware that *certain forces of matter and mind* constitute the *thing in itself* and as such affect the senses and the mind of the subject. Nevertheless, he sticks to the assumption that matter belongs to the world of *appearances*, so that with this concept he cannot determine the thing in itself. In this I see a contradiction that only resolves when it is clear that matter existed long *before* the human spirit in evolutionary history, so that "the unfinished entelechy of matter" (Ernst Bloch) with its *being-in-possibility* is the real basis of the Thing in itself as well as of the world of phenomena. In any case, this means

1. that the term 'thing in itself' becomes obsolete and is to be replaced by expressions such as 'what has appeared and what has not (yet) appeared', the known and the unknown', the known and the (still) unrecognized', the 'Not-yet' (Bloch's *Noch-Nicht*), and
2. that the term 'thing in itself' is also not suitable for transcendentally establishing the supposedly "unconditional" freedom. For this, the "unfinished entelechy of matter" is more likely to come into question, especially as moments of freedom can be observed both in spirit and in nature. (Which I will come back to.)

In general, we can replace the term 'thing in itself' with Ernst Bloch's term 'Not-Yet'. The fact that, as a result of our bondage to senses and intellect, we really cannot know whether we see things as they are, seems to speak against such a radical renunciation. However, this aspect is completely covered and reinterpreted by *Karl Popper's* falsification theory, according to which a claim to truth, coherence, correctness and validity can only be made for any statement as long as no new facts speak against it.

If the dualism of thing-in-itself and appearance no longer applies, the absolutizations of Kant's ethics of ought also become questionable or obsolete, including above all the "general legislation" and the terms 'duty' and 'ought'.

Wanting good and then doing it is not enough for Kant. The same applies to the "good will" that he valued so highly: Only when the will has transformed into an ought the Cat. Imp. can be followed. In doing so, Kant fails to recognize essential properties of the will. Because the will is anchored *per se* not only in the subconscious, but also in mind and reason. Ethically high-quality wanting, the *wanting of the good*, can certainly also be rationally accompanied and controlled when translating into sensible deeds.

On the contrary, according to the Cat. Imp., what man is *obligated* to do results exclusively from the rational activity that is thought of as autonomous. For Kant man is both a member of the intelligible world and a "member of the world of the senses". The human being belongs to the first world on the basis of the "idea of freedom", to the world of the senses *per se*, ie naturally. As a sense-being, man has his own will, which he, however, cannot rely on, especially not as an ethical standard. The sensual *Want* becomes *Shall only* on the condition that "above my will affected by sensual desires there is the idea of a will practical in itself, but belonging to the kingdom of pure reason able to dominate the sensual desires..."^[22] Only then does the ought become a "synthetic sentence *a priori*", which is both unconditional and categorical, i.e. tied to the Cat. Imp., which determines the ought to be based on the "general legislation", so that with it too the Kantian concept of ought ("Sollens-Begriff") stands or falls.

With the general legislation, Kant wants to safeguard the moral law not only morally, but also legally, but thereby ends up in a contradiction between *a priori* and empiricism, among other things because the practice of jurisprudence does not do without *a priori*, and certainly not without empiricism. For this reason alone, the general legislation cannot serve as a foundation for a categorically "pure ought". It should also be noted that legislation consistently arises from material and social necessities and always remains related to them, so that skepticism towards the law, case law and legislation seems to be entirely justified. Even the ancient Romans knew this skepticism, expressed in a nutshell in the motto '*Summum ius summa iniuri*', the highest law can mean the highest injustice, for which an article in the magazine 'Cicero Online' says: "The stronger, the further reaching, the more comprehensive the legal regulatory cosmos, the more the productive idea of justice falls under the wheels, the more the law loses its original function of safeguarding legally protected areas of action."^[23] And Mephisto's classic legal scolding gains all the more weight in Goethe's *Faust I*, where Mephisto fully understands the pupil, who cannot gain anything from "legal scholarship":

"I can't blame you so much / I know how things stand with this teaching. / Law and rights inherit / Like an eternal disease; / They drag themselves from gender to gender / And move gently from place to place. / Reason becomes nonsense, benefit becomes a plague; / Woe to you that you are a grandson! / Of the right that is born with us / Of this, unfortunately, never is the question. "

Apart from a few distortions and exaggerations, such as the complete denial of any relevance of natural law, Mephisto here vividly and emphatically summarizes the common

doubts about jurisdiction and legislation .

With regard to general legislation in particular, the following should also be considered: In order to understand what Kant means by this, it helps to look back at Rousseau's *social contract* (Contrat social), especially since Kant was strongly influenced by it, in particular by the idea of 'volonté générale' , the 'common will' to be exercised by the sovereign, the people themselves. Rousseau distinguishes this will from the 'volonté de tous', the "will of all", which only affects the *totality of private interests*, while the common will should reflect the *totality of the interests of the common good*. In order to satisfy the common will, the sovereign has the three powers - if possible democratically legitimized - at his disposal: legislative, executive and judicial. Rousseau sees the legislature as "the heart", the executive as "the brain" of the community. Both are to be controlled by the judiciary, the right speaking power, because "the people can never be corrupted, but they can be deceived".

When Kant now focuses on general legislation, both as a moral and as a political authority, he seems to be favoring the legislature one-sidedly. The reason for this lies in Kant's concern to allow every individual to actively participate in the political decisions of the community, so that he indirectly even gives them the *right to petition* .

But what neither Kant nor Rousseau took sufficiently into account is the following: private interests, especially those of an economic nature, can endanger and distort the common will and cause considerable damage to the common good, including general legislation. Through the concentration of economic power in private hands new groups arise (e.g. 'pressure groups'), strata and classes, up to and including class struggle. It is well known that only *Karl Marx* and *Friedrich Engels* (see below) succeeded in really recognizing this and analyzing it thoroughly .

It follows necessarily that the universalization of the maxim of the will required by Kant can not at all be required categorically .

The same applies to the peculiar construct of the ' natural formula ' of Cat. Imp., the ethical relevance of which Kant demands *in analogy* to natural law. In fact, the person, even as a legal entity, is also to be regarded as *part of nature*, so that the legality of nature would have to be included in Kant's instance of general legislation, which, however, fails because Kant uses natural law to relate to the world of appearances and not to the world of the transcendently justified ought. An incompatibility, a hiatus that only ends when the idea of a "thing in itself" is given up. There is no doubt that the natural in man is also part of the person who deserves full legal protection and the highest respect as long as he is *sane*. (Whereby I would like to remind you that Kant also describes the naturalness of man as "the animal-like".)

In addition, not only Kant's terms "general legislation" and "ought" are fragile, but also his concept of *duty*, especially since it is also based on a dualism of the world of the senses and the "transcendental" world of thought . According to this, inclinations of all kinds, since they belong to the world of the senses, could never serve as criteria for "unconditional" morality. As is well known, *Friedrich Schiller* criticized it heavily. ("I am happy to serve my friends, but unfortunately I do it with an inclination.") Indeed: There are undoubtedly positive inclinations which can lead to positive, correct actions. Examples: 1. Those who are happy themselves can (and usually want to) make others happy too. 2. Anyone who has a good body feeling or a sense of well-being does not want this to be destroyed by other, mostly malicious people. Rather, meaningful deeds and instructions can grow out of the feeling of well-being, which protect one's own emotional self from harmful attacks. Here, too, what is decisive is not duty but the *inclination* towards well-being. 3. Charity, as Kant rightly sees it, cannot be commanded, but can be practiced voluntarily and consciously without being perceived as a "chore". - In the tradition of such an inclination motifs are similar to: the Golden Rule, the lucky ethics of Aristotle, the Ataraxia concept of the Stoics, the ethics of Christianity and other religions. In addition, further concepts can be sought in the philosophical tradition by means of which the weaknesses of the Cat. Imp. can possibly be compensated. Any form of ethics of behavior control comes into question, including both the concepts criticized by Kant and those based on special Kant criticism.

From all of this it does not obviously follow that Kant's ethics as a whole are obsolete and should therefore be rejected. In addition to the construction errors mentioned, the "unconditionality" of the Cat. Imp. becomes obsolete, however, whereby this does not become a "hypothetical imperative", but can be transformed into a new, *legitimate requirement* that can serve as a component of an ethics of behavioral control (see p. 305 f. 1). Such a newly formulated requirement will also help to review existing ethical concepts of behavior control.

Regardless of the fact that Kant's original version of such an ethics a) consists of a synthesis of the ethics of duty and ought with a personal ethics of values and b) that the Cat. Imp. is no longer tenable as *absolutely valid* .

3. Normative ethics of values? And what's the good (about it)?

"For the good that I want, I do not, but the evil that I do not want, I do." (Paul in Romans 7:19)

If this saying were generally valid, we could want the good, but never achieve it. We would be doomed to evil forever. Or is there speaking, from Paul, a psychoanalyst *avant la lettre*, someone who has not yet read *Sigmund Freud* ? Because Freud relies on ego strength, on the ego's ability to get a grip on the 'it' ("Where 'it' was, 'I' shall become").

No, Paul's sentence cannot be generalized, not even with Paul himself. Especially since it is only to be understood against the background of the apostle's fundamental hostility to the body. In any case, the sentence primarily aimed to provide evidence that *only faith in Christ* can save man from the clutches of evil or "original sin", as it says a few verses later in the 7th chapter of Romans: "I wretched person! Who will deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord "(v. 24 f.). A statement that Paul reinforces in the next chapter, where he writes that the Spirit of Christ made him, Paul, "free from the law of sin and death".

What follows from this? I mean: If you want you can choose what is good, that is, not only wanting the good, but also accomplishing it. However, if there were an (inner-worldly) guarantee or even an automatism, no ethical guidance would be required, not even from the religious side, especially since the downside is that there are hardly any worse advisors than religious fanatics, self-proclaimed "saviors" and the like.

The more I am convinced that we moderns need a new ethic of behavior control (p. 1 -2, aspects 1 to 6). In addition, I see in it the real meaning of my *legitimate request*, regardless of any religious or ideological obligation.[\[24\]](#) *Especially since the universalization of the maxim of the will demanded by Kant cannot categorically be requested.*

At the same time, however, the questions arise a) whether norm and value are not opposing, mutually exclusive concepts, and b) what "the good" actually consists of. If values are not produced merely subjectively, but above all given *objectively*, they belong to the world of being more than to the world of ought. Whereas every norm implies an ought. But how can norm and value coexist at all or even be linked to one another in a normative ethics of values?

In order to gain clarity here, I am relying on a paper that *Detlef Horster* presented in 2007 under the heading *The Relationship of Norms and Values*, in the context of a collection of essays under the title "On the Right That Was Born With Us - Current problems of natural law" (Freiburg, Herder-Verlag). At the beginning Horster refers to a relatively simple solution of the problem proposed by Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. Accordingly, all standards are based on values will emerge from this, whereas the values themselves are "objective", i.e. exist independently from their carriers. It is important to do what is valuable and to refrain from doing what is worthless, which is possible, especially since the norms "guarantee" the possibility of realizing values (op. cit. p. 202).

Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, strictly assigns values to *culture* and his *discourse ethics*, while norms are "universally" valid. This distinction is necessary in order to be able to determine binding norms and generally valid moral concepts. - *Hans Joas* vehemently contradicts this by *describing* values as the "attractive-motivating factor" and norms as the "restrictive-obligatory". Whereby the values could in no way occur without evaluating subjects. Despite such personal ties, there are universally valid values.

"Moral realists" argue completely differently. *Hilary Putnam*, for instance, thinks it is absurd to determine, with Habermas, moral values and norms in a purely cultural-situative manner, i.e. primarily in discourses and conversations. Rather, values apply to Putnam *per se*, as such, because they contribute to the common good, including above all values such as "justice, peace, freedom, protection of life, protection of physical and psychological integrity" (op. cit. p. 209). However, different paths can be taken to achieve this in various cultures. The decisive factor is whether the path taken in each case actually leads to value realization, i.e. contributes to the *well-being of the individual and the community* . A criterion that moral realists consider to be "objective and universal" (loc. cit. p. 210).

Still, the question of what is good remains, which should at least be striven for through values and norms. According to *George Edward Moore*, the adjective 'good' cannot be defined, but the noun 'the good' can. What is good is just good and cannot be defined as a simple term, although the attribute 'good' can be given to every value because the good is the basis of *all* values. And all the more so because one can define the good as "that which contributes to the well-being of the people".

What is "the good" about the values, however, seems unclear. In my opinion, the definition from Ernst Bloch is most helpful here: "Only work plus raw material and material content creates all values; ... "(see p. 173). That work creating values is a good cannot be doubted.

From here there is also a plausible path to the world of standards. *William D. Ross* recognizes that all moral duties are based on the duty to promote the common good ("... there is a positive duty to seek the good of all men", op. cit. p. 211). From which it follows that values can pass into norms: Values are good *in themselves*, and in norms they

become *obligations to the good* . (Which cannot be absolutized in the Kantian manner because people, as bearers of values, are not only intellectual, but also sensual beings.) In any case, it is about an objectivity and universality that *Horster* assumes that it "has not to be justified by natural law ". Rather, it'll be important for the philosopher that he / she simply accepts this fact: "He has to examine it, and he can easily assume that it exists." (p. 213) And this applies equally to values and norms.

Conclusion : I am not at the end of this, but only at the beginning of my research to specify normative ethics or ethics of behavioral control. The aim is, among other things, an ethically founded coexistence between the individual and society. What is *good* for me should also be good for my fellow human beings and therefore reasonable. Conversely, I promote my own good when I do good to others. What this means in concrete terms, i.e. also with regard to the question of the social order (the social system) of a community, will have to be discussed in more detail.

4. Change of values: end of all norms?

When we speak of normative ethics, it is not enough to state that values are always "good" and that everything is good that serves the well-being of the individual and the community. The fact that values in norms become obligations may (or may not) be reassuring, but does not change the fact that both values and norms can be subject to the *change of values*. It therefore seems to me essential to analyze the term 'value' more precisely and to pay particular attention to the change in values. The question to be asked here is whether all values are subject to *constant* change, so that there could be no longer-term valid norm and consequently also no normative ethics of values.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, among others, warns of the alleged dangers of a change in values, whereby she states - especially for the period after 1968 - an increasing *decline in values*, which has led to an unprecedented generational conflict. As an example, she cites the increasing religious fatigue in Western societies, the insistence on individual freedom instead of traditional norms and authorities, the loss of basic virtues such as politeness, punctuality and frugality, a lack of public spirit and disaffection with politics. On the contrary, *values* would first have to be communicated or publicly propagated and promoted.

Helmut Klages distinguishes between two value dimensions: a) that of the "duty and acceptance values", b) that of the "self-development values", which he interprets as "post-materialistic". From this he develops four "types of values": 1. conventionalism (the ethicist of duty), 2. idealism of self-development, with the main interest directed towards "one's own life" (Ulrich Beck), 3. resignation, 4. realism, to which Klages also counts what he calls *the synthesis of values*. Such realism exists when old values are combined with new ones, which even young people consistently achieve. (See: *Changing Values*, Wikipedia, Internet article pp. 3-5.)

In relation to Ms. Noelle-Neumann in particular, it should be noted critically that experience has shown that not everyone adheres to the values of the childhood and adolescence for a lifetime. Many became "68ers" because their western - system of values was permanently damaged, if not almost completely destroyed, by the Vietnam War, imperialism, other excesses of capitalism, authoritarianism etc. - Neoliberal globalization can have a similarly disastrous effect.

In addition, Ms. Noelle-Neumann overlooks the continued existence of traditional guidelines. There are clear tendencies towards more self-development and independence; but this in turn means a *new value orientation*. A love of freedom, self-development and a sense of responsibility are not contradictions in terms! Rather, it shows - even among young people - a clear tendency towards *value synthesis* .

It should be noted, however, that not all values match each other. Not fundamentalism and tolerance, not charity and "will to power", not personal freedom and the "freedom" of those in power to dispose of subordinates as they see fit. Conclusion: Obviously, the "synthesis of values" is not the last word in wisdom either!

However, a new survey on the *parenting behavior of today's parents* is still revealing. The authors of the Allensbach study "*What parents want*" (from 2015) initially state that there is widespread uncertainty about the right parenting behavior, especially in the lower classes. In general, however, there is a clear difference compared to the anti-authoritarian laissez-faire style of the 1970s. At the time, the main aim was to let the children grow up in and to self-development, independence and freedom. On the contrary, today's parents tend to advocate affection and empathetic guidance, i.e. a "loving, affectionate, but at the same time appropriately steering style of upbringing".

In addition, "old" values and virtues such as politeness, responsibility and honesty are regaining great importance. The ten most important educational goals identified in the survey are: "1. Courtesy, good manners (89%) 2. Be responsibly (85%) 3. Honesty, sincerity (84%) 4. Stamina (79%) 5. Helpfulness (79%) 6. Self-confidence (79%) 7. Good, varied education (77%) 8. Independence (77%) 9. Punctuality (69%) 10. Tolerance (68%) ". Overall result: "cascades" of combination possibilities or of *values syntheses* brought up or to be realized . More than 80% of the parents questioned are convinced that the best upbringing is to be "a good role model for your children" so that they - probably - try to meet the personal requirements for at least the most important upbringing goals. (See: <http://www.t-online.de/eltern/erziehung> (id_73233278/viele-eltern-un... or Robra 2015 pp. 343 ff.)

Obviously, no change in value changes anything in the fact that values are consistently positive or have good connotations and serve both the common good and the well-being of the individual, so that values can produce new norms or demands that are perceived as reasonable and "legitimate".

In addition, it is noticeable that values appear very often in the form of *virtues*, which suggests extensive philosophical and historical analyzes (see below). As a guideline and rule of thumb, I propose for this set of questions: *All virtues are values, but not all values are virtues.*[\[25\]](#)

5. From value to norm - despite all conflicts ?

If normative ethics is conceivable and desirable, it must be examined more closely how norms (can) arise from values. Are there any special methods for doing this? Or even automatism? Which definitions of the terms norm and value can be considered decisive? *Thomas Zoglauer* declares: "Standards are action rules stating that a particular act is commanded, allowed or prohibited. In contrast, values represent ideal qualities that people strive for, desire or simply appreciate." To which the author adds, although only by footnote, that a distinction must be made between positive and negative values and that only the positive ones are "striven for by people".[\[26\]](#)

The author of a handout for ethics instruction published by the "*Landesbildungsserver Baden-Württemberg* " ties in with this, adopting Zoglauer's definition of the term *norm* almost literally, but not that of the term *value*, for which no longer "ideal qualities" but "general goal orientations of action" should apply as a criterion.[\[27\]](#) Accordingly, *action-relatedness* now applies as a common denominator for values and norms. A significant, perhaps even highly political change in terms of the ideology of pragmatism! What is overlooked is a) that values demonstrably relate not only to motives for action, but also to internal psychological processes that underlie all motives for action, and b) that being action-related is no guarantee that values and norms are always free of conflict. Zoglauer explains: "Just like norms, values can also compete or contradict one another. A *conflict of values* exists when only one of two values can be achieved. Every conflict of values can thus also be formulated as a conflict of norms. Conflicts of norms and values have the same logical structure "(op. cit p. 30).

In contrast, the *Landesserver* emphasizes the close connection between values and norms. Every value can be realized through a norm, while conversely "to every value can be assigned a certain norm as a rule of action" (ibid.). The *Landesserver* then gives examples of these relationships in a tabular overview, which I reproduce here in excerpts:

value (= general goal orientation for action)	standard (= specific instructions for action)
justice	"You should treat everyone equally!"
responsibility	"You should be responsible for the consequences of your actions!"
environment	"You shouldn't destroy nature!" "You should preserve the environment!"
Life	"You should not kill!"
freedom	"Everyone can do what they want, as long as they don't restrict anyone else's freedom."

It remains unclear here, however, why, in every case, the value has to be reformulated into a norm. The question of whether the table-marked assignments of conflicting values and norms remains unaffected. If such conflicts cannot be resolved and managed, norms and values cannot coexist in plausible assignments.

I consider the *strategies for conflict resolution* that Zoglauer discussed in his book to be all the more valuable. These are 10 "rules of priority", which I am referring to, partly in brief, as follows:

1. Fundamental rights take precedence over utilitarian considerations.
2. In the event of a conflict between two equally important values, a compromise should be sought.
3. Consequentialist: Which compromise leads to the least possible damage?
4. Benefit and damage can only be weighed against each other if rules 1.) to 3.) are followed.
5. Look for fair compromises!
6. Moral obligations are more important than non-moral ones.
7. "Universal moral responsibility usually takes precedence over responsibility for tasks and roles."
8. The "primary moral responsibility is mostly paramount!"
9. The common good comes first!
10. Security technology has priority over commercial interests.[\[28\]](#)

These priority rules, which probably also apply to every type of *mediation*, clearly show normative as well as ethical principles, including respect for the person (No. 2, 3, 5 and 10), the priority of fundamental rights and values (No. 1) and the primacy of moral law (No. 6 to 9). Consequently, it can be assumed that a normative ethics of values is not only desirable, but also indispensable for resolving conflicts of values and norms. In any case, the fact that such conflicts exist should not lead to the erroneous assumption that normative ethics of values cannot survive in cases of conflicts of values and norms.

Therefore, the question that both Zoglauer and the *Landesserver* apparently left unanswered can now also be dealt with, namely the question: on what necessity values are (or must be) transformed into norms. It is important to note the following: The pragmatic definition of value as "goal orientation for action" falls short because, as I said, values not only relate to motives for action, but also to the *internal psychological processes* that make up the motives for action. Any will is accompanied by *feelings*. If I decide to take a refreshing bath, I will feel comfortable beforehand. Not, however, when I am forced to run through heavy rain without protection, for example, because I do not have an umbrella at my disposal. The refreshing bath has a positive value here, the heavy rain a negative one.

Similar contradictions emerge if one examines more closely how all perceptions, ideas, thoughts and (non-) linguistic concepts are accompanied by feelings. It becomes clear that conflicts of values and norms not only arise intersubjectively, but also in one's own soul life. A prime example of this can be found in Goethe's Doctor Faust, who exclaims desperately: "Two souls live, alas! in my chest!" And by that he means his inner turmoil between his instinctuality and his striving for the highest rationality, between "it" and reason. Since Faust sees no other way out of this dilemma for himself, he enters into the pact with the devil, which promises him the greatest happiness despite all the conflict. *Wolfgang P. Olschewski* comments on this: "It seems to me that what seems to be opposing in us always comes to light when we categorize what is present in us as good or bad and reject the apparently bad in us. Every self-rejection creates inner tension, as if the poorly rated was struggling for its position in existence. An imagination about the value of openness could show me that inner tension can dissolve when we are open to what is within us. Ultimately, everything existing is welcome to the open person. For him, the various qualities are not mutually exclusive, they are included. They can coexist. The possibility of the coexistence of seemingly irreconcilable opposites shows us the inner world again and again in the value imaginations when we ask about values and get into the realm of the spiritually unconscious." [\[29\]](#) - So a lot depends on which values we choose. *Value imaginations* - and not just "motives for action" - determine our ability to endure and overcome internal conflicts. This also applies to other polar opposites, such as: egoism vs. altruism, Eros vs. Thanatos, self-realization vs. commitment to others, self-confidence vs. loss of self-esteem, (original) trust vs. nihilism, belief vs. unbelief, knowledge vs. not-knowing, etc. Inner harmony is apparently preferably achieved through *values imagination*.

Nevertheless, it remains to be clarified on the basis of which motives or necessities values can be transformed into norms or are actually transformed. When it comes to values such as justice, responsibility, truth and freedom, their negations easily come to mind: injustice, irresponsibility, falsehood, bondage. They are negative factors that undoubtedly belong to the genetic and / or cultural heritage of humanity. If you let them run free everywhere - instead of the positive values they negate - you would put not only yourself but also society in extreme danger. If nihilism takes the place of (basic) trust, a prosperous coexistence of individuals can no longer be possible.

But how can such dangers be averted, such destructive forces conquered? Probably only through intersubjectively valid, as generally binding rules as possible, i.e. *norms*. If, instead of using the mere value concept of 'environment', I formulate the request "You should preserve the environment!", I get reliable guidance, I know what to do with; whereas without norms the values are endangered or even negated. And *without values, human existence loses its hold*. To avert this, one transforms values into norms. If values become norms, they are saved and secured in them. Those are processes in which value ethics and normativity are combined, normative value ethics becomes *concrete*.

6. Limits of ethics

In a lecture in 1994, *Niklas Luhmann* drew a consistently negative balance of the efforts to promote "academic ethics". [\[30\]](#) Since the beginning of modern times, attempts have repeatedly been made in vain to establish a universally valid morality. Luhmann sees the reason for this failure in the fact that it was not possible to "find undeniably good reasons for doing good and not rather bad (= consciously bad)" (op. cit. p. 19). Which has "quite simply formal reasons", namely because "absolutely bad" cannot be distinguished from "absolutely good": "Because if one wants to observe with the distinction between good and bad, one cannot assume that *one side* of this distinction, namely the good, at the same time legitimizes the distinction itself, which also contains evil." (ibid.) - In doing so, Luhmann actually shifts fundamental questions of ethics into the realm of formal logic. The fact that people have always differentiated between good and bad is of no interest to Luhmann, because in reflecting on this distinction he encountered a formal contradiction.

On the contrary, Thomas Zoglauer rightly points out that ethics is a "dynamic system" in which one is constantly confronted with new conflicts "and may never achieve its goal of creating a conflict-free system" (loc. cit. p. 311). However, one has to ask whether it makes sense at all to set such a goal for ethics; Ethics essentially refers to values and norms, not to the whole of being or even just society, although values and norms, similar to the ought, are based on experiences with reality.

Moreover, if social being determines consciousness, as Marx assumes, the ought - qua consciousness phenomenon - should also be derived from being, which, however, is not the case, but would lead to *naturalistic false conclusions*. Social being and ethics are not the same, not identical. A "conflict-free system" has not yet been produced anywhere, not even on the occasion of previous attempts to establish classless societies. All the more, this will not be possible by means of a conceptual ("superstructure") authority such as ethics, especially since its effectiveness is necessarily limited by the relatively clearly definable limits of ought, values and norms.

In addition, the following should be considered:

- a) Ethics cannot compete with mathematics; it cannot establish anything irrevocable.
- b) The areas and possibilities of action of individuals and societies are not manageable and sometimes only extend as far as their judgment. They are areas of activity that cannot be determined in every detail by any ethics.
- c) It is not uncommon for conflicting goals to be dealt with only temporarily using ethical means.[\[31\]](#)

If values become norms, they are saved and secured in them. These are processes in which ethics of values and normativity unite, normative ethics of values becomes *concrete*. - Especially since there are also *negative "values"*, even if values - and with them morals and ethics - always arise through *work*. It is all the more important to combat the effects of negative values, such as the misuse of weapons and other criminal acts of all kinds. *Here, too, ethics has its limits, as it can in no way replace the judiciary*. Further, highly significant limits can be seen in the political and social system conditions (see p. 309 ff.).

A "conflict-free system" would probably be synonymous with Marx's *realm of freedom* in an *association of free individuals*. To realize this utopia, it requires perhaps the cooperation and joint efforts of all people, especially on the political, socio-economic and technological field, but certainly not without involving ethics, not least in view of the actual threats and hazards (see p. 1-2).

SECOND PART

Traditional ethics of behavior control

Although there seem to be limits and manifold problems with every ethic, its origin can be traced back to the distant past. This retrospective is necessary in order to find out a) how norms arise from values, b) how these norms have actually worked and c) how - among other things on the basis of concrete experiences - a new ethics of behavior control can be established after Kant's justification has proven to be partially fragile or untenable.

7. Early tribal religions

In his search for a "primordial religion", *Hans Küng* did not find anything. Instead, he discovered in early tribal religions what he called the *original ethos*, for which he stated: "Because that is the conviction of the indigenous people: What is good comes from primeval times, all the material and spiritual goods that need to be preserved. After all, it is the ancestral beings who, with their thoughts and actions, have established the norms for customs and traditions." [32] Apparently there is no original religion, but there is an *original ethos* (op. cit. p. 19). The reason for this is obvious: the anthropological constant of the innate ability to judge, which the "indigenous peoples" (such as the Australian Aborigines) used to give their children the various concretizations of "good" and "bad", and complement it with the ethical concept of good and evil. They were helped by the belief in something immortal in the ephemeral - the supposedly invisible eternal in the visible - and, derived from this, the " **eternal, uncreated life force** " effective in all things (p. 21), which of course also includes the centrally important *Sexuality*, which, however, does not cause frivolity, but "deep **reverence for all life**" (p. 24 f.). This can easily be combined with several unwritten ethical norms, such as " **reciprocity, justice, generosity** (for example in mutual giving)", which do not require any mandatory tables to be observed (ibid. P. 25).

It should also be noted that the primordial ethos of the primitive peoples is based on valuations, while the values themselves gradually emerge, change and also (can) disappear again .

8. Early values

In the course of time, the need to record values and norms in coherent *value doctrines* became all the more urgent . Such teachings were by no means invented in the West, but rather, for example, in China and India long before the birth of Christ. Based on the teachings of *Gautama Buddha* (the "enlightened one") who lived between about 560 and 480 BC., *Mahayana Buddhism* declared nirvana to be the divine absolute. And this absolute lies "behind the veil of the individualizing *Maya* as the *principle of all beings and all values*" [33] (emphasis added). - In ancient China, the Taoism handed down from *Lao Tse* - probably in the fourth or third century BC - came to similar views. The Tao is considered on the one hand as the unfathomable, ineffable divine, on the other hand as "the highest good, the principle of all beings and all values", which man can only attain through "self-denial", i.e. through humility, self-humiliation and love for all creatures (ibid. p. 13).

9. The Ten Commandments

Almost without exception, their content can be found not only in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but also in almost all other religions. In this way and beyond, they are based not only on the general moral law (especially in Kant and in Catholicism), but also at least in part on most of the legal systems in our world. It is all the more noticeable that these commandments are now being radically questioned on the one hand, while on the other hand they still find positive feedback and reception. The first, for example, in the atheistically shaped "Humanist Action", the second in the Catholic-inspired "Herder Commentaries". [34] In tabular form, this controversy can be presented as follows:

bid	Herder comment	Humanist. action
1. I am Yahweh your God. You shall have no other gods besides me.	Protection of Monotheism in a polytheist environment. God as a person. In Christianity: Preamble to all bids.	"Put into the mouth of God, dispensable and doubtful; possible basis for Patriarchy, hierarchy, and 'Führertum' (NS-leadership)."
2. You should not make yourself an image of God and do not abuse the name of the Lord.	Ban on cult images. Securing God's Freedom "Abuse ... especially where human things are idolized and humans take the place of God."	"At least since <i>Erich Fromm</i> ... also dispensable." There is no need to mention God, or to speak about him.
3. You should keep the holiday holy.	Signs of God's covenant with Israel. "Even today, people around the world keep on ... weekly - handy rest day: Fridays in Islam, Saturdays in Judaism, Sunday in Christianity."	Not useful, stimulates contradiction. "The Jews even officially use most different tricks to evade this bid."
4. Honor your father and your mother, so that you may prosper and live long in the land.	Generational contract, strengthening the family, aging with dignity, new reciprocity.	"... a pedagogically completely untenable requirement. ... If children are not sufficiently respected by their parents, then even a bid as the fourth is of little use even if granted by bonus promises. "

5. Thou shalt not kill ("murder").	Absolute reverence for life. Keep the peace and protect life!	Comes from the times of blood feud. Needs no particular mentioning - because "for mature people ... it goes without saying".
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6. You should not commit adultery.	Was meant "originally... not as conjugal loyalty in moral sense," but family protection "against illegal devisees".	"A command corresponding to the moral concept, according to which the woman was a property of the man, is dispensable nowadays. "
7. You shall not steal.	Personal responsibility of the person. " Demand for a functioning social system ". "No one should be forced to earn his / her living by stealing."	"A matter of course for mature people."
8. You shall not say anything wrong about your neighbor	Protects "the basis of human life, in court and from the envy of others."	Also "a self-evident demand".

9. You shall not desire your neighbor's house.	Protection of the basis of human life.	"A matter of course for somewhat civilized people . "
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10. You shall not desire your neighbor's wife, his slave, his ox or his donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor.	as for 8. and 9.	"This demand is also dispensable as a commandment."
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Most of the formulations of the commandments come from the books of Moses or from analogous adoption of the sources. The following is noticeable about the controversy: While the "Herder Commentaries " (hereinafter abbreviated as "H.-K.") attempt to do justice to both the original and the current meaning of the Ten Commandments, the author of the "Humanist Action" (in the following with the abbreviation 'HA') rejects all commandments. A mediation between these strictly opposing positions seems to be ruled out. Nevertheless, I think it makes sense and is necessary to appreciate the arguments for and against in the table and to weigh them against each other. While a *tertium comparationis*, an instance of comparison, is needed that can probably be obtained if the *values on* which the commandments are based can be found out.

The Catholic theologian *Peter Egger* remarks that the Ten Commandments, which he considers to be "more relevant than ever", contain "the basic values of life".[35] He determines these values by first reproducing the 10 commandments in partly his own, partly abbreviated form and then assigning them the values derived from them, which can be tabulated as follows:

Commandment (norm)	(Basic) value
1. You should believe in a god!	Belief in God
2 You shall not abuse the name of God!	Reverence for God
3. You shall keep the day of the Lord holy!	Worship of God
4. Honor your father and mother!	The family
5. You should not kill!	The living

6. You shall not commit adultery!	The love and marriage
7. You shall not steal!	Ownership
8. You shouldn't lie!	The truth
9. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife!	The loyalty
10. You shall not covet the property of your neighbor!	The social peace

Compared to the biblical original in Moses, however, this new version results in some significant changes, if not distortions. So by Eggert reducing the 1st commandment to "belief in God", at the expense of the H.-K. rightly recognized further contents monotheism and personality. In the second commandment, Egger does not mention the ban on cult images. He interprets the demand for holy holidays in the 3rd commandment exclusively as "worship of God". From the 8th commandment he crystallizes "the truth" as a basic value, after he has extended the prohibition of defamation contained in the commandment to include the entire phenomenon of "lying". Between the 9th and 10th commandment he exchanges the terms 'house' and 'your neighbor's wife' and then determines the values of *loyalty* and *social peace*, although 'loyalty' is more likely to be assigned to the 6th commandment, to which he also - and probably inadmissibly - assigns the term 'love' as a value. (Which, however, can also be taken as an indication that there are other basic values in addition to those contained in the 10 commandments that must be observed.) - Egger's reduction of the 10th commandment to "social peace" is also incomprehensible, although, similar to the 7th and 9th commandments, it is primarily about the property problem. -

Egger explains the current significance of the basic values he has determined as follows: "These basic values are the pillars of religion and morality. There is no religion without faith, reverence and worship of God. Without the protection of family and life, love and marriage, property and truth, loyalty and social peace, there is no long-term

life for the individual and the community. *Up to now there has not been a people in history who has permanently given up these basic values with impunity. In most cases the disregard for these basic values was the real reason for the downfall of the individual peoples.* "(Ibid., emphasis added by me)

In doing so, Egger goes well beyond the validity claims contained in the commandments, and in the controversy between the H.-K. and the HA are discussed. While these consistently offer standards for assessing validity claims, Egger does not always succeed, especially not with regard to the values of love, loyalty, truth and social peace that he has established. - The following is even more worrying: Egger wants to justify ethics and morals primarily religiously - as *God's commandments* - although these commandments, and even more so from the 10 basic values determined by Egger, show that they are only partially justifiable on a purely religious basis. Strictly speaking, the latter only applies for the first three bids with their explicit duties of man to God, for example, whereas the (basic) values 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10 are probably constituent parts of every legal currency. Fidelity is primarily the subject of discussion in general morality, and truth plays a role above all in philosophical theories, such as cognition theory and epistemology. In other words: Egger's commandments and basic values 4 to 10 do not require any religious foundation at all. Why Egger, however, postulates the latter, probably derives from the following reasons: He wants to justify and affirm the obligation of all believers to the 10 commandments, prescribed in the 'Katechismus der katholischen Kirche' (a) as an expression of a supposedly "natural law" and b) as "serious obligations of each individual", ignoring the fact that these "obligations" have become generally binding only in the secular *legal* systems. (Which *Kant* cleverly takes into account by implying the moral law in the categorical imperative, but not holding it down conceptually, but replacing it through the category *General Legislation*.) Whereas Egger tries to remedy the *lack of legal obligation* ('Rechtsverbindlichkeit') of the 10 Commandments by - very bold - claiming that nations which disregard the so-called "Basic values" (partly not even contained in the commandments!), were to decline, if not doomed to ruin. In addition, it is important to note that the author *does not give any examples* of such allegedly historically proven cases.

All of this leads me to believe that from Eggert's concept [36] no continuous *tertium comparationis* can be obtained, but only occasionally an aid to argumentation. I will probably have to be the *tertium comparationis* or synthesis myself.

And so now to that

Controversy between the 'Herder-Kommentare' (H.-K.) and the 'Humanistische Aktion' (HA)

To the 1st bid

In the Mosaic original, God introduces himself with his Hebrew name *Yahweh* ('he is, he proves himself'). It is different in Martin Luther's catechism, where it says: "I am the Lord, your God, ...", with which God from the beginning emphasizes his claim to unconditional and unrestricted rule. Is the command therefore "dispensable", as the HA thinks? Only if it were *all* about a claim to power. No, because when God says "I" right at the beginning, he is immediately addressing the I, the person of the addressee, who hears or reads the word "I" and pronounces it internally. The Pietists referred to this internalization as "direct filiation with God". - However, *Yahweh* connects this with an exclusive right of representation: "You shall not have any other gods besides me!" And in this way forbids any worship of idols, which in certain manifestations has remained relevant to this day. So what? Was this prohibition, at least, dispensable because it was ineffective?

In any case, it still forces us to think about whether there even might be a highest value (*summum bonum*) that should not be negligently disregarded or replaced by some kind of idol (money, power, self-realization, etc.). In this respect, the first commandment already leads to the question of the original ground of being.

But can this command also be the cause of undesirable social developments such as "patriarchy, hierarchy and leadership" (see above)? Probably only if *Yahweh's* claim to autocracy repeatedly produced such distortions. In reality there are other reasons for this, including the conventional distribution of roles, conflicts of interests, ideologies of power, agglomeration of power, crisis situations - just think of the inglorious rise of National Socialism - and so on. What is indisputable, however, is the fact that certain rulers were *ideologically committed* to religion or have used the belief in God in order to legitimize their own claims to rule. A misuse that does not invalidate the actual, personal value of belief in a Supreme Being ('l'Étre Suprême' of the Jacobins). Behind the whole thing there could be a *supreme omnipotence*, whose effectiveness, however, exceeds any imagination. If God is present as a person in man, this could serve as a basis to justify the personal dignity of every individual - as is indeed proclaimed in Christianity, where the first bid is probably rightly respected as the "Preamble of all the commandments". Even if this does not yet contain any knowledge, but only a "certainty of belief".

To the 2nd commandment

The ban on cult images was certainly justified at the time it was created by Moses, as it was, among other things, a matter of preventing the worship of images of gods and idols. Such a necessity hardly existed in later times. I see a late echo of the ban in the *hostility towards images* of some reformers since the 16th century. The "reformed" believers should focus on their internalized *faith* and not be distracted by images. - I dare to doubt whether a ban on cult images still makes sense today. It becomes completely superfluous when it actually turns out to be "dispensable", as HA claims; whereby this offers a relatively simple recipe for how an abuse of the name of God can be prevented, namely to simply stop using the word 'God', which ultimately amounts to atheism, denial of God.

On the contrary, to deny God and his name can mean to act against better knowledge: Whether God exists or not, cannot be proven, so to me *agnosticism*, not atheism appears as plausible and acceptable.

Furthermore, trying to prevent or forbid the use of the name of God would be completely unrealistic. In contrast, I consider it sensible to warn against the abuse of the name of God in the form of deification of man. "What a person's heart hangs on is actually his God." Because of his arbitrariness, such a god is completely non-binding and not suitable to serve as the basis of ethics and morals. In addition, if one does not know whether God exists, it does not mean that belief in him becomes impossible. However, belief cannot be the sole basis of ethics because any norm can only be generally binding if it is linked to the law or to Kant's general legislation.

To the 3rd commandment

Is a command superfluous because it is not obeyed? Hardly likely. Precisely because people do not sanctify the holiday, do not respect the holiday quiet, the commandment is necessary, which admonishes them to the contrary. However, it cannot be overlooked that no one can be forced to obey the commandment. In France and elsewhere, shops are also open on Sundays without preventing anyone from practicing their beliefs. - The special position of Sundays has been hollowed perhaps by the fact that almost everywhere Saturday has also become a day off, so that the long weekends are easily exploited in other than religious purposes. But all this does not change the fact that the religious holiday is also respected and guaranteed by the State - so as Friday in Islamic, Saturday in Jewish, Sunday in Christian states.

To the 4th commandment

It dates from a time when the children were all responsible for their parents' old age, and therefore does not owe its existence to "parental upbringing errors", as the HA claims. For the same reason it is absurd to declare this commandment to be "pedagogically completely untenable", especially since it serves no pedagogical purpose at all. What is required, however, is mutual, not one-sided, respect.

For the 5th commandment

Are criminals always minors? Hardly likely. If the HA were right, we would consequently have to demand the deletion of the paragraphs on murder and manslaughter from the penal code; an absurd demand in view of the permanent threat and destruction of life and limb from such crimes. - There is disagreement as to whether the formulation of the translation should mean "to kill" or "to murder". "Murder" undoubtedly means a weakening, especially since it does not even take into account the legal facts of manslaughter. - I still seem to take to heart the interpretation by the *Heidelberg Catechism* of 1563, in which it is required to include one's own person in the prohibition of killing in the broadest sense: "I should not revile, hate, insult or kill my neighbor with thoughts, words or gestures, especially not in the act, not even with the help of others. I should rather put aside all thirst for revenge, not harm myself or willfully put myself in danger. That is why the state also has the mandate to prevent killing through its legal system. "

To the 6th commandment

The original protective function of this command no longer exists today. However, whether it is "dispensable" in the sense of the HA must still be doubted. We live in a time that is characterized on the one hand by increasing emancipation, on the other hand by ever higher divorce rates, overstimulation and temptations of all kinds, so that the meaning of the prohibition of adultery must be rethought. The main victims of a divorce are the children. Bride and groom should therefore carefully examine whether they believe the envisaged marriage bond will have a long enough shelf life at all.

To the 7th commandment

A similar objection applies to HA as with the 5th commandment. On the contrary, convincing is the H.K. commentary, which emphasizes the protective function of the command and its help for personal responsibility. On the other hand, the slightly mocking sentence "Property is theft" appears problematic. What is acquired through honest work cannot be degraded to stolen goods, not even in a satirical way.

To the 8th commandment

If this command with HA were "natural", there would be no need to discuss the criminal offense of *defamation*. Incidentally, I would repeat what I expressed in my criticism of Egger regarding his interpretation of the 8th Commandment (see above).

To the 9th commandment

In relation to the position of the HA, should be reaffirmed what I remarked on the corresponding HA announcements on the 5th, 7th and 8th commandment. When livelihoods are at stake, one should beware of belittling.

For the 10th commandment

The same applies here as to the 9th commandment.

Conclusion

The Ten Commandments still provide moral guidance. But alone with them, no behavioral control ethics which can be obtained, notably so not because the 10 commandments as such today no more no more imply any *legal binding*. In addition, it is true that a religious belief almost always contains specific instructions for action; but because of the variety and multiplicity of the different beliefs that exist today, it is completely out of the question to derive normative and at the same time absolutely binding, generally applicable maxims for action from a certain belief. It is all the more important first of all to obtain the greatest possible clarity about the similarities and differences between the religions.

10. Values in religions

Those who are shaped by the Christian tradition may find it difficult to do justice to those of different faiths. In light of this, it seems helpful to first look for what the religions have in common. What is the religious connection between us and others? A few years ago (2007) the '*Interkulturelle Rat in Deutschland e.V.*' provided valuable information on this, whereby it should be noted that the 'Council' ('Rat') has taken this information from the '*Abrahamic Forum*', a forum in which Jews, Christians, Muslims and Bahá'is work together, so not all world religions. To promote the development of "the Christian West to Abrahamic Europe", the forum raises out the following *common values*:

1. Belief in the *one* God, the God of Abraham, albeit in different interpretations.
2. Man is regarded as the "image of God", in Islam as the "governor of God".
3. The high value of *justice* can help to secure world peace and to overcome global poverty.
4. For peace, against violence and terror!
5. Preserve creation!
6. For hospitality (as with Abraham), against racism and hostility to strangers![\[37\]](#)

It is well known that such values are not yet recognized everywhere, let alone realized. Thankfully, not failed the Abrahamic Forum to mention the obstacles that stand in the way between the common values of the religions already due to the continued, sometimes drastic differences (or even incompatibilities!). These differences are not to be denied, but to be *respected*. To be named:

1. Neither the Jews nor the Muslims accept the Christian understanding of Jesus and the Trinity.
2. Neither the Jews nor the Christians share the Islamic esteem of the Prophet Mohammed and the Koran.
3. Bahá'is believe in "messengers of the gods" (e.g. Baha'ullah), which is rejected by Jews, Christians and Muslims.
4. Religious practice, church services, understanding of missions, etc. show some serious differences.
5. In addition to certain social, cultural and historical development factors, the age of the religions also differs.
6. On some questions of equality (of men and women) and of human rights there is no agreement so far.

Various measures are proposed to overcome such differences, particularly in the educational sector, and through increased scientific and cultural exchange and interreligious dialogue.

I think it is questionable whether these goals can be achieved through "approximation to the norms largely adopted in Europe" (p. 2). Different *norms* have been internalized too much through socialization and upbringing, and the associated social and political constraints too strong. An attempt would have to be made to reach an understanding not through norms, but through *common values*, whereby of course the non-Christian religions not mentioned so far must also be taken into account.

This also applies to the question of what the "core" of the religious similarities could be. Here is a quote from O. Petersen: "I believe that in all great religions the same thing is meant by true love: It is the wish that other beings are well, especially when they experience very severe suffering. And that is ultimately the common core of all religions in the field of practice."[\[38\]](#) - What is noteworthy here is the expansion of love, understood as charity (*caritas*) and compassion, to "other beings" and thus to nature and the environment in the broadest sense.

It should be noted, however, that many people - especially in countries outside Europe - have little or no access to the material resources required for such "charitable work".

What is indubitable, however, is that the value of 'love' is also based on the ability to value, namely probably the innate ability to differentiate between 'good' and 'bad'. This means that all religious values are likely to be based on (or can be based on) *non-religious* values. I think that is the "core" of the matter.

Nonetheless, the value concepts of non-Christian religions deserve more detailed analysis. Some standard works provide detailed information on this, such as the handbook *Ethics of World Religions* (Darmstadt 2005) published by Michael Klöcker and Udo Tworuschka, as well as several works by Hans Küng, in particular the *Global Ethic Project* (Munich 1992) and *Searching for Traces - the world religions on the way* (Munich 1999 in 2nd edition). Also recommended: Hans Küng / Karl-Josef Kuschel (eds.): *Declaration on the Global Ethic. The Declaration of the Parliament of the World Religions*, Munich 1993.

The "Handbook of *Ethics of World Religions*" shows the extent to which religions try not only to influence but also to regulate the lives of believers in all areas. In a different, alphabetical order, complexes of topics are dealt with, such as: health, sport, sexuality, contraception, abortion, clothing and nutrition; Upbringing, education and media use; Human rights, the environment, globalization, war and peace, etc., under each keyword for the world religions Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism.

In doing so, the authors also want to do justice to recent historical developments, not least in the field of technology and computer science, whereby they do not fail to recognize that not only encounters and interpenetration take place between religions, but also rivalry, conflict and dispute.

Even more ambitiously, Hans Küng presents his 'Project Global Ethic', on which, to his mind, depends even the survival of mankind. For him, however, the ethical basis is not just the concept of humanity, but also "religious peace", which is to be achieved through interreligious dialogue. Religious peace is the prerequisite for world peace. Küng wants to stimulate the "global conversation about the basic consensus of values, attitudes and standards" (op. cit., blurb).

A *parliament of the world religions* convened in Chicago in 1993 for the project, to which belonged no fewer than 6,500 people from "125 religions and religious traditions". They agreed on four guiding principles of the *Global Ethic Declaration*, namely to 1. non-violence and respect for life, 2. solidarity and fair economic order, 3. tolerance and living in truthfulness, 4. equality and partnership between men and women; in each case as *culturally* binding, i.e. as an obligation to act accordingly.[\[39\]](#)

From a value-philosophical point of view, I consider the fact that all of the above-mentioned guiding principles are not only religious, but above all (*cultural*) *philosophical* and *political* recommendations, so that they can also be accepted by non-believers. Particularly noteworthy is the astonishing foundation of this worldwide ethos declaration in a single formula, in the *golden rule*: "What you don't want someone to do to you, don't do it to anyone else!" This rule should be "the immovable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations and religions."[\[40\]](#) Whether the Golden Rule actually lives up to this very high standard will be examined below.

11. The golden rule

When *Confucius* (551-479 BC) was asked what moral behavior consisted of, he is said to have replied: "Meet people with the same courtesy with which you receive a dear guest. Treat them with the same care with which the great sacrifice is made. What you don't want yourself, don't do it to others either." The Roman Emperor Alexander Severus (208-235) allegedly formulated accordingly: "Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.", in English: "What you do not want to be done to you, do not do that to anyone else." A formula that is quoted as a proverb to this day and already in other earlier religions, such as Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. Jesus is said to have turned it positively as follows: "Now whatever you want the people to do to you, do it to them too!" (Matthew 7:12)[41]. Today's comments are by no means uniform, but rather contradictory. In a statement by the 'Ethics Workshop', on the one hand, the Golden Rule was said to be "an ingeniously simple rule of thumb that therefore provides valuable services in the moral education of children", but a little later it was very critical: "Apparently the Golden Rule fails those cases where the actions of someone else are disadvantageous for me ..., but where the advantages for the other ... are generally seen as more important." [42] What is meant by this becomes clearer when one looks at how *Kant* (1785) criticized the Golden Rule: "Don't think that the trivial *quod tibi non vis fieri etc.* ... could serve as a guideline or principle. Because ... it cannot be a general law, since it does not contain the basis of duties towards oneself, not of duties of love towards others (because some would like to agree that others should not do them good if they could only be rid of being obliged to show them benevolence), finally not of the duties owed to one another; because for this reason the criminal would argue against his punishing judge, etc." [43] It is noticeable here that Kant rejects the golden rule mainly because it lacks the obligation and thus the binding force of a general law. In fact, it is easy to construct similar eventualities in which the golden rule fails, for example when a traffic ticket attendant develops scruples about giving a parking offender a parking ticket because she doesn't want to get a ticket herself. [44]

In addition, I would like to point out the following: What happens if someone disregards the Golden Rule because he thinks it is more advantageous to pursue only his own interests? Which can go so far that someone eliminates or even liquidates his opponents, so that they can no longer "do" anything to him. For example, if there capitalist rulers is allowed not only to intervene in the economy of other nations, but to also drive large parts of these nations into misery, this is only possible because there appears to be no ethical, political-morally and legally qualified instance that prevents or punishes such attacks. Here it becomes fully apparent what the main shortcoming of the Golden Rule is: the lack of legal protection and / or lack of legally binding force. The best rule does not help if it is repeatedly disregarded - and usually with impunity.

All the more astonishing is the fact that the Golden Rule in the 'Global Ethic Project' was held to be "immovable" and "unconditional". The inevitable question here is how this claim is to be assessed from today's perspective, i.e. more than 20 years after its proclamation. In between, unfortunately, lies the terrible human and cultural catastrophe "Nine Eleven", September 11, 2001, the most vicious slap in the face of the global ethic so far; the opposite of what the Chicago parliamentarians had hoped for and demanded. How did that happen? The main reasons for the catastrophe are probably political and economic. *Which undoubtedly does not change the continued legitimacy of the Chicago demands.* - The situation is different, however, with some of its implications in the context of the "Global Ethic Project". For example, *the assertion that world peace mainly depends on religious peace has not come true.* Achieving complete, sustainable religious peace (e.g. through the Golden Rule) seems hardly possible despite many similarities, especially since some of the theological and ideological differences - and especially those that are reinforced by power politics - are sometimes so blatant that they do not seem to be overcome, at least for the time being to let. [45]

12. Hinduism and Buddhism

a) Hinduism

All Indians were originally referred to as 'Hindus', today only those who belong to the Hindu religious community. The history of this religion spans a period of approx. 3500 years, during which time new systems and currents were created. The ancient Indian period of the *Veda* (plural: Vedas, a collection of scriptures, which contain a whole literature) extends from about 1500 to 500 BC. The "Vedic way" soon leads from polytheism to the search for unity and the possible ground of the world, the primal ground of all things in the universe. In parallel to the emergence of the caste system, it is mainly those who are priests who are at the top of the caste hierarchy who take *care of this*: the *Brahman*, whose religious thinking is sliding more and more into spiritual spheres. In which a rather pessimistic basic evaluation of existence occurs according to which all existence has fallen victim to *suffering*; a strange evaluation gradually taking the place of original happiness and life-affirmation. On the other hand, the *Upanishad teachings* - originally esoteric, i.e. typically only intended for a small circle of initiates - offer new "remedies": the concepts of Atman and Brahman, of transmigration of souls and redemption. [46]

Atman means internalization, path to the self, while Brahman, the absolute, also arches this path like all others in the universe, whereby in these principles, unlike in Jews and Christians, an "essential unity" of God and man is to be achieved. Understanding this is said to be beyond the limits of reason, cognition, and science. It is about deeper-lying *truth*, which is by no means accessible to everyone and cannot even be "put into words". Even "the chosen one" can only approach this truth through strict self-discipline and asceticism: "Fasting, rest, silence, strictest concentration and self-discipline, with complete withdrawal of attention and willingness from the outside world - these are the preconditions that enable the spirit to come through all the deceptive sheaths of the Maya to the core of the self, to the Atman. Whereby the "veil of the Maya" means the illusion that arises through the diversity of the world of appearances and prevents true (self) knowledge. (cf. Störig, op. cit., p. 48.)

Such esotericism changes largely in the historical period following the time of the Upanishad teachings, i.e. in the time from approx. 500 BC. Because now the authors of the scriptures are also clearly recognizable, philosophy no longer addresses itself only to the initiated, but to the general public, and no longer in a learned language, but in the spoken language of the people (cf. op. cit. p. 52). A new image of man emerges, but still not in the sense of western individualism, but in relation to overarching systems of order (family, society, cosmos). The individual should fit into these systems. Everything revolves around four principles, which can also be called 'values' or 'goals in life' or 'purposes of existence', namely 1. 'Karma': "the pursuit of pleasure and (above all sexual) enjoyment", 2. 'Artha': "the accumulation of riches, wealth and power", 3. 'Dharma': "the practice of personal and social responsibility within the cosmic order" and 4. "Moksa": "the achievement of liberation from all karmic bonds regulated and all suffering which secular life consists of." Karma means 'the continuing fate of man in good and bad deeds'. Of the principles, *Dharma* deserves special attention, if only because of its extraordinarily broad scope. Coming from Sanskrit, it means, in addition to a basic meaning 'fabric': "Order, law, custom, regulation, rule; Duty, virtue, good works, religious merit; Nature, essential property, characteristic". [47] The word 'Dharma' etymologically goes back to a root 'dhr' ('to hold') and therefore means a world ground, a substance that supports everything, from the smallest to the largest in the cosmos and thus also to the totality of the Human being. Dharma is quite comparable to the basic, all-pervading "life force" of tribal religion, sometimes also comparable to the LOGOS, but over which it goes well because it also involves "the law of God", Nature, Morality and nearly all areas of life, including food and hygiene regulations. *Eternal happiness* can be achieved by those who stick to these rules and know what their duty and tasks consist of, including when people live together. (Whereby "non-violence, truth, non-stealing, purity and control of the senses" are considered universal, that is, they are part of the duties of *all* people. Cf. Yogawiki, op. cit., p. 6)

As a universal ethic, Dharma combines with the central idea of *justice*, as well as with the absolute ('brahman') and self-discovery in the Atman. 'Tat tvam asi' - 'that's you' is the formula *Schopenhauer* enthusiastically quoted, which describes the self's ability to empathize with another self. It is the ability to compassion and 'compassionate' (Schopenhauer's "Mit-Leiden"); anticipating modern *empathy* whose neural basis brain researchers have detected in the *mirror neurons*!

Dharma is considered an excellent means of self-preservation and self-realization. It was also considered to be "man's only refuge", which affords protection against the "six enemies" familiar to every Hindu: 1) worldly desires, 2) anger, 3) avarice and greed, 4) delusion and spiritual darkness, 5) arrogance, 6) envy and jealousy (cf. *Dharma* loc. cit. p. 8).

In Hinduism, new religious and ideological systems have been created time and again. Among them the most famous and - in various forms - most practiced is *theyoga* system, a term that is often misunderstood, particularly in Europe, and for example associated with enchantments, curiosity, obscurantism etc.

Linguistically, the word *yoga* is related to the German 'yoke' and means something like discipline, self-discipline and asceticism. The practicing yogin wants to gain "deepest insight, rapture and redemption" through meditation (Störig, op. cit., p. 84). The spiritual foundations for the gradual path to this goal are mainly Dharma, Atman and Brahman. From the physical, so the "correct sitting" and breathing regulation, it goes up to the purely spiritual, via an internalization of the senses, "concentration of thoughts on a single object to the exclusion of all others", contemplation and meditation, right down to the deepest "immersion and ecstasy", so that the yogin gains insight into the ultimate things and the source of the universe. (The latter is a state that supposedly cannot be described in words.) - In addition, the yogin should be able to gain supernatural powers and abilities, such as "understanding the voices of all animals; ... walking in the airspace; ... mastery of the elements" and in general cognition and knowledge of everything that is generally considered secret and enigmatic (cf. Störig op. cit. p. 85 f.). - Whereas, outside of Hinduism, the "transmigration of souls" is considered as a scandal, a stumbling block of the first order.

b) Buddhism

An amazing phenomenon in more ways than one! It originated more than 2500 years ago in northern India when the prince's son *Siddhartha Gautama* (c. 560-480 BC), who came from Nepal, had his enlightenment experience. 'Buddha' - in English the 'awakened', the 'enlightened' - is his name of honor.

At least two things are astonishing: 1. It is a *Dharma*, a religious (?) worldview that has spread, over the centuries, in a truly peaceful way, namely without any bloodshed (!), over almost all of Asia, finding up to now followers worldwide. 2. If Buddhism is a religion at all, it is - at least originally - a *religion without God*, which to us may seem illogical, if not absurd. What is certain is that Gautama himself did not worship a creator god and under no circumstances wanted to be worshiped as a god himself. His teaching evidently took on traits similar to religion only long after his death ("in the centuries around the turn of the ages").

But what was Gautama Buddha himself thinking? He was very well aware of what his renunciation of all theism meant: to put people in the center and even on themselves! He, Gautama himself, is said to have said: "It is foolish to assume that someone else could bring us happiness or misery." Further: "And whoever ... now or after my death will guide himself, will be Refuge to himself, will not seek external refuge, but will stand by the truth as its guideline ... and will not seek refuge in anyone but himself - it is he who will reach the very highest height." (Quoted by Störig *ibid.* p. 68.) Which may even correspond to modern conceptions of self-determination and self-realization. The question is, however, what Gautama understands by "truth" and how it should or can become a "guideline" for the life of the individual.

For this, it is necessary to scrutinize Gautama's *theory of values*. What values did the "enlightenment" reveal to him? First of all, it is the *Four Noble Truths* that are supposed to help "to answer primal questions of human beings and to see through and cope with the world as well as one's own life". Hans Küng explains four questions and their answers. The questions are: 1. "What is the suffering?", 2. "How does the suffering arise?", 3. "How can the suffering be overcome?", 4. "In which way ..." can the overcoming success? - The answers: 1. "Life itself is suffering: birth, work, separation, old age, illness, death.", 2. Suffering arises from "thirst for life, from clinging to things, from greed, hatred and delusion." But that results in rebirth after rebirth.", 3. Only "giving up desire" helps to overcome suffering. This is the only way to avoid new karma, the result of good and bad deeds, and to prevent a re-entry into the cycle of births.", 4. The method, the path to this is the "path of the reasonable center - neither pleasure nor self-chastisement." Gautama called this path the "eight-fold path to the right of life", or even: the *eight-fold path to nirvana*, whereby he understands Nirvana as the "going out", i.e. the ending of greed, hatred and delusion". (See Küng *op. cit.*, p. 160 f.)

The "holy" eight-part (or eightfold) path actually consists of the following eight value concepts: "... right belief, right thinking, right speech, right action, right life, right striving, right remembrance, right contemplation" (Störig *loc. cit.* p. 59). Whereby "right..." must of course not be misunderstood politically! The eight value-terms can be combined to form a three-part value system consisting of 1. *wisdom and knowledge*, including right thought, remembrance, recognition and belief, 2. *ethics and morality*, with rules of conduct to talk, action and to Life as a whole, 3. *Collection and meditation*: "right immersion".

To 1.: It is important to recognize both world-things and one's own ego in their mutual dependence and "emptiness" (i.e. only relative validity). Such knowledge is a prerequisite for developing an ethically justifiable attitude. This requires extensive and intensive self-observation and self-examination: What are my motives? Is it maybe just selfishness behind them? Instead, how do I find the right attitude towards my fellow human beings, namely kindness, compassion and peacefulness? Knowledge and ethics should act together: From knowledge and wisdom arises morality and morality leads to wisdom and knowledge!

To 2.: Ethics and morals relate specifically to speaking, acting and leading a life. Speaking: One should not talk carelessly, not slander, not lie, not sow hatred and discord. Action: The *basic value* of Buddhism is *not to harm any being*. Specifically, partly as in the Ten Commandments, even if not under threat of punishment, but rather as recommendations on the way to liberation (nirvana) and a meaningful lifestyle: *do not kill, do not steal, do not become unchaste (e.g. through illicit sexual intercourse), not lie, do not take intoxicants*.

To 3.: This is about right concentration, mindfulness and meditation. Equanimity, benevolence, compassion, empathy, sympathy, and mutual expression of joy should be practiced. Benevolence, also a central term in Buddhism, is also translated as "goodness or unlimited love". Benevolence is free from any possessiveness; it is a completely positive attitude towards others, without affection, but also without hatred.

Thus should be clear what Buddhism understands by selflessness, self-examination and self-realization. It's not just about "live and let live", but also about the right, i.e. ethically justifiable, way in which I live and respect the life of my fellow human beings and, wherever it seems acceptable or necessary, I can help shape it in a positive way. [\[48\]](#)

13. Ancient Greek metaphysics

a) The Delphic Oracle: "Know yourself!" and: "Nothing in excess!", Freud vs. Nietzsche

At first glance, the two demands of the oracle of Delphi, whose heyday began in the 9th century BC, seem to make sense. Man should examine and explore his own self without falling into hubris, i.e. becoming arrogant or even making himself the measure of all things. (What *Nietzsche* did not shrink from, for example, when he emphasized: "Yes, this I and the ego's contradiction and confusion still speaks most honestly of its being, this creating, willing, evaluating I, which is the measure and value of things." [\[49\]](#) This is an arbitrary shortening of the "homo-mensura sentence" formulated by *Protagoras* (480-410), according to which man is "the measure of all things".)

In contrast, the Delphic Oracle demands unequivocally from everyone to be measured, to be aware of his limits; what the Romans adapted in their 'Neque nimis!' ('And nothing too much!').

The three basic components of the famous *gnothi seautón* are easy to determine: 1. self-knowledge, 2. the ego, 3. the self. The precise analysis, weighting and evaluation of these components prove to be less straightforward. In order to get ahead here, I will compare two proposed solutions in the following: Nietzsche's plea for the body on the one hand and Freud's commitment to a strong self on the other. In the chapter "Of the Despisers of the Body" contained in his *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche argues as follows: Anyone who despises the body for sheer pride in spirit and reason misses everything essential, namely that the *body* itself is "a great reason" which, however, "doesn't say I, but does I" (*loc. cit.* p. 28). Because for Nietzsche the spirit only fulfills certain functions of the body and "soul is only a word for something on the body" (*op. p.* 27). The nature of man can be measured from the latter and not from reason, especially since behind the ego stands the *self*, which is identical with the body, so that the body turns out to be "a powerful master, an unknown wise man", who even rules the spirit: "The creative body created the spirit as a hand of its will" (*op. p.* 28). The body, and not the spirit, builds "bridges to the superman". In contrast to Kant and the German idealists, Nietzsche constructs a completely new hierarchy in which the body represents the actual self of man, the body subordinating to itself: self, ego, soul, spirit, reason and understanding.

Sigmund Freud may have known Nietzsche's assumptions. (Even if *Thomas Mann* denies this [\[50\]](#)) His model of levels and layers of id, ego and superego at any rate occasionally sounds like a replica to the tirades of the inventor of the superman. Freud sees in the 'it' (id = 'Es'), i.e. in the engine layer, the oldest base layer of the body, but he is careful not to subordinate the I to the 'it', on the contrary, he demands: "Where *it* was, shall be *I*". ("Wo *ES* war, soll *Ich* werden.") To achieve this, the I is always able because of its specific abilities: The ego not only has the musculoskeletal system, but also fulfills the task of self-preservation and self-assertion, for example by mediating between the id and the normative superego.

In any case, an act of the ego is "correct if it simultaneously meets the requirements of the id, the super-ego and reality, that is, knows how to reconcile their claims with one another." [\[51\]](#)

With which Freud indirectly admits that mediations of this kind do not always succeed in the ego. Especially since he states that the id contains "the actual life intention of the individual", so that *sexuality* in the area of tension between eros and the "death instinct" (thanatos), or eros and "destrudo" (destructive instinct), has a special meaning (*loc. cit.* p. 11). All this, however without any prejudice to the skills that Freud attributes to the ego, namely to control the engine layer, too.

What follows from the sometimes diametrically opposed views of Freud and Nietzsche? To this end, it is advisable to critically examine the two positions and compare them with one another. - In contrast to Freud, Nietzsche does not cite scientific evidence for his claims. His motivation is not based on scientific interests, but on ideological and religious-philosophical reasons. He strictly rejects the Pauline-Christian dualism (manicheism) of "flesh" and spirit - probably rightly - but overlooks, in the heat of the moment, so to speak, some serious facts: When spirit and soul are "something on the body", this is particularly true of the verbal language, so that the "body-reason" is by no means silent, on the contrary, only by means of the language human beings can fully develop reason and understanding and experience them sensually, i.e. express themselves in a comprehensive (or incomprehensive) way, order the world of objects, perfect intersubjective communication. With the language, people can even achieve *healing results*, so in psychotherapy. In these subject-object functions, the linguistic *spirit* confers to the body its species-specific *human dignity*. There is no reason to oppose the spirit to the body or to subordinate the spirit to the body - this in contrast to Nietzsche's protestations. The body cannot completely control the mind, and vice versa the

same is true.

I consider to be even more serious the fact that Nietzsche, unlike Freud, simply ignores the dark side of corporeality, especially the instinctual strata. Freud knows very well that the ego does not always manage to control the id (with catastrophic consequences in connection with criminal tendencies!), whereas Nietzsche makes no mention of the problem at all. The reason for this: Nietzsche "transfigures", exaggerates the corporeality in every respect and hurls his conclusions at those "despisers" who consider the body "something sick": "The healthy body speaks more honestly, the pure, perfect and right-angled one: and he speaks of the meaning of the earth." (op. p. 27). With which, however, the author contradicts himself, because here the body *speaks*, in complete contrast to what is asserted a little later ("he doesn't say I, but does I", see above). - Another contradiction: Nietzsche subordinates the ego to the body, although shortly before he called the ego "the measure of all things".

Sigmund Freud expresses himself less enthusiastically, but realistically, even if he also incurs contradictions, for example when on the one hand he grants the id "the real life intention" and on the other hand demands the subordination of the id to the ego. In order to properly appreciate the proportions and relationships of body, soul and spirit, instinctual layer, self, valuation and normativity, more recent findings, such as those of *Benjamin Libet*, would have to be consulted, which I must reserve for later considerations.

How I and self are (can be) connected, becomes conceivable, among other things, on the basis of the comparison of the concepts of Freud and Nietzsche. What about the first "basic component", the demand for self-knowledge, the exploration of one's own self? Research presupposes researchability. This becomes a problem in the case of the demand for self-knowledge in view of the facts a), that no brain has yet been researched almost completely, and b), that the neural web of possible combinations in the individual brain is infinite, unmanageable and mathematically impossible to grasp. *Rosa Luxemburg's* "I was, I am, I will be" must therefore be supplemented by *Ernst Bloch's* "I am, but we don't have each other; therefore we first become." *We are* persons and *we become* personalities. I don't fully understand what I was in the past, I don't know it with 100 percent certainty. My being in the now passes from one moment to the next, runs forward into the uncertain future and into certain death. Reason enough not to declare myself (my "I") to be the measure of all things! I will only become what I am, so I am *not yet*. Self-knowledge only seems to be possible at all under such complex conditions, if it remains a constant task, an ongoing agenda. "I am who I am", only Yahweh can say of himself.

b) Pre-Socratics: Heraclitus and Democritus

"Everything flows. - In the same rivers we rise and we do not rise, *we are and we are not*. - One cannot step into the same river twice ... - War is the father of all things, the king of all things. - I am researching myself. [521] "Sayings" of this kind identify the "dark" *Heraklitus* (approx. 545-483) as one of the founders of *dialectical thinking*. Another contradiction characterizes the basic principle of his ethics: Humanity has a reliable compass, the *logos* - and thus language, reason, understanding, meaning, speech, structure and "the general law", factors that give meaning to all beings. Still, the world is in a mess because few people are ready to follow the Logos. Heraclitus rebukes the masses: "For the meaning of the doctrine as it is here, people never gain an understanding, neither before they hear it nor as soon as they hear it. Because although everything happens according to this sense, they still resemble untried ones; as often as they try themselves out on such words and works as I am discussing them, according to its nature, each decomposing and explaining how it behaves." From this, the author derives his normative demand: "*It is therefore a duty to follow what is common*". But although the meaning is common, the many live as if they had their own insight. "(loc. cit. p. 23, emphasis placed by me). It seems as if Heraclitus anticipated in part what *Kant* understood about 2000 years later by 'duty' and 'general legislation'.

Heraclitus poses the anxious question of how the Logos can be established at all. His answer: not through a lot of knowledge and not through turning away from the truth, for example in favor of poetry, as is customary in large parts of the population. On the other hand, he teaches that the logos must also serve the community as a regulating power and reliable orientation, because it is the basis of the entire *cosmos* (i.e. the ordered universe!): "All human laws derive from the one, divine one-<; because this commands, as far as it only wants, and is sufficient for everyone (and everything) and is even above it." (aO p. 30). It was granted to him, Heraclitus, to recognize such things, because he "explored" himself, a possibility which he by no means only made use of for himself; rather, it was "granted to all" (ibid.). So it is only a matter of following the (divine) Logos in all thinking and doing.

Democritus (approx. 460-370) is known and famous for his materialistic atomic theory. Less well-known is the multitude of his sense, thought and admonition sentences, which contain a wide range of ethics, which one can only really do justice to in special investigations. Nevertheless, I pick out some of these sayings in which a well-ordered inner attitude based on life experience and prudence can be recognized, with which Democritus not only aims at the fulfillment of duties but also at gain in pleasure, so when he declares that it is "better to reprimand one's own mistakes than foreign ones "and:" If the inner being is well ordered, then life is also in order." [53] Wisdom helps to "well think, talk well and do what is obligatory." In addition, everything depends on maintaining moderation and always being aware of the limits of one's own abilities and possibilities: "Because moderate abundance is something safer than overabundance." Gaining pleasure cannot be reached without discipline and moderation (op. p. 100). And like Heraclitus, Democritus refuses to want to achieve such goals through much knowledge. Unlike Heraclitus, however, Democritus recommends not mere law-abiding, but patient persuasion: "... whoever is led to duty by conviction, on the other hand, is unlikely to make a mistake either in public or in secret." (Ibid., p. 109). But only "fools" could do without a *zest for life*. And against excess, Democritus does not set the ultimate goal of gaining pure pleasure as his ultimate goal, but rather "good cheer ..., well-being ..., imperturbability ..." that is achieved by keeping away restlessness and violent movement and by seeking to keep the measure in everything. [53] - Democritus is not only one of the first authoritative materialists, but also one of the leading moralists of his time.

c) Socrates and Plato

Plato's teacher *Socrates* (469-399) apparently took inspiration from Heraclitus and Democritus when he taught that nobody knowingly does wrong; whereas his view that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice seems to have grown out of his own "crap". Jan Rohls writes about the unity of knowledge and virtue that he propagates: "Virtue is ... identified with knowledge. I cannot at the same time know what is good to do and not be morally good. ... for Socrates, that ethically relevant knowledge is not about the neutral knowledge of any matter, but about knowledge that is a skill." (op. p. 46).

A first, albeit not systematically elaborated, *value theory* can be found in *Plato* (427-347), whereby *teleology* can be regarded as a prerequisite for this value theory. Plato orients himself - teleologically - on the best possible, i.e. "on perfect form, highest goal and noblest purpose" (see below).

But how should the best possible not only be thought but also achieved? For Plato it is only conceivable in the *idea of the good*, which is at the center of his philosophy. The best possible is what is perfect, that which is perfectly good. In the parable of the sun in *Politeia*, the doctrine of the state, it says: "This, then, which gives truth to the knowable and the knower of the faculty of knowledge, I define as the idea of the good. ... The objects of knowledge receive not only the being known, but also the existence and essence of the good, which is not itself a being, but protrudes beyond it in sublimity and power." [54] (Whereby "force" is of course again a teleo-logical expression of considerable importance.)

Only the good gives a *value* to all other ideas - and thus to all being - Any value in general depends on the idea of the good. The good is the actual goal cause, that is, the origin and goal of being. In an Internet text log it says: "The idea of the good (the good in itself) is one with *divine reason* (...), with the demiurge who has designed everything in the best possible way according to the ideas (...). God cannot be the cause of *evil* (...); this has its basis in the resistance of matter, the formless, indeterminate, disordered (...), or as Plato later explains, in the "evil world soul", which he contrasts with the good (...)." [55]

In his doctrine of the state, Plato links this conception directly with his doctrine of virtues: the perfectly good contains and at the same time establishes all *wisdom, bravery, prudence and justice* - and thus the four "cardinal virtues" that Plato initially presents using the example of the idea of an ideal state, *justice* being the basis and essence of all virtues - and therefore central for the life of the Individual. Justice can only be maintained, however, if as far as possible everyone contributes to it, i.e. according to their abilities, contributes to the common good as best they can. This requires inner harmony in the individual, from which arise not only the mental balance, but also all other personal goods of happiness - such as health, well-being and beauty -. If a person acts contrary to these ideals, i.e. against the good, he falls victim to all kinds of vices and ugliness, physical and mental weaknesses and diseases.

In addition, Plato creates a connection between ethics and politics with the virtue of justice: "Wisdom as the knowledge of the good is ... not only an individual, but also a political virtue." (Rohls op. p. 55 f.) What, however, also means a) that his state (that of the "Politeia") is ordered strictly hierarchically from top to bottom, and b) that those who can rule in the state are only those who possess the divine highest good, who thereby have recognized and internalized the idea of Good: the philosophers. And with this, Plato designs - on the basis of his theory of values and virtues - a "critical counter-model" against the political grievances of his time (Rohls, op. Cit. P. 57). - What Rohls does not mention, however, is 1. the fact that Plato himself failed when he tried to put his state model into practice in Syracuse, and 2. the fact that tyrants and dictators - up to fascists and Nazis - have repeatedly invoked Plato's non-democratic, totalitarian draft.

d) Aristotle (384-324)

was a student of Plato for 20 years before he conceived his own *theory of values* and norms, primarily in his *Nikomachean ethics*. He relates teleology both to being and to the knowledge of the whole of reality (see below). From teleology alone, however, one cannot infer the value and meaning of the objective and subjective world of objects. *Action can be refused*. Acting just for the sake of acting (as in some forms of actionism, pragmatism and voluntarism) makes little or no sense. This was known to Aristotle, who felt compelled to develop a theory of the valuable and the good. It should be noted at once that Aristotle uses the terms "value" and "good" as almost synonymous

(which can also be recognized from different translations into German, e.g. the *Nicomachean Ethics*).

The fact that Aristotle completely integrated his theory of values into his ethics becomes immediately understandable. In addition, the multitude of different topics that the author deals with in his 'Nicomachean Ethics' appears to be informative. It's about democracy, law, political theory and the constitution, but also about art, courage, justice, thinking, friendliness and honor, ultimately apparently about the entire range of philosophical topics and disciplines.

The differentiations of the concept of value that Aristotle undertakes are all the more interesting. He wants to find out the "ways and means to a good and happy life"^[56], namely a) on the basis of analyzes of the actual ways of life of his contemporaries and b) on the basis of his *soul theory*. A threefold foundation of the theory of values emerges from this, namely in life practice, in psychology and in ethics or philosophy as a whole.

The foundation of the theory of values in the doctrine of the soul means the following: In principle, a person can use all three parts of the soul - reason, "striving" and the irrational - in order to achieve his goals. In principle, there is also agreement about what this goal is: *happiness, a blissful life* . However, people do not agree on *how* this - apparently top priority - goal is to be achieved. For *Aristotle*, in any case, not on the path of indulgence. Rather, it calls for a certain inner, *moral* attitude and a corresponding dealing with the *values*, under which he understands essentially two things: first the external fortunes (i.e. above all things of the outside world), and second the "higher", spiritual and spiritual values that are striven for for themselves, whereby the highest value seems to be something that "is inherently assigned to us and not easily removable" (ibid.). In particular, Aristotle means the following: All people need external goods of happiness. Even the morally superior is dependent on them. However, they are goods of *relative* value, i.e. the possibilities of their use depend "on happy and unhappy external circumstances"^[57]. This means: "As much as there is in these things themselves (namely, things like gold and iron and cattle, etc.), they are capable of producing useful effects under certain circumstances." (Ibid.). They are *practical* values, which not only include material goods, but also, for example, laws and legal systems.

The practical values become problematic as soon as they are in abundance or excess, for example in the case of an unsuitable diversity of legal regulations. Goods or "objects of value" are of relative importance, i.e. "*not goods or values for everyone*" (ibid.). Such overabundance can become useless or even harmful, namely "when there are so many of them that not only their utilization in the service of good by their owner becomes impossible, but the care for their preservation and acquisition draws the owner away from the realization of primary values."(ibid. p. 29) An overabundance of practical values can destroy them themselves and endanger the very existence of their owners. Oskar Kraus even claims in this context that it is about aspects of the "*anti-capitalist* teaching of Aristotle, which has often been discussed" (ibid.).

What about the "higher" values that noble people should strive for on their own initiative, that is, out of an end in themselves and for their own sake? Aristotle says of such striving in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that it is "valuable and enjoyable at the same time"^[58]. So he does not warn against any kind of enjoyment, but only against enjoyment for ignoble motives, against enjoyment for the sake of enjoyment. True happiness can only be found in a *virtuous life*, from which one can conclude: "That is why we do not reasonably call an ox, a horse or any other animal blissful. Because no animal is capable of participating in such an activity. And for the same reason, no child is happy either, since because of its age it cannot yet be active in the way it was intended, and when children are called that way from time to time, it happens in the hope that they will become so one day. *Because, as I said, perfect virtue and a full life are part of happiness.*" (ibid. P. 17, emphasis mine). However, there can be no guarantee of lasting happiness, since people can repeatedly experience severe suffering, even in old age.

But what does Aristotle mean by "full life"? That can't be a meager, miserable life. We only find out about it almost at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. A virtuous, blissful life cannot consist of an insolent, frivolous "Larifari" (=nonsense); on the contrary, it is "a life of serious work, not a funny game...", because: "We call the serious better than the joking and funny, and we always call even more serious the activity of the better part and people." (ibid., 248). Virtue and happiness do not go hand in hand with fundamental lack of enthusiasm, on the contrary: they cannot be achieved without a certain amount of hard work, seriousness, commitment and noble disposition.

Only under such conditions does it make sense to think about the highest happiness values. Aristotle finds this in thinking itself, which enables people to internalize themselves, i.e. to concentrate on their essence and end in themselves, and ultimately lead them into metaphysical and religious, if not mystical dimensions: "If happiness is activity in the sense of excellence, with good reason it can be understood to mean the highest level of excellence: but that can only be that of the supreme power in us. May the spirit or something else be this force, which one is certain to be essentially ruling, leading, directed towards noble and divine objects - whether this force itself may be divine or that what in us may be "the divine element" - *perfect happiness is the working of this force according to its peculiar excellence*. We have already established that this work is a spiritual seeing . ." (In: Gerhardt op. p. 41, emphasis mine.)

From this power, man is also able to take over and cultivate the *virtues* that the community (the polis) offers him. Aristotle distinguishes between dianoetic virtues of understanding and ethical virtues of character. The former include, above all, cleverness (insight), wisdom and "understanding", the latter include bravery, prudence (moderation), generosity, respect and shame. Ethical cardinal virtues - such as bravery, moderation and generosity - lie in the "golden middle" between two extremes that must be avoided : bravery between recklessness and cowardice; the moderation between lust and dullness; the generosity between waste and avarice.

It should be noted that Aristotle recognizes the highest value of human existence in thinking and in the rational "full life". He understands this life teleologically as the "pursuit of happiness", whereby it is reason that can lead to the divine and from there to a true, happy life - even if there is no guarantee of lasting happiness. The following should be considered: Only in *God* does the pursuit of happiness come to rest, because for Aristotle God is the "immobile mover" who consequently unites finiteness and infinity, the rational and the irrational, and finally abolishes mortality in immortality. In this respect, God ends the restlessness of earthly life and instead lets infinite happiness appear. The thought of this happiness can put an end to man's fear of misfortune, suffering and death and open up the meaning of his existence to him.

Criticism of Aristotle's ethics of happiness

One of the most resolute opponents of the Aristotelian happiness ethic, the so-called 'eudaemonism', is *Kant*, whose duty ethic has, however, lost its binding force (see p. 7-16), so that it can no longer simply be regarded as the superior one. Therefore, the conflict between the two philosophers needs further discussion; the following questions could be asked: 1. "Is it acceptable to prefer philosophical happiness to practical reason - or should the relationship of these two sorts of reason must be determined otherwise?" 2. "Can and should we actually orientate ourselves to lived virtues, or do we have to look for independent (autonomous) goals?" 3. "Is the concept of an ultimate goal (namely happiness) suitable at all to explain moral action?" (In: Gerhardt op. p. 42).

Kant repeatedly insists on the autonomy of the will, which he considers to be "the only principle of all moral laws". Just blessedness could not be this principle, because it can produce "maxims, but never such" capable of *laws* of will, especially because happiness depends mostly on individual phenomena, that is: quite different experiences and assessments, so that here "the difference in judgment must be endless". Kant's conclusion: "So the principle of happiness does not prescribe the same practical rules to all reasonable human beings, although they have a common title, namely that of bliss. The moral law is thought to be objectively necessary, only because it should apply to everyone who has reason and will."(ibid.) There could not be "general happiness" as an ethical maxim, but the moral law as a duty .

Which refers to two Kantian principles that have since proven to be fragile, that is, to be untenable in their *categorical* form (see above) - Kant has been criticized also by *Otfried Höffe* (1971), who nevertheless tries to mediate between Kant and Aristotle, while he points out: "The ethics of striving and the will are two models that each reflect one aspect of human action; these are setting, those are pursuing goals. A complete model of human action only emerges from both models. *Kantian and Aristotelian ethics* are not in this regard *competing but corresponding ethics*. Playing Aristotle and Kant off against each other, accusing one or the other of a lack of reflection, hardly leads any further.

On the other hand, it makes sense to measure both ethics against each other, to recognize the different interests on which they are based and to look for a model of human action that unites both interests in the mediation of the ethics of striving and that of the will." (In: Gerhardt op. p. 45). -

However, I see a fundamental difficulty in the fact that *action* tends to be assigned to the area of practical phenomena, whereas *ethics* is more based on reflection. In order to cope with this difficulty, experience has shown that it is not enough to rely exclusively on Kant and Aristotle, especially not when it comes to establishing a new, contemporary ethics of behavior control. To this end, numerous other traditional ethical concepts must undoubtedly first be consulted. Only then could it be possible to answer the third of the "key questions" mentioned above, provided the associated problem of the *ultimate justification* does not turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle. What are "final goals", what can they be?

e) Epicurus (341-279)

"Live in secret!" is Epicurus' maxim for action, which sounds more like an invitation to not act, which, however, would amount to a misunderstanding. Behind the motto there is an attitude that is probably based on negative personal experiences and certain negative historical developments - such as the decline of Attic democracy. Epicurus compensated his aversion to political and other public activities by seemingly attaching highest value to other forms of community life. So of friendship and conviviality, as he himself cultivated them in his "garden of philosophy". He even remarks: "Of all the goods that wisdom knows how to procure for the happiness of a whole life, the greatest by far is the ability to make friends."^[59]

Epicurus considers the greatest happiness and perfect life to be worth striving for and attainable. Even if only under certain conditions. He does not reject sensual desires as a matter of principle, but warns against misjudging them; so he distinguishes between a) necessary, b) natural and c) harmful desires, in order then to note possible combinations of these factors:

“Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, the other natural and not necessary; some others are neither natural nor necessary, rather arise from empty delusions.” (op. cit., p. 83) Such delusions and the harmful desires on which they are based, must always be avoided or combated.

The bliss of life should not be spoiled by anything, not even by the thought of death, the end of life. Death is a terrible evil, but ultimately also “nothing”, because “when we are there, death is not there, but when death is there, we are no longer” (ibid. p. 68). With the fear of death, the fear of life disappears; the wise man appreciates life and tries to determine his own future. The goal is not to live as long as possible, but as comfortable as possible. Fear of death and of overpowering gods would only impair the joy of life. Epicurus therefore combats certain traditional ideas of God: “But he is not godless who seeks to remove the ideas of God of the great multitude, but rather he who attaches the views of the great multitude to the gods” (ibid. P. 67). Intervention in the freedom of the individual can no longer be granted to the gods. These are tones critical of religion that one looks for probably in vain in Plato and Aristotle. - Last but not least, Epicurus derives his theory of values from a twofold teleological approach: the goal, purpose and meaning of human existence is *happiness*, enhanced by *joy*. Those who strive for happiness can best achieve it through joy.

D) Stoic happiness: Ataraxia through virtue

In contrast to Epicurus, the Stoics (from approx. 300 BC) seek the meaning and goal of existence not in joy, but in peace of mind, the 'ataraxia', i.e. in the harmony of man with himself, with society and with Nature. To this end, they develop a certain image of man and a certain view of nature. The Stoics consider the latter to be causally and ultimately causally (entelethetically) determined, so that they consider the things of the outside world (the external goods) to be unavailable.^[60] So it is not the things themselves that are decisive, but their *evaluation*. But this must be ethically founded, i.e. it must be based on morally impeccable deliberation and insight; the ethical foundations or principles of behavior must be correct and responsible.

Every action in the Stoa becomes good if it is based on or is accompanied by reasonable deliberation and moral insight. Everything that is contrary is bad, especially actions based on *affects*, to which the Stoics include “pleasure, displeasure, desire and fear” (ibid.). These affects can only be combated through the correct use of reason.

Only those who observe all of this can hope to find happiness and peace of mind, whereby it is crucial that the supreme virtue, moral insight, rule, from which arise all other virtues - justice, bravery, knowledge, etc. - As knowledge, virtue becomes “teachable and cannot be lost” (ibid.); so, almost like Aristotle, virtue is dependent on education and practice. Nonetheless, a natural disposition can come to the rescue: the “appropriation” ('oikeiosis', ibid.): Humans have to evaluate things in a meaningful way, they have to find out which things are naturally appropriate to them, i.e. which are useful (“beneficial”) and which are not. Only then can he rationally satisfy his natural striving for *self-preservation*. Reason should become his second, true nature. And only then will man be able to transfer *appropriation* to the whole of society and ultimately to all of humanity.

Conclusion

In the ancient value doctrines and maxims of action there are some shortcomings. Plato's metaphysics, the basis of his theory of values, is not convincing, especially since it has already been refuted by Aristotle with regard to the theory of ideas. With Aristotle it is unclear whether happiness is ultimately to be sought in virtue or in the divine or in both. Furthermore, arguments against the Aristotelian happiness ethic were put forward by *Kant*. Some shortcomings in the teachings of Epicurus and the Stoics have been pointed out by the skeptics. Above all, their criticism of the Stoics' exaggerated belief in reason seems justified. I also consider the stoic tendency to radical internalization to be unacceptable. I find Epicurus' total rejection of the state and politics, of public life in general, understandable, but not exemplary. - Seen as a whole, the conclusion seems to be justified that in this deficiency situation, i.e. as a result of the weaknesses of the ancient value doctrines, main reasons are to be found for the fact that the time was ripe for a completely new value doctrine.

14. Christianity

a) Jesus, Paul and love

What is new about Jesus' teaching on values? It is reduced to a simple denominator: the then *completely new justification of human dignity in freedom and equality of all people before God*. The “crux” or the difficulty in this, however, lies in the fact that this thesis initially only seems to be justifiable theologically, so that atheists cannot be prepared to accept it. If all people are free and equal only before God, then all who do not believe in God reject this justification.

This rejection turns out to be even more harsh when atheists learn that the re-establishment of human dignity is based on an alleged salvation of God, namely on the incarnation, the *incarnation of God*. “... God loved the world so much that he gave his only Son ... so that the world might be saved through him”, says the Gospel of John (chap. 3, v. 16 f.). Sacrificial love for the world and for people is therefore a prerequisite for the incarnation. Jesus names two commandments as the most important maxims for action: love for God and charity. Man should love God “with all his heart and soul”. And Jesus adds: “You should love your neighbor as yourself”. No other commandment is greater than these two. (Mark 12, 29-31) If you look for more detailed explanations, you will find such in particular in Jesus' *Sermon on the Mount* and in the 1st Corinthians of the Apostle Paul. In the Sermon on the Mount, the “Beatitudes” are followed by six “antitheses” to the Old Jewish Law and the Ten Commandments (with some additions), then considerations on “true piety” (including Our Father), then the Golden Rule and finally a series of final admonitions. In addition to the basic value of justice, the Beatitudes are essentially about the virtues of humility, non-violence, mercy, a pure heart, the ability to make peace and the willingness to endure suffering and persecution. Without exception, these values can be assigned to *justice*, which Jesus emphasized twice. At the same time, it seems that full justice can only be achieved in the *kingdom of God*. In any case, Jesus obliges his disciples and followers to do so by relativizing almost all other values, namely even those of material support for life (food, clothing, etc.): “But you must first be concerned with his kingdom and his righteousness; then everything else will be added to you” (Matt. 6:33). (Incidentally, a sentence whose reversal *Hegel* once said with amusement: “First try to eat and drink, then everything else will come to you too!”)

In addition, every form of violence, revenge and retribution should be avoided; “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” can no longer be the motto. Direct confrontations with opponents are to be avoided. One should not hate enemies but love them. Charity and piety should not be displayed. - Jesus mentions the *golden rule* more casually and in a conspicuously concise form (“What you don't want someone to do to you, don't do it to anyone else!”). With Jesus it reads: “So whatever you expect of others, do it for them too!” (Matt. 7, 12). The fact that Jesus only mentions this rule in passing, is probably due to the fact that he does not see it as competition, but as a supplement and confirmation of his value teachings.

There should also be no hypocrisy or display in prayer. The *Lord's Prayer* is supposed to strengthen the religious and spiritual community of believers through its we-form (“... as we also forgive our guilty parties”); believers who may feel guilty and needy towards God and, moreover, are exposed to temptation and evil. Those who pray ask God for short-term help out of these dangers, even if they know (or believe) that the long-term evil will only completely disappear in the kingdom of God.

Taken as a whole, the Sermon on the Mount and the Our Father are certainly part of the *foundations of the new covenant of freedom from the law*, which Jesus promises to his people. With it he wants to replace the old covenant that God once made with Moses - Moses with God. Jesus offers the new covenant to all people on the occasion of the last supper before his death on the cross. He identifies this covenant with the symbolic cup of his blood which he offers to the disciples. The new covenant is sealed in the faith in Christ's resurrection and in his missionary mandate: “Go into all the world and teach all peoples and teach them to keep everything I have commanded you!” - In addition, do not forget the fact that Jesus himself pretends to be one of the highest norms by declaring that he himself is “the way and the truth and the life”.

What also defines the essence of *love*, Paul has impressively set out in his 'Song of Songs', namely in the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians, in which he shows which virtues love contains or leads to, having previously mentioned the different talents (“gifts of grace”) of people, such as the ability to exercise teaching and leadership functions, to heal diseases, or even to work miracles like Jesus himself; in addition, the ability to impart faith, wisdom, knowledge and knowledge. All these talents are the fruits of the Spirit (God) and yet cannot be compared with the power of love. From it Paul allows all good things to emerge in man, namely - the virtues that can only be fully achieved by an adult - such as goodness, truthfulness, patience, tolerance, strength in faith and hope, steadfastness and perseverance. He writes: “Love is long-suffering, love is kind. It doesn't get excited, it doesn't brag, it doesn't puff up. It does not act improperly, does not seek its advantage, does not allow itself to be provoked to anger, does not bear up against evil. It does not rejoice in the injustice, but rejoices in the truth. It endures everything, believes everything, hopes everything, withstands everything. Love never ceases” (1 Cor. 13: 4-8).

The apostle contrasts this widespread network of virtues with a series of vices and malice, including anger, boasting, improper behavior and opportunism. (There are several similar “catalogs of virtues and vices” in the New Testament.) From love, however, Paul concludes - teleologically - the possibility of perfection, without, however,

specifying whether he only means the otherworldly or perhaps also possible conceptions of this world when he says, "Now we look in a mirror and see only puzzling outlines, but then we look face to face. Now I know imperfectly, but then I will know through and through, just as I was also known through and through." (1 Cor. 13:12).

From God's love for people the path (which Paul considers unique and unsurpassable) leads to imperfect knowledge and from there to the highest, perfect knowledge that no human being is yet able to achieve, so that in the end only "faith, love, hope, these three" remain, of which love is "the greatest" (1 Cor. 13:13). That faith and hope - after love - are to be regarded as basic values of the Christian *person*, needs no further discussion. Philosophically hope has probably found the strongest significance in *Ernst Bloch's learned hope* („docta spes“). [61]

b) Kant's criticism: can love be "commanded"?

For Jesus and Paul, the commandments to love God and neighbor undoubtedly have a normative character. Nevertheless, the question arises whether love can even be elevated to the norm, whether it can be "ordered". Kant denies this outright, with the following arguments: "Love as inclination" cannot be offered, "but benefit from duty itself, if there is no inclination at all ... love God above everything and your neighbor as yourself" calls for "respect for a law that commands love as a commandment". But love for God as inclination ("pathological love") is impossible, since God is not an object of the senses. Love for people again cannot be commanded as an inclination, but "practical love" can. "To love God in this meaning means: *gladly* following his commandments; to love your neighbor means: to exercise *gladly* all forms of duty towards him. To strive for this attitude (not to have it) can only be offered. ... " "Love is a matter of *feeling*, not of wanting, and I cannot love because I want, but still less because I *should* (be compelled to love); therefore an *obligation* to love is absurd. But *benevolence* (amor benevolentiae) can, as an act, be subject to a law of duty." "To do *all* people *good* to the *best* of our *ability* is a duty, whether you love them or not." [62]

Kant therefore considers it impossible, if not absurd, to make love for God and for one's neighbor the norm. He sees the main reason for this in the fact that love is a "feeling", an *inclination* and therefore cannot be made a duty. In the case of God this is not possible anyway, because God, as cannot be sensually experienced, cannot even be the object of an inclination. There could be no law that commands love. -

My objection to this: love is not just a purely subjective sensation, which as such would always be restricted to one's own person. Rather, love is always also a *relationship*: between I and you, subject A) and subject B), and probably also between subject and object, because in consciousness mental *objects* arise - both of people and things - in each case in the interplay of Perception (or sensation), imagination and conceptual thinking. Even as a relationship, love naturally remains an inclination, which is not naturally present in every person, but can be counteracted, prevented, e.g. by hatred and evil prejudice. Therefore, Jesus considered it right to call on people to love God and neighbor through commandments and therefore *normatively*. However, these remain commandments of *faith* and are not to be understood as philosophical norms with a claim to general validity. Here quoting Kantian claims to duty, ought and absoluteness, is all the more forbidden since these claims have for the most part proven to be untenable (see above). Belief commandments can nonetheless also be understood philosophically as instructions for action that can serve as orientation. It would be immoral not to demand love for people and others.

15. Christian values and norms from antiquity to the present

a) Augustine (354-430)

"Noli foras ire! in te ipso habitat veritas." ('Don't go out, the truth resides in yourself!'). This invitation from the Church Father Augustine could be misunderstood as a mere variant of the Delphic admonition to self-knowledge. Actually, the Christian church father and Catholic saint is concerned with more and different things. Indeed, he asks himself how a Christian can partake of divine truth. For this he suggests a certain way, a certain method. The starting point is your own self: I can be wrong and I can doubt anything. But I cannot doubt that *I am the one* who is mistaken and the one who doubts. In the words of Augustine: "Si enim fallor, sum." In English: "Because if I am wrong, I am." Long before Descartes, Augustine recognized this possibility of self-assurance. But what is 'I', and who am I? In order to gain clarity on this, Augustine first admits that he undoubtedly belongs not only to the spiritual world, but also to the sensory world, but warns against trusting the senses too much or even exclusively. Those who do that will soon be disappointed and unable to see the real reason for things - God's love.

Therefore - as Augustine argues quite in the spirit of the Delphic Oracle - man must first recognize himself, which is only possible on the way inwards, into the interior of the soul. Hence his request: "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas.": 'Don't go out, go back into yourself; the truth dwells in the inner man'. Only this way inwards leads at the same time upwards - to God, namely through the innermost part of the restless human heart. (To which the philosopher *Kurt Flasch* remarks that this signifies the "turning point of our esteem".) Augustine writes at the beginning of his > Confessions < ('Confessiones', approx. 400 AD): "Fecisti nos ad Te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in Te. ("You created us for you, and our heart is restless until it finds rest in you'.) With 'Te' (= 'You') the author naturally means God. Only in him can man find *the truth* par excellence - and thus access to the kingdom of God (to the Civitas Dei). This path of man to himself and to God is by no means an easy one, on the contrary: "To get to know each other, it takes great effort: he (*i.e. man*) must free himself from his senses, fight the absent-mindedness of thoughts and keep a tight rein on himself. This can only be done by people who endure all the injustice that the course of the world with its prejudices inflicts on them day after day, by learning to get over them in solitude or by knowing how to heal them through art and science. If the spirit comes to itself in this way, then it recognizes the beauty of the universe" (ibid.). -

However, as Augustine explains in his later work, only a few people are allowed to do this at all. Only a few are able to find the self in the spirit and from there the way to "the only truth" - to *truth* in God. Because Augustine now connects the idea of self-discovery in the spirit with the doctrine of predestination, according to which "only a few ... are chosen" (Matt. 20, 16) to partake of the grace of God, while the great mass of people is a "massa peccati", a 'mass of sins', and as such predestinated to eternal damnation - in the hereafter in hell and purgatory - and so already on the basis of *original sin*: "So, yes so, so is man inside: blind and limp, slumpy and indecent." [63], which is probably equivalent to a generalization of "vices catalogs" as they can already be found in the New Testament (e.g. in Gal. 5, 19-21). With considerable consequences, e.g. for the assessment of sexuality, in which Augustine fundamentally sees "a sin" that can only be tamed with difficulty in marriage, so that celibacy is worth more than marriage. (!) - It is already here but to ask what this devaluation of the worldly means when Augustine demands that man should "free himself from the senses ...". Are we humans capable of this at all? In any case, Augustine is doing what *Walter Schulz* calls the "cut between inwardness and outwardness". [64] Only those who distance themselves from the external have a chance at all to find *true happiness*. Only through love of God and neighbor, man can find *self-love*, which differs radically from selfishness, "which for Augustine constitutes the essence of sin and which can be overcome through asceticism" (Rohls, op. cit., p. 160).

This thought movement is of decisive importance for Augustine's theory of values. There would therefore be a fixed hierarchy of values, which leads from top to bottom, from God to the world, to the world of ideas and to the immortal soul, then to the world of the senses and from there again to the outside world and finally back to the entire universe.

Fundamentalism with bad consequences? Criticism of the values of Augustine

Augustine's thought structure has been criticized again and again, especially apparently by theorists of the 20th century. I believe that it begins where Augustine also began: with the analysis of the ego. Since Nietzsche and Freud at the latest, we have known that human beings can and must also be viewed in terms of their *physicality*. Then there is no reason to devalue the senses. Without sensual perception there is neither memory nor imagination and thinking, especially since these elements of consciousness are without exception connected to the human emotional world. Since the senses also mediate between the inside and outside world, there is no need to make a "cut between inwardness and outwardness". Dialectical subject-object relationships bridge the alleged gap between consciousness and the outside world.

This also eliminates the prerequisite for being able to find the path to "truth in God" exclusively via the spirit, i.e. by "switching off" (better: artificial exclusion) of the senses. God's existence is anyway not provable, making it far-fetched to locate in him everything called truth.

With this, I don't put in question the *content of faith to God*, but rather Augustine's view that only God could claim a "value in itself" for himself, especially since values are - or can be - based on objectively verifiable properties. Thoroughly *fundamentalistic* and inadmissible, however, is the attempt to put in perspective all values of this world in favor of a supposedly absolute values-truth "in itself", resting solely in God, especially since even the Christian values can claim validity without spiritual puffing up.

Obviously, Augustine's hierarchy of values led or contributed to unfortunate undesirable developments. Ultimately, the commandment of love does not always prevent a certain intolerance towards those who think differently and those of different faiths. Augustine does not simply demand, for example, to endure deviants, but - and this even with reference to the commandment of love! - to forcibly raise them if necessary. By legitimizing coercion in questions of faith, it apparently secures Christian doctrine, but in reality opens up various forms of intolerance - up to and including the issuing of the death penalty for heretics by medieval emperors and the excesses of the Inquisition.

The fact that Augustine invented a *theory of just war* must seem even more questionable to us today. "Anyone who is attacked, this is his simple motto, has the right to defend himself. He may also try to retrieve stolen goods and to wage war for this purpose, because this war is a just war." [65] - Where such justification can lead was already shown during Augustine's lifetime, when he, in his capacity as Bishop of Hippo, cruelly persecuted the Donatists (a sect with "a ... strongly socially oriented Christian

tendency") and called this war "Holy War". It is hardly surprising that in the years that followed, Christian rulers repeatedly justified their wars, including the Crusades, with reference to Augustine.

It is also not surprising that Augustine a) appeared as a staunch anti-Semite and described Jews as "murderers", b) justified "book burnings, expropriations and the destruction of temples", and has branded c) theater as "sanctuaries of worthlessness, ... wickedness and fornication". [66]

It is also obvious that Augustine's pronouncements about marriage, morality and sexuality are almost nowhere accepted. Even well-known Catholic theologians criticize the "Holy Father of the Church", sometimes violently. *Konrad Hilpert*, for example, vigorously rejects the general classification of sexuality as a "sin", as vigorously as the assertion that marriage and procreation are primarily used for discipline. In addition, Augustine completely ignored the "subject nature of love" and completely wrongly viewed marriage as "inferior" to celibacy.[67]

b) Middle Ages

"C'est vers le Moyen Age, énorme et délicat,
qu'il faudrait que mon cœur en panne naviguât,
loin de ce siècle charnel et de chair triste. "

(from: Verlaine: *Sagesse*, 1881)

Rather freely translated:

'It's the Middle Ages, enormous and delicate,
that my torn heart has to seek
far from our time of carnal lust, sad carnal lust. '

The late romantic *Paul Verlaine* (1844-96) reveals a religious longing here that stands in stark contrast to the prejudice of the "dark" Middle Ages that was popular as early as the 19th century. Where does this nostalgia come from, which was also very popular with German romantics, especially *Novalis*? Perhaps because next to and above secured systems of order there was still respect for God, the holy and the mystery? Perhaps also because the Middle Ages were not only characterized by religious dependence - God as absolute ruler over everything and everyone - and worldly oppression, but also by figures of light such as Emperor Friedrich II von Hohenstaufen (1194-1250), the also known as 'stupor mundi', a 'wonder of the world', and in Italian as 'lo Svevo' (the Swabian), and by scholars such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Master Eckhart.

One of the light figures was undoubtedly

Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) ,

who is called 'San Francesco d'Assisi' in Italy. In contrast to the aforementioned scholars, he is a triple patron saint, namely of Italy, animals and ecology. By this, his most important spheres of activity (or "target groups") are named: his fellow human beings and all other creatures within the framework of nature and the universe as a whole. In his *Canticle of the Sun*, Francesco praises the Creator God and all of creation with a unique poetic intensity, not with erudition, not in the language, style and gestures of a theorist, but in his Umbrian-Italian vernacular - and with impressive, sometimes bold images and ideas, religious ideas and admonitions, such as: "Praise my Lord and give him thanks and blessings / And remain subordinate to him in great humility." - With which Francesco clearly proclaims the value attitude man should take towards God and his own fate: that of humility. Preliminary conclusion: Francesco praises the cosmic unity of God, man and nature. He recognizes the highest value in God, but without devaluing man and the world. However, he demands from man insight into his fateful dependence on God and therefore not only corresponding humility, but also value decisions about his attitude to God and the things of the world, value decisions, of which supposedly depends not only everyday *behavior*, but also the salvation of the soul and thus the happiness of the person.

Unlike the scholars of his time, Francis of Assisi is mostly satisfied with the Gospel as a reference, also and especially in the question of truth, from which he does not derive a theoretical problem, but a practical obligation to love one's neighbor. He did not build a new teaching structure, but he did emphasize certain values in the Gospel - such as humility, poverty and charity. Striving for a bishopric would probably never have occurred to him. This saved remained him, among other things, from seeing, as Augustine, own convictions grossly distorted. Francis did not need to get involved with worldly powers so that he could avoid justifying wars. He would certainly have refused to refer to Jews across the board as "murderers". In general, he apparently never behaved in a hostile manner towards those of different faiths and those who think differently, even if his attempt to convert a sultan to Christianity failed.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that Francis of Assisi did not succeed in reforming his church thoroughly and sustainably. Unfortunately, it is not possible for me here and now to trace in detail the reasons for this failure. -

The fact that the current pope, who comes from Argentina - for the first time in the long history of the popes - has adopted the name 'Franciscus' may be seen as a signal for our time. But it probably also serves to improve the reputation of the Catholic Church, which has been battered by various affairs (including sexual abuse) . Which is perhaps not atypical for a Jesuit who knows how to choose his means skillfully.

In any case, San Francesco's theory of values remains largely up-to-date. On behalf of numerous others, I will conclude by quoting two sentences from an interview that *Jacques le Goff* (1924-2014), a French historian and specialist in the Middle Ages, gave to the Italian daily 'La Repubblica' (October 5, 2013). In it he replies to the question why there is a continuing fascination with Francesco: "Because he transfers *attitudes and values* that are considered essential by most of the Christian world. *The criticism of money and the bankers, the poverty and the solidarity bring San Francesco very close to our concerns, especially in times of crisis.*" [68] Like no other, Francis of Assisi embodied the ideals of mutual respect for all creatures and complete equality in fraternity.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

understands the human being as a fundamentally goal-oriented being; He writes: "Man now has a goal towards which his whole life and actions strive, because he acts according to his reason, and this can obviously only be active with regard to one goal." [69] (Of course, it should be noted immediately that this optimism of reason has become problematic since *Sigmund Freud* at the latest.)

However, Thomas cannot and does not want to interpret the purposefulness (telos-relatedness) of the human being in a purely inner-worldly way. For the source of all teleology - the ultimate cause of all causes, goals and purposes - can only be God for him, whom he also describes as the "highest good" (Summum bonum). Only in the *knowledge* of this does he consider teleology to be legitimate at all and conclude from this, however, that man cannot partake of the perfect happiness of perfect knowledge of God in his earthly life. On this he writes: "Man only reaches happiness, insofar as it is his own goal, *after* this life. The highest happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which the human spirit will possess after this life ... " [70] Which does not mean that man on earth cannot know God at all. Rather, people could already become "*new people*" down here through faith and grace . "In his willpower through the virtue of love", man can participate "in divine self-love" (op. p. 90).

Thomas' special doctrine of values is largely identical to his doctrine of virtues, which he constructed hierarchically from top to bottom. For him, of course, priority is given to the fundamental Christian virtues of faith, love and hope, which are only accessible through the grace of God, to which he subordinates the four cardinal virtues wisdom, bravery, prudence ('temperance') and justice. He treats the cardinal virtues on the basis of the differentiations and extensions that Aristotle made to Plato's original concepts. To this end, the 'dtv-Atlas philosophy' says: "The cardinal virtues are determined as the best possible constitution of natural faculties. Thus wisdom and prudence are assigned to reason, justice to will, bravery to striving and temperance to desire "(op. p. 85).

In order to make these virtues effective, man should keep to the divine commandments, especially the Christian commandment to love. His own conscience can always help him, especially since, according to Thomas, there is an infallible "primordial conscience" ("synderesis") that is always encouraging to be good and from which the situational conscience ('conscientia') must be distinguished. As a function of 'con-scientia', Thomas sees also a "the concrete act of conscience (...)" in which standards and experiences guided from outside merge to form a judgment on the basis of conscience. Aquinas considers the judgment of the conscience the last instance for man, even if he thus contradicts the official church. Conscience tracks the reasons and considerations that lead to an action, but is not, like the pursuit of wealth, exposed to the influence of affects and emotions. Therefore, there can be a disproportion between choice of action and judgment of conscience (called 'guilty conscience'). [71] More precisely: In contrast to the primordial conscience, the situational (the 'con-scientia') can definitely fall into error, which of course can lead to difficult problems and situations. [72]

In any case, Thomas uses the values mentioned to describe a person's *inner* attitude that is to be demanded, not yet the outer order. Decisive for the external order and the corresponding attitudes are the *laws*, beginning with God as supreme lawgiver, in whose "eternal law" man participates, through the "natural law" that man can recognize through his reason. Only in non-human nature does the law of nature act as an "inner necessity", while man can make use of his *free will*, provided he is able to observe ethical principles. That is why Thomas calls the supreme principle of practical reason: "The good must be done, the evil must be avoided" (*atlas of philosophy*, op. cit., p. 85).

For the coexistence in the community, however, neither the law of God nor the law of nature are sufficient. Rather, this requires special *human* legislation ('lex humana'), especially since people can pursue very different goals. By nature, humans are not loners. More than all other living beings, as Thomas explains, man is dependent on

sociability and, moreover, "the creature created for community and state life"[\[73\]](#). By nature, humans are deficient, but they are able to compensate for missing natural abilities through joint cultural achievements .

This requires clever leadership. A king must always serve the common good. Only then is rule justified at all. With this, Thomas formulates a high political and social claim: "If a society of free people is directed by its leader towards the common good of society, then this government will be right and just as it is appropriate for free people. But if the leadership does not set the common good of society as its goal, but the personal advantage of the leader, then the rule will be unjust and contrary to nature." (op. cit. p. 147). Though he believes God is man's only true goal, Thomas knows that goals alone are no guarantee of justice. People can pursue goals that are not only completely different, but also dangerous to the public. Unfortunately, this insight of Thomas Aquinas has all too often come true in the course of history.

Master Eckhart (approx. 1260-1327)

is referred to as a "mystic" because he preached the desirable union ('unio mystica') of the human soul with God. But that's only half the story. What Meister Eckhart really thought emerges from his sermon about a passage from the Gospel of Luke in which Jesus meets the sisters Maria and Martha (Luke 10, 38-42; this Maria is not identical with Jesus' mother!). Mary wants to be completely with Jesus. That is why she leaves the work of Jesus' visit to her sister, sits at the feet of the master and does nothing but listen to him. Martha complains about this to Jesus, who, however, reminds her that Mary has "chosen the better part" that cannot be taken from her.

Surprisingly, in his sermon, Meister Eckhart does not defend Maria, but Martha. She has more life experience and wisdom than the older one. Eckhart combines this practical knowledge with a theoretical one by stating: "In some respects, life recognize in a purer form than the "eternal light". Eternal light gives knowledge of itself and of God, but life makes know itself without God. If it looks at itself alone, it grasps more sharply the difference between equal and unequal." (Quoted in Flasch 2010, p. 225.)

This largely corresponds to my view that the Christian virtues retain their value even if they are not superelevated theologically. Meister Eckhart, however, does not carry out this separation, but develops a synthesis of knowledge of God and practical work that should enable people to "find living truth in their cheerful presence in good deeds" (op. cit., p. 227 f.).

In doing so, Meister Eckhart grants the highest priority to active neighborly love, but not to inwardness, to which Kurt Flasch notes that inwardness is not the ultimate goal, but the "first stage": "It is essential, but not the highest value." (ibid. p. 229) . In any case, with his Christian pragmatism, Meister Eckhart avoids the dead ends into which Augustine had fallen. More than this, I would therefore see Meister Eckhart as authoritative for our "appreciations".

As the highest value Meister Eckhart regards the divine Logos, which is invoked in the preface to the Gospel of John. However, he does not translate this with 'reason' or 'sense', but with 'knowledge' (recognizing) which he equates with the wisdom, justice and goodness of God. Man can take part in it, mediated by Christ, who is to become part of himself in man, so that the believer is no longer necessarily dependent on the means of grace of the church in his relationship to God. - In the recognizing subjectivity, Meister Eckhart mediates God, man and the world. "In the place of the absolute subject far beyond human subjectivity, to which the Augustinian and nominalist voluntarism had absolutized God, there is the mediation of divine and human subjectivity."[\[74\]](#)

c) Reformers

Martin Luther's doctrine of justification

In the Latin original of the *Letter to the Romans*, chapter 3, verse 28, we read: "arbitramur enim iustificari hominem per fidem sine operibus legis"[\[75\]](#). Translated almost literally, this means: 'We are therefore convinced that man becomes righteous through faith, without the works of the law.' I think it is essential to translate the Latin 'enim' by 'therefore', because in the two previous verses of the same chapter it is stated that God Himself is just and makes those who believe in Jesus just so that every "vainglory" ('glorification') is overridden, not by the law of deeds, but "by the law of faith". Which means that a person fails in the attempt to make himself "righteous" by appealing to his own deeds; and only from this it follows that man is righteous not "by the works of the law" but by faith. This is followed by Paul in the next verse (28) with "arbitramur enim ...", so that "enim" can be translated by "therefore" (or "for"). - On the contrary, Luther's translation of the same verse seems rather strange: "This is how we consider it / That man is just / without the works of law / solely through faith." (op.), in today's Luther Bible: "So we consider now that man becomes righteous without the works of the law, solely through faith." Strangely, the same verse in the (Catholic or ecumenical) *standard* translation (Stuttgart 1980/2009) reads : " Because we are convinced that Man becomes righteous by faith, regardless of works of the law " (p. 1253). Luther "ingredient" on this verse is therefore the word 'solely', with the serious consequence that Luther asserts that justification is *exclusively* attainable by faith, not by reference to man's own deeds. A consequence that weighs particularly heavily, because it corresponds neither to the original text (see above in Latin) nor to the context of the Romans chapter, where Paul explains, albeit only at the very end: "Are we now overriding the law through faith? On the contrary, we establish the law" (v. 31).

Luther's conclusion that man can be justified "only through faith" is therefore misleading or even falsifying, so that one must ask how the "great reformer" could make such a mistake. In his *Letter about Interpreting*, he justifies himself in a lengthy and detailed manner by stating that German usage suggests such an "addition" without further ado. - On the contrary, I conclude on a completely different reason, which Luther admits only indirectly. For a long time he was tormented by the question: "How do I get a gracious God?" Until he finally found a biblically "documented" answer in the said passage in Romans: 'Sola fide!', 'Solely through faith', whereby *sola* ('alone') is not biblical, but an arbitrary ingredient of Luther. In short: *The quintessence of the dispute can only be that Luther's 'sola fide' is not correct, but that man can be justified through God's grace if he obeys his commandments and laws, including those made by man, of course.* A formula according to which Luther - strangely and contradictory enough - consistently guided himself in his *practice of life*, even if he occasionally resorted to unclean, even immoral means, for example in his harsh condemnation of the rebellious peasants (1525), his anti-Semitism and his partial women-hatred, whereby again and again his letter believerness, his gluing to the wordings of the Bible, becomes virulent.

For a more detailed explanation: Luther relativizes the value of conscience as a moral authority in favor of grace and faith. Not human conscience alone, but God incarnated in Christ appears as the highest moral authority. Which apparently largely corresponds to Kant's categorical imperative, albeit in theological formulation. In contrast, however, is Luther's rejection of free will. In his work *On the unfree will*, he claims that man is free and unfree at the same time. Free - within certain limits - towards fellow human beings, but unfree in his relationship with God. In order to substantiate these theses, Luther tries to deeply analyse the nature of the Christian person which he divides into two strictly separate, completely different natures, the physical and the spiritual. Bodily, i.e. in flesh and blood, the Christian shares the fate of all people: outwardly, to be sinful and mortal. But mentally he is completely different, namely a "spiritual, new, inner person" [\[76\]](#) if he is guided by the Word of God. With this, Luther also names the prerequisite for human justification solely out of grace ('sola gratia') and out of faith ('sola fide'). All piety is based on this - but also *all freedom of the Christian*. Nonetheless, a new problem arises from this. Isn't man condemned to complete passivity, to doing nothing, "if only faith makes pious and works contribute nothing to grace" (ibid.)? In order to solve this problem, Luther subdivides the human sphere anew, namely a) his relationship to his own corporeality, in particular with regard to the connections between body, work and salvation, and b) the question of humanity, especially with regard to God, good works and charity.

Here too, Luther can fall back on his two dialectically interlinked guiding principles, which result on the one hand from the "freedom from religious compulsion to perform" and, on the other hand, from the connection between general human corporeality and the commandment of Christian charity. The principles read: 1. "A Christian man is a free master over all things and subject to no one." And 2. "A Christian man is a servant bondsman of all things and subject to everyone." (ibid.) Accordingly, man is free and unfree, master and servant at the same time. Servitude obliges him to do many things, first of all to his own body, which has to do works and endure temptations. In all activities, people should ask about the motives for their actions. A pious person has to do good works, knowing full well that he cannot earn his salvation from God through this (see above). Faith and obedience to God's commandments go hand in hand. - It was Jesus who set an example of how man should behave towards his fellow men. Unselfishly useful and ready to sacrifice, we should serve our neighbor.

In this way Luther succeeds - despite his strict separation of spiritual and physical spheres - in reconciling freedom of conscience and belief. Just as God gives freedom *from* and freedom *to* conscience out of grace, so he enables Christians to have meaningful and active freedom *in* the world, but also freedom *from* the world.

But how does fit in with this the fact that Luther massively questions human free will in his work 'De servo arbitrio'?

Erasmus von Rotterdam had emphasized the ability of people to contribute to the salvation of their own soul of their own accord, i.e. through their own free will, especially since people also have the freedom to decide for or against God. In contrast, Luther polemizes: "It is certain ... that we do everything out of necessity and nothing out of free will, since the power of free will is nothing and does nothing and cannot do anything good if grace is lacking." Free will as such is "a completely divine honorific name" and can only be granted to "the divine majesty"[\[77\]](#). But: Where's there that "certain degree of free choice," Luther previously assigned to man? If everything is determined (consistently and completely) by the grace of God, all feeling, thinking and acting in man is also determined, so that there is no room for freedom or the "certain degree of free choice". But with this Luther contradicts himself.

A comprehensive criticism of Luther would be necessary to shed more light on this problem, but I am not in a position here and now. Instead, only the following should be noted: In any case, Luther's view of man is no longer acceptable. *It is simply not true that man is inherently evil*, as Luther claims following Genesis 8:21, where it says that

man's aspirations are "evil from youth". In terms of evolutionary history, the opposite has been found: people are quite capable of doing good and bringing about improvements, especially when they not only compete with one another, but work together in a meaningful way.

The consequences of this knowledge for Luther's teaching, especially the doctrine of grace, hardly seem foreseeable. Without good deeds, there seems to be no progress in human history. It can hardly be verified whether the salvation of people's souls depends on it. It should be noted that the pessimistic views of Moses, Paul, Augustine and Luther cannot be considered valuable with regard to the image of man; this in clear contrast with the corresponding teachings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, among others, which *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* joined in the 18th century Has.

Judging Luther's evaluations as comprehensively and fairly as possible, that is, without lapsing into the extremes of blind admiration or blind condemnation, is not possible in a confined space; it would be the task of a special investigation.

Calvin (1509-64)

Calvin devotes only around 50 pages of his main work *Institutio ... Teaching in the Christian Religion* (1536/59, book III, chapters 21-24) to the doctrine of *predestination*. Apparently he did not attach particular importance to this teaching. As the basis of his treatise, Calvin chooses some biblical passages, including the following one from Romans, in which Paul refers to Moses: "For he said to Moses: Whom I am gracious, I am gracious, and whom I have mercy on, I have mercy" (Rom. 8:15). Therefore it is not a question of human will and action, but only God's grace. Without further ado, Calvin therefore connects the Old Testament reference with the Christian doctrine of grace by freely translating: "In this time the rest of people will be saved according to the choice of grace. But if it is by grace, it is not of works; otherwise grace would not be grace" (Rom. 11.5 f.).

But who now becomes the chosen one through this "choice", there is, to Calvin's mind, no information about this in the Bible; it is and remains God's secret, whom he destines for eternal salvation and whom for eternal damnation. For Calvin this is reason enough to hold on to the "double predestination" (for salvation or for damnation), whereby he sometimes also replaces the term predestination with "primary destination" or "election". Calvin considers completely absurd to accuse God of such obvious arbitrariness, because nobody is allowed to "judge" with God (as it says in Rom. 9, 20). [78]

Another matter is what the Calvinists made of those teachings, especially after the death of their master. More and more they felt the uncertainty about the "predestination" as an agonizing burden, especially since their instructor and disciplinarian had obliged them to adhere to a strict work ethic and largely to renounce consumption and instincts. They wondered what value all drudgery and all renunciation should have, if none of these could guarantee salvation. *Achim Dethmers* describes the way out that they found as follows: "The Calvinists are... tormented *throughout* their lives by uncertainty as to whether they are chosen or not. They are therefore trying to cling to anything in their earthly life that offers an indication of being chosen. Since work itself is the achievement pleasing to God and wealth can be gained only by laboring oneself without indulging in material comforts beyond the bare minimum, it is clear that wealth, which must not be enjoyed sensually, becomes this criterion of being chosen. So whoever has visible success in the world through work ... has an indication of his being chosen, despite the fact that he cannot force himself to be chosen." And this was even crucial for the development (the rapid "take off") of Capitalism since the beginning of modern era. [79]

Business ethics. With the discovery of new sea routes, e.g. to America and India, but also through Renaissance and humanism, the world economy has enjoyed an upswing like never before since the beginning of modern era. However, with not only positive consequences. In his time when "the money economy went wild" (G. Stükelberger), Calvin turned - as a theologian - against excesses and injustices of all kinds. He also justified his business ethics theologically: Man should not lose himself in money and property, but should above all trust in God.

The Geneva reformer has apparently set standards for interest and banking in particular, not least in favor of the poor. These standards could still be used today as criteria for a "fair interest". Accordingly, one should not demand any interest at all from poor people, make no profit on the back of the weak, not invest money out of pure greed for more money; instead, do charitable work and always follow the "golden rule of reciprocity" when it comes to money matters, i.e. don't expect business partners to do what they shouldn't do to you. It is a business ethic in which people's needs are taken into account, and this also applies bindingly to justice, the common good, moderation in working life and in science and even a "political framework that combines legal certainty with personal responsibility" - ultimately everything "For the glory of God". - In this respect, perhaps the Calvinists, but not Calvin himself, are to be seen as pioneers of what *Max Weber* called capitalism in the form of "ascetic Protestantism".

Calvin criticism. Calvin's teaching structure is extremely extensive and full of consequences. It stands and falls with his concept of God. This is Trinitarian, theistic and panentheistic at the same time, in other words: Calvin considers the existence of the Triune Creator God to be irrefutably binding and absolutely true, who is present in the entire universe with his omnipotence and offers his grace to all people. Calvin tries to underpin these beliefs with a cosmological proof of God, according to which the omnipotence of God is already recognizable in every natural process.

Kant has refuted this proof. The existence of God cannot be proven, so that there should actually be no theocracy, no only religiously based exercise of power and rule. Also subject to this verdict (this rejection) is the pre-destination doctrine including its misunderstood extensions to a "Protestant-capitalist ethic". Calvin's claims to political power are just as invalid as his ethical standards and evaluations, including his "business ethics", which have been declared absolutely binding. In any case, the preservation of the common good, invoked by Calvin, cannot exist if human dignity is not recognized as one of the highest values, but trampled underfoot, as revealed by Calvin's criminal attacks against "witches" and those of different faiths. - Opinion terrorism and contempt for human beings - as Calvin apparently shamelessly practiced - are intolerable and must be fought.

Thomas Müntzer (1489-1525)

on his way to truth encounters the class society of his time, especially that of the oppressive feudal lords (together with their depraved accomplices, the selfish priests and "scriptures" who stick to the letter and have long since betrayed and lost the living spirit of Christ) on the one hand, and the broad mass of the population on the other side. At that time, the largely impoverished, mostly serf peasants formed the core of this broad mass. Müntzer joins their rebellion in the revolutionary Peasant War; for them he finally died when he was cruelly tortured and executed in 1525 after the terrible slaughter of the lost battle near Frankenhausen. [80]

Luther's conception of evil has proven untenable. Obsolete are also his assumptions of original sin, predestination and free will. Müntzer has already recognized this. His opposing positions widely make sense. The final rift between himself and Luther ignites - and this in itself may be seen as symbolic - on a theological issue with grave political consequences. It is about the question of how with Paul (Rom. 13) the attitude of the Christian to the *authorities* is to be determined. Luther relies here exclusively on the first two verses of Rom. 13, in which absolute obedience to the authorities is required, since they are instituted by God. Müntzer, however, relativizes this claim to absoluteness with a new interpretation of the 3rd and 4th verses of Rom. 13, which say that the duty of the authorities is to protect the upright and to punish the wicked. Müntzer now asks - certainly rightly - what happens if an authority does not fulfill this obligation. His answer: "And when that is reversed, the sword will be taken from them (the princes) and will be given to the angry people for the destruction of the wicked." [81] Carl Hinrichs explains that Müntzer had - in contrast to Luther - "... interpreted the people's revolutionary right of resistance, which at the same time leads to the idea of people's sovereignty" (op. p. 36).

As a result, Müntzer grants the people the right to take power themselves if their rulers fail or prove to be "godless". But who are the people? Carl Hinrichs: "... for Müntzer the people are initially only those who are directly enlightened according to his teaching, without scripture and tradition, in whom God's will is directly effective, in the broader sense the 'covenant' " (the "chosen ones"), that Müntzer founded himself (ibid.). The princes can also join this covenant if they acknowledge the principles of the "elect" and actively advocate a new, just social order.

Müntzer's "Bund" presents itself as a new regulatory power, without which the community would allegedly sink into anarchy and lack of rights. The new order can only be achieved through a revolution, for which Müntzer sees the time as coming when the peasants - spurred on by the ideas of freedom of the Reformation - rise up against their aristocratic oppressors. The purpose of the revolution is to open up people to their true destiny, which Müntzer tries again and again to prove through biblical passages. His ambition goes far beyond his home regions of Thuringia and Saxony: The new revolutionary movement should encompass all of Germany. (See Hinrichs loc. cit. p. 63.)

But what is to be made of this concept? It is undoubtedly fundamentalist through and through, namely consistently theologically grounded. At the same time, it impresses with its internal logic and correctness. In many ways it appears to be superior to the teachings and aspirations of Luther. The more the question arises why Müntzer failed so catastrophically politically (or militarily), while Luther's reform was more or less successful in the long term.

The Hungarian philosopher *Georg Lukács* (1885-1971) suggests an explanation that is amazingly plausible at first glance. In Müntzer he noted a break ("hiatus") between theory and practice, i.e. between the theological foundation of revolutionary endeavors and the inability to correctly assess the political and military situation. (Cf. K. Ebert loc. cit. p. 255 f.)

I agree with this insofar as Müntzer, in his fanaticism, which was reinforced by end-time expectations in Jesus and the early church, rose to be the social revolutionary leader of the peasants, although he lacked the necessary political and military competence and experience. A *concrete analysis of the concrete situation* should have given him information about the actual balance of power and forces. From the outset, the peasants had no chance against the armed army of the aristocrats allied with big business.

And what happened to Müntzer's other high-tension expectations? So we ask today, we have to ask. From today's perspective, almost nothing of what Müntzer, Marx, Bloch, and others dreamed of, seems to be real. The October Revolution turned into terror, Stalinism and dictatorial bureaucraticism.

In Germany, the Red Revolution failed and was ultimately bloodily stifled by the Nazi regime. - After 1989 the bureaucratic state socialism of the Eastern bloc also collapsed, while neoliberal capitalism triumphed. For how much longer? Above all globally, but in many cases also locally, the questions to which socialism offered "definitive" answers remain largely unresolved, and all too often the problems remain unsolved.

It seems all the more necessary to finally learn from history, i.e. also and especially from what intrepid fighters ("historical heroes"?) like Thomas Müntzer and Karl Marx have tried. *Both would only become tragic figures if no one was willing to deal with them any more, to learn from them and their history, to seek in them answers to the inevitable questions of values, norms and meaning.*

d) Counter-Reformation: Ignatius von Loyola (1491-1556)

The 'Spiritual Exercises' of Ignatius of Loyola are essentially about the following: The practitioner ('retreatant') should first fully entrust himself / herself to the grace of God, specifically as a preparation for the "discernment of spirits", a phase of self-examination, which should serve to check one's own moods and feelings (states of mind), to see whether they can correspond to the Christian faith or not. Only then can existentially important decisions for their own lives, and indeed now due to *intellectual excessive* testing, then to reconcile reason and emotion.

However, if the retiree is in a state of "desolation" (i.e. depression), he / she should not make a decision. Only when "inner calm and inner coherence (consolation)"^[82] and the relation to one's own self corresponds to that to God, man can decide appropriately, namely according to his feelings as well as his reason and understanding. But the believer cannot decide on this alone. He should entrust himself to the help and mediation of the church (priests) in order to find the right way to God. - According to the Jesuit view, this attempt also applies to the question of the *meaning of life*, so that all values and evaluations are ultimately founded on a Christian-religious basis; whereby the Jesuits leave it up to the individual, i.e. his / her *free will*, to decide whether he / she accepts this order of values or not. (This, by the way, seems to me to be a reason for claiming that the teachings of Ignatius of Loyola are still valid and useful today. In fact, the emphasis on free will is one of the refinements of the Jesuit.)

But why is it all? Just for the "glory of God"? Basically, Ignatius is also likely to obey a counter-Reformation motivation. He wants to renew and protect his church, namely by 1. justifying the Catholic Church's claims to power, 2. preventing or at least making it more difficult to withdraw from the Catholic Church, and 3. promoting entry into this church. Regarding 2.: Catholics who are strengthened in their faith (including in their own salvation!) through the "spiritual exercises" will not see themselves prompted to leave the church. To 3.: Non-Catholics can come to the insight, among other things through the teachings of Ignatius, that in the Catholic Church they are better off than in other religious communities. To 1.: The Catholic Church can cite numerous so-called "shining examples" not only from the Bible, but also from its tradition, which are able to justify its claim to power.

But do such ends really justify the means? Hardly if the means consist mainly of psychological sophistication and the art of persuasion, and the purposes primarily of subordinating people to a largely undemocratic, quasi-monarchical power apparatus with a universal, absolutist claim to rule. All the more, the by no means only positive aspects of this denomination (like those of every other!) have to be repeatedly checked and publicly discussed, and, if necessary, with the corresponding political consequences, such as the disentanglement (separation) of state and church, such as France, for example, completed it in 1905.

e) Christian socialism

If Jesus was a Social Revolutionary, then he was also one of the first socialists, although the idea of socialism may be much older. There is no doubt that Jesus condemned arbitrary rule and oppression. However, he also has spoken sentences which do not indicate a revolutionary, but a more conservative stance, as before Pilate: "My kingdom is not of this world." (John 18, 36).^[83] so towards Pharisees and other tempters: "So give the emperor what is the emperor's, and God what is God's!" (Matt. 22, 21; Mk. 12, 17; L. 20, 25). - In any case, it is understandable that Pope Benedict XVI. in his 2nd encyclical ('Spe salvi', 2007) stated that Jesus' message was "not directly social revolutionary"; Jesus was also not a Spartacus and not a "liberation fighter like Barrabas or Bar Koch-ba". What however other theorists as *Ernst Bloch* and the religion scientist *Reza Aslan* would disagree. I think the controversy that ensues is hardly decidable. What is certain is that Jesus did not plan or organize an uprising against the Roman occupying power and the Jewish upper class who made agreements with them. However, it cannot be doubted that Jesus intended a long-term revolution in the sense of a radical, lasting *upheaval in living and dependent relationships and attitudes*, for example when he emphasized that he wanted to give people "new wine in new bottles" (Mk. 2, 22).

The result is the love communist organized Brethren Congregation of the early Christians, but already in the 4th century -the Christian community - after multiple, cruel persecution - received the rank of a *state church* without losing its basic values and ideals, such as *faith, love, hope, freedom, equality and Brotherhood*.

It is all the more astonishing that *theories of Christian socialism* worth mentioning have only existed since the 19th century (probably under the influence of Marxism), as in *F.R. de Lamennais* (1782-1854), who succeeded in uniting in new syntheses ideas of Christianity, socialism, liberalism and even Marxism. Lamennais, for example, prepared Marx's goal of a "free association of free individuals". However, in contrast to Marx, he never was an atheist, especially as he always advocated *Fideism* saying that faith is to be rated higher than any human reason.

Similar ideas can be found in the Protestant theologian, pastor and hymn poet *Christoph Blumhardt* (1842-1919) and above all in *Paul Tillich* (1886-1965), whose hope for a religious socialism in the form of a "theonomy", a "holy and at the same time just God-legality", but never came true. Nonetheless, Tillich has earned lasting merits through his work, for example through 1. the fact that he took Christianity's social mandate seriously, 2. the renewed thematization of the question of meaning, also and especially in connection with the social question, 3. the social criticism, 4. the unconditional commitment to justice, law and the rule of law - against terror, tyranny and anarchy, 5. the inclusion of fundamentally important religious, liberal and democratic principles, 6. taking due account of the image of man and being a person, 7. the commitment to freedom of the mind, individuality and free creativity, 8. the demand for undogmatic, impartial scholarship, 9. the criticism of state socialism, 10. the recognition and creative acceptance of numerous positive contributions of Marxism, such as the problem of alienation, capitalism Criticism and the dialectical method. It is noticeable that these "merits" are based almost without exception on *non-Christian* values, from which I conclude that the main reasons for Tillich's failure are not only to be found in the actual course of history, but also in some of his questionable syntheses of Christianity and socialism.

Apart from that, the Christian socialism of the 20th century has strongly been impressed by the Latin American *liberation theology*. In his foundational work 'A *Theology of Liberation*', published in 1971, the Peruvian priest and professor

Gustavo Gutiérrez (born 1928) founds his synthesis of Christianity and socialism on the basis of, among other things, an expanded concept of sin. "Structural sin" is what he calls the growing gap between rich and poor under capitalism. He

considers the *liberation from this sin* "a necessary condition for the realization of justice in the world" (Rohls op. p 691).

Accordingly, *Leonardo Boff* and *Jon Sobrino* see in Jesus the "liberator ... who with the kingdom of God heralds the structural revolution and transformation of social and political conditions", whereby they are convinced that the kingdom of God will gradually be realized through the historical successes of liberation (ibid.).

It is a doctrine that has met with violent rejection in the Vatican since the 1980s, which was justified by the cardinal of the Curia and later Pope *Josef Ratzinger* with his criticism of the allegedly misanthropic, because atheistic, Marxism. - Notwithstanding the papal condemnation, however, the Latin American movement has found strong resonance throughout the Third World. In politically, philosophically and religiously interested circles in highly developed countries, this response was particularly strong in the 1970s and 80s. In a lecture given in Switzerland in 2013, Leonardo Boff explains that this has changed in the meantime, especially with the advance of the neoliberal economic system. Since liberation theology opposes this trend, it should now be "made invisible".^[84] The media coverage is now only sparse because the liberation theologians present their resistance and their alternatives "less polemically today" (ibid.). The decline and fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe also contributed to growing disinterest. - Nevertheless Boff is not pessimistic, on the contrary, he evaluates as very encouraging, among other things, the fact that in Latin America now even conservative religious dignitaries have adopted the "option for the poor" (ibid.). According to Boff, the religious-social-political movement has even become a general cultural-political one.

f) Christian social teachings

The *Catholic social doctrine* rests philosophically and theologically on at least three pillars: 1. natural law, 2. the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Newthomism, 3.

personalism. The human person - given by God - has both natural reason and spiritual access to divine revelation and thus to the *basic values* and the highest moral standards, so that the human being as a person stands higher than all historical systems of law. "Natural law is the knowledge of law and justice peculiar to human reason", as *Herbert Pribyl* formulated following Thomas Aquinas and Johannes Messner . [85] The natural law as being *essential law* corresponds to the *inviolable* dignity of man so that his basic rights are *inalienable*.

Anyone who wants to think about it should first deal with the five principles, i.e. *basic values*, that have been worked out in Catholic social teaching over time, namely the *common good, personality, solidarity, subsidiarity and sustainability* .

Common good: Following Thomas von Aquin and Newthomism, the aim is to establish an ideal order of the community. The common good has priority over individual interests, but should ultimately also strengthen the individual.

Personality: philosophically founded by *Max Scheler* and others. In being a person, individuality and community come together, namely in the body and soul unity of the human being, who at the same time counts as a spirit-determined being, willed by God. Mental self-confidence should enable self-realization. Freedom and self-responsibility are standard values of life. - *Solidarity*: People should be responsible not only for themselves, but also for the order of society, which obliges them to show solidarity with one another.

Subsidiarity. The community should act in "subsidiary", i.e. supportively. In exercising political power, therefore, the sub-groups of society must be taken into account. Central power finds its limits where decisions can be made better at lower levels of jurisdiction, that is, both person-related and pertinent. Nevertheless, the larger community is obliged to provide assistance to the smaller one if necessary.

According to a definition by the SPD politician *Volker Hauff* from 1987, *sustainability* is considered to be "realized when the needs of the present are met without the risk that future generations will not be able to meet their own needs". Catholic relief organizations took up the term towards the end of the 1990s, followed by most of the bishops and some Catholic social ethicists. From a Christian perspective, the task of man anyway is, inter alia, "to preserve creation", so that the demands of the ecology movement fall on fertile ground in the Catholic social teaching.

These largely idealistic principles most likely can be realized in a *real social market economy*. Whether this can succeed despite the moloch-like spread of neoliberalism, however, must be doubted and cannot be discussed here for the time being.

Protestant social ethics is distinguished from this doctrine by the fact that its basic pillars, natural law, common good and personality, are hardly discussed nowadays. But what is "typically evangelical" about this ethic? A question that cannot be adequately clarified just by the reference to the Reformation. In any case, it seems helpful to appeal to the only authoritative Protestant authority: that of the Gospel, although the *social mandate* contained in it seems to be controversial. - The other two conceptual components, the social and the ethical, also cause difficulties. If there is a Christian social mandate, why is there still a need for ethics? This would have to be an "ethics of being" (of the social!), Although, as is well known, no ought can be derived from mere being. Where then do the should-orientated *value* standards come from?

Well, according to the Gospel, Christ embodies good in general, the absolutely good, the divine supreme good. Therefore he can claim to be the truth, the way and life itself and to give further standards of value to the moral "individual character" of the human being. Those who believe in Christ can sustainably strengthen their own *freedom to do good* as well as *freedom from evil*. This is probably the true "freedom of a Christian" who should largely rely on his own, ultimately God-given powers, including freedom of will and conscience.

Which means that people are also free to stand up for the good in *all* people, i.e. for a *global society* that is *good as a whole* . Humanity as such should be "holy" to everyone, as *Kant* demands. However, it cannot be overlooked that the world as a whole is (still) by no means good, but in many places is in a bad way. In addition, a Christian social mandate can be derived from the Gospel, but Jesus did not preach economic theory, social theory or a political program. In any case, an economic system in which exploitation, greed for profit, alienation and class opposition prevail is incompatible with the Christian spirit which is also incompatible with social systems that are characterized by lack of freedom, disregard for the person, bureaucracy, fundamentalism and all sorts of terrorism .

On the other hand, a *liberal, democratic eco-socialism* should be seen as an ideal compatible with Christian values. Evangelical social teaching can help by inheriting both the Christian socialism (Lamennais, Blumhardt, Tillich and others) and the theology of liberation and the Catholic social teaching and become a real *Christian social teaching*.

g) Other, non-Christian religions

Of the world religions whose values and norms I have analyzed, only **Islam** is missing so far . So here the addition: 'Islam' in the original sense of the word means something like 'complete surrender to God and his will' and beyond, similar to the Hebrew 'Shalom': 'peace in the sense of an all-embracing salvation', i.e. no more only a certain religious community, but "the core of true religiosity par excellence". [86]

But religion means attachment to God, in Islam even complete surrender to God who "does what he wants" - thus complete submission of the individual to his will. Where is the natural human right to self-determination? Is it not completely denied and destroyed? Well, influential Islamic theologians have recognized this danger and therefore refer to the fact that the Koran certainly grants people a certain autonomy because it repeatedly appeals to reason, experience and the ability to cognize, and to nature and history as their sources. However, only within certain, clearly defined limits. More important than faith in Islam, similar to Judaism (!), is the *right action* of human beings, which is all the more strictly regulated by the *Sharia*, the legal system, the law, the "totality of human actions regarding the precepts of Allah ". This means that people can be motivated to the highest level of commitment and endeavor ('jihad' in the literal meaning!), if not *forced* to do so, if necessary also to holy war.

Since humans cannot and may not decide on good and evil on their own, they do not need any special ethics, but only a special "character trait", a term that is surprisingly close to the word origin SUELOS (for "ethics"). Nonetheless, the Muslim duties result from a strict moral code which, in addition to genuine religious regulations (confession to God and Mohammed, the five-fold daily ritual, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca) includes the obligation to pay an individual, precisely calculated income tax - as an expression of solidarity with the poor and weak in society. - Otherwise, the detailed rules of conduct based on the Koran largely correspond to those of the Ten Commandments, but also contain precise instructions and prohibitions with the aim of educating humility, truthfulness, politeness, taking responsibility for one's own actions, public spirit, moderation , gratitude and vigilance in relation to violations of the rules of the Koran, whereby the possibility of retaliation (self-defense) is also granted.

Islamism. A particularly delicate but unavoidable topic that can hardly be covered in a few sentences. The world community is confronted with the extreme excesses of Islamist fundamentalism - especially in the form of terrorism - right up to the present day. However, an overwhelming majority of Muslims now firmly reject such fundamentalism. Too obviously some "godly warriors" violate against the basic rules and principles of their own religion.

Sufis and Alevis

The fact that Islam does not necessarily have to result in fundamentalism is shown by Islamic religious communities such as those of the Sufis and Alevis, who emphasize less the reasons of the law and the letter than the *reasons of the heart and humanity* and thus to meet the desires and longings of the people.

In Arabic, 'Suf' refers to the 'coarse wool' from which the penitential shirts of the first Sufi monks were knitted. Their goal was to experience God's closeness in their hearts, a goal that ascetics and mystics had long before them. In Islam, such aspirations did not emerge until the late 9th century. However, the Sufis were always careful to respect Allah's highest authority and dominance, so that a total amalgamation of God and man was out of the question.

They differed from most ascetics and mystics in that they were by no means children of sadness, but expressed their faith through joy, love and a certain permissiveness, especially in music and dance (dervish dance to trance!). That all this happened for the glory of God, they demonstrated with a special remembrance of God, the "... *Dhikr Allah*: Allah is invoked incessantly and his many names, his greatness and eternity are extolled like a litany" (Küng).

The path of the individual believing Sufi is mystical insofar as, coming from the law, it leads on the path of mysticism to truth in God; scientifically and ideologically supported by a strongly psychological "science of the inside" and "teaching of the heart" (ibid.).

In the Islamic world, however, the Sufis were not welcome everywhere. They were attacked by orthodox theologians, some also by politicians and statesmen such as the Turkish founder *Kemal Atatürk*, who was not afraid of banning Sufi orders classified as politically reactionary (cf. loc . cit. p. 299). Nevertheless, still today the Sufis have hardly lost any of their influence and impact.

The **Alevi**s and the Sufis share a humanistic orientation, which also includes the mystical interpretation of the Koran. Their movement, whose members can mainly be found in the east of what is now Turkey, has existed since the 13th century. They derive their name "followers of Ali" from Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali, whom they, unlike the Sunnis, hold in honor.

The fact that they were often attacked and persecuted by Sunnis is probably also due to their rejection of the Sunni Sharia and any dogmatic interpretation of religion. Instead, they assess the love of God higher than the fear of God; they see, almost pantheistic, the divine founded in every human being, from they derive, also in terms of mystic: charity, fellow human friendliness, patience and modesty as the top Values of everyday life. Some of them are closer than to the Koran to the teachings of the ancient Persian philosopher Zoroaster (Zarathustra), who called for "right action, right thinking, right speaking", among other things. [\[87\]](#)

16. Philosophical values and norms since the Middle Ages

a) Freedom and emancipation movements in the Middle Ages

Movements of this kind undoubtedly already existed in antiquity; just think of the Spartacus uprising and the like. Such movements appeared in new forms in the Middle Ages, especially as new conditions arose as a result of Christianity (Church and Pope), feudalism and others. But it was not uncommon for new areas of freedom to be fought for first. An example of this is found in the *Magna Carta Libertatum* (the 'Great Charter of Freedoms') promulgated in England in 1215. It is considered to be one of the germ cells of European human rights development, although it initially only seems to be about a balance of interests between the monarchy and the nobility. The fact that there is more to it than that, is already indicated in the first paragraph of the document, in which the *Church* is granted full freedom and guarantees of rights. Above all, all negotiated freedoms are *permanently* valid (§ 2). Tax and inheritance matters are regulated, widows are granted the right to remain unmarried.

The legal protection of the individual, in particular protection against arbitrary arrest, is of central importance. Forbidden is any attack on the person, such as expropriation, condemnation, banishment or imprisonment, as long as there is no corresponding decision of a court according to the state law (§ 39). - Everyone has full freedom to travel.

Merchants of all nationalities are guaranteed safe conduct, except in times of war. Any discord between the king and his subjects should be forgiven and avoided, especially "enmity, envy, malice" (§ 76). Basically, the right is inalienable and valid for everyone.

The aim of this 'Great Charter of Freedom' is therefore to guarantee freedom through legal certainty, and to do so in mutual responsibility, i.e. for the individual as well as for communities and society as a whole. (However, the monarchy and feudal structure remain untouched.)

b) From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance

There is much to suggest that the whole range of possible values has only really been accessible since the beginning of modern times, i.e. the Renaissance. For this, a suitable scaling is apparently required first. In 2008 *Ute Maltrus* made a distinction between a) moral, b) religious, c) political, d) aesthetic, e) material values with regard to "values education in school". To a) she cites: "Sincerity / truth, justice, loyalty", to b): "Fear of God, love of neighbor", to c): "Tolerance, freedom, equality, common good, peace, dignity, protection of life, responsibility, 'to d):' art, beauty" to e): "prosperity". [\[88\]](#) A scheme that can only serve as a rough guide. I see an opportunity to counter the insurmountable unmanageability of (possible) values and value concepts in taking an *exemplary* approach, i.e. presenting phenomena of an epoch, provided that they can be considered characteristic or typical.

In the case of the Renaissance, this project may appear problematic because it is disputed whether there was a continuity of development or a break, a clear turning point, between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Anyhow, as typical aspects the following can be highlighted: 1. The Renaissance (= 're-birth') is not just a "rebirth of antiquity," but a "new birth". 2. A new world-view is born: the heliocentric (Copernican), which, against the opposition of the Church, replaces the geocentric (Ptolemaic). 3. *Giordano Bruno* (1548-1600) claims, in contrast to Catholic dogmatics, the infinity of the universe. 4. Priority no longer has the relationship between God and the world, but that between the self and the world. 5. People become the focus of interest. 6. Action is decisive: "Man is created for the activity, and utility is his determination", says the builder and "universal man" (*uomo universale*) *Leon Battista Alberti* (1404-1472). The *homo faber*; the active, working person is "someone who is no longer ashamed of his work". 7. In addition to handicrafts, new forms of goods production emerge, for example in factories, and thereby a new, early capitalist monetary and economic system, for which pioneering work is being done in Italy. 8. The fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (1453) and the resulting flight of Byzantine scholars to Northern Italy revives the study of antiquity (original texts, works of art, etc.). 9. Philosophy (e.g. in the newly founded Platonic Academy of Florence), science and culture come to a new, never before known development; to peak performances such as the world-person theater of *William Shakespeare* (1564-1616). No less prominent are artists and thinkers such as *Leonardo da Vinci*, *Raffaello*, *Michelangelo*, *Botticelli*, *Brunelleschi*, *Pietro Aretino*, *Machiavelli*, *Savonarola* and *Lorenzo de' Medici* (il Magnifico). 10. Humanism and universality (the versatility of the *uomo universale*, the universal genius) become allies. 11. Columbus and circumnavigators like *Magellan* and *Vasco da Gama* with their discoveries are preparing what is now called "globalization".

c) From the Baroque to the Enlightenment

A big rift goes through the 17th century, the Baroque era. The first thing that will be torn is the bond of values that previously held society together. The raging of the Thirty Years' War characterizes the first half of the century, while in the second half, on the one hand, absolutism (e.g. in France) re-emerged and, on the other hand, thanks to the *Bill of Rights* (of 1689), at least in England, once again was fought for precursors of a parliamentary democracy. - The Spaniards call that time the 'Siglo de Oro', the "Golden Century" (of their literature); for the French, it is the 'Grand Siècle', the century of Louis XIV, that brought the world a new golden age of culture.

Descartes (1596-1650)

At the beginning of the *Discours de la méthode* (from 1637) Descartes explains that common sense (*bon sens*) is what is "best distributed" in the world. It is equivalent to a) the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood and b) reason (*raison*) itself.

And these characteristics are naturally the same in all people ("naturellement égale en tous les hommes"). In connection with the *Cogito* and the theory of ideas, these statements have proven to be revolutionary. It is no coincidence that Descartes is mentioned in the same breath as the French Revolution ("la Révolution, c'est Descartes"). The philosopher *André Glucksmann* even sets up the equation Descartes = France (*Descartes c'est la France*, Paris 1987). Against which, however, speaks among other things the fact that Descartes spent several years of his life outside France. In any case, one should not simply reduce a philosopher of this format to his country of origin. Descartes never belongs to anyone - and he belongs to *all* who respect reason and understanding; to all who do not idolize power and hierarchy, but stand up for the rights and freedom of every single person.

Modern brain research has provided evidence for the *functional unit of the person* as claimed by Descartes. Without the body (including a functioning brain) and without a psychological foundation, the human mind cannot work. But understanding can also be found for Descartes' the three-substance doctrine. The *essence* of mind and consciousness is by no means explained by referring only to the mind-body unity of the person. Spirit can be interpreted as a dialectical subject-object relationship and this in turn as an *information* event. Information, especially as *quantum information*, is, among other things, the "actual basis of beings", through which the mind-body problem also appears more and more to be solvable. [\[89\]](#)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

is widely regarded as a rather cynical pioneer of the absolutist state. What is overlooked here is the fact that he is one of the few who have recognized what is important in humans: being a *person*, which has to be honored and protected again and again. The philosophical motives of this insight are already visible in the confrontation that Hobbes, like Gassendi, has led against Descartes, specifically with reference to the six *Meditations* of Descartes. Where Hobbes surprisingly repeatedly treats the Cartesian ideas and proofs of God, i.e. in almost half of his 16 "objections", answered later on by Descartes. In essence, Hobbes criticizes the claim that man has an "innate idea" of God, which, however, could not be proven. In addition, Christianity requires "of us to believe that God is incomprehensible" (11th objection). - Descartes answers this with three dry sentences; "Inconceivability of God" only means that it is impossible to get a comprehensive, appropriate idea of him, whereas it is not doubtful and has already been repeated "ad nauseam" that there is indeed an *idea* of God, God could very well be *thought of*. Elsewhere, namely in the reply to Hobbes' 10th objection, Descartes makes it clear that he does not consider the ideas themselves to be innate, but rather *the ability to develop ideas*. - This distinction is certainly extremely important. Unfortunately, Descartes did not explain it in detail.

Hobbes' ingenious device is that he differentiates between "natural" and "artificial" persons, so that he can apparently easily transfer the term person to *state theory*. Natural persons are themselves agents of action, while artificial persons are those to whom other people ascribe actions. Hobbes includes not only all *legal entities*, but also all possible assemblies, corporations and finally even the *state*. He defines this, in his main work *Leviathan* (from 1651), as "a person ... in whom each and every one of a large number has made himself the author of their actions through mutual contract between everyone ...". What Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *social contract* seems to anticipate, especially since Hobbes adds: "Whoever embodies this person is called *sovereign* and, as they say, possesses *supreme power*, and everyone else is his *subject*."

Natural and artificial person merge here. Even in the state, even as a subject, the person remains a person. This is often overlooked when the Hobbesian state is interpreted as merely absolutistic, as a violent abolition of the "wolfish state of nature" of man.

Nevertheless, Hobbes' concept of person is just as little democratic as his concept of state. His "sovereign" is indeed a "person" who - in contrast to Rousseau's concept - stands *outside* the social contract, is not bound by the law (but "legibus absolutus") and does not guarantee the rights of his subjects.

Whereas, in Hobbes, the subject is very much obliged to obey his ruler as long as he fulfills his main task of securing inner peace. After all, the subjects are free "within the areas not regulated by law ... to do what they consider to be the most advantageous on the basis of their own reason." (*Lexikon der philosophischen Werke* , op. cit. p. 405)

So the ruler's power is absolute, but by no means unlimited. Anyhow, with his concept of person, Hobbes provides a starting point for what seems to make up the *real value of man*: being a *person* .

Values and norms of the Enlightenment

Descartes' "natural light" ('lumière naturelle') became a beacon and symbol for an entire epoch in the 18th century. The Age of Enlightenment is called 'le siècle des lumières' in French, 'illuminismo' in Italian, and 'age of enlightenment' in English. The light of the Cartesian rationalism is by no means the only and probably not the most important source of this current of the time. Rather, this is to be sought not only in French freethinking in the 17th century, but above all in England, namely in the *empiricism* that arose there, the doctrine of experience. *Experience* is undoubtedly a basic concept of any value, norm and sense philosophy, and that already in accordance with the original meaning of 'sense' in the Indo-Germanic 'sinan': being on the move, traveling, driving.

The empiricism was systematically founded by *Francis Bacon of Verulam* (1561-1626), who explained *observation and experiment* as the indispensable basis of all research and presented them in detail. *John Locke* and *David Hume* expanded Bacon's empiricism through additional epistemological considerations, Locke because of his total rejection of "innate ideas", Hume because of his division of the objects of thought and research into a) facts ("matters of fact") and b) "relations of ideas". In part, Locke and Hume also incorporate the materialistic conceptions of Gassendi and Hobbes.

Lamettrie (1709-51)

Lamettrie's *ethic of forbearance* is based on subtle psychology and careful observation of social realities. (Nothing from mere, even "innate" ideas, everything from "experience and observation"!) Anyone who really wants to experience pleasure and enjoyment must not be a "libertine", says Lamettrie. And why? What's behind that? Which ratings, which values? Questions that arise when you consider the empathy with which Lamettrie treats problems of love, eros and sexuality. Is it a coincidence that he is trying to do justice to the female (allegedly "weak") gender in particular? Hardly likely.

A closer look at the way in which Lamettrie explains the relationship between the individual and society promises more information. Even the Golden Rule binds the individual to his fellow human beings and thus to society; to which Lamettrie, the "Epicurean", attaches surprisingly high importance. *He considers people to be particularly virtuous who value the common good more than their own interests*. But why is it, he asks, that in order to be happy, certain people in a certain society are unhappy? By no means just on themselves, for they are usually naturally benign, know the Golden Rule, and are protected from excessive selfishness by Natural Law. Only in rare cases, there are exceptions of these observations. If, however, people (can) become unhappy, it can be assumed that this is due to, among other things, inadequate social framework conditions .

Hence, social criticism is required. Society is largely in a bad state, grievances are to be lamented everywhere. Traditional politics, religion and education fail especially when they meet people's natural desire for happiness with rigid morals (including threats with the devil and hell), disregard and oppression. Hence even *Justice* degenerates into an instrument of power in the state, cannot be guaranteed by the state and its laws, and the common good cannot be established.

Remedy would only be possible if the rulers would always provide individuals with effective help to help themselves. Then the next one would stand by the neighbor in solidarity. *Happiness for everyone* would be possible if the investments for the good and the just were promoted early, consistently and sustainably. Then everyone would know for himself / herself what to do. As a result, there cannot seem to be absolutely valid values. It is questionable whether Lamettrie therefore only knows and recognizes *relative* values.

In any case, his *philosophy of forbearance*, that is, of compassion, corresponds perfectly to modern scientific knowledge. Compassion and empathy are not mere wishful thinking. Using the *mirror neurons* discovered by modern brain research, we practice these skills every day. In this respect too, Lamettrie was way ahead of his time.

Taking into account the context in which he uses his terms shows that they are almost without exception *value terms*, or at least terms accociable with values terms which he consistently conceives as *constants*, i.e. seemingly timeless valid concepts. Without these concepts of value , Lamettrie's thought structure, which is already endangered by all sorts of uncertainties, doubts and fluctuations, would collapse into nothing. And even such fluctuations suggest that Lamettrie actually considers his concepts of value to be only relatively valid. In any case, absolute values can only exist if the absolute exists at all, especially since this undoubtedly belongs to the realm of ideals, as can only be found in religious traditions and some philosophical systems (e.g. with Plato and Hegel). Lamettrie has always fought vigorously against the absolute claims that emerged from such systems. It can hardly be decided whether there are any absolutes at all. After all, the positivist *Auguste Comte* (1798-1857) called for everything absolute to be replaced by relative.

Incidentally, Lamettrie's value concepts certainly contain *personal* and therefore *holistic* assessments and values. For this reason alone, they can in no way be "legibus absolutus", i.e. values detachable from (natural) laws. If everything is materially conditioned (as Lamettrie assumes), there cannot be anything detached from it, something absolute. On the other hand: If the person's values are constant, i.e. valid over time, they cannot be completely relative. A solution to this problem can therefore be - with regard to Lamettrie's oeuvre as a whole - to no longer merely assert "relative values", but also to assert *values of the person*.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78)

As with Lamettrie, Rousseau is ultimately about nothing other than the *value of the person*. One of the basic questions that the Geneva philosopher posed in VI. Chapter of his 'Contrat Social' (the 'Articles of Association') of 1762, reads: *How can a form of society ('forme d'association') be found "which defends and protects the person and the assets of every member of society with all its common strength, and through which each individual, even if he unites himself with all, nevertheless only obeys himself and remains just as free as before"?* He gives the answer to this question a little later in the same chapter; it reads: *"All of us associate ('met en commun') his person and his power under the supreme line of the general will (, volonté générale'), and we take every single member of the community as an indivisible part of the whole ."*

In other words: The individual ('la personne particulière') becomes a community person ('personne publique') and thus a *legal person* by first relinquishing all of his / her rights to the sovereign, the common will, who in turn, i.e. as a quasi-service ('equivalent'), guarantees to every person all rights and thus the greatest possible freedom. As a result, the "natural person" takes on the status of a legally fully secure person, which would not be possible without the common will (and the corresponding legislation) formed by the consent of all members of the community.

In addition, Rousseau earned undeniable merits not only through his warnings against alienated life distant from nature. Rather, his political philosophy in connection with his new definition of the value of the "inalienable person" had a very lasting effect. This philosophy proved to be a first-rate power in the history of ideas and politics, which later influenced such important poets and thinkers as Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Fichte, Herder, Marx, Nietzsche, Pestalozzi and Basedow and thus trends such as the *Sturm und Drang and Romanticism* , *socialism, philosophy of life, personalism, psychoanalysis and reform pedagogy*. *Supporters of today's eco-movement also refer to Rousseau*.

Similar to Lamettrie, however, there is a weak point in Rousseau's philosophy, namely the question of how economic, social and political powers work together in such a way that they bring about or reinforce social inequality and injustice. This is not due to pure private property (which Rousseau initially referred to as the actual fall of mankind, but later approved in its bourgeois version). Not Rousseau, but *Karl Marx* asks how "functioning private ownership of the means of production" (Ralf Dahrendorf) intensifies class antagonisms under capitalism .

The idea of tolerance in Voltaire, Lessing and Goethe

In the article "Tolérance" of his *Philosophical Pocket Words book* from 1764, **Voltaire** asks: "What is tolerance? Tolerance is the dowry of humanity. We are all full of weaknesses and errors: Let us forgive each other for our stupidities! - this has to be the first law of nature." To connect a little later the personhood of the human being with the broad horizons of nature, history and humanity. Everyone has weaknesses, can be wrong and is therefore (almost like in Lamettrie) dependent on the *forbearance of his fellow men*.

Such indulgence can have beneficial effects - even interreligious, intercultural and international - as soon as there are sufficiently strong common interests, but not when it comes exclusively to questions of religion, that is to say "the last things". To Voltaire's mind, disputes about this all too often end "criminally".

Nonetheless, Voltaire adds a prayer at the end of his treatise on tolerance, in which he addresses, with great seriousness, the "God of all beings and of all times", a God who can no longer be assigned to a particular religion. Once again he refers to man's susceptibility to error and therefore asks God for help: "Let us help one another to bear the burden of a short, fleeting life ..." and: "Let all people remember that they are brothers! They should like to abhor all tyranny over the soul as well as the highway robbery, which takes away the fruits of their labor and their quiet diligence!" [90]

That Voltaire turns to God with a prayer does not seem to be compatible with his *deism*. Because according to the deist view, God created the world, but has not taken care of it since then. How should he then be "approachable"? Maybe for "reasons of reason"? Apparently Voltaire does not shrink from the danger of mistaking himself. - All the more violently he hurls his *Écrasez l'Infâme* ('Smash the wickedness!') against any claim to absoluteness. From which it follows that he not only sharply criticizes Catholicism, but also other "fanatical" religions such as Judaism and Islam (Islam, for example, in his tragedy *Mahomet*). Which, however, he relativized in later years, especially since, in the mono-theistic founders of religions, he recognizes more and more the trailblazers of his deism and its "natural morality". [91] The fact that Voltaire was accepted into the *Masonic lodge* shortly before the end of his life (1778) cannot be overlooked.

Lessing and Goethe. *Johann Wolfgang von Goethe* (1749-1832) considers tolerance to be insufficient as mere tolerance and endurance (in the sense of the Latin "tolerare": "to tolerate, to endure"). Rather, it is important to show to fellow human beings not only tolerance, but compassion, respect and recognition (which people are quite capable of due to their ability to *empathize*). So Goethe wants that man is respected and recognized in his *personhood*, demands which he has repeatedly exemplified in his literary works.

Alongside him and Kant, *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing* (1729-81) was one of the most important pioneers of the German Enlightenment. He too demands tolerance in the sense of respect and recognition and connects this demand with the *problem of truth*. In his *duplicate* from 1778 he states: "It is not the truth that any person is in possession of, or supposed to be, but the sincere effort that he has made to discover the truth that makes a *person's worth*. (...) If God kept all truth in his right hand and in his left the only ever active urge for truth, although with the addition of always and eternally erring, and said to me: choose! I humbly fell into his left hand and said: Father give! The pure truth is only for you!" (Emphasis added) A clear rejection of any kind of absolute claim!

Nonetheless, Lessing considers the connection between tolerance and a sense of justice to be indispensable. As persons, people are to be treated at least as fairly as the issues affecting them. For this reason alone, it is wrong to describe the tolerance idea as "out of date", as Hendryk M. Broder (born 1946) did in an NDR interview on November 15, 2014. It is also not true that tolerance is only "graciously bestowed" on subjects by their rulers "from above", that is, in vertically organized societies long ago. Tolerance is much more a *value of the person* to be respected every day and everywhere.

This was precisely the concern of Goethe, Lessing and others before and after them. They expand the idea of tolerance to include the dimensions of respect and recognition and thus make it an indispensable part of being a person. Mere endurance does not mean recognition of the person. But there is no recognition without enduring. From which it follows that we should recognize our fellow human beings in *their personality*, namely, among other things, as *legal persons* and as *social beings determined by nature and spirit*.

If we adjust our behavior according to these regulations, new possibilities open up to deal with the *problem of intolerance* as well. Intolerance cannot simply be forbidden, as Rousseau said. Anyone who believes that they can fight intolerance through intolerance will also go astray (which H.M. Broder suggested, probably not only with provocative intent). You then not only run the risk of becoming illogical by betraying your tolerance (which Broder at least admits), but you also take the risk of possibly committing a criminal offense. Therefore, in my view, remains only the following: We must, as often and as long as possible, trust the effects of possible tolerant and reasonable own *behavior*, including the force of the better argument and of convincing speech, - and, in an emergency situation, do not be afraid to take *legal* action, which of course includes the right to self-defense. Then we can openly fight intolerance effectively without becoming intolerant ourselves, i.e. without betraying the principles of tolerance - and their limits.

e) human rights

The American Revolution

The *Virginia Bill of Rights* of 1776, the *Declaration of Independence* of the same year and the *Bill of Rights* of 1791 - based on the English models *Magna Charta*, *Habeas Corpus Act* and *Bill of Rights* of 1689 - are further milestones on the way of human rights to ever greater general validity. The struggle for personal rights is concretized in the *Declaration of Independence* of 1776 as a struggle against despotism and tyranny. The English king at the time is considered a tyrant, who is accused in a long list of more than two dozen violent, no longer tolerable arbitrary acts and attacks. The king was not only guilty of tyrannical *taxation without representation*, but also plundered the population, cut off New England from world trade, prevented urgently needed laws, dissolved popular representations by force, corrupted judges, subordinated civil order-forces to the English military, etc. Therefore, the American revolutionaries come to the conclusion that such a prince, who by every one of his deeds reveals the character of a tyrant, cannot be the ruler of a free people, so that the 13 signatory states of New-England rightly proclaimed and implemented their independence.

Philosophically and religiously, the revolutionaries justify their actions primarily with tolerance and respect for the inalienable rights of the person, up to the "decent respect to the opinion of mankind" (the due respect for human opinion). They want to justify themselves not only to their own people, but also to the global public.

How this happens, a single sentence in the preamble sums up precisely and easily: "*We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.*"

These principles are not based on atheism, but on deeply religious respect for the Creator and his creatures, in accordance with the Christian doctrine of the equality of all human beings before God (i.e. with what constitutes what is actually new, the new good news of Christianity). Equal dignity, life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness are values that *all* people, including non-Christians and atheists, can take to heart and claim as rights.

In the new federal state, the *constitution* is based on the separation of powers, almost as *Montesquieu* had already called for in the *Esprit des Lois* of 1748. Authors and politicians such as *Thomas Paine* and *Benjamin Franklin* have emphasized the exemplary nature of the revolution and the new form of government. All over the world, this model could serve to free people from tyranny, hardship and oppression. *Rohls* concludes (op. cit. p. 407): "The constitution, however, with its provisions on freedom and security of the person, i.e. human rights, as the oldest written constitution of a modern state, is the model for all future liberal-democratic state systems."

The French Revolution. *Aristotle* already called for freedom, equality and justice. Freedom, equality and fraternity are undoubtedly among the most important principles of the French Revolution, which began in 1789. No less than the American constitutional principles, these principles are undoubtedly a hallmark of free democracy to this day - in the German Basic Law, for example, as freedom of the person, equality before the law (including "sisterhood" also: equal rights for men and women) as well as an invitation to solidarity (so in the sentence "property obliges"). However, it is precisely these examples that raise the question of whether the three principles (or *ideals* or *guiding ideas* or *basic values*) have already been fully realized somewhere in the world. Which is undoubtedly not the case.

The main pillars of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the citizen*, which was adopted by the French National Assembly on 26 August 1789 are *freedom and equality* that exist from birth and are *inalienable*; the equality, however, expressly in the form of *equality before the law*. Because there are definitely differences between people, in the course of a life also from a *social* point of view, differences which, however, are only acceptable as long as they do not harm the "common benefit" (Art 1).

The political institutions (or associations) required for the corresponding control are only legitimate if they serve to preserve the natural, non-prescribable human rights, namely the rights to *freedom, property and security* and the right to resist oppression (Art. 2).

What freedom consists of - as a natural right - is set out in several articles. Their limits lie in the freedom of fellow human beings. Basically everything is allowed as long as it does not cause harm to fellow human beings. These limits can only be described in more detail through *laws* (Art. 4). Strongly guaranteed are *freedom of opinion and religion*, as long as they do not disturb the legally regulated public order (Art. 10). The same applies to the spreading ('communication') of thoughts and opinions. In speech, writing and printing (press), every citizen may express himself freely within the limits of what is permitted by law.

The laws themselves are only valid as an "expression of the common will" ('*volonté générale*', a clear borrowing from Rousseau!). The sovereignty that corresponds to the common will always emanates from the nation itself (Art. 3), so that every citizen has the *personal* right, directly or indirectly, to participate in the establishment of the common will and thus in the formation of the entire political will. Since the *same law applies to all*, every citizen has equal access to all public offices that are to be filled according to the suitability and abilities of the applicants.

Other articles guarantee, among other things, the *separation of powers*, the *right to property*, fair taxation, protection against arbitrary charge and arrest, the legal presumption of innocence, which is counted among personal rights, and the establishment of police and justice, to which every taxpayer has to contribute according to his income..

The word *fraternity*, meaning brotherhood, does not appear in the *declaration...* of 1789, undoubtedly, however, indirectly, and so also in the related meanings of the terms

'solidarity' and 'justice'. Without solidary recognition of fellow human beings, there is no recognition of the original freedom and basic personal freedoms, no equality before the law, no "common benefit", no "happiness for all". Justice can only exist where there is such recognition.

f) again briefly on Kant , the enlightener

In his book *What is Enlightenment?* Kant emphasizes that people should have the courage to use their own intellect so that they could be trusted not only to use the general legislation as a guideline for their own maxims, but also to actively participate in this legislation. Philosophically, Kant developed this position among other things by drawing far-reaching conclusions from the pioneering work of numerous theorists and the human rights declarations of 1776/91 (USA) and 1789 (France), which enabled him to construct the Categorical imperative . Another great feat was that he combined rationalism and empiricism in new syntheses. I have described these great deeds in detail elsewhere, especially in: Robra 2015, pp. 250-259, which does not change anything about my recently expressed criticism of Kant's ethics (see pp. 7-15).

g) On the classic German ideal of humanity and on German idealism

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) was granted the opportunity to complete the classic ideal of humanity in a new philosophy of art, society and the state, mainly so in the treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters* (1795) . In this, he calls for an *aesthetic state of reason* and sees art as a suitable means for its realization. Man should gradually bring his being and appearances, spirit and nature, duty and inclination into harmony. This could succeed especially through art because it joins mind and matter, content and form, reason and sensibility.

Goethe also expressed this ideal in a concise, normative form, namely in the verses: "Man should be noble / helpful and good! / Because that alone / distinguishes him / from all beings / whom we know. " (From Goethe's poem *Das Göttliche*). To behave "in a noble manner", and thus *ethically*, means to develop compassion and empathy for other people and to support them with active help. Goethe expresses himself similarly in numerous *sayings with normative content* , for example in this: "Little children, love each other, and if that doesn't work, at least let one another count !" In which the idea of active tolerance is linked to the Christian commandment to love one's neighbor. And also in: "God gives the nuts, but he doesn't crack them." An admonition to people not to shrink from the task of solving their problems on their own initiative. Those who follow such maxims can be considered truly humane and realize what, above all, allows a person to be a person. The classic ideal of humanity thus proves to be exemplary and *ethical* in the truest sense of the word.

Schiller wins his ethical convictions not least in the confrontation with Kant who had demanded that humans should and must control their sensuality by virtue of reason, i.e. "under the despotism of the categorical imperative". Schiller follows him in this, but only partially, namely only insofar as he also demands that man should control his instincts. However, he rejects Kant's harsh opposition between reason and sensuality just as resolutely as he rejects the "despotism of the categorical imperative". Especially since he considers it possible to combine the two poles of human existence (for Freud: id and super-ego) in harmony with one another. He therefore not only criticizes Kant's concept of duty, and thus the categorical imperative, but also other basic elements of Kant's ethics, for example in questions of love, lust, happiness, morality and virtue.

To love: Schiller is convinced that man cannot live in happiness and harmony without love, whereby he particularly values *unselfish* love. Man should also fulfill his duty out of love for it. - A completely unbearable thought for Kant! Duty is one of the highest commandments for him, but not based on feelings, but on the unconditional necessity of the moral law, which cannot be changed or influenced by any feeling, not even that of love .

The same applies to *pleasure*. For Kant, "moral pleasure" is an impossibility, whereas Schiller conceives precisely this as "pure pleasure, a pure pleasure precisely as the highest flowering of moral life" .^[92] This signifies that Schiller recognizes the *intellectual pleasure* or also: the *desire for morality* (a "desire ... produced by means of our moral nature") as a factor containing the continuous "integral element of moral life " (cf. Appellmann loc. cit. p. 362 f.).

In his dispute with Aristotle, Kant had rejected *happiness* as the goal of morality. Although he does not simply reject the pursuit of happiness, he considers it impossible to make happiness the epitome of binding ethics. - Whereas, in contrast, Schiller sees bliss as a link between sensuality and reason. "That is to say, blessed is someone who, in order to enjoy, does not need to do without." (Appellmann loc. cit. p. 364). The prerequisite for this is to control one's own *inclinations* in such a way that they can be brought into harmony with reason. Only then harmony and "full harmony" can be achieved.

To morality. For Kant, moral is "only that which happens out of respect for the moral law without taking into account the sensual motives" (op. cit. p. 365). What Schiller largely agrees with, but adds, in significant difference, that moral action and sensuality do not exclude each other *per se*. Sensuality should be "educated" (not constrained!), so that it can serve moral purposes of the person on the basis of free decision, or at least not stand in the way of those purposes. Once again, Schiller considers *inclinations* worthy of promoting morality or a "moral way of thinking".

To virtue. Kant brings it in connection not only with morality, but also with happiness, but restricts: "Virtue does give a claim to happiness, but it is not this in itself, so in itself it is not the perfect good either." (Ibid., p. 370). Incidentally, only those people can be described as "virtuous" who "feel firmly attached to the maxims of observing their duties". (loc. cit., p. 372, seemingly Kant means here 'observe' in the sense of 'fulfill'). - Schiller criticizes these restrictions by claiming that virtue is nothing other than an "inclination of duty".

Incidentally, his concept of virtue is based on a very special inclination: *love*. With which, in contrast to Kant, he wants to include the wholeness of human nature in his concept of virtue. Virtue, love and beauty should complement each other harmoniously: "Virtue should not have a deterrent effect, should not be in opposition to our nature, but rather be paired with graces." (op. cit. p. 373). Obviously, Kant sees virtue primarily as that of the *fulfillment of duty*, whereas Schiller sees in it a possibility of reconciling duty and inclination, ethics and aesthetics.

Accordingly, what Schiller opposes to the Kantian rigorism can largely be subsumed under a single term, that of the "beautiful soul". In his treatise on *Grace and Dignity* (of 1793) Schiller explains: "In a beautiful soul, then, sensuality and reason, duty and inclination harmonize, and grace is its expression in the phenomenon. Only in the service of a beautiful soul, nature can possess freedom and preserve its form at the same time, since it loses the former under the rule of a strict mind, the latter under the anarchy of sensuality. A beautiful soul pours an irresistible grace over an education that lacks architectural beauty, and one often sees it triumph over the flaws of nature. All movements that emanate from it will be light, gentle, and yet animated. The eye will shine brightly and freely, and sensation will shine in it. The gentleness of the heart gives the mouth a grace that cannot contradict itself. There will be no tension in the faces, no compulsion in the voluntary movements, for the soul does not know about any of such things. Music will be the voice and move the heart with the pure flow of its modulations. Architectural beauty can please, it can be admired, it can astonish; but only grace will carry you away. Beauty has *worshippers*; but only grace has *lovers*; because we pay homage to the Creator and love people."^[93]

Once again, love becomes the key concept of Schiller's ethics. However, supplemented by other basic concepts such as person, grace and dignity. As a person, for Schiller, the human being is "a being that is *itself* a cause, and indeed the absolute ultimate cause, of its states, which can change according to reasons that it takes from itself" (op. p. 29). And already in the next sentence the author makes it clear that being a person also includes "finding empathy and wanting" and does not go into pure spirituality: "The way he appears depends on the way he feels and wants, that is, on Conditions that he himself determines in his freedom, and is not determined by nature according to its necessity. If man were merely a sensible being, nature would at the same time give the laws and determine the cases of application; now it shares the regiment with freedom, and although its laws endure, it is now the spirit that decides the cases. "

At this point I consider a brief excursus on Schiller's terms 'freedom' and 'spirit' to be necessary. Schiller establishes both terms in an *idealistic* way, that is in idealistic reflection, especially since he elsewhere complains of the "tragedy of idealism", i.e. its presumed transience. Famous is Schiller's demand that man is *free*, "created free", even if he were "born in chains". But: freedom and nature share "the regiment" in people who, as persons, unite both the persistent and the changing, ie changeable states, so that they, freelancing, can transform the possible into the real. But since for Schiller the human being without sensuality is "only form, without spirit only matter", it must be clarified how far his spiritual determination extends to the person. To this end, Schiller differentiates between the spirit itself and its effects. The spirit itself also embraces the entire living nature, while its effects are all half perceptible, namely "through the whole system" (ibid.). It is a *feeling*, not just an acting, mind. The spirit only achieves and attains the highest freedom in *art* : "The form drove ... wants freedom and unity of personality, i.e. wants truth and justice. The greatest expansion of human existence can be found where there is an urge to form."^[94]

I now consider the following to be decisive: Contrary to his claim to guarantee morality through art, Schiller feels compelled to base morality on another, *non-aesthetic* concept: *dignity*, which, to his mind, first endows the moral force resting in freedom of art and spirit with the "expression of a sublime disposition" (op. cit. p. 51). In connection with *grace*: "Dignity prevents love from becoming desire. Grace prevents respect from becoming fear. True beauty, true grace should never arouse desire. Where this interferes, either the object must lack dignity or the observer lacks the morality of the sensations. " (ibid., p. 63). Only dignity and courage teach the right way to deal with mistakes and defects of all kinds: "One must reprimand a mistake with grace and confess it with dignity." (p. 59). In addition, Schiller considers dignity to be a *majestic power* that "compels us to look within ourselves". And: "We incline our heads before God, forget everything except ourselves and feel nothing but the heavy burden of our own existence" (p. 64). In dignity everything that is only aesthetic apparently falls silent, instead the reality principle comes into full effect. Without dignity, the spirit can not control the instinctual layer, meanness and malice can take hold.

It is all the more astonishing that Schiller does not see the possibility of perfection in the mere reality principle, but again primarily in an *aesthetic* category: *play*. Only in play man can really master and develop his dual nature: "... to finally say it all at once, man only plays where he is in the full meaning of the word man, and *he is only fully man where he plays* ." (p. 107). On the other hand, for Schiller, reality is only a "realm of forces", while ethics is only effective in the "holy realm of laws". The two realms can only be abolished in the Hegelian sense, i.e. fully realized, in the "aesthetic state", which will finally free people from all constraints. Schiller on this: "In the middle of the terrible realm of forces and in the middle of the holy realm of laws, the aesthetic instinct for education builds unnoticed in a third, joyful realm of play and appearance, in which it removes the fetters of all relationships and releases him from everything that means compulsion, both in the physical and in the moral. If in the *dynamic* state of rights man encounters man as a force and limits his work - if he opposes him in the *ethical* state of duties with the majesty of the law and binds his will, then he is allowed, in the circle of pleasant company, in the *aesthetic* state, to appear only as a figure, as an object of free play. *Giving freedom through freedom* is the basic law of this realm. "- And in this "realm of aesthetic appearance" even the "ideal of equality" is realized. (op. p. 147 and 149.)

Critical appraisal

Unfortunately, Schiller's great utopia of an aesthetic state has apparently not yet been realized anywhere. The role of the state seems unclear to me. Even an aesthetic state of equals is still a state! Perhaps even only a state within a state. But do you still need it when all people are "equal"?

Amazingly and contradictingly, Schiller himself did not consider a comprehensive realization of his utopia to be realistic. At the very end of his treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, he writes: "But does such a state of beautiful appearance also exist, and where can it be found? The need for it exists in every finely tuned soul; in fact, like the pure church and the pure republic, one would like to find it only in a few select circles, where not the mindless imitation of foreign customs but rather one's own beautiful nature directs the behavior, where man through the most complicated circumstances walks with bold simplicity and calm innocence and has no need to offend another's freedom in order to assert his own, nor to throw away his dignity in order to show grace." (op. cit., p. 149).

This is contradictory because Schiller had previously asserted both the ideal and the practical primacy of art. When the "state" is mentioned, one might expect political, legal, sociological and economic analyzes. Schiller renounces this, but believes that ethics can be abolished in a "state of beautiful appearances". If, however, this state only exists in the minds of an elite with a sense of art or in a few small, "selected circles", Schiller's ethics apparently ends up in a totally idealistic impasse. A deplorable result, but announced already by the fact that Schiller was forced to base his ethics seemingly continuously founded in art, on a non-aesthetic concept: the *dignity* of man. Where, however, a discussion of the term 'dignity' already highly praised by Kant would have been necessary. After all, Kant had given the responsible *person* "absolute" value and thus absolute dignity and expressly linked this with the purpose-means relation that he had emphasized in the purpose formula of the categorical imperative. (See Eisler 1964, pp. 613, 603).

Nevertheless, Schiller's ethics seem to be superior to those of Kant in several respects. Like the apostle Paul, Kant demands the inexorable suppression of sensuality by reason. Schiller avoids this (manicheistic!) dualism by building aesthetic and ethical bridges between reason and sensuality. Love, grace, beauty and dignity should enable people to keep the instinctual layer and the superego in balance.

To my mind, both Kant and Schiller fall short here. Kant correctly sees the dangers of criminal tendencies, overinterprets them as "evil", and, almost biblically, as "original sin", which does not stand up to scientific examination. Schiller does not completely overlook the dangers arising from evil, but does not allow them to become relevant in his ethical concepts; nor does he consider it necessary to legally secure the person or even to discuss the term 'legal person'. Instead, he holds the *spirit* conceived as omnipresent, to be able to strengthen the personality of the people, in particular through art, so that they can always claim it as a reliable moral. However, there is no evidence of a spirit that penetrates "the entire living nature" and "the entire system". Otherwise it is almost only found in Hegel and Schelling; and even if the latter understands the human spirit as a dialectical subject-object relationship, he assumes that all of nature, and thus also man, is permeated by the spirit of God. In both Hegel and Schelling, this pantheistic concept of spirit rests on a theological, *not scientific* basis. - Schiller has never tried to explain the human mind, among other things, by the *being-in-possibilities* of matter. This, too, is part of the "tragedy of idealism" complained about by Schiller.

However, the following, apparently sustainable, merits of Schiller remain to be assessed positively: 1. Human nature is not to be split up in two ways, but to be understood *holistically*. 2. Duty and inclination do not have to be in opposition. 3. Affections and feelings, such as love, grace and dignity, can very well have a morally motivating effect. 4. The freedom of art should be developed into a *realm of freedom and equality for all people*.

Nevertheless, the following must be added: If you take Schiller at his word, ethics can only exist a) for small, elite circles and b) as the "realm of laws". Which is unmanageable, because Ethics claim general validity or at least orientation for everyone as far as possible. Morality can only be reflected in ethics if the actual living conditions of people are appropriately taken into account; however, ethical considerations could get tangled up and lost in the confusion of everyday life and daily events. Solutions to this problem will have to be sought.

Hegel (1770-1831)

Hegel's critique of Kant also seems to offer solutions to those problems that emerged from the controversy between Schiller and Kant. Hegel starts from Kant's epistemology and specifically criticizes the "thing in itself. What a thing can be "in itself" is always already "in it", so only exists in its identifiable features and properties, from which Hegel concludes that things could not appear otherwise than "according to their essence", so that Kant's distinction between thing-in-itself and appearance becomes obsolete. Because Kant did not recognize this, he had no access to the truth at all, especially since, in contrast to Hegel, he was not in a position to connect in-itself and for-itself to the synthesis of "in-and-for-itself". A "being-in-and-for-itself", with which Hegel also wants to determine the *essence* itself, namely a) as the "being-have-been" ('das Ge-wesene') and b) as the "product of something made". This in the firm conviction that he can determine the things or the objects of knowledge as they actually are, whereby he bases this conviction on the Absolute Knowledge. (Which undoubtedly also applies to Hegel's *dialectical method*, which is supposed to do justice to the changes in things that are everywhere in flux).

Since with Kant only the "ability to know" is the subject of investigation, the essence of philosophy, the epistemology itself, is not at all visible with him, with the result: "Kantian philosophy is theoretically the methodically made enlightenment; namely, that no truth, but only appearance can be known."[\[95\]](#)

On the other hand, what can be found in Hegel's own philosophy is "what is true in and of itself" (ibid.). Whether such allegations, combined with one's own grandiose claims, are at all tenable will have to be investigated (see below).

If the thing in itself falls away, then, in addition to Kant's concept of freedom, its justification for the "absolute" validity of the categorical imperative becomes obsolete, but not its relevance in terms of content. Which, however, *Hegel* sees quite differently. For although he appreciates Kant's determination of human autonomy as the basis of duty, he then claims that this determination turns out to be an "empty formalism" as long as Kant's mere 'morality' is not replaced by the concept of concrete *morality*. As a result of this deficiency, ethics degenerate into a "talk of duty for the sake of duty"[\[96\]](#). A concrete, i.e. "immanent doctrine of duty" is lost. Kant's definition of duty remains abstract and formal, so that it is unsuitable as a criterion for evaluating actual action. No catalog of *special* obligations can be derived from an abstract, formal obligation. Worse: this formalism even makes it possible to justify "all unreal and immoral conduct" (ibid.). A reproach that could not have turned out worse against a staunch ethicist and moralist like Kant!

Hegel also bases his opposing position of socially realized morality on a criticism of Kant's strict separation of what *is* and what *is ought*. In Gerhardt (op. cit. P. 79) it says: "*For Hegel it is taken for granted that practical reason cannot rise above history as a formal authority and that the moral demands (the ought) are not at all intelligible, if they are not already rudimentarily realized in the reality of social development (i.e. in being) as morality; ...*" Gerhardt adds to his comment the following Hegel quote: "What is generally valid is also generally in force; what *ought*, is in fact, and what only *should be*, without *really being*, has no truth." (ibid.) Thus Hegel reinforces his accusation that Kant ought ethics does not refer to any being, any reality.

Nevertheless, Hegel renounces an ethics of his own, declared as such, but explains his concept of morality in the context of his *legal philosophy* (from 1821) and in the posthumously published work *System der Sittlichkeit* ('system of morality'), in which he specifies his legal philosophy in some points. Yet, I cannot go into the details of these publications here. If one considers the radicalism with which Hegel rejects Kant's ethics, the mediation of the two opposing positions seems completely out of the question. The more you will be amazed when you learn that the philosopher *Chu-Yang Wei* in his dissertation of 2010 interpreted Hegel's theory of morality as a further development and even as a "completion" of Kantian morality by stating: "In bourgeois society the principle of individual is clearly recognized by Hegel, but not abstractly or theoretically. Rather, the recognition of the abstract individual in civil society is presented in a broad context with the system of needs, the administration of justice, the police and the corporation. According to Hegel, the principle of bourgeois society is therefore ambiguous: on the one hand it is the recognition of the person striving for the satisfaction of his own ends, on the other hand it is the form of generality in which each can satisfy his needs through the other. ... That means that the individual is not opposed to civil society. On the contrary, civil society is a system of mutual dependence in which the interests of the individual and the welfare of society as a whole are combined. ... With this recognition of the peculiarity of the individual in civil society, it can be stated that Hegel's legal philosophy differs clearly from ancient political theory." [\[97\]](#)(My question: Is that why Hegel's ethics are also superior to those of Kant?)

In short form, Chu-Yang Wei's interpretation states that not only legal security, but also the moral needs and problems of the individual in the rule of law are already

sufficiently taken into account, so that a Categorical imperative is no longer needed. To clarify this, I will try the following

Critical appreciation .

Hegel regards the essence of things as “something made”, knowing quite well that this “made” manifests itself in certain features and properties. Which raises the question of who or what, for example, “made” natural things – a question that Hegel would probably answer with a reference to the Creator God or the Absolute, without being able to scientifically justify this answer. Furthermore, if what is evident in the nature of things is analyzable by features and properties, the analyst must undoubtedly go to the level of the *appearances*, so that Kant's argument again applies that only these appearances, but *not the things themselves* can be determined. From which it follows that the *in-itself* of things cannot simply merge into an “in-and-for-itself”, as Hegel claims. *Epistemology* is clearly visible in Kant, whereas Hegel's claim to be able to infallibly recognize the in-and-for-itself being of things proves to be untenable.

The same applies to Hegel's assertion that the categorical imperative is an “empty formalism”. Both the direct reference to action in Cat. Imp. (“Act so, that ...”) and the implication of the *unconditional dignity* of the sane person connected with it speak against it. The “General Legislation” evoked in the Cat. Imp. , i.e. the moral law, can only be abused if one detaches the moral law from its logical connection not only with the good as the highest value, but also from the obligation to be a person as an end in itself, the common good and the happiness not only of the respective individual, but also of all other rational persons. In this respect, too, Hegel's criticism is wrong.

Nevertheless, *Chu-Yang Wei's* thesis that Hegel's anchoring of morality in social reality means an advance on Kant's concept of morality should not be dismissed. Morality and morality do not first develop in pure reason, but rather in the early stages of evolution and in any case in childhood and adolescence, namely in education and socialization. This is true even if Hegel did not write a theory of individuality and ultimately “abolishes” in the absolute everything that is substantial, including morality. In any case, in his concept of social morality, Hegel reconciles being and ought even more strongly than Kant, whose Cat. Imp., nevertheless, does also not persist in ought, but affects or *should* affect the concrete being of people .

Hegel explains where Kant's “maxims of the will” come from and what social and moral conditions they are subject to. He reaffirms the (actually self-evident) demand that ethics should deal with morality and therefore has to take into account its concrete form . In addition, with his new approach, Hegel offers a plausible solution for the questions and problems raised by Schiller's concept of ethics. Not an “aesthetic state”, but a society of free and equals civilized by morality should be desirable, a society in which perfect freedom is no longer limited to that of artists.

h) Socialist Ethics - from Marx to Ethical Socialism

There would be no word to be said about values and norms in connection with the works of **Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels** if those theorists were right who claim that Marx and Engels had absolutely nothing to do with ethics. In fact, there are good reasons to believe otherwise. As an example, I will pick out two positions that can lead to a fruitful controversy, on the one hand the work of *Alexander Ulfig* : 'Morals and ethics. The desideratum of Marxism '(2015) and, on the other hand, the works a) 'Marx's emancipatory critique in terms of a complementarity of theory and practice' by *Kyongseok Lim* (Diss Tübingen of 2003.) and b) *Matthias Möhring-Hesse* : 'Allow justice. Political Ethics and Materialistic Analysis of Society ' (2018).

In short these positions are:

a) *Ulfig* : Marx and Engels refer to no ethics, but assert that there could be no binding ethics and no acceptance of the General Rights of Man, as long as social and economic inequalities persist..

b) *Lim* and *Möhring-Hesse* : Lim bases his thesis on, among others: Philip J. Kain: *Marx and Ethics* (New York 1988) and notes: “According to Kain, Marx's ethical standpoint can be summarized under three periods: First stage (1835-1843), under the influence of Aristotle and Kant, Marx believed in the role of ethics. In the second stage (1845-1856), on the other hand, he denies morality as an ideological illusion, because ethics alone cannot guide a change in reality. In the third stage (1857-1883) he withdrew the blatant tone of ideological moral criticism, because he recognized the action-based welfare ethics as a possibility of practical world change.” Möhring-Hesse considers Marx to be the founder of “ethics of adequate living, working and coexistence”.[\[98\]](#)

In order to judge this controversy, it must be examined whether or not Marx's theory is actually ethically irrelevant. Relevant are Marx's comments on the solutions proposed by Hegel. According to them, Hegel stands “on the standpoint of modern economics”, but did not recognize the negative side of work, that of *alienated* work: “The work that Hegel alone knows and recognizes is *abstractly intellectual* ”.[\[99\]](#) As a *knowledge* awareness pretends to be immediately the other side of its existence, namely: sensuality, reality and life (op. p. 654). Which is one of the reasons why Hegel claims that the true essence of nature, religion, state and art can only come to its true expression and validity as *philosophy of nature, religion, state and art* (p. 656).

These abstract-dialectical divestments of human life are considered to be a “divine process” in the highest “abolition”, with Hegel's God appearing as “*absolute spirit, the knowing and active idea*”, which is actually nothing more than “*mystical subject-object or subjectivity overarching over the object*”, i.e. absolutization of the subject, which ultimately has nothing left but “pure, restless circling in itself”(p. 659), that is narcissism, spiritual navel gaze: the “absolute” spirit claims to be bearer of world history, although at best it can be assumed that world history itself is only able to generate such a spirit from itself as the result of its process.

Hegel is therefore neither able to do justice to the *personality* and *individuality* of man, nor to adequately represent the relationship between state and society. Marx writes about this in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State* : “Family and bourgeois society are real parts of the state, real spiritual existences of the will, they are ways of being of the state; family and civil society make *themselves* a state. They are the driving forces. According to Hegel, on the other hand, they are *done* by the real idea; it is not their own curriculum vitae that unites them to form the state, but rather the life of the idea ...; they owe their existence to a different spirit than theirs; they are provisions set by a third party, not self-determination; therefore they are also defined as “finiteness”, as the own *finiteness* of the “real idea”.[\[100\]](#) Therefore, Hegel did not recognize the real causes of alienation, exploitation, inequality and oppression in capitalist society. On the contrary, it was to be established dialectically and materialistically that in capitalist society the free objectification of man is prevented because the exploitation based on private property always leads to *alienation*. To Marx, therefore, it appears necessary to abolish private ownership of the means of production that are suitable (“functioning”) for exploitation, i.e. not by “taking the object back into consciousness”, but by revolutionary appropriation of the object. In this negation of the negation, Marx recognizes a presupposition of what Feuerbach called “the positive grounded in itself”.

In this sense, Marx calls his teaching an “*implemented naturalism or humanism*” which “differs from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time is their unifying truth” (loc. cit. 1962, p. 649). As a sociable, social being (the ‘zoon politikon’ of Aristotle), man is completely dependent on society in order to be not only a natural but also a truly human being: “So *society* is the perfect essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the real naturalism of man and the humanism of nature ”(op. p. 596).

In this way, Marx finds his dialectical-materialistic alternative to idealism without renouncing certain achievements of (Hegelian) idealism, such as the dialectical method. His new concept of a humanistic naturalism or naturalistic humanism is also the basis of what Matthias Möhring-Hesse calls Marx's “recognizable ethics of living, working and living together” (loc. cit.) . Marx and Engels put these ethics in place of the *class morals* of the capitalists, with which the latter have always justified the assertion of their interests against the wage-earners; to which Engels (in his *Anti-Dühring*) explains: “We reject ... any imposition obliging us to any kind of moral dogmatics as an eternal, final, furthermore immutable moral law, under the pretext that the moral world also has its permanent principles, who stand above history and differences between nations. On the contrary, we maintain that all previous moral theory is the result, in the last instance, of the current economic social situation. And just as society has hitherto moved in class opposition, so morality has always been a class morality; either it justified the rule and the interests of the ruling class, or, as soon as the oppressed class became powerful enough, it represented indignation against this rule, and by this confirmed the future interests of the oppressed. There is no doubt that there has been progress on the whole for morality as well as for all other branches of human knowledge. But we are not yet beyond class morality. ”

Accordingly, in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx calls for the “**categorical imperative to overturn all conditions in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being**”, a requirement put forward by Marx not only “for reasons of offended morality”, as one critic claims, but above all with a socially critical, revolutionary intention. By referring to the almost all-encompassing object area of “*conditions*”, the Kantian concept of person loses its latent anthropocentric limitation, while the grave deficiencies of Hegel's concept of morality clearly come to light. The loftiest synthesis of morality, ethics, state and society is of no use if the person is not a self-determined *citizen*, but “a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being” .

The same applies to Hegel's concept of freedom, according to which freedom is a) “insight into necessity” and b) “progress in the consciousness of freedom”. Marx, on the contrary, considers the *complete* realization of the freedom of all human beings and thus of his ethics of an appropriate life to be possible, albeit only in a classless society, that is, in a *realm of freedom* of a “free association of free individuals” in which, of course, the General human rights would be fully realized.

From all this it is clear that - in contrast to the theses put forward by A. Ulfig - the teachings of Marx and Engels do indeed contain an *ethics of the appropriate life*, the

components of which can be summarized as follows:

1. Alienation, exploitation, inequality and oppression are hallmarks of capitalist rule.
2. All previous morality is class morality in which either the rule of the ruling class or the rebellion of the oppressed against this rule was justified.
3. To demand is the *categorical imperative* to "overturn all conditions, in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being."
4. In order to achieve true freedom for all people, the capitalist mode of production and with it class society must be abolished.
5. The *normative immediate goal* of socialism is: "Everyone according to his / her abilities, everyone according to his / her needs."
6. Only in a classless society, the *ethics of a decent living can come into full effect* and a *realm of freedom be established* in a "free association of free individuals".

Ethical socialism

It is not uncommon for Marx and Engels to be defamed as pioneers of the "red terror" practiced in Soviet communism. The extent to which this accusation is actually defamatory can be seen from the fact that a) Marx and Engels, as I have just been able to show, make a high degree of *ethical* arguments, b) they never advocate terror as a means of politics, c) they have nowhere discussed in a broad way the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and d) have considered also parliamentary paths to socialism to be possible. - Which is quite different with the genealogy of social democracy. Here lines of development lead from Marx via Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-64) and August Bebel (1840-1913) to ethical socialism and from there via Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) and revisionism to social democracy, which finally abandoned Marxism in the Godesberg program of the SPD of 1959.

Ethical socialism occupies a special position in this line of development, for the following reasons: In view of the high ethical and socio-normative claims that Marx and Engels repeatedly make in their concepts, it makes sense to combine these claims with those of Kant. This idea is at the basis of ethical socialism, which authors such as Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, F. A. Lange, Karl Vorländer and Max Adler have tried to establish since the late 19th century. For Cohen (1842-1918) Kant is "*the true and real originator of German socialism*"^[101], and the Categorical imperative is not only the supreme guiding principle for any socialism, but also contains "the moral program of the new time and all future of world history".^[102] With which Cohen apparently even goes much further than Kant. He considers the *purpose formula* of the Cat. Imp. with its emphasis on the dignity of the person to be directly socially relevant, an intention that Cohen sees realized in the fact that the Cat. Imp. "explains the idea of humanity as its content", so that the following can be deduced from the formula: "The self-purpose generates and determines the concept of the person, the basic concept of ethics. Mere means is the thing which, as a matter of economic traffic, is merchandise. The worker can therefore never be accounted for merely as merchandise, not even for the higher purposes of the alleged national wealth; he / she must be considered and, at all times, treated 'at the same time as a purpose' ". (In: Sandkühler op. p. 72.)

However, the fact that Cohen takes Kant's ethics at face value without any ifs or buts has a fateful effect, and indeed also for the fate of ethical socialism, up to and including the claim to absoluteness based on the reference to God, so that he does not shrink from associating the ethical claim of socialism, "the just cause", with both the idea of morality and religious belief, so that he inadmissibly mixes belief and knowledge when he claims: "Who trusts in the truth of the idea, hopes for the reality of the just cause. This hope is more than an emotional expression of moral conviction. This hope is belief in God " (op. p. 76).

As a result, Cohen's concept of socialism differs fundamentally from that developed by Marx and Engels. Cohen rejects not only atheism, but also dialectical materialism and class struggle theory. His socialism based on an "idealism of ethics" cannot be based on materialism. And the Marxist concept of class struggle becomes obsolete because he understands socialism "as a moral postulate which as such is general-human and precisely not class-specific" (Rohls, op. cit., p. 565). Instead of class-struggle Cohen wants to establish an "Ethical State" ending all conflicts, what Rohls confirms: "It is not a particular class, but the State considered as the subject of realization of this postulate, i.e. the state adapting its legal system to this ethical claim. The class antagonisms are therefore eliminated in the ethical state." (Ibid.).

But it is precisely this that contributed decisively to the failure of the ethical socialism conceived by Cohen. No state can prevent the - ultimately *materially* conditioned - class opposites; a socialist state as a "state of God" would be absurd, especially since God can act as a postulate of faith, as with Kant, but not as a guarantee for social equilibrium. Calling to God alone cannot solve problems. "God gives the nuts, but he doesn't crack them," says Goethe (so that also Cohen's additional concept of a "cooperative socialism"^[103] does not change anything.)

It seems questionable whether Kant and Marx can be reconciled at all. *Karl Vorländer* (1860-1928) comes to the conclusion that Kant was definitely "not a socialist", so that a connection to Marx is possible at best on the level of *methods*, the Kantian as "recognition critical-ethical", the Marxian as "evolutionary-economic" (Sandkühler op. cit. p. 315), whereby Vorländer disregards the ethical components of Marx's theory! Nevertheless, under such premises it is possible to justify socialism philosophically. Even the alleged "formalism" of Cat. Imp. criticized so harshly and erroneously by Hegel could be meaningfully operationalized, namely as a "guiding star" and as "the ultimate goal towards which the moral movement of humanity" should take its course, an eternal >task<. "(ibid., p. 328) On the other hand," the living *content* ... of an ethics can always only be given by the requirements of its time "(ibid.). Kant and Marx could definitely agree on this. Marx's "realm of freedom" in no way excludes Kant's ideal "realm of purposes", on the contrary. The Austro-Marxist *Max Adler* explains this common way: "For Marx this goal is with the words of the Communist Manifesto called an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. With Kant, this goal is seen in an externally and internally perfect state constitution as the only state in which mankind can fully develop all its talents." (op. p. 176) My objection: The concept of the state ends the commonality, because Marx and Engels see precisely "the death of the state" as a prerequisite for the beginning of the realm of freedom.

Conclusion : Even if ethical socialism, which was "only" a theoretical concept, failed at the beginning of the 20th century, it does not seem absurd to try to bring Kant and Marx under one roof, although not by renouncing dialectical and partially idealistically enriched materialism and the struggle for political-social emancipation with the aim of overcoming class antagonisms. In any case, not able to do this was the so-called "Marxist-Leninist ethics" (which was already a highly questionable construct in theory. Did Lenin have an *ethics* ?) .

i) From positivism to neoliberalism - via utilitarianism, pragmatism, critical rationalism

Positivism. As Hegel *Auguste Comte* (1798-1857) believes in the "irresistable" progress of mankind, but rejects, in contrast to Hegel, any historically powerful "Absolute Spirit" (and "world spirit"), but expects everything from a *knowledge of facts* where every Absolute is replaced by Relative. In his *Cours de philosophie positive* (ca. 1830-42), he claims that mankind since ancient times has, in increasing enhancement and improvement, run three different stages (or, états': states), namely 1. a theological or "fictional" stage, 2. the metaphysical or abstract, and 3. the scientific or *positive* stage, which "positive philosophy" takes into account. This philosophy sets itself the task of finding out regularities in and behind the phenomena in order to promote the (social) sciences so that future developments are predictable and determinable; the motto is: "savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour prévenir" (*to know in order to anticipate, anticipate in order to intervene*). A global democracy should secure the future in alliance with industry. - Comte's work has partly pointed the way for the development of sociology since the 19th century, even if it does not contain a critical theory of society such as that developed by Marx.

Utilitarianism

Two works are of fundamental importance for the development of utilitarianism, the *doctrine of the useful*, namely 1. The *Introduction to the principles of morality and legislation* (1789) written by *Jeremy Bentham* (1748-1832), in which, like already with Aristotle and Epicurus, the main question is how the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" of people can be achieved. All politics and legislation and every kind of *legal system* should be based on this ethical criterion .

The second basic work is *Utilitarianism* (1861) by *John Stuart Mill* (1806-73), who essentially expands Bentham's considerations by including in the rule of maximizing happiness the "inner motivation", i.e. the personal instance of conscience, in relation to, among other things Common good and general benefit.

Bentham defines *usefulness* as follows: "Usefulness is the property of an object that tends to produce profit, advantage, joy, good, or happiness ... or ... to preserve the group whose interest is being contemplated, from calamity, suffering, evil, or misfortune; if this group is about the community in general, it is about the happiness of the community; if it is about a certain individual, it is about the happiness of that individual."^[101] Bentham then applies this term to the problem of action by stating : "One can ... say of an action that it corresponds to the principle of usefulness ... if its inherent tendency towards increasing the happiness of the community is greater than any other inherent tendency to decrease it." (ibid.) Which, for Bentham, makes sense also if it is not about the "happiness of the community", but about the happiness of a particular individual.

In order to make these general provisions more concrete, Bentham emphasizes certain *values* that can be used to gain standards for assessing the usefulness of actions. To this end, on the one hand, like Kant, he emphasizes *people*, but above all wants, more consequentialist^[102], to be taken into account the *effects* which cause certain actions in certain individuals, so that it is advisable to find out: "a) the value of any identifiable *joy* seemingly in *first* line produced by the action; b) the value of any *suffering* seemingly in *first* line produced by the action; c) the value of any joy that seems to have been brought about by it in the *second* place. This establishes the *consequence* of the

first joy and the impurity of the first suffering; d) the value of every suffering that appears to be caused by it in the second place. This founds the *consequence of the first suffering* and the *impurity of the first joy*." (op. p. 94). Then, by a sort of algebraic method, all the joys and all the suffering are added separately, which would thus show what for the particular person is "good" and what is "bad". This procedure can also be applied to a larger number of people.

What is striking about these recommendations is that Bentham does not differentiate between *objects and occasions* that cause joy or suffering. Bentham thinks that poetry should not be valued higher than bowling as long as it does not grant a higher degree of joy. (Whereas Epicurus had at least emphasized that the highest joys are those of the spirit!) Bentham was in any case made the same reproach that has already been made against Epicurus and other hedonists, namely that with them "*human life is indistinguishable from pigish*" (Gerhardt op. p. 95). It is all the more astonishing that Bentham claims that "any policy and legislation and any kind of *legal system*" can accord to his criteria (see above).

Pragmatism

(Not to be confused with 'pragmatics', the doctrine of linguistic action.) Here, too, I have to be content with pointing out a few basic ideas. The new standard here is *action*, which is valued even higher than thinking; whereby the pragmatists certainly tie in with utilitarianism. What the person does is now decisive, but it has to be useful.

The American philosopher *William James* (1842-1910) wants to found on action even his *concept of truth* that can be derived from the *totality of the experience*, as James points out in his main work *Pragmatism* (1907). According to this, the truth changes procedurally with reality, so that every individual truth must be respected. Incidentally, what is *useful* is always *true*. (A thesis that meanwhile has been refuted by the *correspondence theory of truth*.)

In addition, *Charles S. Peirce* (1839-1914) examines: *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*, 1878. Accordingly, every term must be checked for what it actually contains, what it actually does and what consequences it (could) have, especially if it carries convictions or justifies reliable action. What is "real" would then again be determined by thinking (not by acting!), which sets clear limits to pragmatism. (See *Lexicon of Philosophical Works* loc. cit. p. 579; 342.)

Nonetheless, the USA has succeeded in embodying this teaching in a striking figure, that of the *self-made man*: man is himself! He made himself! This is the motto that stands above the actual, very own American dream: to work, on your own, your way up from simple worker ("dishwasher") to millionaire or even billionaire. This can supposedly be achieved by those who work tirelessly hard, who fearlessly face the facts and know how to use them to their own advantage. Those who dream of it can ideologically feel at home in positivism, utilitarianism and pragmatism.

The downside: the dream of a self-made man is becoming less and less common nowadays. In the USA and in other countries the tendencies towards petrifying class relations are becoming more permanent, and the chances of advancement are apparently decreasing more and more.

Critical Rationalism

This complex of theories owes most of all to *Sir Karl R. Popper* (1902-94), i.e. his main works *Logic of Research* (1935), *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945) and *Objective Knowledge* (1972). Popper sees the 'logic of research' as a contribution to the epistemology of modern natural science. In contrast to the positivists, he distrusts mere factual knowledge because all knowledge is bound by *theory*. Any theory can only hold true as long as it is not refuted by new or overlooked facts. The validity of a theory cannot be proven, but it can be "falsified" (refuted). Positivist "protocol sentences" are therefore not sufficient as a basis for research. Rather, only the intersubjective examination of theories can contribute to this.

In the *Open Society ...* Popper criticizes totalitarian (Stalinist) Soviet Marxism, the ancestors of which he considers Plato, Hegel and Marx, among others. Politics can legitimize itself not on the basis of philosophical state models such as that of Plato, but only through a "social technique of individual problems". He accuses Hegel of having promoted totalitarianism through his claims to absoluteness. Those who, like Marx and others, want to make people "happy" only contribute to the justification of tyranny. Marx's goal of a classless society amounts to replacing concrete analysis by prophecy.

It remains to be seen whether Popper really does justice to the philosophers mentioned with his criticism. In any case, he misunderstood Hegel's *dialectic* as a violation of the basic rules of logic ($A = A$, etc.). In addition, Popper did not recognize that there cannot be a really free, "open society" as long as the social question not only remains unsolved, but even is constantly exacerbated for example as a result of the globalized capitalist mode of production. Apart from that, the positivists, utilitarians, pragmatists and critical rationalists have made a major contribution to confirming and philosophically reinforcing the ideas and the real existence of *liberalism*, right up to today's globalized neoliberalism.

The question to be asked is which "normative" (or destructive!) forms of liberalism have been adopted in the course of neoliberal globalization. To this end, I have expressed my opinion on several occasions, so in *Robra* 2003, pp 147 et seq., in *Robra* 2015, pp 284-286 and 338. I repeat the following: The authors *Hans-Peter Martin* and *Harald Schumann* state as early as 1997 what they call *The Trap of Globalization*, which they perceive as an highly dangerous attack on freedom, democracy and prosperity. *Freedom is lost when the economy and society are liberalized globally but not politically controlled globally*.

Deregulation and privatization lead to a "drastic expansion of the international financial markets", with devastating consequences, as has been shown in numerous banking crises and in particular in the *world financial crisis* from 2008 onwards.

There is a trend towards the "20:80 society" in which only a fifth of those able to work can find a job, especially in the "Third World". The race to reduce costs ("downsizing", for example by relocating production to low-wage countries) constantly contributes to mass and long-term unemployment, even in the "rich" countries. The level of culture sinks, for example through "tittytainment", the shallow mixture of sex, kitsch and pop, with which one wants to distract the broad masses from the problems and keep them "in good temper".

Schumann and Martin's hopes for regional countermovements, for example through increased European integration, have consistently proven to be deceptive. No wonder, for example, in view of the close links between crisis-prone regions such as the USA, Japan and Europe, which for a long time handled between one another the largest part of world trade (up to 80%), but are now increasingly under competitive pressure, especially from China. But since everyone, especially China, is dependent on "open", i.e. liberalized, markets, the damage, dangers and uncertainties associated with neoliberal globalization will hardly be able to be eliminated in the foreseeable future - as will of course not the intellectual, cultural and global political crises - not least those of rampant nationalism and populism.

What once appeared to be largely liberating and even trend-setting through the Enlightenment, positivism, utilitarianism, pragmatism and critical rationalism, threatens to degenerate into a permanent nightmare in (neo)liberalism. (See *Robra* 2003, p. 147 ff.)

Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (1844-1900) - from denial of morality to fascism?

I see great merit for Schopenhauer in the fact that he valued and described *pity as co-suffering*, towards the end of his major work *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in the chapter "Ethics (I)", where he writes: "... all true and pure love is pity, and all love that is not pity is selfishness. Selfishness is *eros*; Compassion is the *agape*. Mixtures of the two often take place." By interpreting pity as "agape", as completely selfless love, Schopenhauer affirms the Christian ideal of love for one's neighbor, with the difference that he - in addition to *art* and *resignation* - believes that *co-suffering* is capable and sufficient to deal with suffering.

Walter Schulz explains the details of this concept (op. cit. p. 165): "The second way to meet suffering is *pity*, more precisely: *co-suffering*. Schopenhauer's theory of compassion is actually not an ethical theory if one understands ethics to be a doctrine that emphasizes moral laws and ought-rules. Compassion cannot be demanded, compassion is an affect that overcomes me in the face of someone else's suffering. ... Nonetheless: this process of compassion is, as Schopenhauer says, a *mystery*, because as I sympathize with the other, feel his or her suffering as mine, not only my individuality is canceled out, but also that of the other. Compassion does not mean the other person as a certain person, but as a suffering being in general. The paradox of pity is that it is directed towards a concrete person and yet does not sympathize with him / her for the sake of his / her personality, but only because he / she suffers. Compassion is *universal*."

That in fact not only animals, but also people are capable of empathy has been confirmed by the discovery of *mirror neurons*. Rather shocking is the fact that *Nietzsche* not only disqualifies the concept of pity of his predecessor Schopenhauer as "nonsense" but also makes it ridiculous when he polemicalises in *Beyond Good and Evil* (No. 222): "Where today pity is preached - and, rightly heard, no other religion is being preached now - the psychologist may open his ears: through all vanity, through all the noise that is common to these preachers (like all preachers), he will hear a hoarse, groaning, real sound of *self-disdain*. It belongs to that darkening and ugliness of Europe, which has been growing for a century ... The man of "modern ideas", this proud ape, is irrepressibly dissatisfied with himself: that is certain. He suffers: and his vanity wants him to only "co-suffer" ...". So what Schopenhauer praises as the highest *selflessness* (agape), Nietzsche mocks as an expression of mere "*self-contempt*".

It is different with Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's attitude towards the Kantian ethics. Schopenhauer allowed himself the tomfoolery ('Eulenspiegelerei') to take Kant's 'thing in itself' literally, i.e. to equate it with the *will* that is sensibly attached to the genitals ... Incidentally, Schopenhauer assessed the *will* as a "world knot" *per se* at the same

time as its solution, i.e. not only as a manifestation of the (sub)conscience but as all-present in nature, even in the hole cosmos. He does not ask whether the non-human nature can want anything. (What *does* the flower, what *does* the amoeba, what *does* the galaxy *want*?) No, for him the will is the unquestionable primal reason, synonymous with Kant's *thing in itself*.

This is exactly where Friedrich Nietzsche takes offense, although he otherwise adopts the concept of will of his teacher almost uncritically and continues to work it out. In an early work "To Schopenhauer" (from 1868), he hints, after all, at the fact that Schopenhauer had "borrowed all qualifiers of the will from the world of phenomena".^[103] Whereas what belongs to the world of phenomena, however, could by no means be ascribed to the thing-in-itself. In contrast, Nietzsche found elsewhere almost only words of praise for Schopenhauer's concept of the will, especially in his work "Schopenhauer als Erzieher" (1874). In addition, he enhances this concept to the general "will to power".

Nietzsche's attitude towards Kant's thing-in-itself is inconsistent. While in his early work he still considered it to be a merit of Kant to accept the thing in itself as one of the foundations of morality, in his later work he resolutely rejects it and even considers it "nonsensical".

But he must have thoroughly misunderstood the categorical imperative. For he writes: "How? Do you admire the categorical imperative in you? This "firmness" of your so-called moral judgment? This "unconditionality" of feeling: "like me, everybody must judge"? Rather, admire your *selfishness* in it! And the blindness, pettiness and unpretentiousness of your selfishness! Because it is selfishness to feel *one's own* judgment as a general law; ... Anyone who still judges "in this case everyone should act like this" has not yet gone five steps in self-knowledge; ... "^[104] Subsequently, the author tries to prove that actions are fundamentally "unrecognizable", simply because of the subjective opinions and evaluations that accompany them, so that actions are in no way to be considered as judgment criteria.

Nietzsche's misunderstanding: Kant called for each individual, subjective maxim to be elevated to a general law; with which, however, Nietzsche inverts Kant's demand to the opposite, in order to reduce it to absurdity. In fact, Kant had only demanded a review of the subjective maxims by the general legislation! In contrast, Nietzsche no longer wants to bind the autonomy of the person to any external legality, rather all people should become "the new, the unique, the incomparable, the self-legislative, the self-creating" (op. cit. p. 82), in order to then only be able to become a "physicist ... creator" founded on: "Up physics! And higher still that which *forces* us to do it - our honesty." (ibid.) With which Nietzsche now binds people at his own discretion, namely a) to "physics" and b) to his own *logos* of "honesty", hence his own worldview. But now he ends up exactly where Kant was already successful: in the attempt to reconcile autonomy, morality and legality. This with the important difference that Nietzsche has demonstrably failed, whereas Kant's ethics does not exist in full, but can also not be described as obsolete, especially since it continues to inspire the discussion about fundamental questions of ethics.

Why did Nietzsche fail in this regard? The main reason for this lies in his "revaluation of values", which ultimately ends in replacing ethics and morals by the *will to power*. This means that even the "honesty" ultimately proves not to be a moral guide, especially since Nietzsche regards it as *intellectual* honesty and as tantamount to *oneself's own truthfulness*. Since he demands honesty only "intra-subjectively", that is, only towards the own person, *not towards others*, it cannot serve as a moral criterion, which Nietzsche freely admits when he exclaims: "New: **honesty** denies *t h e* human being, it doesn't want *g e n e r a l* moral practice."^[105] In place of honesty, the "creation of new values" comes primarily through the ideal figures of *the philosopher, the artist and the "holy"* (i.e. socially and philanthropically committed), namely "beyond good and evil", but, instead, on the basis of the readily understandable distinction between *good and bad*. Everything that is good for life is good, everything that is bad for life is bad. In this respect, *Thorsten Bachmann* apparently was not entirely wrong when he referred to Nietzsche's morally critical "ethics" as an "ethics of strength".

The question is, however, where the standards for this "strength" are to be taken from. Nietzsche considers the opposition of 'good and evil' to be wrong, because this was subsequently introduced instead of 'good and bad', namely by the Christians as the basis of a "slave morality", which Nietzsche wants to replace with his arrogant *master morality*. *To what extent this criticism is to be regarded as flawed, I have explained elsewhere* (Robra 2015, pp. 55-58). The undeniable power of evil (= criminal energy) does not disappear because one no longer distinguishes between good and evil. In this respect, too, Nietzsche's moral criticism falls fatally short and wrong. In addition, he obviously does not want to justify any new ethics with the "new values" demanded by him, especially since these values are supposed to be entirely in the service of "the will to power" and the creation of the "superman". The philosopher no longer has to obey a (Kantian) general legislation, but should soar himself as the sole "legislator": "*But the true philosophers are commanders and legislators: they say, so shall it be!*", they first determine the where? and what for? of mankind. Their recognizing is *creating*, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is - *will to power*".^[106] Nietzsche subjects everything else to this objective. Ultimately, unlike Kant, it is neither about ethics nor about epistemology. Rather, his concept is strongly reminiscent of *Plato's* old dream that philosophers should become kings and kings should become philosophers.

To this day, it seems unclear whether Nietzsche, with such concepts, paved the way for fascists and other tyrants. I would *not* assess his teaching as ethics or "ethics of strength". Rather as an *ideology of the power and the law of the mightier*, which has undoubtedly been reinterpreted and "adapted" by the Nazis and other tyrants for purposes of abuse of power and the glorification of violence. No ethics can be justified with the "right of the strongest", on the contrary: it justifies any, often senseless and destructive immorality!

Ethics of values - only from Hermann Lotze to Nicolai Hartmann?

First of all, I would like to remind you of the aim of this treatise to find criteria for the re-establishment of a *normative value ethics of behavior control*, especially since the foundations constructed for this by Kant have proven to be no longer entirely sustainable.

Aristotle already speaks of values. Kant attaches to billable person even *absolute* value so that his ethics has to be seen not as mere ethics of duty, but also as *value ethics*, though this term supposedly only later came into circulation, namely by **Hermann Lotze** (1817-81), to whom is awarded also the merit to have, for the first time, discussed in detail the concept of value and to have developed an own theory of value and ethics whose particularity consists in having won it by a Kant criticism. In tabular terms, the views of the two philosophers can be compared as follows ^[107]:

Kant	Lotze
Reason as the highest legislative faculty	Feeling and conscience as the highest level of legitimation
Epistemology as a preliminary stage to true philosophical knowledge	Rejection of the epistemological reflection with the result of theoretical subreptions

systematic reasoning	Ecclecticism and narrative philosophy under the guise of a "system"
Rationality	Irrationality
Principle thinking	Worldview

scientific thinking	Ideology
mind ('Gemüt') should conform to understanding	mind ('Gemüt') stands <i>above</i> understanding
Conscience as a subjective place of practical reason	Conscience as an irrational direct faculty
There is only so much meaning in the world as we make	divine sense as justification of the false existing
True science of nature as a condition of the possibility to establish non-empirical concepts	Recognition of science of nature, but cocking an irrational superstructure

Lotze rates mind, feeling and conscience significantly higher than (Kantian) reason, understanding, knowledge theory and argumentation, which means the following for Lotze's concept of value: He does not try to fathom the essence of what is valuable, but rather the emerging of values. Lotze's interest does not focus on the person, the subject as a whole, but on his soul life, although he reduces the soul life to the *pure inwardness of the mind*. Only the mind should decide what is of value and what is not, *based on feelings of pleasure and displeasure*. What causes pleasure has value; what causes displeasure has no value. Often enough, not only the physical, but also the mental well-being of the mind depends on it. Because not only sensory perceptions, but also all ideas and concepts are accompanied by feelings of value, which also accompany our work to a much greater extent than reason, understanding, theory or empiricism. The "value-sensing reason"^[108] does not judge the thinkable neutrally, but with regard to the "inner dignity of its content" (ibid.). Feeling is the ability to feel values. In contrast to Kant, Lotze does not accept the objection that feelings are unpredictable, inconsistent and unreliable. With regard to the "Basic Law for the Assessment of All Works, especially

bourgeois objective errors	thinking with	bourgeois consciously ideological needs	thinking that subordinates the con-struction to
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also the aesthetic and ethical ones, Lotze explains the assumption that they are “determined by a value-feeling subject” (ibid.). The world of feeling, that is, what Kant had expressly rejected as a possible basis for a moral philosophy, becomes for Lotze the yardstick of value theory and thus also of value ethics.

Critical appraisal. If one asks what to think of Lotze's theory of values, there is actually no way

around the criticism that *Bodo Gaßmann* made of it. However, I cannot go into the details of this criticism here. Instead, in the following I will emphasize what Gaßmann has neglected in his Lotze criticism. As I have already explained in detail, values are *not first conveyed through ad hoc feelings*, but mainly through genetic factors, upbringing, socialization, milieu and the environment, and indeed already in the course of *language acquisition*. It is therefore to be ruled out that, as with Lotze, only the mind, the core of the soul, decides on the values. Even more: The reduction to the activity of the "soul core" leads to misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the actual soul activity, e.g. in *experience*: First the subject, i.e. the whole person, experiences something, not just the soul core, the 'Gemüt' (by the way, a word that only exists in German with this meaning of *absolute inwardness*!). If I abstract from this, I miss the process that actually leads from experience to recognition and, as in by far most cases, to the re-recognition of values. Lotze's theory of values is therefore a colossus on feet of clay and therefore unsuitable for the foundation of a value ethic; a circumstance that prompts me not to report in detail here neither Lotze's ethics nor Gassmann's criticism of it. Instead, I think it is necessary to address Gaßmann's fundamental criticism of the concept of value, in all one

Excursus: 'Value': a "bad word"?

Gaßmann presented not only a devastating criticism of Lotze, but of any philosophy of value in general, under the title *Critique of the Philosophy of Value ...* (see footnote no. 107). The author attributes the fact that people are based on values at all to “outside determination” and the alleged lack of principles in class society. He already considers the word “value” to be a “bad word” and in what follows complains about the persistence of the “whispering of value”, while he accuses *Max Weber* of having retained the term value just to be able to raise his demand for freedom of value in science.[\[109\]](#)

As he himself frankly admits, *Gaßmann* went from Paul to Saul because he himself - before he turned to harsh criticism of the philosophy of values - for a long time worked as a “teacher of values and norms” (sic!). He finds reasons for this change in some German philosophers of the 19th century, and not only in Lotze, but also at *Windelband*, *Rickert* and *Nietzsche*, who were the first to make the philosophy of values socially acceptable or to have raised it to the rank of a school philosophy. He cites the philosophers mentioned, supplemented by *Max Weber*, as representatives of a “subjective value philosophy”, while he assigns *Max Scheler's Materiale Wertethik* (1913) to an “objective value philosophy”.

Of Lotze, whom *Gaßmann* regards as the actual founder of the philosophy of values, he claims that he stated “mind and conscience” as the true determinants of values, which he regards as wrong because it does not take in account historicity and the origin of values as the “instinctual structure of society” (sic!). Irrationalism of this kind certainly corresponds to the ideological needs of the bourgeoisie and leads not only to devaluation, but also to the “destruction of reason” (the latter near to *Georg Lukács's* eponymous, monumental genealogy of German fascism.)

In contrast to Lotze, *Windelband* and *Rickert* would have put the origin of values into “normal consciousness” and thus reduced thinking to “immanence of consciousness”, although on the other hand they would have deduced the fact of valuing from the “perception of cultured people”. However, *Nietzsche* and even more *Scheler* had recognized that values should not be understood purely subjectively. If, however, *Scheler* still declares moral values based on “feeling for value”, this only corresponds again to an ideological need of the German bourgeoisie, which, however, even marks *Scheler* as the “climax of the destruction of reason”. As alleged value philosopher of present time *Gaßmann* cites only the *Habermas* of “discourse ethics” (1981), that to his mind, however, represents little more than a “value pluralism”.

Criticism of Gaßmann's criticism. Has *Jürgen Habermas* destroyed his own reason and that of the bourgeoisie, because in his *discourse ethics* he established sensible rules for public speech and discussion? Hardly likely. Moreover, *Gaßmann* misses his subject in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic terms. The fact that evaluations do not only arise in adults, but already prenatally seems unknown to him. Phylo-genetically, it is not permissible to locate the value problem only with some German philosophers of the 19th century. In the distant past, at the latest in *tribal religions*, values already played a decisive role. As in all other religions, by the way, which *Gaßmann* completely ignores.

All of this is reason enough to reject as completely unfounded his attempt to use the term “value ” as a “no word” or “whispered value ”. (Whereby it should not be overlooked that *Heidegger* used the expression “value whispering” (“Wertgeraune”) as a personal battle term.)

It is not possible to distinguish between subjective and objective value philosophy, because in every evaluation special dialectical subject-object relationships are involved. Anyone who, as an adult, appeals to conscience and mind is not engaging in “self-destruction”, but in *asserting self-assertion* as a value in itself. (Which, however, does not change anything about my criticism of Lotze's “emotional reduction”, i.e. his completely inadequate analysis of experience and recognition. In any case, I cannot understand the fact that *Gaßmann* does not even mention this Lotze's mistake.) In *Gaßmann's* argumentation numerous other contradictions and inconsistencies cannot be overlooked. There is no such thing as a “drive structure in society”. Individuals have drives, not society. *Herbert Marcuse* titled his book *Instinctual Structure and Society!* (Emphasis mine) In addition, although *Gassmann* refers several times to *Marx* as a revolutionary social critic, he does not mention the fact that *Marx* ascribes *value doctrines* such as those of use, exchange and surplus value that are centrally important and determine nearly everything else.

Completely arbitrary is also *Gaßmann's* choice of alleged value philosophers, whereas he neglects the achievements of numerous earlier and later value philosophers, including *Kant's* conception of the unconditional value of the accountable person. And more than strange is the fact that the author - without taking into account the *case Heidegger* and in contrast to *Lukács* - sees in *Max Scheler* the real “destroyer of reason”. If *Gaßmann* had treated philosophers of value like *Sartre* and *Camus* in addition to *Heidegger*, his devastating criticism would not have been possible. The same applies to outstanding personalists such as *Emmanuel Mounier* and *William Stern*, whose assessments and values are far higher than those of *Scheler*.

It is not uncommon for the author himself to fall into the jargon of irrationalism, when he claims that value philosophers are only concerned with “privileged access by bourgeois >noble philistines<”, while moral values “have nothing to do with the reality of class society” (ibid).

On the whole, *Gaßmann's* criticism of the concept of value appears wrong and unjustified, which does not mean that values and norms can no longer be discussed; on the contrary, the questions and problems raised by Lotze and his errors also demand further reflection, e.g. on the basis of the works by

Max Scheler (1874-1928), who criticized *Kant's* separation of the spheres of reason and understanding on the one hand and the level of *feeling* on the other. He himself does not just want to present some theory of values, but rather a “material ethics of values” in which feeling - e.g. in the form of (neighbor) love - and personalism are combined in new syntheses. “Like Lotze, *Scheler* ascribes its own being to values, which he calls validity. The ethical values are placed in front of the ought insofar as everything ought to be based on values. *Scheler* does not derive individual duties from a general and purely formal moral law, but he justifies the objectivity of the moral by recourse to a realm of material values that is independent of the subject.” (*Rohls*, op. Cit., P. 601)

For *Scheler*, the highest authority is the “infinite person” of God, which he also calls the “person of persons”. As the core of the individuality of the individual, he calls the “intimate person” who is not subject to any social determination, and yet, as a “total person”, can become a “perfect person” if he / she succeeds in embracing the individual and the social to harmoniously unite one's own personhood. Above all, the “act substance”, the person's ability to act, helps, whereby *Scheler* differentiates between “singularizing individual acts” of the individual (or intimate person) and “social acts” of the “person as a whole”. Incidentally - and this phrase seems decisive or fatal to me - only be a person who has a *spirit* (as the highest ethical value!) and is therefore capable of fully responsible action - which undoubtedly means a dubious restriction, since such spirit-powerful responsibility can only be attributed to *mature*, fully sane citizens.[\[110\]](#)

Jörg Johannes Lechner writes about *Scheler's* theory of values in an Internet article in 2011: “For *Scheler* initially ‘value’ does not mean ‘ethics of goods and purposes’ ... Because *Scheler* fully agrees with *Kant* on the rejection of eudaimonism. “He clearly emphasizes that, according to his theory, “pleasure can never be a value”... . In addition: “Values do not originally have the character of laws ... are not empty, abstract forms”. ... “All values are qualities ... and this regardless of the form of being.” ... With this we got to know two basic components of the concept of value: 1. quality, 2. independence from being; we can add: and of thinking. ... objects are given to us in the world; some of them are goods. “Only secondarily” are we given “the values that we feel in them”. The quality of value is now not a real one, but an ideal structure. *Scheler* presents the situation as follows: Certain names indicate the content, e.g. of colors. “Just as the names of colors do not refer to mere properties of physical things, neither do the names for values refer to mere properties of the given units that we call goods.”

There are even value qualities of the “sensually pleasant” which at first glance seem to be one with the object, but which can nevertheless be grasped for themselves; for example certain kinds of good taste. It follows from this that the material ethics of values rejects the necessary connection between quality and the corresponding quantity; it also teaches that value “overbuilds, superimposes” matter, gives it “the glimmer of a meaning, a meaning of a higher order”. It grasps the quality of value as a being that stands in itself. If, for example, one enjoys some fruits (apricot, peach), the taste of each individual fruit is “qualitatively different from that of the others ... The value

qualities that the sensually pleasant thing possesses in these cases are real qualities of the value itself." Accordingly, in value we have an object that cannot be recognized through *quantitas externa*, since it is not an object of the senses. It is not the sugar content of the peach, for example, that is the value in Scheler's sense, but the value is the sensual pleasure itself that the peach has.

Let us now go to the following question: What kind of being is the value? According to what has been said before, it can never be a real object, in other words: given is simply "reality" which of course also bears its real qualities; in addition to these, however, there is another type of attribute, a quality, for example the good taste. Apparently this quality of value is closely linked to reality itself, yes, in the whole of reality lies the foundation of the value itself. Scheler explains in his 'formalism': "Values of this kind are not definable", furthermore: "*Definable* here of course is nothing, like all last value phenomena." (emphasis mine)

The relative independence of the values has already been emphasized briefly; it is possible that they are "thought for themselves". They are somehow logically abstracted from the object, because through its properties the object provides the foundation for its formation. It is a fact "that in feeling, value is given as different from this feeling and therefore the disappearance of feeling does not cancel the existence of value". - Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind: *Values only arise through work or lively, intellectual acts*. If objects were present alone, values would not yet exist with and through these. Scheler expresses himself clearly and unequivocally: "In general, I have, in principle, to reject from the threshold of philosophy: a heaven of ideas and values that should be completely "independent" of the essence and complete execution of living, independent not only of people and human consciousness, but of the essence and execution of a living spirit in general".

The deficiencies in Scheler's theory of values are reinforced in his old work. In order to secure the spirit as the highest *value* instance, he finally advocates a dualism of body and soul, whereby the body is finally downgraded to a "thing", so that the spiritual and the physical aspects of being a person diverge. - But this stands in stark contrast to Scheler's original intention to explain personality as a body and soul unity. (More on this in K. Robra: *And because the human being is a person ...* loc. cit. p. 41-44.)

Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)

In his voluminous *Ethik* of 1926, N. Hartmann describes what he understands by values and norms in such detail that I can only summarize it here in a very shortened way. Like Scheler, the author thinks he has to overcome Kant's alleged "formalism" through a "material" ethics of values, although he does not see values as factors of reality with material references, but as "timeless and general", i.e. as "ideal beings" and, however, at the same time understood as historically mediated and subject to change. [111] *Jan Rohls* (loc. cit. p. 603) also remarks: "Like Scheler, Hartmann starts from the difference between the world of being and the world of values, whereby he conceives the values as ideal entities in the Platonic sense. And as with Scheler, the values do not realize themselves in the world of being; their realization is much more dependent on the people who belong to both worlds. Realization is only moral if it is carried out through freedom and is based on the objective hierarchy of the individual values. Freedom is now understood as negative and positive freedom, as freedom from all causality and as freedom in the sense of personal self-determination. This explains Hartmann's postulate of atheism. While Kant arrives at the postulate of the existence of God through the moral law, Hartmann considers the moral freedom of the person to be incompatible with the existence of God. When man is free, God cannot exist. ... Ethics, on the other hand, must proceed from the autonomy of morality, that is, from the fact that the moral is valuable in itself and not because it is commanded. In addition, the thought of Providence contradicts the freedom of man just as much as the thought of redemption contradicts the inextricability of moral guilt. People are responsible for their evil actions and must therefore bear their own guilt, and where this is not admitted, people are declared to be insane."

In addition, N. Hartmann puts his "material ethics of values" in a larger context with the *question of meaning* ('Sinnfrage'). In the occidental tradition, it was long considered impossible to determine meaning in the human being or out of himself. Until the 18th century, according to Hartmann, the preliminary judgment from Plato persisted that such "investigation" was only possible through reference to the *realm of ideas*, i.e. to metaphysical and / or theological pre-determinations. On the other hand, *Max Scheler's* "material ethics of values" provided a better orientation. Accordingly, people do not always have to reinvent values, but rather *acquire* them *anew* each time, especially since it is not the realm of values itself, but only "value awareness" that is subject to change.

However, Hartmann still considers many things unclear, such as the differences between value, meaning and purpose. *Teleological thinking* is primarily to blame for this. It prevents the insight that values alone cannot achieve the content of the ought in order to achieve a goal. Because, in the real world, what is valuable and what is unworthy coexist with and with one another, people need purpose orientation. The striving for purpose only becomes meaningful through values. It is therefore important to determine the relationship between meaning and value appropriately, namely in the "essential law": "... all meaning in the world is value-related, and all value is meaningful". [112] That means: meaning and value are dependent on each other, even if not every "fulfillment of meaning" consists in "value realization". Love retains its moral value, even if it does not meet with love in return and thus with fulfillment of meaning. But without meaning given by humans, the values remain "powerless" (op. cit., p. 21 f.).

According to Hartmann, value and meaning do not need teleology, they are rather its prerequisite. Value and meaning are not to be sought in the metaphysical, the eternal, but in the "constantly evolving manifold", i.e. in the "temporal, ephemeral" (p. 24) - which *Nietzsche* has already asserted! Nevertheless, meaning and value do not lose any of their possible "*timeless*" (!) validity. However, this in no way excludes the fact that meaning and value can be missed. People can be mistaken, even and especially when they strive for goals. The "curse of restlessness and lack of meaning" does not stop at love either, especially since love "always wants more" (p. 27). Nevertheless, striving is always to esteem highly; remains the task to make values fruitful by practical actions, and to uphold '*fulfilling of meaning*' ('Sinnerfüllung') as '*giving meaning*' ('Sinngebung'). Yet in no way in the sense of the "old" (Platonic) metaphysics. Meaning is not given because the world is *imperfect* and because valuable exists alongside with what is not. Meaning does not exist in itself, but only in the freedom and being-for-oneself of the human being. For this reason alone, meaning cannot be determined for "the whole". Nonetheless, man can also understand the apparently meaningless, irrelevant as a task, as the possibility of giving new meaning.

According to Hartmann, teleology is the only thing going all out, with bad consequences. Its continuous "determinism" leads, especially under the aspect of the problem of meaning, to the "self-destruction of man", to the end of his freedom, especially freedom of will and thus the ability to differentiate between good and evil. In contrast, Hartmann's new "Metaphysics of Meaning" finally gives people "their right in the world" (p. 32).

In terms of the philosophy of history: History encompasses more than man can grasp. History always moves in the change and in the vicissitudes of generations, peoples and historical situations. For this reason alone, there can be no "strict legality" in the philosophy of history (p. 33), and there is little that man can learn from history. History itself can neither only be explained economically "from below" nor only spiritually "from above". It is "neither pure fulfillment of meaning nor pure senselessness" (p. 36) Working for purposes is possible in small, individual worlds, but disappears in the whole of history (ibid.). History is not based on meaning, but is dependent on *sense-giving*, i.e. on the people who help to determine "direction and goal" (p. 38). Value decisions are also made in the "big whole", people reduce the arbitrary variety of values through their (among other things political) sense-giving (ibid.).

Critical appraisal. First of all, one can consider what *Michael Wittmann* (2018) found out about *Nicolai Hartmann's doctrine of free will* [112]. For Hartmann, "it is not the being determined by the moral law ... that constitutes the essence of freedom, but the ability to decide for oneself, for or against the law; ... " (loc. cit. p. 137). The moral law represents a "mere requirement", which, however, is "absolutely a real-ethical fact in the behavior of people" (ibid.). However, a large number of cases must be taken into account, "where a moral requirement is not considered and therefore does not allow a determining force to emanate". Kant had elegantly solved this problem in that "he recognizes the essence of freedom in no way in the from determined by Ought, but by treating freedom as a *foundation* of the moral Ought; he does not regard the ought as a *principle*, but as a *sign* of freedom; the moral demand is an *appeal* to freedom, so in fact already presupposes it." (op. p. 138)

Indeed, Kant considers freedom to be a value in itself which, however, *cannot* apply *unreservedly* because it is tied to the validity of general legislation. The freedom of the person always ends with the freedom of others! In addition, if value, aim, purpose and meaning are undoubtedly of central importance, at least the terms need to be thoroughly clarified. Hartmann is trying to do this, but only approximately, superficially. *Which* values, goals, purpose and meaning contents are to be involved, remains largely in the dark. More light is only to win by considering the terms *in detail*, that is also in their essential historical appearances..

Values turn out to be "meaningful" in specific action situations. It is therefore not right to treat the teleological problem simply negatively in terms of determinism. Because it is important to choose the right means for the realization of values at the right moment in order to move from the target cause "value" to the target content "meaning" (= norm?). This cannot be done through predetermination, but can succeed *on the basis of open teleology*[113]. You have to know the values and be able to name them, but also use suitable means to realize them.

For N. Hartmann, however, open teleology does not exist, is *terra incognita*, completely unknown. Also unknown to him are the *religious values* in the Christian and non-Christian tradition, from Jesus and Paul to Luther, Ignatius von Loyola and others, and from Moses and Buddha to Mohammed and many others, largely irreplaceable contributions which Hartmann simply ignores in the course of his all-round attack against traditional metaphysics and religion.

Nor does he mention the fact that numerous (perhaps most!) religious values are still of high practical importance almost everywhere, regardless of their embedding in religious beliefs.

Furthermore: Hartmann admits that value and meaning can relate to the *objective*, but does not draw any conclusions from this for his concept of "giving meaning" ('Sinngebung'). Value, sense, giving and finding meaning can, however, not just go up in subjectivity, since they contain *objective* components. We shall come back to

this. [114]. In other words: Even with Nicolai Hartmann's in-depth, albeit questionable analyzes, which, as a result of their connection with the question of meaning, touch on the *problem of norms*, the last word is by no means spoken on the matter of the possible justification of a normative ethics of values.

17. Further positions of the 20th century

a) Personalism

With *Emmanuel Mounier* (1905-50), I pick out a thinker of personalism whose views seem to be particularly relevant in terms of value ethics. As early as the 1930s, Mounier noted a general *decline in Western values*. As he said, this affected not only, but primarily, Christianity, which, with a few exceptions, he sees in "retreat" all over Europe. Which worries him especially because, as a staunch Catholic, he still believes in the values of Christianity. Mounier sees reasons for the "failure" of Christianity in the advance of bourgeois individualism, in the exaggerated internalization (introversion) of believing Christians and in a *general crisis of consciousness among Westerners*. This crisis consciousness makes understandable the fact that Mounier looked for federals in other schools of thought of his time - for *value-federals!* - which he finds above all in existential philosophy and in large parts of Marxism. In numerous Christian thinkers - Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Péguy, Gabriel Marcel and others - he sees, probably rightly, pioneers of existential philosophies, even if, for example in Heidegger and Sartre, atheistic tendencies cannot be denied.

Mounier expresses himself in a similarly differentiated manner on Marxism. He praises its sense of material conditions, the "camaraderie with things". Marxism is an effective antidote to bourgeois decline, such as boundless egoism, profit addiction and prestige thinking. On the basis of various similarities with Christianity (e.g. criticism of alienation, hope for solidarity, emancipation and self-determination) he even suspects a "secret bond" between Christians and communists. (See Robra 2003, pp. 103-105.)

This corresponds to Mounier's pronounced *anti-capitalism*. In capitalism, apart from a few technical advances, there is essentially only "error" and "corruption", especially with regard to the "free play of forces" in the market economy and the idolatry of production, money and profit, which means that *all human values* (including private and religious) are hopelessly and permanently endangered. He considers the power and influence of the *financial oligarchy*, which *tends to become completely independent*, to be particularly harmful, whereas he expressly calls for the abolition of stock market speculation and effective (workers) control in an "industrial democracy". Not capital, but the *self-reliant person as a person* must be the yardstick of all politics. Mounier expresses a clear rejection of some other contents of Marxism, such as (like Sartre) against the socio-economic determinism and the alleged disregard for individuality, freedom and individual responsibility of the person. Mounier considers a "material revolution" without a spiritual or religious component to be unthinkable and impossible.

He propagates *personalism* mainly in the 1930s and -40s, e.g. in his magazine and movement, *Esprit* and numerous own publications. He wants to counter the generally crisis-ridden developments with a *new Christian personalism* based on a thoroughly revolutionary claim.

He defines the person, provisionally and tentatively, as the "total circumference of man". Knowing well that he is thus entering into uncertain territory (e.g. with regard to the "circumference" of the human being), he supplements his attempt at definition with references to the history of the concept of person, whereby, in addition to numerous Christian thinkers, he also counts the Delphic Oracle ("Know thyself!"), the Descartes personal *Meditations*, Leibniz, Kant, Rousseau and Goethe. He considers being a person to be "given by God" and therefore hardly definable or explainable. (It should be noted that in Christianity God is viewed as a *triune person*.)

He subordinates the term *personality* to that of the *person* because personality - due to multiple negations up to and including death - depends entirely on the imponderables and vicissitudes of subjectivity, especially when the subject is predominantly seen as individualistic. (Cf. K. Robra 2003, pp. 105-115, with detailed critical appraisal.)

Appreciation. Mounier also advocates a radical "revaluation of values", but not in the sense of Nietzsche, not against Christianity, but on the basis of Christianity. That he subordinates the term personality to that of the person seems understandable, but regrettable. Because all persons realize themselves in their personality, in what they make of their life, knowing well that these achievements are no less ephemeral (or "unabolishable") than the person himself. Mounier undeniably has opened to personalism new political, social and ideological dimensions and horizons. He made personalism one of the most important philosophies of the 20th century, alongside Marxism and existential philosophy. After him, socialists all over the world (not least in France in the early 1980s) tried to realize what Mounier thought. It is a third way between communism and capitalism, a way that avoids any form of totalitarianism, and of course the newest totalitarianism: that of globalized neoliberalism.

But what about the ethical relevance of personalism as a whole? In order to do this at least halfway, I use previous analyzes [115] to a **conclusion** with 22 guiding principles, of which the striking ethical values are the following:

1. Persons are at the same time natural (bodily), spiritually and soul determined beings.
2. As such, they are consistently also religious or can be determined by reference to some kind of *reverence for nature, life and spirit*.
3. Personal consciousness leads to respect for the *corporeality* of the human being determined as "Leiblichkeit" ('*spiritual corporeality*').
4. Likewise to respect for the body-soul-spiritual identity and individuality of the person and thus for the *dignity of the person*, including as a *legal person*.
5. It seems unclear when the legal entity status begins - in France potentially as early as the 22nd week of pregnancy.
6. It is also unclear whether not only embryos but also genetic programs are to be subject to legal protection.
7. Personality means humanity, i.e. communality in the sense of the ability to compassion (empathy), community and sense of community - instead of isolation or even "predatory isolation".
8. As a *role bearer*: functions in family, society, working life (profession), state, public life, e.g. as a legal entity.
9. It seems problematic to expand the scope of the concept of person beyond that of the human being, even if this does not call into question common collective names such as the *Legal person*.
10. Being a person means responsibility and sense of responsibility, for example in the sense of a historically conscious ethics, which can largely be justified with Kant's categorical imperative, in particular in the person-related (personalistic) version.
11. CREATIVITY: free development of person and personality.
12. Ability to CREATE SENSE: Persons are able to make objective (or hidden) meaning recognizable.
13. Person = "mask" (according to the origin of the word), but ultimately only in the sense of "not-yet", the utopia of the *realm of freedom*, which we can approach through free, creative activity possible in our connections with nature, art, technology and history. (See K. Robra 2003, p. 168 f.)

Amazingly, despite such extensive provisions, it does not seem possible to work out a universally accepted *definition of the term person*. The 22 criteria mentioned most closely correspond to *Emmanuel Mounier's* statement that the person is "*le volume total de l'homme*", the entire "scope" of the person. This also fits the existential philosophy or personalistic "surpassing", the future-oriented outgrowth of man beyond himself, not necessarily to "superhuman", but to the concrete utopia of the not-yet, the realm of freedom, where people finally can fully develop the potential for freedom that is already inherent in nature, and especially in every human being.

b) Existentialism: Sartre and Camus

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) is considered the *philosopher of freedom* par excellence. How much freedom is important to him can be seen from the fact that he occasionally even infiltrates the term where it originally did not exist: in Kant's categorical imperative. Sartre's own formula is: "l'impératif: <traite en toi-même et en autrui la liberté comme fin> [116] (the imperative: <treat freedom as an end in yourself and in others >'). In Kant's original, however, this formula is: "Act so that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of everyone else, always as a purpose in itself, never only as a means." In this *self-purpose formula*, Kant does not speak of "freedom" at all, but of "humanity, both in your person and in the person of everyone else". Sartre obviously disregards this wording and also claims that the self-purpose formula is in no way compatible with the basic formula ("contredit à l'universalité du premier impératif", (ibid., "contradicts the universality of the first imperative"), so that there no synthesis

of the two formulas is possible, especially since there is no possibility of understanding between them ("... et n'ont aucune zone commune de compréhension", *ibid.*, "and have no common level of understanding") Sartre has undoubtedly not refuted the Cat. Imp. Obviously, he does not recognize *the value and person relatedness* of the two formulas of the cat. imp., or does not want to admit this relatedness. Instead, he simply replaces, in Kant's formula, the notion of 'humanity' by 'freedom'.

Nevertheless, in *L'Être et le Néant* (1943, 'Being and Nothingness', hereinafter: EN), Sartre presents a *value-philosophical* founding concept of freedom, although in a partially break sketchy value theory, that can be resumed as follows:

1. Values come into the world with the reality of human beings (EN 137) and: "... to say that we invent values means nothing else than this: a *priori* life has no meaning. Before you live, life is nothing; it is up to you to make sense of it, and the value is none other than the sense you choose" [117] Whereby Sartre apparently subordinates the term 'value' to the category 'meaning'. It turns out, however, that he understands 'value' primarily as a *person's self-design for his / her own possibilities*. [118] 2. Fear is the source of all values (EN 722). 3. Nevertheless, the values exceed (transcend) being: "La valeur est par delà l'être", value is beyond being (EN 136). The values give the for-itself a structure that extends into infinity. (Just the *meaning*?) 4. The values themselves do not have the quality of a being, but of an *ought* for the consciousness (the for-itself) (EN 137). 5. There is an *absolute self*, in which any "suspension" (dépassement) of the for-itself-being is abolished. As an absolute, this is a comprehensive unity from which any *sense* of being should actually emerge (EN 137, 148). 6. The absolute self consists of identity, purity, persistence ('permanence') and foundation of the self. Which leads to the fact that the values are subject to the double sense (the Janus-headedness) of 'being and nothing': the absolute can *not be realized*. 7. As the highest "sense", value also founds any *freedom*: "... elle hante la liberté", the value, leaves no rest to freedom (EN 137). And yet value and meaning are at the same time the product, the birth of freedom (EN 138), and can therefore only be further justified when the "being of other" people emerges.

Gerhard Seel concludes from all this that "the *holistic being* that Sartre asks for" is "nothing other than the *realized value*" [119], even if the value itself primarily means a "regulative principle" for Sartre. Which makes sense as soon as one learns of Seel's further conclusion: "There can no longer be any doubt that Sartre makes the concept of value fruitful not only for his theory of concrete human action, but also for the conclusions of his philosophical system." (op. cit 250)

Two core values: freedom and responsibility. On the one hand, Sartre allows the value to found freedom, but on the other hand also describes freedom as the "basis of all values" (in: Sartre 1964, p. 31 or in EN 138), so that freedom now seems to be the highest value of all. In fact, the *existentialist* Sartre sets freedom as absolute: it has no other limits than its own (EN 515). And thus also "bases" the being-for-himself of the human being, without therefore merely being a content of consciousness among many other (possible) ones. Freedom is freedom of the *ego* in being with other people and thus, at least as a "goal", freedom for all, freedom for all self. In the words of Sartre: "... I cannot aim at my freedom if I do not also aim at the freedom of others." (In: Sartre 1964, p. 32.)

Man is "condemned" to this freedom, because for Sartre God does not exist any more than any other metaphysical authority that could determine the essence of man in advance, *a priori*. Again and again Sartre quotes Hegel, according to whom the essence is what has been ("das Ge-wesene"): "Essence is what has been" (including EN 515, German in the quotation:!). That means: Man makes himself what he is through what he does. So that he cannot *not* act and is therefore condemned not only to freedom, but also to *choice*, to *design* (himself): "Man is nothing other than his design, he only exists to the extent to which he realizes himself, so he is nothing other than the totality of his actions, nothing other than his life." (In: Sartre 1964, p. 22).

With the serious consequence, that people even are *in charge* for all that they do. Freedom as a goal for all can only be striven for if we share responsibility. Because the person who acts in, through and for freedom, binds himself, through his *commitment*, to the design of the whole: "Thus our responsibility is much greater than we could possibly assume, because it binds the whole of humanity." p. 12). By choosing, "I am responsible for myself and for everyone, and I create a certain image of the person I choose; by choosing me, I choose the people." For that reason alone freedom cannot lose itself in abstractions (*ibid* p.13.). ... Freedom wants itself concretely " (*ibid* p. 32), i.e. also: in concrete, shared responsibility. Man is free, i.e. he can do what he can account for to himself and to other people.

Sartre criticism. It seems indisputable that Sartre achieved a wide *impact* also and especially with his literary works, even if the philosophical content of these works hardly differs from that of his genuinely philosophical and political works. In other words: Even without critical examination of Sartre's literary work, it is possible to present his *value horizons* as I tried before. On the other hand, it seems impossible to me to make manageable the abundance of secondary literature on Sartre's philosophy and thus on his value horizons. Therefore I have to limit myself to the following criticisms of Sartre.

In his *letter on humanism*, Heidegger criticizes Sartre's concept of existence. With his assertion of the priority of existence over essence, Sartre remains stuck in the "oblivion of being" and cannot come to being. 'Existence' as Sartre understands it means: "actualitas, reality in contrast to the mere possibility as an idea" (op. Cit., P. 18). But the true nature of man ("man in the fate of truth") cannot be grasped with this. In contrast to what Heidegger calls "ek-sistence", namely: "standing out into the truth of being" (*ibid.*).

But: Heidegger claims such "standing out" for himself without being able to explain *being* as such. What appears to be an elevation of the human being towards the "truth of being" turns out to be an actual degradation of the concrete being-subject, especially since Heidegger is not afraid to even let the subject go under in the "people".

On the other hand, Sartre remains credible when he points out that being can be found "everywhere" and that being conscious is always the consciousness of something, while the ego only exists together with the other person or in the group. And probably also when he insists on the greatest possible freedom, not only for the I of being-for-oneself, but at the same time for all people.

Nonetheless, I consider it necessary to point out certain shortcomings in Sartre's theories, which the critics seem to have not or insufficiently considered: 1. Sartre apparently does not recognize that evolutionary history, despite or even *because* of "evil", has produced positive syntheses for living beings *through organized cooperation*, i.e. has given real progress, further and higher development. These positive achievements cannot be explained by means of a mere two-fold dialectic (A constantly against B), as claimed by Sartre,. 2. Living beings are capable of such cooperation, among other things, because they have *empathy* and compassion. (Of *mirror neurons*, Sartre could not yet know anything, but rather of empathy and compassion!) Where empathy prevails, it can be ensured that the - certainly existing - Evil does not take the upper hand, that the other is not easily objectified, but is fundamentally recognized in his personhood, even if there is no motivation for this through group or individual interests. *Accordingly, Sartre's attitude towards love and sexuality appears to be one-sidedly negative and therefore inappropriate.* 3. Those who know and actively practice compassion perceive their fellow human beings in their entirety, i.e. not only as spiritual beings, but also as part of nature. The "in-itself" of nature is always designed in the human person as "in-and-for-itself", as a unity of nature, body, soul and spirit. This unity connects man with himself and with his own kind. And unfortunately this is also an aspect that Sartre neglected.

Not to be forgotten is also the fact that Sartre in 1960 with his *Critique de la raison dialectique* ('Critique of Dialectical Reason') has passed to *Marxism*, whereby he did not hesitate to justify the revolutionary avant-gardism - thus and, among other things, Leninism; this despite numerous *freedom theorems* to which he remained true in his interpretation of Marxism. (More on this in: Robra 2015, pp. 297-327.)

And that's enough of the criticism. *It is undeniable that Sartre's achievements and merits still deserve recognition. For which high values he himself has always fought, should be clear.*

Albert Camus (1913-60): the splendor of Mediterranean values

Sartre is considered "Nordic", Camus as "Mediterranean". But that's woodcut, black and white painting. In reality, Sartre, the Italy fan, anti-colonialist and anti-racist, contains a lot of southern things, while the Algerian-French ("pied-noir") Camus is very familiar with philosophers like Nietzsche, Spengler and Kierkegaard and with the (northern) European fiction - from Dostoyevsky to Kafka, from Rilke to Gide and Proust.

Camus appreciates the absurd, denies the meaning - and yet finds the meaning of life: in life itself. To understand this, one has to deal with the values of his philosophy. As *Detlev Mares* did in his work on the break between Camus and Sartre. [120] From this I quote at length, but allow me, for better clarity and comprehensibility, to add a subtitle now and then. Mares writes (op. cit., P. 5) first of all about **the absurd and the revolt**: > The starting point of Camus' philosophical thought is the "absurd", the awareness of the contradiction between man's striving for meaning and the experience of the senselessness of the world. The lack of truths about the basic problems of the existential situation of man leads to despair as an inescapable basic experience. But when a person chooses to live, that is, does not commit suicide out of desperation, he looks the absurd in the eye. In this rebellion against the absurd, man revolts against the negativity of existence and gives life its greatness and value, because in this revolt "one discovers the metaphysical demand for unity, the impossibility of getting hold of it, and the creation of a replacement world". In his revolt, man testifies to his only truth, day after day, by accepting the challenge of life. ... <

Mediterranean thinking. > Camus sees the right measure, which opposes the seductions of absolute worldviews, manifested in Mediterranean thinking. As early as 1938 he referred to "at a time when the predilection of doctrinal things wants to alienate us from the real world", to the "connection with the few ephemeral and essential things ... that give our life meaning: the sea, the sun and women in light". A statement from 1958 illustrates Camus' rejection of the idolatry of history despite the lack of absolute truths and the basic experience of the absurd: "Misery prevented me from believing that everything under the sun and in history is good; the sun taught me that history is not

everything. Change life, yes, but not the world ". When Camus in *The Man in the Revolt* ... thinks through to the end of ideas such as the demands for freedom or justice, down to their final consequences, he shows that all historical attempts to realize the absolute are doomed to failure and thus underpins his philosophy of a conscious Moderation and a love for the world. <

Marxism and Stalinism: Terror instead of Freedom !? > Camus sees in Marx's thinking the mixing of a scientific method of criticizing the ruling capitalism with a future-oriented "utopian messianism". "The unfortunate thing is that the critical method, which by its nature would have been adapted to reality, diverged more and more from the facts in so far as it wanted to remain true to the prophecy". ... "After all, the idea of a mission by the proletariat has not been embodied in history to this day. That sums up the failure of Marxist prophecy ". ... "The end of the story is not a value of example and perfection. It is a principle of arbitrariness and terror ". <(Mares op. Cit. P. 6 f.)

Then the terrible quarrel broke out, which led to the break with Sartre. Camus' revolt falls on deaf ears with Sartre, especially since the latter in Camus' gesture of rebellion sees no historically appropriate reaction to the actual grievances – absurdities, misery, injustices, etc. – of the time.

Camus' independent philosophy of life. With his criticism, Sartre does not do justice to Camus, especially since the latter attaches great importance to not sacrificing human life "for the benefit of utopian goals" (Mares op. Cit. P. 11). Camus sees the true *value of life* confirmed in the revolt. Almost entirely on their own - at least without divine assistance - people set their own *values* and fight for them for themselves and others. Even the most lonely ("solitaire") can be in solidarity ("solidaire"). Camus even allows this optimism of solidarity, at least temporarily, to take the place of the absurd. But his philosophy is not exhausted here either. Rather, it turns out to be an *independent philosophy of life*, the content of which Camus himself suggests as follows: "Accept life as it is? Stupid. Means of doing it differently? We are far from ruling life, it is life that rules us and stops us at every opportunity. Accept human fate? On the contrary, I believe that revolt is part of human nature. It is a dark comedy to pretend to be ready to accept what is imposed on us. It's all about living. So many things are worth loving and it's ridiculous to pretend that all one can do is love pain. Comedy. Adjustment. One has to be sincere. Sincerely at any cost, even if it harms us.

So neither revolt nor despair. Life, with everything that goes with it. Those who revolt against life or just endure it close themselves off from it. Pure illusion. We are in life. It hits us, it hurts us, it spits in our faces. It also enlightens us with a sudden and insane happiness that lets us partake. It doesn't take long. But it's enough. Don't be mistaken. The pain is there. Can't be denied. Perhaps the essential part of life is in our deepest innermost being. Our contradictions. The mystics and J.-C. Love. Union. Certainly, but why make words about it? See you later." (Quoted from Radisch 2014, p. 183 f. That Camus even cites " J.-C. ", i.e. *Jesus Christ* , may be astonishing. After all, Jesus said of himself that he was "the way and truth and life." And how did Sartre say?: " Man is nothing other than his life! ")

So Camus acknowledges his contradictions and those of life in general. I see the most serious in the following. He opposes the *Pensée de Midi*, the mediterranean thinking, to the "nordic" thinking, and this, as Iris Radisch (ibid. p 240 f.) explains, as follows: In the *Pensée de Midi* "lights up a paradisiac, original European world that corresponds to Camus' transfigurations of his own childhood - simple, Greek, moderate, naturally beautiful, tolerant, modest, Mediterranean, committed to human nature and belief in life. It stands in clear opposition to modern Europe which Albert Camus in exemplary form encountered in France: intemperate, hybrid, urban, progressive, destructive, dictatorial, ugly, far from nature, terrorist, north- European, imperialist. "

Camus, however , blames not only French but also *German* thinkers ("German thinking") for the last-mentioned undesirable development of modernism, including the "main defendants" Hegel. Marx and Nietzsche. But it is precisely this view that has contributed to Camus disregarding the economic and social order behind the "nordic" excesses he named: the *capitalist one* - which in its neoliberal, globalized form largely determines world events to this day. Camus stops at his opposition of "Mediterranean-ecological" and "Nordic-destructive". But he does *not* present the criticism of capitalism, which for overcoming this rigid opposition would be necessary.

Instead, everything revolves around life itself, so that the absurd and revolt against it appear subordinate to the philosophy of life. In this way alone, Camus' thinking differs from that of Nietzsche, in spite of all influences. The goal is not the superman of the "will to power", but empathy and insertion into a "cosmic primal event" (Radisch, op. cit. p. 184) as the basis of all life. Camus wants s to protect us against Teutonic presumption and megalomania through the mediterranean virtues of measure, love of nature and ease, Hellenic wisdom and serenity, French wit and savoir-vivre, in short, by the art of living.

Not least from these indisputable merits of Camus, I. Radisch (op. cit. p. 258) concludes: "In the end, history proved Sartre wrong. And Camus is confirmed in everything." - But this woodcut-like simplification contains at best half the truth. With his 'Pensée de Midi', Camus offers the foundations for an *eco-ethics* - also and especially nowadays still up-to-date - but fails to support it with the necessary criticism of capitalism. *Sartre*, however, has the merit to have founded, in his *Critique of dialectical reason*, partially anew Marxism, which he calls " the unsurpassable philosophy of our time" and thus the required criticism of capitalism - without, however, connecting this criticism with what Camus has achieved in his *Pensée de Midi*.

What connects Camus and Sartre despite everything. Despite such contrasts, it seems possible to mediate between the two thinkers. Instead of emphasizing seemingly insurmountable differences between the two opponents, as quite a few critics do (as is *Bernard-Henri Lévy*^[121] for Sartre and Radisch for Camus), the similarities should be appreciated. Both thinkers undoubtedly defend freedom, the rights of freedom and the pursuit of happiness of every human being. Both fight every form of bondage, be it economic, social, political, religious or any other kind. When Sartre sharply condemns Soviet communism after Hungary in 1956, Prague 1968 and Paris May 1968, he practically once again places himself at the side of his former friend Camus .

In addition, both Sartre and Camus reject historical determinism (the Marxist "law of meaning") and the definition of history as a utopian goal for the future. Both do not want nihilism, but affirmation of life and justice .

Both are against totalitarianism. It seems pointless to me to speculate about how both of them, if they were still alive today, would assess the latest form of totalitarianism: *neoliberal globalization*. That social inequalities are constantly worsening, the social question is still unresolved, misery, exploitation and oppression, not only in the countries of the former "Third World", are spreading again and again, humanity staggers from one crisis to the next. Both Camus and Sartre would never have accepted all of this, never accepted them as "God's willed fate".

Conclusion. The following surprising result emerges from my analysis of the controversy between Sartre and Camus: A synthesis of eco-ethics and criticism of capitalism is indispensable, so that, in a modified form, the basic problem arises again, which was already at the center of all ethical issues with Kant There are considerations, namely the question of how the autonomy or freedom of the individual - as a legal person with individual morals - is to be reconciled with general legislation.

Which brings me to a crucial point in my investigations and deliberations. Obviously, a *hypothesis of paramount importance* can be derived from the "state of affairs", which is always also one of the *persons* concerned. It reads: *In order to conceive the required normative-value-like, contemporary ethics of behavior control, it is imperative to search a synthesis of the personal autonomy of individuals, eco-ethics, criticism of capitalism and general legislation.* The main obstacle here, however, turns out to be the fact that society consists of individuals, but cannot be analyzed on the basis of a possible overview of the totality of individual fates, because such an overview of the whole is not possible.

As Marx correctly recognized, social analysis is only possible as an analysis of the conditions, relationships, and interests that prevail in a particular society. Which of course also includes the respective *legal system*, and indeed within the framework of the Kantian general legislation.

Which new questions arise from this, will have to be clarified in the following, initially on the basis of the critical theory of society developed by the *Frankfurt School*, albeit limited to its *ethical* implications.

c) Neo-Marxist Concepts

Critical Theory of Society ("Frankfurt School")

This theory, essentially founded by *Max Horkheimer* (1895-1973) and *Theodor W. Adorno* (1903-69), can also serve as an ethical authority against poorly existing capitalist conditions. A Wikipedia article on *Critical Theory* asserts: "In late capitalist society, increasing capital concentration and bureaucracy are causing the spontaneous and individual to be killed off in the "administered world". Enlightenment reason had indeed seen the acquisition of true knowledge about the world as the essence of man, but this reason has changed to an "instrumental" and "purposeful" one. This instrumental reason regards the world and people solely from the point of view of utility. The relationships between individuals are, so the argumentation, largely objectified by dissolving traditional ties. They were noticeably reduced to mere exchange relationships. In the end, a "totally managed world" emerges that exerts extensive social control over the individual and consistently suppresses idealism, nonconformism, unconventionality or creativity, which are running contrary to its character.

The *Critical Theory* of philosophy wants to grant a practical and central importance for society and thus expects better conditions for a future society."

Max Horkheimer, one of the directors of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, claims in *Materialism and Morals*, an article from 1933^[122]. Kant's categorical imperative could in no way lead to a balance between individual and general morality and certainly not promote the common good. In support of this thesis, he strikingly refers exclusively to the *basic formula* of the Cat. Imp., namely in the formulation: "Act only according to the maxim by which you can also want it to become a general law." Horkheimer considers it completely unsuitable, i.e. inoperative. He sees the formula based on Kant's false assumption that one can refrain from any motivation through interests in individuals. *Schopenhauer*, whose pessimism Horkheimer largely shares, found that there were always some motives influencing the will. (Whereby it should be remembered that Schopenhauer wants to replace Kant's thing in itself, and thus one of the foundations of the Cat. Imp., by the *will*.) In this sense, Horkheimer claims that there are no criteria at all according to which an adjustment could be made between the individual and the general "expediency" (loc. cit. p. 4). The consequences are constant restlessness, lack of clarity, endless reflection, confusion and constant "distress", in other words the exact opposite of what Kant intended. For Kant, the general law is "the general law of nature", from which, however, no reliable set of rules for a balance of interests between individuals and the general public can be obtained. There was no consensus whatsoever as to what could be considered a "general law" at all; rather, there are as many different convictions as there are social groups.

Conscience is also not a reliable guideline. Horkheimer asks rhetorically: "Is there any outrage that has not already been committed with a clear conscience?" By analogy, he rejects all the concrete examples that Kant cites to prove the effectiveness of Cat. Imp. He sees the main reasons for such deficiencies in the fact that Kant completely disregards the actual interests of individuals and therefore also the opposites and conflicts that prevail in a society (p. 7).

Only dialectical materialism is able to take a look at the real social conditions and the moral problems that arise from them. Thus, like Hegel, Horkheimer reduces the moral problems to societal ones. These are not to solve by a Kat. Imp., but only by a *change in society*. Specifically: First, the needs and interests of all people would have to be found out, "in a rational way" within the society itself (p. 9). Only then can the basic evil be removed, which consists in the unreasonableness of the bourgeois order. Against the latter, socialism sets the "effect of sensible designs in the interests of all" (p. 12). The "happiness of the general public" can only be achieved through an association of free producers.

Critical appraisal. Horkheimer's essay from 1933 seems like an answer to the unspoken question of how it was possible for a people of poets and thinkers who produced the highly moral Kant and the no less highly moral classic German ideal of humanity, to fall victim to the Nazi ideology and to Hitler, the seducer of the people. There are (possible) connections that I unfortunately cannot go into here.

In his argumentation, Horkheimer relies one-sidedly on the basic formula of the Cat. Imp. In the version mentioned, whose legal term he misinterprets as a "law of nature", although Kant has proven that the Cat. Imp. is not a Law of nature, but of *ought* acts. On this narrow basis, Horkheimer wants to prove that Kant cannot make the step from the individual maxim to the general law. An undertaking that would have turned out to be much more difficult if the author had gone into the second common formulation of the basic formula, according to which it is necessary to check in each case whether the maxim of one's own will is suitable as a principle of general legislation. Horkheimer obviously knew very well what this means, as he quotes Kant with the sentence that the legal entity should "be generally legislative, but also be subject to these laws themselves" (p. 12). Horkheimer owes us the necessary consequences from this.

After all the necessary conclusions are: Whether an act in the sense of general legislation is reprehensible, i.e. for example is illegal or unnatural or violates other laws, can be, I think, relatively easily to determine, for example by means of the moral law based on the Ten Commandments and other ethical precepts which most often have entered the respective legal systems. By no means unrealistic is Kant's requirement that everyone should be involved in the legislation (which is quite possible in the form of petitions or other political activities). In order to recognize and acknowledge this, Horkheimer should have at least consulted also the *self-purpose formula* of the Cat. Imp., in which Kant laid down the inalienable dignity of the legal person, a dignity that is by no means compatible with exploitation, oppression, alienation, need and misery!

Nonetheless, I consider Horkheimer's insight to be correct that in capitalism the actual social conditions with their contradictions and conflicts repeatedly stand in the way of the full effectiveness of the Cat. Imp. As long as both capitalists and wage earners, albeit in conflicting interests, have to struggle with the difficulties of securing a livelihood, they will often not be able and willing to value the common good above their private interests. Which raises the question of whether the latter will not be possible at all in a - hitherto utopian - socialist-liberal society.

As a result of the relative conditionality of morality by society, however, the *requirement of respect for the legal person* is no more invalid than the need to a) comply with the law and b) participate in shaping it. The question of whether and how both, i.e. the societal conditionality of morality and the necessary foundation of morality through general legislation, can generally be reconciled, will have to be discussed again at a later opportunity, according to the "hypothesis of paramount importance" that I have formulated (see above p. 160 f.)

Jürgen Habermas (born 1929): Discourse Ethics (1983 ff.)

Habermas - like his teachers and colleagues Horkheimer and Adorno - made numerous contributions to the critical theory of society. The starting point, lynchpin and pivotal point of his considerations is a theory of modernity that *ties in* with Kant, Hegel and Marx and with which he pursues *emancipatory* and *ethical* goals. He is convinced that anyone can use criticism as a weapon against any kind of underage, especially since at least all adults are able to speak the language. Here, Habermas is not only inspired by those philosophers, but, to a large extent, also by the North American Pragmatists. From Ch. S. Peirce, for example, he adopts the truth theory of "validity by consensus through an unlimited community of investigators", hence the consensus theory of truth. Early on, and up to the present day, his thinking revolves around the subject of 'morality' ("Moralität und Sittlichkeit").

His discourse ethics can be seen as a form of *cognitivism*, because Habermas wants to show with it "how moral questions can be cognitively decided and what their cognitivity consists of exactly"^[123]. According to Habermas it is the possibility, not isolated and alone, but in larger communication groups, arguing to comment on moral issues and to weigh the pros and cons. This should take place in "domination-free discourses", for which Habermas assumes that certain rules are followed through which an "ideal speech situation" is to be achieved. A distinction can be made between these rules: a) a universalization principle, b) a discourse-ethical principle and c) certain discourse rules. Principle a) takes center stage, namely as the "central argumentation rule" (Lumer); the principle of universalization reads: "Every valid norm [must] meet the condition that the consequences and side effects that result from their *general* observance for the satisfaction of the interests of *each* individual, (presumably) are accepted by *all* those concerned (and can be preferred to the effects of the known alternative control options)."^[124] What Habermas understands here by "norm", he explains b) through the discourse ethical principle: "A norm [may] only claim validity if all those who may be affected by it, as *participants in a practical discourse*, reach their agreement (or would achieve) that this norm applies." (loc. cit., p. 3)

c) In order to make such a "practical discourse" go as smoothly as possible, the discourse participants should always adhere to the following "universal- or transcendentally-pragmatic discourse rules of conduct": "1. Anyone who is capable of speaking is entitled to participate in a discourse in full equality with all other discourse participants. 2. Neither outside nor inside may any kind of coercion be exerted on the process of understanding; only the "unconstrained compulsion of the better argument" is permitted in the "domination-free discourse" (HABERMAS). 3. The participants in the discourse may accordingly be guided solely by the motive of cooperative and argumentative consensus finding; thus goodwill (i.e. recognition of the better argument) and truthfulness (i.e. agreement of the statements with one's own convictions) are presupposed. 4. The contributions to the discourse are subject to the demand for linguistic comprehensibility and logical-pragmatic correctness (i.e. compliance with the traditional rules of logic and the contextual rules of communication)."^[125] "Truthfulness" presupposes a theory of *truth* that Habermas offers in the form of the *consensus theory*. This reads: "Those statements are considered to be true whose validity claims are recognized by all participants in the discourse under ideal communication conditions." (Ibid., supplemented by the definition by Peirce cited above). Under such conditions, even ethical norms should then be able to be checked for their validity.

Without exception, *Christoph Lumer* subjected these principles and rules to radical criticism, although he does not do justice to the discourse rules mentioned under c), which he reproduces in his paper shortened to 3 (!) lines, because he only remarks about them: they are "detailed, but not conclusive", but "wrong". Nonetheless, Lumer does not give any reasons for this harsh condemnation, whereas he applies it - apparently "generously" - for his subsequent statements "given as premises" (Lumer, op. cit., p. 4). An astonishing caper that makes it difficult to refer, without prejudice, Lumer's no less radical, but at least plausibly well-founded criticism of principles a) and b).

Nevertheless, now to a): This in my opinion obviously consistent principle contains, as Lumer claims, no argumentation rule at all, because it does not even speak of argumentation. Rather, it is a matter of "Habermas' (provisional) moral criterion for norms", which can by no means be discussed "monologically", but only by a "multitude of people" (op. cit. p. 2). On the other hand, Lumer objects that even the "lonely decision maker" can definitely decide on moral criteria if he has "sufficiently strong benefit theories and large computing capacities" (ibid.). He also points out that the principle of universalization ('U') can only be correct if the validity of the norm is "optimal for each individual affected". However, this is an impossibility, since experience has shown that individuals always follow *different* norms, so that the dispute about the validity of these norms simply cannot be resolved. Habermas has *not yet* presented fully valid moral criteria. Instead, he has meanwhile significantly reduced his normative claim, since he now claims that moral discourses are only about "interests that can be generalized", although it remains unclear *which* interests could be meant, with the bad result: "Either the "interests that can be generalized" are constructed by an *abstract* person and are therefore the same for all individuals; then the (...) intersubjectivity and individuality that Habermas - against Kant - repeatedly complained about is lost, and these interests have little or nothing to do with real people. Or the "interests that can

be generalized" are each constructed by the *real* person and are therefore intersubjectively different; then there is again no norm that is optimal for *everyone ...*" (op. cit. p. 11).

To b): The logical connection is unclear here. Habermas claims, on the one hand, to be able to derive the universalization principle U from "prerequisites for argumentation" and, on the other hand, to be able to derive the discourse ethical principle D from U. Habermas had not succeeded in both, however, not with a) for the reason already mentioned (so "validity of the norm"), not with b) because Lumer could "not discover the glimmer of a derivation" here (op. p. 7). Indeed: The obvious consequentialism of a) for U does not necessarily lead to the "more economical" principle b) for D! In addition, Lumer points out that the "ideal speech situation" or the "ideal forms of talks" appear as either discourse or "(contract-) negotiations". Discourses with a large number of participants should serve, among other things, to establish the truth, e.g. "to cooperatively check the truth of a thesis" (p. 13), which primarily relates to the validity of already existing norms. However, as Lumer explains, "the people involved would then have to be arguably qualified and have the background information necessary in the area of knowledge in question" (ibid.). In contrast, (contract-) negotiations aim to identify and coordinate certain options for action. Lumer concludes that Habermas also wants this form of conversation to be dealt with under the aspect of normativity from the fact that in the negotiations 1. "those affected should agree to the *norm themselves*" (which would result from a certain "way of acting") and 2. "the result of the conversation should be a kind of consensual legislative act with which the social validity of the norm would be secured" (loc. cit. p. 14). However, Lumer is convinced that neither of the two forms of conversation is productive, that is, could lead to a "meaningful moral principle". The discursive consensus can in no way serve as a moral criterion, because such a criterion is already an indispensable prerequisite for any discussion of ethical norms. In addition, Habermas himself admitted that "the conditions for an ideal discourse" were never met. In order to know which ethical norms are really binding for the discourse, one must either be able to fall back on a previous "secondary criterion" of the assessment so that the discussion about it is superfluous, or one has no secondary norm criterion at all, so that one can never know "which norms are moral". The consensus sought by Habermas can only guarantee the relative probability of the validity of *opinions* about a certain norm, but not their actual validity. Opinion and consensus about a norm remained purely theoretical, one could not state why one should *obey* it. Lumer: "In Habermas' ethics, there is no theory at this point that would provide practical, motivating reasons to act as the morally valid norm demands" (p. 15).

From all of this, Lumer concludes that Habermas' concept does not offer any justification for a discourse ethics, but only a "formula compromise that verbally compiles everything that is important to Habermas: on the one hand discourse, cognitivism and truth, on the other hand democracy, power sharing and political autonomy". Lumer sees "also a political-institutional problem" in the desideratum to reconcile these factors, but a mere philosophical compromise of a formula does nothing to solve it (op. p. 16).

Critical appraisal. The very term 'discourse' causes confusion, as a result of the almost unmanageable number of its meanings and nuances of meaning, some of which differ greatly. Which does not seem to apply to the original Latin word 'discursus', because it means little more than "running apart, running back and forth, riding". In contrast, the Roman word history of 'discursus', especially in French and Italian, has gotten out of hand. Whereas in an older French-German dictionary (PONS, Klett 1978) are to be found only the equivalents "discourse; execution; speech; treatise; (school) essay; *gram* form of speech" , in the monolingual *Petit Robert* there is an inflation to approx. 32 (!) synonyms, which not only encompass *validity claims of all kinds* , but also colloquial language such as 'conversation, dialogue, talk, chatter, improvisation' and, in elaborated or philosophical codes, such items as 'apology, proof, plea, Philippika', etc., up to the 'ensemble des contextes', the whole of contexts). While Italian contributes further original new formations, such as 'fare un discorso' (talking into the blue) or 'un discorso senza capo né coda' (literally: 'speech without head nor tail').

The inflationary use of the term 'discours' is probably one of the reasons for *Foucault's* new coinage for discourse as "the difference ... between what can theoretically be said, made and thought of and what is actually said, made and thought" .[\[126\]](#) Whereby Foucault certainly also means the fact that the discourses themselves can create and organize *reality* (cf. ibid.).

Habermas may have been guided by such semantic and conceptual prominence when he tried to found the discourse ethics newly conceived by him and *Karl-Otto Apel*. If one now compares this initial situation with the actual formulation of this "ethics" and Lumer's criticism, the birth defect of the concept becomes easily recognizable: Habermas wants to secure the discourse on normativity not only formally, but also in terms of content. If he had been content with the basic meaning of 'speech' when using the term discourse, he could safely have ignored the problem of norms. That he exactly did not do that, is related to his reception of the categorical imperative. He wanted to counteract its "solipsistic" tendency, that is to say, he did not trust the "lonely decision maker" (Lumer, see above), which Kant took for granted, namely that everyone would be able to determine whether an action was in accordance with the moral law, good morals, general legislation and unconditional respect for the dignity of the person. The fact that Habermas considered the "lonely decision maker" to be overwhelmed in this respect is due, among other things, to the negative influence emanating from Hegel's and Nietzsche's misinterpretations of the Cat. Imp. (See above). Habermas wanted to put an end to what he suspected of overburdening the individual by discussing the *norm problems* in new, open discussion forums and solving them in a democratic manner. (Even if he later stated that it was only about "interests" of the participants in the discussion "that could be generalized".)

Lumer has proven that this concept cannot work by reducing both the "principle of universalization" and the "discursive-ethical principle" to absurdity (see above). To my mind, this proof presented by Lumer is compelling, but not his *non- founded* criticism of the "rules of discourse". Rather, I consider most of them to be relevant and viable.

Yet, rules of discourse are useless if discourse itself is to fail right from the beginning, namely a) by an excessively wide range of meanings of the term 'discourse' and b) as a result of the fact that the discussions are compromised by the subject *norms*.

Instead, the extension of the term 'discourse' should be restricted as far as possible to certain forms of linguistic communication, including *internet communication*, but also conventional forms of linguistic communication. Especially for the Internet - ("Cyber" -) communication, especially in view of the acute danger of a *digital dictatorship*, appropriate ethical standards of monitoring and evaluation are to be found; as a first priority to ensure that the *inviolable dignity of the person* is always respected, while the normative details for each of these forms of discourse are to be found or negotiated separately, namely in democratically legitimated *expert committees* .

I consider another restriction to be essential. As soon as, like with all moral and ethical questions, a discussion is about *truth*, i.e. about the ability, claim and search for truth, it will prove impractical to make this discussion accessible to everyone. Truth claims are always relative, that is, they are tied to certain *theories* that each relate to certain problem areas and areas of knowledge. However, not everyone has the ability to work with such theories, i.e. to be able to check their validity if necessary. This, too, is a clear deficit of Habermas' rules of discourse, which nevertheless cannot be completely overridden. Rather, they retain their value as soon as the necessary corrections mentioned have been made.

Habermas' ethics of discourse, however, can in no way replace the categorical imperative. Decisive ethical and normative questions have to be approached with different methods, be it in expert committees, be it through the scientific cooperation of individual theorists, who in any case are never "lonely decision-makers" but can only achieve acceptable results if they duly consider what has already been achieved: the relevant ethical concepts - and make their results available to the general public, without exception, if possible.

Let us anticipate one result: *there can apparently not be an absolutely valid ethics of behavior control, because the question of truth plays a decisive role in every ethics* .

Ernst Bloch (1885-1977): from Kant to dialectical-materialistic ethics

Like Hegel, Marx and Engels, Bloch did not write a book entitled 'Ethics'. How high he nevertheless estimates the value of ethics - and at least to the same extent as the aforementioned predecessors - is evident from the following: "So it seems necessary in this place to let Kant burn through Hegel; the I must remain in everything; ... so the wishing, demanding ego, the unrestricted world of postulates of its *a priori* is the best fruit, the only purpose of the system; and Kant is therefore as sure about Hegel as Psyche is about Pnuma. Self about Pan, ethics about the world encyclopedia ... " .[\[127\]](#) This is how early Bloch speaks in the *Spirit of utopia* (1923, p. 236). As *Eberhard Braun* rightly points out, Bloch at least places Kant higher than Hegel. The *ego*, and not just the liberated ego in Marx's realm of freedom, seems to stand above everything else here - as does ethics even above the whole world, the "world encyclopedia".

Is this why Bloch advocates an ego ethic, even an "ego ethic" with himself at the center? Not at all! Especially since Bloch, especially the later one, is far from following Kant uncritically in everything. On the contrary, he criticizes the Königsberger sometimes violently, for example with the assertion that the categorical imperative is in a "class society, with master and servant" not at all followable.[\[128\]](#) That is, with a thesis which he initially tries to support with the following arguments: "But what contradiction would arise in the maxim of the will, if a class-conscious proletarian embraced the maxim of his will with the principle of a general one, including the capitalist society and legislation! - The greatest contradiction, namely in the concept of solidarity, would only be evoked by this; the categorical imperative thus prevents itself precisely because of the class-egoistically quite impossible principle of a general moral law . Thus the categorical imperative in class society is precisely morally inoperable; if it could be followed, the harmonizers would be the best moralists for the good of all, including the capitalist class ." (op. cit., p. 458).

But immediately after this, rather surprising, suddenly follows a reversal of the argumentation as breaks down again and again in Bloch's Kant-criticism, and so for the benefit of the great Königsberger! Bloch already in the next sentence points out that capitalists could in no way invoke the Cat. Imp., and if so, then "not other than to their own *sondennation*" (ibid.). Simply because Kant "in his maxim and legislation" left no room for private gain at the expense of the general public. Which, you can hear and be

amazed, Bloch's initially violent rejection of the Cat. Imp. all of a sudden, turns into the opposite! Because as an antidote to any unlawful taking of advantage, the Cat. Imp. appears "almost like an optative, yes, like an anticipation formula towards a non-antagonistic society, that is, towards a classless society in which real generality of moral legislation is possible at all." (ibid.) And Bloch then connects Kant with Marx without any problems by now referring to the *self-purpose formula* of the Cat. Imp., through which Kant "almost irrevocably" condemned the society of exploitation (ibid.).

What I have presented here is by no means the only "return coach" of this kind. In *The Principle of Hope*, subsection "Rescuing the individual through community" (p. 1139 ff.), Bloch describes the Cat. Imp. as "the most formal, but also the most radical, guide table of the moral collective", remarking a little later: "The moral effectiveness of the categorical imperative in particular presupposes a society that is no longer divided into classes."^[129] This as a consequence of Kant's demand to bring individual happiness into harmony with that of the general public, which, according to Bloch, could never bring about the "happiness of the exploiter", especially since the wage earners are always only a means to misuse purposes. - Which, however, leads to one of the most serious problems of Marx's and even more so of Bloch's ethics: *Can the protection of the freedom of the individual through general legislation even exist in a class society, as demanded by Kant?*

Of course, Bloch has thought about this problem. Accordingly, Kant is on the wrong track if he believes that he can remove the Cat. Imp. from the grasp of history. *Hans-Ernst Schiller* states: "In general, it applies to Bloch that moral concepts and ethics depend on historical-social conditions and must reflect them: > Value judgments of a moral nature [...] were always dependent on the changing social basis < (PH 1567)."^[130] (PH = *Principle of Hope*).

This fits in with the fact that Bloch developed an *ethics of change*, not least on the basis of ethical concepts and postulates such as value, dignity, the highest good, virtue and responsibility, which were not only based on Kant.

Bloch deals primarily with *values* in one of the final chapters of *The Principle of Hope* under the title 'The final desired content and the highest good' (p. 1551 ff.). The "ideal value image" should therefore be striven for seriously, but not as a mere, unrealistic ideal, but in reality, primarily in art, according to which values "only become ideals in the strict sense when they are especially sublime, appear as a pre-semblance of an uplifting quality, one that has been aesthetically driven to an end in the existing world." (op. cit., 1556). This also applies *mutatis mutandis* to religious values, and no less also to legal standards and "the moral good" par excellence, for which philosophers like Socrates and Kant even undertook an "evaluation of values" in order to then apply the actual standards of value to people themselves. Whereby the *subjective and the objective come together in interaction*. There are always different criteria for evaluating morality, but also common models, and models that depend not only on subjective preferences but also on objective-material interests, so that "ranks" occur.

Basically, values are created through *work*: "Only work plus raw material and material content creates all values; there is no creation of value, especially in a higher climax, through the isolated subject side without intrusive value materials." (op. p. 1568, emphasis KR). If the human work on the material becomes the decisive criterion, the object side gives "the material to the value", but it is only through the work on this material that *value differentiations and gradations* arise, based on the *setting* of purposes and useful activity: "Everywhere like this the value goes back to a desire, including its subjectively intended, objectively concretizable value-purpose content" (p. 1570). So that use, exchange and surplus value can of course also be related to human labor, whereby Bloch emphatically refers to the Marxian definitions: value = "condensed work", measure of value = the "socially necessary working time" (p. 1571 f.), in order to finally indicate the limit of any theory of value: "... the subjective as well as the objective theory of value ceases at the *highest moment of the highest good*, like the entire subject-object relationship that is still hold away from one another" (p. 1577).

From which it follows that it is imperative to go into Bloch's concept of the *highest good* ('summum bonum'), which of course is not limited to the Kantian. Bloch identifies this "highest" with the *meaning of life*, that is, with the "last Purpose" ('Wozu überhaupt'), more accurately: the "the last purpose of human intent" (p. 1562), which may be a final authority or even *last foundation of ethics*. However: Bloch sees the test to the example in the fact that the highest *bonus* is at the same time a *unum*, a unified, and a *verum*, a convincing truth (cf. ibid.). In concrete terms: The *last purpose* cannot consist in the "thwarting nothing", but in the "*content of the dynamic, material core of the world that processes everything out*" (p. 1564). It is the "pole star of every utopia", especially of every *concrete utopia*, so that Bloch does not hesitate to combine this, his very own concept, with what Kant called "the unconditional" (God, freedom, immortality). With Bloch's qualification: the Supreme Good has always been thought of as "God", but still remains a "*real problem*" (p. 1565) in the world process; and finally, in a Marxist twist: "What was thought under the highest good, which was previously called God, then the kingdom of God, and finally the kingdom of freedom, constitutes not only the ideal of human history, but also the metaphysical problem of Nature latency." (p. 1566) For Bloch, the highest good consists in a synthesis of Marx's vision of the goal of the *realm of freedom* and what he himself called "the incompletable entelechy of matter". Whereby his hypothesis of a "natural subject" undoubtedly also plays a role, a development of purposes and goals of nature that rules in matter, carries the world process, but is still unexplained.

Under these aspects, Bloch's other ethics terms also take on clearer contours or a value-ethical and normative format. This applies first of all to the concept of *dignity*, which H.-E. Schiller only dealt with relatively briefly in the above-mentioned ethics article, which, however, comes into play in Bloch's work *Natural Law and Human Dignity*, where he says: "As the final quintessence of classical natural law ... the postulate of human dignity always remains; even people, not only their class, do not, as Brecht says, like to have the boot on their face, and what remains in natural law gave this aversion, a conceptual, even abstract, format that had been revolutionary since Spartacus." (ibid. 1977, p. 232). In this respect, natural law plays a prominent role in the definition of human dignity, which Bloch sometimes equates with *walking upright*, not least in connection with Bloch's term "*ethical freedom*" or "freedom in each class as a choice, as freedom of action, as ethical and religious, generally only *contra fatum* substantiated, that is, in view of a still *open*, not yet *fully determined world*", but always in the "mode of human behavior towards objective-real possibility", and with a clear goal: "the unalienated humanity", which Bloch also calls the "*content of freedom*" (op. cit. p. 186). Accordingly, freedom is unthinkable for him without a rational order, which cannot be produced in a capitalistic society. In the *Principle of Hope* (p. 728), he comes to the conclusion, towards the end of the chapter 'Freedom and Order - Outline of Social Utopias': "Fate is uncertain, uncontrolled necessity, freedom is controlled, from which alienation has disappeared and real order comes up, just as the *realm of freedom*." Where it is finally clear what *Friedrich Engels* meant when he said that freedom is "insight into necessity". Here too, as with Bloch, Kant's solution to the problem of autonomy and legality shimmers through. Reasonable order is an indispensable prerequisite for any freedom.

And ultimately, this constitutes the contents of Bloch's *ethics of change*, which not only pushes forward "that *homo homini lupus* is no longer profitable"^[131], that people do no longer face and tear each other like wolves. Rather, these ethics should serve to fight for *real freedom*, for which Bloch writes in his *Politische Messungen* (1977, p. 252): "Only this ethics of change cancels out the mere gallery of changes in the history of ethics so far." So not all of the previous ethics becomes obsolete, but becomes *critically inheritable*, not least in favor of concrete political practice, to which Bloch notes: "A really encouraging ethics can start like this, directed against dehumanization, with theory-practice towards citizen. If one suspects with Kant that true politics cannot take a step without first paying homage to morality, then that is correct, but only because true morality in this our time cannot take a step without being politics, revolutionary." (ibid.) Which does not mean that morality must finally be absorbed in politics, because: "Politics neither completely resolves the individual conflicts below their own (such as the 'communist forget-me-not' of sexual love) nor does it explain and illuminate the what for (= highest purpose), the Summum bonum and even the darkness of death." (op. cit. p. 253). Also and especially in the *ethics of change*, it is morality that gives the individual their dignity, both in class society and in a future realm of freedom of a classless society: "One does not die for an organized production budget; our totality is not an only politically negotiable one, let alone merely a matter of advice and teaching in politics. *Morality by its own accord falls to the fighter for the realm of freedom, but the fact that he is a fighter is not written in communist politics, but only in communist morality.*" (ibid. emphasis added by me.)

What inspires the struggle for the realm of freedom is not only revolutionary awareness, but also "faith", love, hope in human relationships", even as "the ultimate moral agent of the revolution"! (ibid.)

In my opinion, Bloch has - for the time being - answered the interim question I asked whether the safeguarding of freedom demanded by Kant through general legislation can even exist in a class society (see above, p. 172 f.). Man - and also the revolutionary - wins and retains his dignity at all times through morality, largely secured by general legislation in which everyone is to participate. For Bloch, the revolutionary freedom fighter is morally right in two ways: on the one hand as a legal person, on the other hand through his legitimate struggle for true freedom, equality and non-alienation.

When Bloch speaks of *change*, he means moving closer to the "truth of the social" = socialism, to Marx's realm of freedom or "the realization of the social utopia as a prerequisite for the realization of the metaphysically highest good" (H.-E. Schiller) and thus a desideratum that has lost none of its explosive topicality even in the 21st century, so that H.-E. Schiller rightly declares: "In the 21st century, the cards are reshuffled, huge disappointment to process, but as long as the conditions are unjust and destructive, we cannot stop our fighting for a better society"^[132]

But how should this be possible? Undoubtedly not without concrete analyzes of the concrete situations with which we are confronted today, eminently noticeable not only due to global capitalism, but, in its wake, increasingly also due to the *creeping ecological catastrophe*. Problems pile up, not least also of all psychological or "pastoral" kind, which apparently cannot be overcome without a philosophical orientation.

Bloch's ethics also help here. For him there is no morality without natural law, but this is not enough to justify it. Rather, Bloch assumes that "great morality" is even superior to natural law, "placed above it". *Doris Zeilinger* writes about this: "Great morality surpasses natural law here," is even adequate to and overrides radical law "... That is, that natural law "sets human freedom into possible solidarity", i.e. a realizes a scientific project, whereas true morality intends "the clearing up of the kind of

human alienation and dissatisfaction" ... that not only has social cause. Bloch succeeds in creating a memorable image in order to make clear the relationship between natural law and morality: "The positively existing law, of course, is primarily 'rectified' and judged in a revolutionary way by radical natural law; real morality says yes to this and keeps the amen open "..."[\[133\]](#)

However, this is an *unfinished* morality that remains committed to the utopia of the realm of freedom and can only be *fully* realized there. And thus at the same time serves as a benchmark even higher than natural law, not only for the future, but also for all practice in the here and now. This corresponds to the fact that Bloch thinks and argues *genuinely ecologically*; which is due to his concept of nature, according to which nature is first to be understood as 'natura naturans', i.e. as a creative power and (possible) "natural subject", as a power of which *Schelling* declares that it is "its own legislator", which as such is by no means to be understood adequately in terms of natural science, for example through atomic and field theories.

In recognition of these qualities, Bloch is developing a new *technology alliance* with nature, in which nature is no longer ruthlessly abused in the capitalist manner, but is *respected* as a *possible (hypothetical) subject*, always including *how natural resources are dealt with*, for example the extraction and processing of raw materials must be critically examined, for which Bloch explains: "All of this is closed to the mechanism; the real problem of the agent, which carries out the turnover like the dialectic turnover of natural phenomena, is an implication that is also quantitatively present, but quantitatively untraceable. "[\[134\]](#) Quite differently presented in *Nature Alliance* and *Alliance Technology* to which Bloch requires: "Marxism of technology, when it will once be thoroughly thought, is not philanthropy for abused metals, but, in any case, the end of the naive transfer on nature of the interests of exploiters and tamers of wild beasts." And: "Natural flow as a friend, technology as the release and mediation of the creations slumbering in nature, that is one of the most concrete aspects of concrete utopia." (op. cit., p. 813).

Which can be fully realized only in a classless society, i.e. not without a "social revolution"; but before that as a compass and guiding star for all emancipatory practice, and thus possibly also as the basis of all *eco-ethics* (see p. 199 ff. and 324 ff.).

Under these aspects, Bloch's ethics of change cannot in any way be reduced to his handling of certain moral and ethical concepts, but rather *his entire work* as part of the "world encyclopedia", which is ultimately also subject to ethics, can be taken into account - an undertaking that, however, would mean a Herculean work, so that I have to content myself with a few programmatic notes. Concerning, e.g., the ethical relevance of the main and key concepts of Bloch's philosophy, including, for example, matter, entelechy, dialectic, natural law, natural alliance and 'nature-subject', anticipation, atheism, concrete utopia, novelty, Hope (docta spes), not-yet, Process, revolution, anticipation, freedom and walking upright. Which might already be possible with the help of the articles listed in the *Bloch dictionary* for the analysis of "Bloch's words", but would hardly be achievable by an individual. More details and more on Bloch's ethics and his concept of freedom can be found at H.-E. Schiller loc. cit. pp. 102 and 144-161.

18. Core principles of a dialectical-materialistic ethics

1. As the basis of ethics, Kant's God, freedom, thing -in-itself and immortality of the soul cannot be assumed, but with Ernst Bloch the *unfinished entelechy of matter*.
2. This basis is not absolutely valid, especially since every ethic is connected with the course of history, social conditions and certain claims to truth.
3. The entelechy of matter manifests itself, among other things, in Schelling-Bloch's concept of nature, according to which nature can be understood as "its own legislator" and *natura naturans* with a *hypothetical* 'nature subject' ("Natursubjekt").
4. From these determinations follow the *purpose in itself* and the *intrinsic value* of nature, which must be respected.
5. Dialectically and materialistically, it is stated that in capitalist society the free objectification of man is prevented because the exploitation based on private property always leads to *alienation*. To Marx, therefore, it appears necessary to abolish private ownership of the means of production that is suitable ("functioning") for exploitation.
6. Marx: "*Society* is the perfect essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the naturalism of man carried out and the humanism of nature carried out".
7. Marx's "recognizable ethics of living, working and coexisting appropriately".
8. Marx calls for the "categorical imperative to overturn all conditions in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being."
9. The most sublime synthesis of morality, state and society is of no use if the person is not a self-determined *citizen*, but "a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being".
10. In order to achieve true freedom for all people, the capitalist mode of production and with it class society must be abolished.
11. The *normative immediate goal* of socialism is: "Everyone according to his abilities, everyone according to his needs."
12. Only in a Classless Society can *ethics be measured life* fully come to fruition, and a *realm of freedom* will be built where the "real freedom" is that "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of everybody"(Marx / Engels).
13. For the ethical socialist *Hermann Cohen*, the categorical imperative is not only the highest guiding principle for all socialism, but also "the moral program of the new time and all future of world history".
14. Even if ethical socialism, which was "only" a theoretical concept, failed at the beginning of the 20th century, it does not seem absurd to try to bring Kant and Marx under one roof, although not by renouncing dialectically and partly idealistically enriched materialism.
15. *Horkheimer*: In the Cat. Imp. Kant completely disregards the actual interests of individuals and therefore also the contradictions and conflicts that prevail in a society.
16. According to Horkheimer, the latter cannot be resolved through a Cat. Imp., but only through a *change in society*.
17. The "happiness of the general public" can only be achieved through an association of free producers.
18. "Man's right on this earth, / since he only lives for a short time, is to be happy / to partake of all the lust of the world / to get bread and not a stone to eat." - "First come the food, then comes the morality."(Bertolt Brecht)
19. In spite of the fact that morality is conditioned by society, the requirement to respect the legal person is not less valid than the demands a) to comply with the law and b) to participate in shaping it.
20. *Habermas* was possibly guided by semantic and conceptual protuberances of the term '*discours*' when he tried to found the *discourse ethics* that he and *Karl-Otto Apel* had newly conceived.
21. Habermas's attempt to secure the discourses on normativity accessible to everyone not only formally, but also with the intent to replace the Cat. Imp. is failed, according to *Lumer*.
22. *Ernst Bloch*: As an antidote to any unlawful taking of advantage, the Cat. Imp. works "almost like an optative, yes like an anticipation formula towards a non-antagonistic society, that is, to a classless society in which there, at all, real generality of moral legislation is possible". Relatively easily Bloch connects Kant with Marx, albeit with occasionally sharp reservations about Kant, whom he finally admits to have condemned the exploiters society, and so, "almost irrevocably", with reference to the *self-purpose formula* of Cat Imp.
23. Bloch: "Only work plus raw material and material content creates all values." (Whereby a "desire" is always involved.)
24. According to Bloch, moral judgments (unlike Kant!) were always "dependent on the changing social basis".
25. For Bloch there is no morality without natural law, but this is not enough to justify it. Rather, Bloch assumes that "great morality" is even superior to natural law, "placed above" it.
26. For Bloch, the highest good consists in a synthesis of Marx's vision of the *realm of freedom* and what he himself called "the unfinished entelechy of matter".
27. Bloch's ethics of *change* should serve to fight for *real freedom*.
28. When Bloch speaks of *change*, he means the approach to the "truth of the social" = socialism, to Marx's realm of freedom or "the realization of the social utopia as a

prerequisite for the realization of the metaphysical highest good" (H.- E. Schiller).

29. Bloch thinks and argues *genuinely ecologically*; this already because of his concept of nature (so core sentence no. 3).

30. Bloch: "It remains the ultimate moral agent of the revolution: faith, love, hope in human relationships; this music only becomes flesh when all the guests have sat down at the table. Happiness is simple and obvious, but its ways are complicated, and the content that it displays is mysterious."

31. Man - also and especially the revolutionary - wins and retains his dignity at any time through morality, temporarily secured by general legislation in which everyone is to participate, even if the "real generality of moral legislation" seems possible only in a classless society.

19. Eco-ethics (I)

Ethics of change? Good and right. But: *what* has to be changed? It shows up differently from day to day, sometimes more, sometimes less. In our time, unfortunately, not only in the grimace of globalized capitalism, but also in the monster *eco-crisis*, which admittedly also has a capitalist grimace, but not only this. Also, and especially in the so-called socialist countries, the wrong handling of nature and the environment had a catastrophic effect. All of this makes the desideratum of an eco-ethic a mammoth task of a special kind.

How should such ethics be founded? *Vittorio Hösle* (born 1960) proposed an interesting solution, based on natural law. This should be guaranteed by the state, ultimately in a "universal state with a monopoly of force". Jan Rohls writes about this (op. cit. p. 711): "Natural law is a yardstick for judging the morality of positive law, which is based on the principles of general ethics. Natural law as a core component of morality indicates the direction that the gradual transformation of positive law has to take. Hösle is conceiving a state that is based on natural law and protects it with its coercive force. In doing so, he further develops the social rule of law to an ecological state that meets the requirements of natural law, because it recognizes the rights of future generations.

This natural law state should also be flanked by a "civil religion of natural law", especially since in today's Catholicism natural law, like moral law, is granted an absoluteness based on God's commandments. But Hösle ignores the fact that there is no scientific basis for such an absolute claim, as well as the fact of the limited validity of natural law. Ernst Bloch rightly saw this limit in the fact that "great morality", especially in the concrete utopia of the highest good (see above), is to be given priority over natural law. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether Bloch's concept of nature and the concepts associated with it are really suitable to offer a better alternative for the possible justification of an eco-ethics.

What **Hans Jonas** (1903-93) in *The Responsibility Principle* (PV, 1979) [135] radically calls into question, in relation to both Marx's theory and Bloch's philosophy of hope. Where to falls that Jonas treats Marx's work in as highly selective-reductionist manner, so that he neglects essential contents of Marx's theory - for example, his new version of the dialectic method, analysis and criticism of capitalism, the term alienation and the revolutionary theory. Jonas devotes only a few lines to the extensive Marxian Hegel criticism. If Marx wanted to put Hegel "upside down", this would only serve to put the "want of the actors" in the place of Hegel's "ruse of reason" (PV, p. 228 f.). In contrast, the author deals in detail with Marx's utopia of the "realm of freedom", not least as a forerunner and model of Bloch's utopia.

Jonas sees Marx's abolition of alienated work in a classless society as a misunderstanding of the essence of work. This in no way consists in a "freedom from purpose", but is always tied to the necessity of maintaining life. But Marx would eliminate this need, saying by *absolute domination and exploitation of nature* (within the meaning of *Francis Bacon*), represented by the full power of modern technology, taking over most parts of peoples' work (at least in its conventional forms), with the result that work, "if at all still provided by people, ... to an ever increasing degree (in the communist as well as in every technological society), will be soulless, fragmented into mechanical sub-processes" (PV, P. 344). After that, however, as soon as man is freed also from this residual form of alienated work in the realm of freedom, it can only be "pointless, purpose-free work" (ibid.). Such a "realm of freedom" could not exist at all, since Marx had obtained it by "separating himself from the realm of necessity", disregarding the fact that outside the realm of necessity there could be no freedom at all, for freedom always consists only in "measuring oneself with necessity" (PV p. 364 f.). Marx therefore not only misunderstood the essence of work, but also the essence of freedom, so that he would even lose spontaneity, human dignity and the value of interpersonal relationship. Jonas rejects Marx's concepts of a *humanization of nature* and the *naturalization of man* because the latter cannot be concretized and the former falls victim to Marx's alleged idolization of technology.

Incidentally, Jonas identifies the Marxian doctrine largely with its "realization" in "real existing" Soviet socialism, which inevitably and inexorably became *totalitarian*, notably in the form of state-controlled planned economy and the unlimited governance power of the Communist parties. A "needs economy" is generally preferable to a "profit economy", but not if it justifies the state-run planned economy, which is afflicted with the well-known shortcomings of a centralized bureaucracy. If the government determines "what counts as a need", "even the greatest waste of finite resources can come out at the expense of the overall ecology" (PV p. 261), while the claim to total government power has led to "communist tyranny" (P. 263).

Under such dubious pre-determinations, Jonas also criticizes Bloch's *principle of hope*, to which he consciously opposes his *principle of responsibility*, focusing in particular on Bloch's concepts of concrete utopia, of not-yet-being and of pre-appearance. Ex negative, he first explains what the not-yet does *not* mean, namely neither "the openness to *new as such*" nor "the infinite *approach* to a never-achieved goal" nor that of *Hannah Arendt's originality of authentic human action* nor Heidegger's "running ahead" into the future (the notorious "running ahead into death?") (PV p. 377 f.). Nonetheless, Bloch presented a complete "ontology of *not-yet-being*" with the basic principle "S not yet = P", i.e. "(the subject is not yet its predicate), where being P not only *can* achieve, *but rather* should" in order to *really be* S" (p. 376). As an aid in this, Bloch praised the "pre-appearance of the law", which comes into play above all in art, although it is not clear how Bloch classifies "the pessimists" (e.g. Kafka, Dostoyevsky).

Against the "pre-appearance" in art Jonas points out that perfect artworks prove their values in "absolute present", that is just not in any pre-appearance in the future. There could be no "not yet" for humans anyway because they - as the "real human beings" - always "were there" (loc. cit. p. 382). On the other hand, Bloch's utopian man of classless society could be "only the homunculus of socio-technical futurology, sordidly conditioned to find good behavior and wellbeing, trained to the core to be lawful" (ibid.). This is exactly what is to be "feared" for the future, not to be hoped for. Because being human actually always emerges from the past, never from merely anticipated future, so that Bloch's utopia is misleading, especially since it is based on a false image of man. With significant ethical consequences, since Jonas concludes from his criticism of Bloch, that after all it was "highly necessary to *free the requirement of justice, goodness and reason from the bait of utopia*" (p 386).

Conclusion: Overall, and especially with his terrifying vision of the shameful "homunculus of socio-technical futurology", Jonas against Bloch basically makes the same reproach that he had already made against Marx: to be largely responsible for the tyrannical totalitarianism of the Soviets!

But what does Jonas' own *ethics of responsibility* look like? At the same time, he understands his critique of the utopias of Marx and Bloch as "a critique of technology in a preview of its extreme possibilities" (p. 388). The dynamic of technical progress, which is reaching into the utopian, gives no cause for hope, but above all for *fear*. So that against Bloch, the 'principle of responsibility' arises almost of its own accord, especially since fear is combined with concern for strangers and vulnerable humanity: "As a potential ... fear is already part of the original question by which one can imagine starting any active responsibility: what will happen to *him* if *I* do not take care? The darker the answer, the lighter the responsibility" (p. 391).

To the **principle of responsibility** Jonas ties his claim to present an "ethics for technical civilization". What Jonas means by this, appears, among other things, clear from the combined comprehensive "take-aways" which the Internet published for *principle responsibility* [136]. From this I quote the following: "In contrast to earlier times, man is today in a position to destroy the whole world with technology. / Since the previous ethics did not do justice to this threat, there is an ethical vacuum in the modern age. / Man has a moral duty to preserve the heritage of civilization and planet earth. / Necessary becomes a "heuristic of fear" that anticipates the worst-potential dangers; errors are no longer allowed. / Mankind has no right to collective suicide, it is morally obliged to exist. / Because mankind is already jeopardizing its future with its actions, it has a responsibility. / ... / ... / In view of the impending ecological catastrophe, cautious use of technology and careful use of resources are required." (loc. cit., p. 2). - Which, to my opinion, must be supplemented by Jonas' much-quoted *imperative of ecological sustainability*, which strangely does not appear in the "take-aways": "Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth"; or to put it negatively: "Act in such a way that the effects of your action are not destructive to the future possibilities of such life"; or simply: "Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite continuation of mankind on earth"; or, again put in a positive way: "Include in your current choice the future integrity of the human being as a co-object of your will". (PV p. 36). What apparently does not amount on utopia, but on flawless *consequentialism*!

Arno Münster's counter-criticism

In a lecture in 2004 [137] Arno Münster deals relatively extensively with Jonas' criticism of Marx and Bloch and argues as follows: The basis of Jonas' criticism is a "hermeneutic of fear", according to which only the "fear of human distortion" can make possible an adequate image of man, the "concept of man", (op. cit. p. 1). For Jonas, anxiety and fear, not hope, are the actual driving forces behind history that lead to responsible behavior. Münster does not question the concept of responsibility as such, nor

Jonas' criticism of "actually existing socialism". However, he considers as "incomprehensible" Jonas' attempt "to extend the competence of the ethics of responsibility ... also to the area of utopian ideals of humanity, utopian thinking in general and utopian Marxism in particular" (p. 2). Because this only succeeds at the price of a completely unacceptable devaluation of the utopias of Marx and Bloch, which Jonas considers to be totally "unrealistic". On Jonas' special critique of Marx, Münster remarks: "Jonas puts into question the Marxist theory of the possible humanization of the world through the humanization of work, i.e. through the revolutionary overcoming of alienation and alienated labor, and in this context presumes in Marx an almost "religious belief in the omnipotence of technology to always create the good." For Hans Jonas, Marxism is indeed nothing else - and that is already a highly one-sided definition - than a later offshoot of Francis Bacon's scientific utopias, in other words, nothing else than the execution of Bacon's last will." (p. 3) As a result of this reductionism, Jonas completely misunderstood the essence of Marxism, which is by no means primarily concerned with the "potentialities of technology" (ibid.). Jonas considers the assumption that capitalist immorality can be eliminated and that "a new person" can be created to be "absolutely naive". In fact, Jonas justifies his "realistic skepticism" in this regard with reference to the "police and informant system" in the Soviet state. Münster, on the other contrary, considers such skepticism to be completely counterproductive. "Passivity and resignation" are their hardly avoidable consequences, symptoms of "civilization pessimism" (p. 4 f.). Jonas' condemnations of the Marxist utopia are completely incomprehensible in view of the actual situation both in the countries of the "Third World" and in the highly developed countries. The former are so badly off that, according to Jonas, utopias can no longer help them, while for the latter it is true that "the progress of technology and a more equitable distribution of the wealth ... makes totally superfluous basically the class struggle and the socialist reorganization of the socio-economic conditions" (p. 5). And this argument probably forms the core of Jonas' criticism of Marx and Bloch. Jonas could not do justice to the latter because he "misinterpreted a whole series of central terms of Bloch's philosophy, misrepresented them and hastily rejected them, often in an exaggeratedly polemical form" (p. 6). Jonas completely disregards the fact that Bloch with his utopia offers a "guiding principle" for the fight against capitalism.

Münster considers Jonas' equation of the Marx-Bloch utopia with the belief in a perfectionism of technology to be completely absurd. Jonas does not want to admit that Bloch argues *genuinely ecologically* and instead insists on a "veto right of nature against utopia"; this in complete disregard of Bloch's concepts such as the "alliance behavior of man towards nature" and the "resurrection of nature" (p.8). For Jonas these all are nothing but "extravagant dreams" (p. 9). Utopia leads to "catastrophe" and is therefore superfluous. Münster explains: "The radicalism with which Hans Jonas ... attacks and questions the philosophical-political recourse to utopias in general and Bloch's eschatological-messianic philosophy of "concrete utopia" in particular, proves once again that he is not willing to loyally deal with the theses put forward by Bloch in the "Hope Principle" and in "Experimentum Mundi". He is more concerned with using Bloch's neo-Marxist philosophy as a pretext to settle globally ideologically with Marxism and the "Marxist utopia" as a whole" (p. 10). Jonas did not even notice Bloch's explicit *criticism of Stalinism*, presented on the occasion of the Marx commemoration in Trier in May 1968. Instead, he makes Bloch, like Marx, largely jointly responsible for the Stalinist terror and even claims that Bloch's concepts are contrary to the dignity of man. What is to answer by what Bloch has set out in *Natural Law and Human Dignity* (see above), whereas Jonas "keeps silent ... completely that Bloch himself, after Immanuel Kant, ... is one of the greatest philosophical advocates of the concept of "human dignity", and undisputed the neo-Marxist thinker of the 20th century, who relies most heavily on the concept of "human dignity" to justify his revolutionary humanism "(Münster loc. cit. p. 11) - (whereas, however, I cannot understand why the author here uses the term *human dignity* put in quotation marks, a term with which Bloch criticized not only fascism, but also "actually existing socialism"! On Jonas' allegations of totalitarianism, Münster remarks that "Bloch's ontology of 'being different in Utopia' has absolutely nothing to do with futurology, technical planning or even a utopian anthropology of 'superman' à la Nietzsche" (p. 13). Bloch least of all can be accused of a lack of scientific knowledge and love of truth or even ignorance of the difficulty of the task of the anti-capitalist struggle.

Conclusion. I can only wholeheartedly endorse Münster's counter-criticism. I would add that it is not Marx' and Bloch's concept of man that is obviously *wrong*, but that of Jonas. Jonas only understands man as what he "always was", and thus denies the fact that man not only emerged as a product of evolution, but continues to participate in evolution, even if no longer just in a natural-vigorous manner, but through expanded individual and collective intelligence and cultural achievements. People know that it is not anxiety and fear or even pure competition, but above all *trusting cooperation and solidarity* that lead to real progress and real improvement in living conditions. (Team) spirit and meaningful work on the matter, as certainly also the responsible handling of nature and its resources, have always advanced humanity, eliminating or at least alleviating hardship and misery and mobilized undreamt-of creative forces of development in art, culture, politics and technology; to which no doubt belong also Bloch's philosophy and Marx's dream of the *realm of freedom*.

Jonas does not do justice to all of this, also and especially not with regard to the ethical implications of the teachings of Marx and Bloch. Jonas mentions neither Bloch's *ethics of change* nor Marx's *ethics of a reasonable life* (see above). Instead, he expresses himself derogatory about the way in which Marx and Bloch deal with ethical principles such as the nature of work, freedom and human dignity, which is just as unacceptable as his criticism of Bloch's aesthetics, in which he ignores such an essential referen as Schiller's *Schaubühne as a moral institution* and Bloch's definition of art as "*a laboratory and also a festival of executed possibilities*"^[138], according to which art is also and especially still an expression of *freedom, creativity and non-alienation*, where it "aesthetizes" highly problematic ("dark") content and insofar here, too, conveys a glimpse of a future of freedom that is possible for all people.

On the other hand, I consider the *imperative of sustainability* contained in Jonas' *principle of responsibility* to be entirely meritorious and worthy of *discussion*, for which I must, however, refer to special studies that I cannot go into here and now. Therefore only this about the imperative of sustainability: In terms of content, I fully agree with the appeals to be responsible for nature and the environment contained therein, but not with the consequential justification of this appeal. How is an individual supposed to foresee the future of all mankind? Or even the "indefinite continuation of mankind on earth"? In contrast, as far more realistic proves Kant categorical imperative, that Jonas misinterprets as "self-limitation of freedom" (PV 168), because he obviously does not realize that Kant, precisely because of the permanent restriction of freedom troubled by threats of all kinds, tries to secure the *autonomy and unconditional dignity and thus the freedom of the legal person*, which at the same time can be regarded as a reliable basis for the 'principle of responsibility'. Jonas would have done well to include this basis in his considerations.

Incidentally, I got the impression that Jonas thinks and writes consistently in a *system-conformist* manner, in the sense of existing capitalism. He obviously believes he can save capitalism - as a "better alternative" to socialism - both over the eco-crisis and in view of the nuclear threat and other acute dangers. In this respect, Jonas is apparently mainly concerned with crisis management, which, however, raises the question of what alternatives there can be at all as long as the *realm of freedom* does not materialize.

Sustainability. What Jonas rightly demands in his imperative needs to be specified and enlarged. The basic work for this can be seen, at least in large parts, in the 454-page study written by the environmental activist and Germanist *Saral Sarkar*, which was published in German in 2001: *Die nachhaltige Gesellschaft - Eine kritische Analyse der Systemalternativen*, in a translation of *The Sustainable Society - A Critical Analysis of System Alternatives* (published in English in 1999).

Sarkar attributes the eco-crisis to the scarcity of resources caused by overexploitation, among other things, and the associated environmental destruction in conventional industrial societies. Against this, he sets the principle of sustainability and connects it with more far-reaching socialist demands. Following "Meadows et al. 1992" he considers a society to be sustainable only "if it is structured and behaves in such a way that it remains viable over all generations"^[139], from which he concludes that an economy "*theoretically*" only could be sustainable, "if it is fully based on renewable resources" and consumes these no faster than "they regenerate or are produced again by nature", which must inevitably lead to the end of conventional industrial management (ibid.). In practice, however, compromises and exceptions (as with coal, iron and aluminum) are still necessary for the time being. (Unfortunately, Sarkar does not address the changes occurring as a result of the "digital revolution".) Sarkar does not consider any other than socialist solutions to the problems to be possible, especially since not only the "limits to growth" but also those of technological solutions are clearly recognizable. As a result, on p. 220 he formulates concrete goals for a sustainable transformation of society, including the top one: "The economy must be made sustainable." These goals are not only used to measure the system alternatives to socialism, but also those from 1989 onwards collapsing Soviet communism, to which he dedicates almost a quarter of his work (pp. 43-142). Not just the shortcomings of the political system, but, to an even greater extent, severe ideological deficits were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet experiment (p. 48). And for no less inadequate Sarkar holds the solution attempts that have been taken by eco-capitalism, eco-Keynesianism and market socialism.

Review of the second part

Eco-ethics apparently inevitably lead to eco-socialist concepts, even if these are not yet sufficiently ethically founded. In any case, they are goals that are based on global and local *necessities*, but so far could not be achieved either capitalistically or ("real")socialistically. That these goals and necessities can be *morally* justified, especially under the conditions prevailing in class society, cannot be doubted, because they imply legitimate requests, desiderata and imperatives to act. In order to achieve such a justification, it would be sufficient to refer to the content of the ethics of happiness (Aristotle et al.), Kantianism, dialectical-materialistic ethics and eco-ethics that I have discussed.

Against this, the objection could be raised that there are still some other ethics in the 21st century, which have not yet been dealt with here, which might be just as or even better suited to solving the moral-philosophical problems mentioned above. Against this objection, however, my firm conviction is that precisely this is not the case, mainly because these ethics do not seem to be able to solve the basic problems with which an *ethics of behavior control* is confronted that deserves the name. I mean the following: 1. Eco-ethics are not yet sufficiently well founded. 2. Kant's ethics largely retains its substantial relevance and validity - with the exceptions I mentioned, including the claim

to absoluteness. Even to this lasting relevance, as far as I survey it, meets no one of the not yet consulted ethics – as ego-ethics, evolutionary and constructivist ethics, consequentialism, technology assessment, medical, situation, integration- and information-ethics, postmodern and non-conformist ethics and the like. 3. In contrast to the latter, Kant's ethics can be combined with the requirements of an eco-ethics and a dialectical-materialistic ethics. The resulting question, what it is all about in detail, will be the subject of my considerations in the following third part of this treatise.

THIRD PART

Re-establishment of an ethics of behavior control

20. Conclusions

From what I have said so far, I draw the following conclusions:

1. The question is what is meant by the terms behavior, control and behavior control.
2. Which ethical norms, arising from work and values, can exist at all in a class society?
3. If norms arise from values and values from work, it must be clarified how these factors interact.
4. Ethics is at least partially to be founded anthropologically, historical- philosophically, socio-theoretically and socio-economically, and so *without naturalistic fallacies*.
5. Which *eco-ethics* correspond to these questions and problems?
6. How can the above-mentioned requirements and theoretical approaches contribute to overcoming the five most important challenges of our time mentioned at the beginning: globalization, eco-crisis, digitization, trans- and posthumanism?
7. Is it true that ethics, as Ernst Bloch claims in one of his early works, is "above everything"?

21. How is ethics created? An overview.

Ethics does not arise through naturalistic fallacies from being to ought, not through the unmediated, direct transfer of knowledge of nature and historical experience to moral concepts. Nor does it arise from arbitrarily raising one's own convictions to law or disregarding the right of other people to self-determination. Ethics can also no more be substantiate, as in Kant, in thing- itself, freedom, God and the immortality of soul (see above p 7-15).

On the other hand, an overview seems possible to me as follows: One can start from the fact that in-formation ("setting-into-form") is constantly happening in the universe; the reasons for this, which presumably precede the Big Bang, are unknown. It is the in-formation, that can be referred to Ernst Bloch's *unfinished entelechy of matter*. For it is a question of strivings for goals and purposes that can already be demonstrated in the elementary particles of matter and which continue to have an evolutionary effect, i.e. *not yet* completed. Thus in nature, the *natura naturans, working* due to its own legalism and creating *values in itself*, which, moreover, appear as a largely *normalized* because the value creations take place within the independent laws of nature. The task of researching natural scientists is, among other things, to discover these regularities, to recognize them and, if possible in mathematical language, to formulate them as laws of nature.


Insight into the laws of nature therefore means knowledge of natural values and norms. An insight that always occurs within the framework of individual and collective theory, evaluation and standardization horizons. However, unlike nature, the individual works in subject-object relationships, namely on "raw materials and material contents" (E. Bloch) that can be found in nature and history. Typically human *desire*, i.e. individual and collective determination of goals and objectives, partly include and partly superimpose the teleonomy of nature *in human work*. As a natural and cultural being, humans work, more or less alienated, on the basis of special historical-technical conditions that are subject to constant change. Through this work, people create their own *values*, which of course also play a role in every type of *assessment*, but where the knowledge can be influenced by *interests*, if not embarrassed.

Nonetheless, the knowledge of values implies specific possibilities and laws of natural and intellectual normalization. Normalized are a) innate values (e.g. self-preservation), b) values through education and socialization, c) values by General (including political) Legislature. All of this in the form of internalization, i.e. storage of the conscious (the ego, the id and the super-ego) and the unconscious in the memory and thus in the subconscious. From this, the maxims, the subjective moral concepts, are formed, which in turn are repeatedly confronted with the objective, e.g. the general legislation.

As *legal persons*, humans combine individual and collective morals. And only here, i.e. on the level of the consciousness carried by the subconscious, ethics can begin and tie in. Ethics is conscious, verified morality, the philosophical science of moral concepts that are brought to ethical terms. – So that an overall view emerges, which begins with the concrete being of the informational, unfinished entelechy, and mediated, among other things, through work, values, norms and morals, up to the ought of ethics.

In a schematic representation:

in English



in-formation in the whole universe
 the unfinished entelechy of matter

the work of nature
 the values of nature

normalization in nature laws

recognizing values by human individuals

general legislation

+

human work

=

new creation of values

normalization of values based on

a) innate values b) education and socialization c) political legislation and

societal
 settlement

individual and collective morals /

the legal person

ethics

But what happens if the decisive step from morality to ethics is *not* taken? And: why is this step decisive and therefore indispensable? Two questions that can be discussed in an exemplary manner on the basis of a 710-page study published by *Norbert Bischof* in 2020 : *Morals - its nature, its dynamism and its shadow*. The author comes to the conclusion that morality cannot be explained on the basis of its social and cultural conditionality, but only from the supposedly constant connection to the "phylogeny", the internalized phylogenetic evolution of humans. With the remarkable consequence that morality is essentially *innate* and thus primarily serves individual self-preservation (cf. loc . cit . p. 678). In addition, Bishop claims that its function is "in the context of coping with instinctual conflicts" (ibid.). In humans, differently from as in the animals, would arise "patterns of order", for example, of "*righteousness and purity*", even if they are disturbed by feelings of "guilt and shame". Nevertheless, patterns of order of this kind should "be able to be experienced as transcendent guarantors of a fulfilled existence" (ibid.).

However, they can not be relied on in the *long term*, because: "The canon of values that these order patterns seem to reflect, however, remains virtual. **As soon as it is implemented in real life, it breaks into facets that can no longer be brought into line.** This is the "*paradox of moral* ": Although everyone feels in cognate manner, what is

good and bad, the relativity of individual perspectives prevents inevitably, that the judgments thus formed are identical" (p. 679, highlighting KR). The question to be asked, however, is what concepts of "value" and "paradox" are behind this. After all, Bishop justifies his assumption that values and moral order patterns can by no means have general validity, by stating: "The cause of this dilemma is the human need to ascertain one's own *identity*. ... Since every individual stands at the intersection of many overcrossing identification circles, the evaluation of which depends on the location of those involved and also on the divine judgment of success, there can in principle be no universalizable basis of legitimation for human action."(ibid.).

Of course, this also means that Kant's Cat. Imp. is no longer applicable, not only because of its claim to absoluteness, but also as a possible orientation framework for legitimate claims. Bischof justifies this, among other things, with his criticism of the Cat. Imp., in which he can find no reason why the subjective maxim of one's own will should be measured against general legislation (cf. loc. cit. p. 86 ff.). According to Bischof, it is therefore impossible to escape subjective arbitrariness and the "paradox of morality" in favor of morality. He specifies: "The moral paradox is based on the fact that the human motif was not designed on the drawing board and therefore does not work out in detail. It is like walking upright and the phylogenetically still far from fully corrected damage that has been caused to the statics of the spine and the childbearing process. *The primitive behavioral regulators no longer cope with the retrofitted navigation instruments, whose degrees of freedom overwhelm their control skills.*" (loc. cit. p. 565, emphasis added by KR).

Critical appraisal. Bischof thus admits that in addition to and above the "primitive behavioral regulators", i.e. innate morality, there is a "retrofitted set of navigational instruments", i.e. the morality acquired through upbringing, socialization and one's own intellectual activity. This in clear contradiction to his harsh rejection of the social and cultural conditionality of morality! – The latter, i.e. the *acquired* morality, has produced "degrees of freedom" to such an extent that the "control competence" of the "original" morality fails, so that people have to come to terms with the fundamental *instability* caused by the "paradox of morality". Which means: The acquired morality is far weaker than the innate, although it has created immense "degrees of freedom". – Yet, Bischof does not recognize that freedom can only be secured through a completely differently understood morality, namely that measured by the (Kantian) general legislation, i.e. in the recognition of the person as a *legal person* – a prerequisite that puts innate and acquired morality no longer against each other, but connects them in a new, effective synthesis.

I see deeper reasons for Bischof's misjudgment in his inadequately founded concepts of 'value' and 'norm'. Of both, he recognizes only the subjective, but not the *objective or intersubjective objectivizable* components. B. lets values arise from individual "motives", norms from "feelings of value" (cf. loc. cit. p. 464 and 354). Thus completely ignoring the fact that values are also objective in nature, as produced by *work* (see Bloch's definition above, p 173). Since Bischof reduces values to "motives" or to "value feelings", he cannot help but let also arise all *norms* of such subjective emotions. (see. op. p. 354). Even norms understood as "articulated feelings of value" remain purely subjective and therefore not only manipulable, but also completely non-binding – a nonsense that Bishop apparently did not even notice.

It should have become clear why Bischof cannot succeed in the *indispensable* transition from morality to ethics – the foundation of morality through ethics. This foundation is in fact indispensable because the "paradox of morality" with its purely subjective components prevents any possibility of orientation, for example the *moral law*, general legislation and the common good, so that, instead of the "categorical" imperative, no "*legitimate requests*" to justify an ethics of behavior control could be raised any more. Why, however, both, i.e. both the orientation and the legitimate requests, are reasonable and necessary, I have repeatedly pointed out (e.g. herein on pages 4 et seq., 16 et seq., and 305 et seq.).

22. Discussion of the terms behavior, control and behavior control.

Behavior. Why this and not 'action'? Although there, yet, are intersections between the two terms? First of all, it should be remembered that any action can also count as behavior, but not every behavior can be described as an action. The reaction of the organism to a certain environmental stimulus, for example in the form of sweating, triggered by increased temperature, is to be assessed as behavior, but not as action. Action is defined as "intentional behavior", while the term behavior itself also includes *non-intentional* behavior. *Behavior* is another term that, unlike action, does not belong to the exclusive domain of pragmatism. If you include the word fields, it becomes clear why the relationship to ethics and morality is much easier to establish from the point of view of behavior than from the point of view of action. What can already be determined with Kant, because the Kat. Imp. Almost always begins with "Act so that ...", but is not understandable through this mere reference to action, but only when one considers, as well, the maxims, the will, the recognized inalienable purpose-in-itself and the unconditional dignity of the person, and so in relation to the common well-being, as constitutive for the Cat. Imp., which relates to both intentional and non-intentional *behavior*.

In general, behavior is considered to be "the totality of all observable changes in state, especially the ways in which matter reacts"[140] This enormous scope of the concept proves to be helpful in certain respects. Also adjacent are expressions such as 'to behave' and 'relationship', especially since the latter in the form of *social relationships* does not only play a role in Karl Marx. Also to be considered are combinations of terms such as "norm of behavior", "behavioral repertoire" and "behavioral disorder", which are not common or not readily possible with the term "action". Close also is the question of the *fact*: "What is the situation with ...?" ("Wie *verhält* es sich mit ...?") From where the reference to correspondence, coherence and consensus theories of *truth* and then to essential moral criteria can easily be established.

In psychology, 'behavior' seemed for a long time to be the very own terrain of *behaviorism*, which, however, after its foundation by *B.F. Skinner* in 1938, was initially limited to analyzing observable reactions of an organism to environmental stimuli; until it turned out that behavior cannot be understood at all without its high degree of dependence on the *subconscious*. Since the studies of *Benjamin Libet*, however, we have known a) that all values and behavioral norms are also registered and stored in the subconscious, and b) that no behavior is completely determined by the subconscious, but often also depends or even *must* depend on conscious, rational decisions of individuals. From which I conclude that there is an indisputable necessity to take due account of the *values and standards of values* anchored in the subconscious as well as in the conscious soul and spirit, especially since all norms are based on values.

Control. It has been proven that control takes place in every person – especially on the basis of *information* – both consciously and unconsciously. I differentiate a) between natural (biological, neural) and artificial (medial) information and b) between self-control and external control (e.g. through digital or media acquisition). This corresponds to my hypothesis that the mind-body problem can probably be solved using a dialectical-materialistic concept of information.[141]. I see myself confirmed through the definition of "**Cybernetics** [Greek: >art of wheelman<]; the science of complex dynamic systems whose response patterns (especially regulation, control, adjustment, release) are based on information management, so they are able to react differently to changes in the environment." [142] From which it emerges that we humans, and not just machines, have cybernetics = *wheelman's* art. On the other hand, however, stands the conclusion that *Rudolf Maresch* (2004) drew from his examination of the remarkable book by *Stefan Rieger* on *Cybernetic anthropology* (2003), by rejecting Rieger's "reinterpretation and transformation of cybernetics in human studies", and so in order to present his own astonishing conception of man, according to which "man is human only where self-control and self-regulation break, where man is random and falls into a quasi anomic state where he gets >outside of himself<, wasting himself excessively: in laughing and in sex, in wasting his savings or in suicide bombing"[143]. (sic!). But this is exactly what I think is completely unacceptable. Anyone who condemns the proven self-control and instead even approves of the "suicide bombing" opens the door to any *criminal* or otherwise harmful behavior. Even if the human being, as with Nietzsche, should be "the undetected animal", this does not mean that he could live in permanent ecstasy ("outside of himself"). Rather, our *self-regulation* ensures that we do not sink into the chaos of excessive self-exhaustion. – Stefan Rieger's *cybernetic anthropology*, on the other contrary, is to be taken *seriously*, including and especially with terms such as *regulated freedom* or *virtuality* in the Latin sense: 'virtus' = "ability, potency, possibility" [144]

Behavior control. Cybernetics and ethics of values, how should they fit together? The former apparently has nothing to do with morality, while the latter appears to be the real core of ethics and morality. And yet both are combined in the term 'behavior control', as will be shown below.

Isabel Winn has found out that the cybernetic control circuit is ideally suited for the purposes of "self and time management", not just for mere time management. The main components of this control loop are: diagnosis, prognosis, goal setting, planning, implementation and control. Specifically: 1. Without a diagnosis we are disoriented and do not see any undesirable developments. 2. The prognosis shows "where the current path is leading" [145]. 3. Objective: "Without goals you don't know where you want to go and what is the purpose of daily activity." ("... for which your efforts should be worthwhile", ibid.). 4. Planning and organization in order to sharpen the view for the essentials and to recognize which measures are to be taken "systematically and time-consciously". 5. Realization for the successful implementation of the measures. 6. Control or, if necessary: target correction; overview of what has been achieved, and foresight on future possibilities and paths. – As a prerequisite for the functioning of the rule circle Winn mentions: "The most important feature of the cybernetic loop is that all six components cling together, i.e. are mutually dependent." (ibid.) Easily can be demonstrated that here both intentional and non-intentional behavior is involved, i.e. by no means only the application of stimulus-response schemes.

It is questionable, however, whether Winns well-meaning suggestions can be considered as consistently realistic and feasible in our time of the turbo-capitalism with phenomena such as "turbo-time", "simultaneous realization" ("Vergleichzeitigung"), and multi-tasking (see p. 207 f.).

Only goals and factors such as time and the environment can be described objectively; everything else concerns the non-intentional in its interaction with the intentional. You want to *know* in what position you are in and in which direction you are moving. Location and direction are largely environmental, but become psychological factors as early

as the diagnosis and even more so in prognosis, goal setting, planning and implementation (see above). If I sense a danger or an obstacle somewhere, I try to look at and analyze its characteristics and properties as clearly and objectively as possible. If I have recognized a danger, for example an approaching storm, I prepare myself for it internally and take appropriate precautions, e.g. prefer to stay at home or take rain gear with me: "Danger recognized, danger averted!" The same applies to any necessary reorientation or target corrections. As of crucial importance I consider the standards of value available that determine my judgment. Can it be my goal to lose my life, in a criminal way, "suicide bombing"? If yes, why? If not, why not? Which should be valued higher: life as such or human dignity? In "suicide bombing" both are disregarded in two respects: Not only your own life will go to hell, but also that of other, completely innocent people. Since the same applies to their human dignity as to mine, it should not be difficult to reach a verdict: "Suicide bombing" is to be rejected because it violates both the prohibition of killing and the possibly *unconditional* dignity of the legal person.

Such considerations can be used to observe how cybernetics becomes *morally justifiable behavioral control*. What initially looks like a mere stimulus-reaction process -- the impact of the environment on time management - is increasingly developing into a prime example of value-ethical behavior control. I see the reason for this in the fact that it was not machines but humans who invented cybernetics, based on existing knowledge about control processes in humans. In addition, it has long been known that behavior control can take place wherever information (= setting into form) is meaningfully used.

Christoph Lumer has presented and philosophically deepened the relations between behavioral control and ethics of values, whereby surprisingly he reaches similar results as Isabel Winn later on, with the important difference that he did not recourse to the cybernetic loop. Rather, it is essentially based on a comparison between ethics of values ("axiology"), ethics of duty ("deontology") and ethics of virtue ("aretism"). From these he distinguishes more primitive forms such as the stimulus-reaction mechanism and the reflexes. The latter cannot always be "suppressed" through conscious decisions, while stimulus-reaction mechanisms supposedly belong more to the animal and plant kingdom. [146] (Whereby Lumer overlooks the fact that such mechanisms can also be found in every cybernetic control circuit, even if not as a measure of behavior control.)

Lumer criticizes the ethics of duty because it is ineffective, contrary to freedom and "anthropologically impossible". To his mind, deontologists are not able to explain how people "can reach practical acceptance ... of moral norms at all." Without subjective motivation, which Lumer also calls "maximizing desirability", there can be no action whatsoever just for the sake of duty. Kant also starts from false assumptions here. In addition, ethics of duty have no recipe for the frequently occurring *conflicts of norms*. Such conflicts can only be reasonably decided based on ethical values (op. cit., p. 14 f.) Lumer remarks on virtue ethics that, above all, they lack "moral value systems". Furthermore, no "socially binding obligations" could be derived from them. Lumer's conclusion: "Virtue ethics is ... at best a concept for an individual, not for a socially binding morality." (op. p. 16).

Because of these weaknesses of duty and virtue ethics, value ethics is to be preferred in any case. Consequently Lumer describes in detail the advantages of value ethics, which he, however, praises mainly as *subjective*, whereas he mentions only in passing, i.e. without analyzing, *objective* value ethics. Subjective ethics of values is based on the individual "optimization or desirability maximization" that can be found in every human being, with the wishes being "egoistic or altruistic or socially neutral" (op. p. 8). In addition, there are *intrinsic* desires, such as those for "avoiding pain or for increasing pleasure", which are evolutionary and consistently, even if not exclusively, "conducive to survival" (ibid.). In addition, there are also "instrumental" wishes, i.e. those with which one looks for means to fulfill the intrinsic wishes. Desires that are *constant over time* are to be distinguished from ephemeral, only "emotion-induced" ones.

Incidentally, Lumer's results overlap with those of Isabel Winn as to the "maximization of desirability". Subjective ethics of values enable people to set goals and realize them, plan for the long term, react flexibly to new situations and combine individual actions with one another, also in favor of longer-term life planning. Another advantage is provided by the "enormous freedom of design", which can even imply the *meaning of life*: "Free spaces arise and are exploited for playful, aesthetic (in a very broad sense, which also includes *haute cuisine* or refined eroticism), creative, exploratory and last but not least, meaningful moral activities." (op. p. 10). This enables the individuals to determine themselves the content of morality and to distinguish what is important from what is unimportant for their own selves. The associated "emancipation from the mere functionalism of morality" should not be underestimated, this with a swipe at Kant's Cat. Imp. and "the dictate of incomprehensible duties" (op. p. 11).

Critical appreciation. Lumer's concept of a subjective ethics of values by means of "maximizing desirability" is coherent and largely convincing, especially in the demarcation and positive distinction from ethics of duty and virtue. Basically, this concept is an *ethic of private happiness* in which the common good, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number", plays almost no role. However, I very much doubt whether such a subjectivism is really sustainable. Lumer does not address the question of whether there can be, at all, a subjective "maximization of desirability" - as a purely subjective value ethics *for everyone* - in a global class society of *profit-maximization*: the aesthetics of "haute cuisine", while elsewhere people are starving because mass unemployment hardship and misery prevail? A cynicism that can hardly be surpassed, hardly be forgivable! Especially since Lumer completely disregards what Kant has put forward with valid reasons for legally safeguarding the moral individual, the legal person in the field of tension between subjective maxims and general legislation. In other words: "The best cannot live in peace if the bad neighbor does not like it."

Here the maximization of desirability encounters barely surmountable limits, while the ethics of duty in Kant's Cat. Imp. certainly retains its justification, especially since general legislation is not "anthropologically impossible", but is based on anthropological necessity.

In addition, Lumer ignores the question of the origin of values. If it is based on *work* ("plus raw material and material content", which I assume with Ernst Bloch), there is definitely a repertoire of already *objectively* available values with which every desirability has to do constantly. In addition, values present themselves internally as mental *objects* to which the subject relates and forms its options. That means: Objective values can become subjective and vice versa, because what is subjectively worked out can have objective value, simply by investing work in objectively or mentally objectively available raw materials and material contents. Without such a *subject-object* relationship, there can be no ethics of values. To which historically grown values that could potentially arise, only then can be examined more closely if there are examined significant historical-philosophical and anthropological aspects of this history outline conditions. Unfortunately, Lumer also neglects the question of what political and philosophical consequences result from the ethics of behavior control in a class society. Must such an ethics ultimately even merge into history, analogous to Marx's demand that theory be "suspended" in practice?

The same applies to the 542-page book *Behavioral Cybernetics, that is ethics*, written by Winfried U. Radel, with the subtitle: *The pragmatic ethics: For more common good & value creation*, (Oberhausen 2019), an ethic that in particular also should apply "in everyday life". Also Radel ignores the factual and system design limits of ethics, that I have described herein (p. 25-27 or chapter 27). I think the title of Radel's book is misleading. Behavioral control cannot be reduced to behavioral cybernetics (see above, p. 195 f.), and the latter cannot simply be equated with ethics, because cybernetics, even understood as "wheelman's art", can serve *criminal* purposes. In addition, there cannot be a purely pragmatic and at the same time "inductive" ethics, as Radel suggests, because ethics is not, as in pragmatism, about acting for the sake of acting, but about *evaluating behavior standards*. Radel overlooks the basic problem that Kant wanted to solve, namely to reconcile subjective with objective values and norms. This corresponds to the fact that R. disregards almost the entire philosophical tradition of ethics (with the exception of Aristotle) and therefore misses the core of the matter, as discussed by Kant, Hegel, Marx and Bloch, among others. Another serious factor is that Radel denies *religions* any (!) ethical competence. Apart from that, however, the book contains a multitude of quite interesting considerations, especially on basic terms such as love, "the emotional", "the volitive of responsibility" (albeit uncritically based on Hans Jonas), freedom, justice, "social culture", "global value development" etc. However, I consider Radel's view that every value arises from an "individual will" to be inadequate (op. cit., p. 223); because values arise through *work* in the broadest sense, even if this is always accompanied by a "desire" (see p. 173).

23. On the relationship between ethics, the philosophy of history and anthropology

Ethics is not a theory of society, but of morality. The latter is always socially conditioned and therefore always only of relative, not absolute, validity and duration. From which it follows that all ethics are socially conditioned and therefore cannot be conceived as absolutely valid, a fact that Kant apparently underestimated. Does this also mean that there can be values, but no norms? Not as long as laws, and not only the "factual", have *normative force*. In my opinion, values can in any case become norms if they are brought into legal form and / or internalized in the individual super-ego.

This has not changed since Kant. However, standards do not have to be justified as "absolutely valid"; it is sufficient that they are legally binding and, if necessary, *correctable by natural law*. This, however, refers to elementary historical-philosophical, anthropological and political dimensions of ethics. If solidarity prevailed not only in natural law but also in everyday practice and everyone could live according to his / her needs, this would be *socialism*, which, however, "in its purest form" has not existed anywhere before. When Ernst Bloch accordingly calls for an *ethics of change*, he recognizes the social conditionality of ethics and can consequently no longer, as in his early *Spirit of Utopia* (1923), place ethics above everything, above the "whole world encyclopedia". How can this change be explained? Probably from the fact that Bloch could not avoid giving up his early belief in God in favor of atheism (to his mind existing also in Christianity!). As a result of the necessary reassessment of what is to be regarded as the highest good: no longer God, but the *realm of freedom*. That it is to fight in "growing human commitment" (also "into the religious secret"). [147]

Referring now to what I already have found among the "limits of ethics" (p 25-27), it becomes clear why ethics is not to be founded on the unconditioned and the absolute, but on philosophy of history and anthropology. This fits in with the fact that ethics is a science, but not a mathematically exact one. Ethics has to take into account the uncertainties and contingencies of history and of the human condition. And: "The areas and possibilities of action of individuals and societies are not manageable and

sometimes only go as far as their judgment. These are areas of activity that no ethics can provide in the best of every detail"(see p. 26). Schematically, the relationships of ethics, philosophy of history and anthropology can be represented as follows:

(philosophy of history)

The fact that *behavior* relates not only to actions but also to matter as a whole may be surprising, but can hardly be doubted (see above) . Even elementary particles *behave* in partly definable, partly undefinable way. As long as this is the case, there is room for philosophical speculation and the formation of hypotheses. Even if Ernst Bloch replaced Kant's highest good with the realm of freedom, this does not mean that a highest good (= God or Bloch's "nature subject") would once and for all be settled as a *postulate*. If there is a highest good as the originator of the whole, the emergence of values actually begins in the inorganic matter, which is to be considered as being-impossibility (= entelechy). Without failing to recognize that nature is not only "incomplete" but also *imperfect*. Natural disasters, epidemics, death, illness and ailments, malformations, what is apparently senselessly destructive in humans and nature, all of this repeatedly shakes the belief and trust in the meaningfulness of the whole. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that at the origin of the whole there has not been an "acting ", but an *event*, from which the forward driving, entelechy factors have developed. In this respect, the philosophy of history and anthropology not only contain reference theories of ethics, but also belong to their founding instances.

24. On the relevance of the philosophy of history and anthropology for an ethics of behavior control

People want to know where they are from and where they are going. So the philosophy of history must begin *cosmologically* , i.e. with facts and assumptions about the beginning and the end, past and future of the whole, although the whole cannot be surveyed or defined.

The Ekpyrotic Cosmos (Paul Steinhardt 2002. In this cosmos there is no Big Bang, so that the critics of the Big Bang theory can see themselves confirmed in striking fashion. As the US-American physicist Paul Steinhardt (Princeton University) has found the previous model of cyclic universe suffering from decisive mistakes of construction, so with the claim that the so-called *big crunch* could be put "in accurate reflection to the Big Bang".[148] Singularities like the "Big Bang" are anyway "the toxic waste of the cosmos".

Steinhardt contrasts this with concept of a pulsating, ecpyrotic universe. The ancient Greek 'ekpyrosis' actually means "world fire", which in Stoic philosophy is a term according to which "the world is cyclically set on fire and reborn".[149] According to Steinhardt, it was not a big bang out of nowhere, but the collision of "branes" that led to the creation of the universe we know : "The ecpyrotic model corresponds to a cyclical universe that, always when brane collisions take place, expands, contracts again and expands again after another collision."(ibid.)

According to which the world-matter did not arise from nothing or from pure information, but from already existing, always already existing matter (including information, energy and radiation). And this dynamic, moving matter is not a block matter, but a material space-time event in a sea of infinite possibilities, a field of experimentation of being-in-possibilities, from which man ultimately also emerged. In terms of evolutionary history, matter becomes a carrier of energy and information, i.e. the carrier of patterns and meanings in the evolutionary chain: origin (?) - not - not yet - inorganic - organic - soul - spiritual. The original cosmic matter, and with it the original world time, enters into world matter and thus later also into the person of man.

Information is not everything, but it should not be underestimated, because it is by no means a mere thought, but rather exists from the beginning in nature, as *original world information*. According to Rainer E. Zimmermann, information is constantly being produced in the universe. In 2011, Zimmermann postulated a "primordial matter", which, however, could only be thought, not observed. After all, a "*spin network*" can be represented, even if only in mathematically abstract form, which "works on the fundamental level of the universe" like a "quantum computer" which is constantly generating information and "which is hardware and software at the same time". This spin network is the basis of everything that can be observed. It is a new expression for the creative power of nature ('natura naturans') and at the same time an extension of the relevant knowledge of Aristotle, Spinoza, Schelling and Ernst Bloch, and especially of Bloch's hypothetical "nature subject".[150]

Theoretician *Erich Bieramperl* argues *similarly in his auto-adaptation theory* .[151] On subatomic level, Bieramperl recognizes operations similar to the operations of *sensors*. Elementary particles gain *information* about their environment, i.e. about other E-particles with which they are able to establish contact. The e-particle scans its surroundings like a radar. Information, contacts and connections of E-particles are by no means new phenomena. Bieramperl found a new explanation for this, with far-reaching consequences: Nature apparently organizes itself, but out of an original "self" that already seems to contain something *subjective*. However, if one asks about the target cause of the whole thing, one cannot avoid looking at the *information-containing matter* itself, i.e. to take as the basis not necessarily Ernst Bloch's hypothetical "nature subject", but his concept of an "unfinished entelechy of matter".

Time. Everything takes place in here. However, there is some dispute about how it should be understood. I see a main problem in reconciling the subjective and objective aspects of time without questioning Einstein's physical theory of *spacetime*. For this purpose, I have proposed a *hypothesis on the original world time*, based on the following statement by *Heidegger* : "The ecstatic unity of temporality, that is, the unity of the 'outside of itself' in the raptures of future, past and present, is the condition of the possibility that there can be a being that exists as its 'there' " (*Being and Time*, p. 350). The term "condition of possibility" appears here at first purely subjective-intelligible, as a pure category of understanding. But: Its reference object, the being, the "there", is not only present in the mind; rather, it is at the same time the *objective* basis of all intellectual activity. The temporality of this being can therefore initially only be objective, in the "ecstasy", in the "outside of itself" of the temporal "raptures". As the 4th dimension, the temporal contrasts with everything spatial, which is another reason why time should be understood in terms of itself.

Regardless of this, the temporal also resides in ourselves (presumably until we have "blessed" it), for example as a "psychological arrow of time".*The objective "there" of world time manifests itself in us as duration, experienced time, that is, subjectively. And that is precisely of what consists the mediation sought between the subjective and the objective of time!*

Incidentally, this mediation does not mean a fixation of time either. The essence is not only Hegel's "being" of the past ('das Gewesene'), but also the not-yet of the future, the future that has not yet appeared. And the future will probably show more and more clearly what time is all about. Time is not a thing, not a mere "appearance", but rather, preliminary and hypothetical, a basic condition of being, original World time as apparently unchanging series of moments and "Augenblicke" (moments).

This time can be measured, for example as International World Time in the different time zones, but in terms of content, i.e. in its "vanishingly" small individual moments, it cannot be experienced. We do not live in *the* moment, but *in* the present time. - We all participate in world time, albeit in different, relatively short periods of time, in which our individual past is getting longer and our individual future is getting shorter and shorter. It would be a cruel farce, if there would only be Heidegger's "running forward into death" ('Vorlaufen in den Tod'), but not Bloch's *images of hope against death*, the *spirit of utopia* , the splendor of the cosmological *all* (of course also in the sense of the Bloch cosmology), a perfection whose pre-appearance ('Vor-Schein') is able to dispel the shadows of nothingness and nihilism.[152] So that even in dark times of increasing lack of freedom, we must not despair of the task to approach the *realm of freedom*. - The world time cannot be manipulated. It takes its toll in the form of more or less *meaningfully* used time.[153]

Turbo time. Those who are subject to it will hardly be able to free themselves from their compulsory regime even through the suggestions made by Isabel Winn on time management (see p. 197 f.). The possible consequences of forced acceleration and false time division are well known on the one hand, but on the other hand, individually different to such an extent that it can hardly be represented. Therefore I have to content myself with a few hints and remarks. With *Karlheinz Geißler* the indicated difficulty is reflected, among other things, in the fact that he uses some strange and sometimes monstrous terms. In addition to the "intensification of work", he presents the "increase in options", i.e. in addition to the "patchwork identity": the "death of the subject", and finally such monster formations as "accessibility management", "everyday standby" and "instant-Enjoyment Culture".[154] Behind these conceptual monsters there are blatant wrong turns. And who believes to find, his luck, or even *the* ever-lasting luck, can easily go astray. Because: *You will definitely miss luck if you are constantly chasing after it. Where there are no breaks, no interruptions, there is also no possibility of learning from mistakes. And that certainly will make you unhappy!* We are not prepared for non-stop and multitasking, at least not our brains, which are simply not able to "control several different things at the same time with the same high concentration" (Geißler op. cit. p. 151). Those who disregard this not only accept increasing deficiencies in the ability to concentrate, but also disruptions in perception and information processing op. p. 153 ff.). Striking features of the non-stop society are insomnia tendency, indicated by rising accident rates due to fatigue, "heart rhythm disturbances, hypertension, somniphathy and performance degradation" (op. p. 111) as well as increasing dependence of soporifics and sedatives. Marriage and the family are particularly drawn to pity. Key words here: rising divorce rates, declining births, more and more people living alone, unstable shared apartments. Geißler sums up and warns: "The limits of non-stop have been reached, if not exceeded, where people become a safety risk due to increased time pressure and increased time compression, when fatigue and inattentiveness are attributed to them as system defects or as "human error".

After all, it would be fatal if the subjects in the non-stop society had to spend their time in saving their lives and their health because they would have to constantly fear for them" (op. p. 114).

As an antidote, Geißler recommends, among other things, a return to the limits of human nature, questions about the *meaning, purpose and goal of one's own actions*, the ability to say no and what he, like Isabel Winn after him, calls the "art of time", which I can not go into more detail here not only for reasons of time, so that I have to refer to my earlier statements in this regard (in: Robra 2015, p. 474 ff.).

Globalization. In history, it is not uncommon for things to be rather unspiritual or "mindless". Often conjured were the "demons of National Socialism, ... of Bolshevism, ... of religious fanaticism" etc. If not just "great men" in main and state actions, but people of all origins, stripes and character, make history, the "engine of history" is their entire activity, and not just their social work. From which it follows that globalization, especially under the aspect of world history or even eternity ('sub specie aeternitatis'), by no means makes up the whole of history. (Whereby I emphasize again that this "whole" is not manageable.) So the question is which aspects of history can be meant when *globalization* is mentioned. The word means: 'comprising', i.e. the inclusion of the entire globe in the history horizons of mankind and in the possibilities historical action.

Apparently everything begins "locally", for example the history of each individual in the womb, but also political-geographical expansions such as that of the history of Rome and its empire. After which the merely local is abandoned in favor of continuous enlarging of horizons that ultimately is not confined to individual regions.

The answers to the questions about the meaning of globalization change in a striking way, often depending on the sometimes completely unpredictable vicissitudes of history. In 2003 I assumed more deterministically that globalization would also make so-called *turbo-capitalism* perpetuate. That has not been confirmed. *Harald Schumann* and *Christiane Grefe* cited the reasons for this as early as 2009, and already under the impression of the terrible financial crash of 2008, as follows: "The checkered economic history of the 20th century proves that the limitless expansion of capitalism is by no means predetermined. History may well take a different direction. It is a dialectical process. Wherever the mechanism of supply and demand, of return on capital and structural change overcomes limits, violates particular interests or threatens existing cultures, this process also generates counter-movements. And the consequences are open. It is by no means certain that the trend towards global integration will continue and not turn into the opposite again." [155]

In fact, there are diverse, sometimes dubious populist counter-movements against turbo-capitalist globalization, which I cannot describe here for reasons of space. In any case, still valid is the warning against playing down catastrophic "side effects" of globalization, including the intensification of social differences and conflicts, the creeping or acute climate and environmental catastrophe, increasingly unequal trade, increasing world market domination by some major players (the "global players"), with nasty consequences such as the collapse of entire economies in Africa and elsewhere, which has led to wars, catastrophic refugee crises and humanitarian catastrophes, among other things. In addition: the banking and financial crash of 2008, with serious, unforeseeable consequences for the world economy and the course of globalization. And the corona pandemic of 2020 also raises the system question, the question of which economic and social system is better suited to withstanding life-threatening dangers.

Anthropology, the "human resource". In view of the situation described, it seems advisable to reflect on human nature, even if its analysis can probably never be final. Here, too, new findings repeatedly force new considerations and location determinations. However, one can always build on factors such as communication, contact and cooperation, already demonstrable in inorganic matter and in all further stages of being, up to individual consciousness and social being; basics of further and higher development.

Accordingly, there are at least three plausible answers to the question of what man is: 1.) Man is what he has become; his "being" is his essence. 2.) He is what he can still become, what he *is not yet*. 3.) And this is *my* (preliminary) answer: He / she is matter and person at the same time. Humans can therefore be determined both materially and spiritually, both from the "total scope" of being human as well as from the material and informational-entelechetical matter. It is well known that not only the body and the spirit, but also the psyche, the soul as the basis of experience, belong to the total scope. The attempt to understand the body-soul unity has been made many times and may never have succeeded. There cannot be a "final" solution because we do not know which possibilities, which not-yet, will give us the future. After all, *dialectical thinking* helps to reduce the fundamental imponderability of the mind-body problem to a tolerable level, and to be able to offer plausible solutions, as I hope to show in the following.

To answer 1.). It demands a recourse to the origin, the alleged beginning of the cosmos, but at least to the material basis of human existence, and thus to the gigantic evolutionary history, i.e. for example to our genetic heritage. Even at the subatomic level, information or structures are found that can be analyzed and interpreted as "significant". Among other things, there are "dynamic patterns" with certain wave functions or space-time symmetries and asymmetries to which physicists can already assign *purposes*. [156]

It is a *teleonomy*, where "syntactic mapping" seems to prevail, which is reflected in the atoms in the development of the periodic table of chemical elements.

How *molecular* coding works, is shown in the special semantics of the genetic code and thus of life itself, which at the same time contains the biological-material substrate of natural word-languages. Again are working principles of association and attribution, principles that contain a "principle of higher development and transcoding" (op. p. 22). Plants and living things are also made up of DNA molecules. In the behavior of people, the extraordinary enlargement of the neocortex and the development of consciousness lead, among other things, to ever better forms of linguistic expression and its communication. However, it is not the mere communication that seems to have been primarily significant, but rather the "construction of coherent worldviews, composed of different sensory modalities" (op. p. 29). Carrier, pattern and meaning are basic elements of any language, whereby the cell language, i.e. the "signaling in the cells", is already decisive for the development of the psyche (ibid.). So that the *mind-body problem* turns out to be the core issue of anthropology.

The US biomedical scientist *Candace B. Pert* (2001) did pioneering work on this. In order to avoid any dualism, she analyzes "all cellular (or energetic) events in living organisms as *dynamic information events*". True mediation between material and immaterial takes place through *feelings*, represented, among other things, in neuropeptides, which ensure the "informational interaction" between the body cells and, among other things, between the psyche and the immune system. It is a unit that Pert also calls "body spirit", a definition which, however, does not convince me, especially since the spirit in humans is described with Schelling as a dialectical subject-object relationship or with *Gregory Bateson* as "the world of information processing". So that the confusing term "body spirit" can be replaced by that of *body-mind information*.

From which, however, I derive a new hypothesis to solve the mind-body problem. Information that can be analyzed dialectically and materialistically is mediated between body and soul; dialectically entirely with Schelling's subject-object; because information can be understood in a dialectical-materialist way, on the basis of neuroscience, explainable as the trias *carrier - meaning - pattern* as *in-formation*. The brain, indirectly the whole body, serves as a carrier of neuronally determinable (synaptic) patterns, which in turn are carriers of symbolism, e.g. in linguistic and non-linguistic meanings.

In addition, information qua communication can also be understood as a relationship between subject-object, object-subject. What finally led me to the conclusion: "Dialectics as a unity of identity and non-identity fully affects the human body and soul, although there are limits to explainability become recognizable, e.g. outside the human body and soul identity, which is limited by conception and death. In any case, we don't know the beginning and end of the whole of which we are a part. This also defines the limits within which a dialectical-materialistic theory of the human body and soul can move." [157] So the person as a whole (Mounier's "volume total de l'homme") is not manageable, but a core aspect of its physical and mental constitution, the "basic state of mind" ('Grundbefindlichkeit'). Wanting to analyze the whole of being a person is likely to be a hopeless undertaking anyway.

25. Value syntheses that (can) control behavior

A person's horizons of values are not always identical with those of historical tradition. Everyone can find value orientation oneself, especially in combination with *value syntheses*. These arise consistently in larger contexts, essentially in the areas of anthropology, psychology, economics, sociology, politics, ecology, world views, aesthetics and religion. Value syntheses can be assigned to these areas, in larger contexts and according to the degree of their accentuation, especially since most of these syntheses consist of values that can be assigned to different areas of life and being.

Probably, only values that are recognized all over the world can be generally valid or even binding. A criterion that has seldom been met so far. This includes in any case, albeit with restrictions, 1. the UN Declarations of Human Rights (since 1948) and 2. the *Declaration on the Global Ethic*, decided in 1993 in Chicago by the "World Parliament of Religions".

For *universally* binding, however, none of these statements must be kept. The authors of the 'Global Ethic' were not successful. Unfortunately, they have not achieved their goal of securing world peace through worldwide religious peace. Insurmountable still seem some of the religious oppositions and differences of opinion, so between the three monotheist world religions, but also towards other religious groups, mostly due to starkly different religious theories and practices. Where, on top of that, religion is abused for political purposes, it can lead to the most serious conflicts up to and including war, as has been shown time and again, and not just since "Nine Eleven 2001".

There can probably only be ways out of the dilemma if the knowledge spreads that religious values are or can be based on non-religious values. This insight can be

reinforced if one considers that a large, perhaps the largest part of the *religious* value syntheses is basically non-religious, namely, for example, anthropological, social or ideological. Only 11 of the 75 or so value syntheses I have listed are completely "religiously accentuated". While around half of the anthropologically accentuated syntheses and a quarter each of the socio-economic, political and ideological syntheses are at least partially of religious origin. So that one can imagine the extent to which religious values are integrated into non-religious ones.

In addition, it is readily apparent that the "religion accented" syntheses can also be accepted in secular surroundings. Just think of the commandment of love emanated by Jews and Christians, of Christian social ethics and the *common values of the religions* (e.g. justice, anti-racism, anti-xenophobia, peace, preservation of the environment, see p. 39 ff.).

Such commonalities should pave the way to the insight that religious absoluteness claims can and must be dispensed with. Only then does it even seem conceivable that value syntheses of all kinds are fundamentally respected and tolerated.

Which, of course, would still not mean that the values are generally valid or even generally binding. The latter is a lofty, ambitious goal, which the UN human rights declarations are undoubtedly striving for. Whereas members of non-Western cultures raised considerable reservations and in some cases (e.g. in the Arab region) issued their own different people's legal declarations, which in turn are not recognized elsewhere. Some of these reservations only appear to relate to the texts of the Western "Declarations", as when they criticize the emphasis on *personal rights*.

Equating such rights (at least as a tendency) with problematic social developments in Western countries seems dangerous. From this it follows immediately that rights and legal declarations are ineffective as long as the actual developments scorn them, which is to be lamented not least as a result of neoliberal globalization (see above). *In this respect, human rights are still to be demanded everywhere, which cannot be achieved with appeals to common values alone. (And also not with an additional "Declaration of Human Duties".)*

Nevertheless, the value syntheses listed by me in *Wege zum Sinn* (2015) offer the possibility of orientation, whereby I consciously exclude the question of the possible normativity of these values, although it cannot be overlooked that they are (or can be) consistently becoming norms, namely in general legislation. As examples, I take up the following syntheses:

a) anthropologically accentuated

Value - goal - purpose - time - life - meaning . It has been proven that the maturation of the individual is based on genetic information as well as on active object reference. A process of active *evaluation* may develop from this before birth, but definitely in the childhood and *adolescence stage*. We experience the objects of the outside world and those of our inner world (our "mental objects") not only passively, but *actively* look for ways to understand these objects and possibly make use of them.

The infant can grasp objects not least through purposeful action, i.e. adequate movements, especially of the hands.

Doing this makes sense, even if it is still largely unconscious. Apparently, this is the deeply rooted foundation of the nexus, the close connection between meaning, value, goal and purpose. It needs to be remembered that the Greek 'telos', among other things, means 'purpose, goal completion, end', and allegedly also *sense*, which, however, is rare in the literature.

The connections between values, goals and purposes and the question of meaning remain to be explained in more detail. Based on *work*, values are undoubtedly products not only of individual history, but also of the general history of mankind and its different (cultural) traditions. And so primarily concerned with philosophy, especially the philosophy of values, but also the philosophy of religion. Values only become fully understandable when one learns their general and intellectual history backgrounds. Only then can an *understanding* of foreign cultural value traditions be expected - a crucial prerequisite for any intercultural, cross-peoples and national *understanding about common and different values*, and not about vague or undefinable "being". (Whereby the 'métissage culturel', the mixture of cultures, is of particular importance.) Values prove themselves in everyday life, in *meaningful* actions and facilities. The associated "aims and purposes" can only be adequately investigated if scientific information about them has been conveyed, i.e. about different forms of *teleology*. (Which I have tried in Robra 2015, pp 363-454, specifically as to the question of meaning (>Sinnfrage<) op. cit. pp. 482-529.)

Mutuality - justice - generosity - "eternal force of life" - reverence for all life . I have already shown how, in the *tribal religions*, this reverence is combined with several unwritten ethical norms, such as "reciprocity, justice, generosity (e.g. in giving reciprocally), for the observance of which no requirement tables are required" (see above p. 28 f.) *It remains to be stated again that the primal ethos of the indigenous peoples is already based on valuations, while the values themselves gradually develop, change and also (can) disappear again* .

About *Justice*, John Rawls (1921-2002) has written the standard work: *A Theory of Justice* (1971), while Hans-Ernst Schiller (2001), unlike Rawls, equates justice and equality, and Thomas Ebert (born 1941) makes coexist justice and equality as such (2015). Rawls is primarily concerned with the questions of political and social justice, which he nonetheless deals with from a *moral* point of view, albeit preferably with a view to the existing social institutions and only secondarily to the persons involved. Rawls considers ethics to be scientifically justified and therefore acceptable if "it succeeds in reaching agreement between well-considered moral judgments and generally rationally justifiable principles". [158] Rawls' central thesis is that persons, in a fictional "original state", would basically "opt for two principles, namely for that of maximum equal individual freedom and for the principle of difference, which only then allows inequalities of distribution if everyone, and especially the worst off group in society, has an advantage from it." (op. p. 708). Rawls is convinced that "justice as fairness" can be achieved on the basis of these principles, because they agree with general "*socio-ethical judgments*".

The pragmatist Thomas Ebert, on the other hand, offers simpler solutions, suggesting (in 2015) the following: "1. Since people are unequal in some respects and equal in other respects, social justice consists, among other things, in giving both equality and inequality the space it deserves. 2. In the case of inequality between people, a theoretical distinction can be made between natural (genetic) inequality, socially determined inequality (inequality of opportunities) and freedom-related inequality (inequality as a result of the different uses that individuals make of their freedom). 3. On this basis, an attempt can be made to solve the problem of equality and inequality with the help of the general formula of social justice as a connection between equality of opportunity and fairness of achievement. This includes the norm of justice that tolerates natural inequality, eliminates socially determined inequality and respects *inequality caused by freedom*, and so in accordance with the justice of performance." [159] (emphasis mine). - I consider the latter to be unacceptable, especially since Th. Ebert much too narrowly uses the concept of social justice, and so in contrast to H.-E. Schiller and Rawls. If freedom causes inequality, it cannot be real freedom, especially not in view of the fact that, so far, it has not been possible to eliminate socially determined inequality comprehensively and sustainably. New syntheses are required for both problems, above all from morality, politics and concrete utopia (see below).

Like Rawls, Hans-Ernst Schiller assumes an ideal type of social justice, which, however, he distinguishes from political justice. He understands social justice to be "the principles and rules that relate to the distribution and production of social wealth and, in particular, to the tasks that the individual or their elementary community in general cannot solve themselves", including, for example, "income equity, formation and tax justice" [160], while political justice refers to "the participation of individuals in the design and administration of the community" (op. p. 91). In general, for H.-E. Schiller, the call for justice is a "reaction to the class division, to the fact that there are rich and poor and that one is at the mercy of the other" (op. p. 95).

In addition, the author discusses terms such as distributive justice (with Aristotle: "treating equals equally and unequal unequally"), performance principle, participation rights and the recognition of human rights as a basic requirement for justice.

The author defines *social human rights* rather by natural law, including the "right to working conditions that do not have ruinous consequences, the right to health-care provision, education and participation in cultural life, the right to work" (op. p. 109). He also considers procedural justice in justice and politics, equal opportunities and recognition to be fundamental, whereas global poverty, the justification of (social) inequality and allegedly "just" and other wars compromise the whole of justice. In order to counter such dangers, combined with manipulation, corruption, populism and incitement, H.-E. Schiller demands *moral policy* at all levels and concludes his considerations with the postulate: "The establishment of a lasting peace is a duty. It is therefore imperative, and ultimately perhaps even wise, to enter a state of rule of law in which the rules of justice apply to all - equally" (op. p. 132). - Obviously there are moral duties after all, even outside of general legislation. Nevertheless, the question arises how such duties can become common property, that is, how they can be generally recognized and obeyed.

Self-worth of the person - tolerance - emancipation . Every human being experiences tests for the example of the intrinsic worth of the person by enduring and fighting the struggle between good and evil within himself and with his fellow human beings. Whether we gain or lose freedom is at stake in this battle. Which does not have to be justified metaphysically, especially since it is probably enough to ascertain the material basis of this circumstance: the unfinished, imperfect nature in us.

In this respect, Kant's Cat. Imp. does not suffer any damage if it can no longer be justified as "absolutely valid". Because the following still applies: Without general legislation, there is neither legal security nor secure morals. And this does not add up to mere ethics of duty, as long as general legislation respects both subjective and objective value ethics. Rather, the ethics of duty is inconceivable without ethics of values, and one day it might be absorbed into it. Even and especially in a class society, the

intrinsic value of the person and his / her *relative* freedom must be protected, above all through human rights that can be corrected under natural law.

To which largely correspond the theories of personhood worked out by personalists (p. 148 et seq.), firmly including *tolerance* and *emancipation*. To the development of the idea of tolerance have crucially contributed the pioneering insights, analyzes and demands of Enlightenment, such of *Voltaire*, *Lessing* and *Goethe* (see p. 10 4 ff.). Of decisive importance I consider to be Goethe's postulate that mere toleration and endurance (in the Latin sense of 'tolerare': 'to endure, to tolerate') is not enough, but must always be transformed into real tolerance through *compassion*, *respect* and *appreciation*. One is all the more surprised when one learns that such morally indispensable knowledge has been fought up to our present day. For example, when a regional bishop of Lower Saxony stated in 2006 that Lessing's concept of tolerance was incompatible with the requirements of today's pluralistic society. As to him, one of the peculiarities of a religion is the "absolute claim to which every religion is to be granted". Lessing does not accept this claim (which is undoubtedly true!), and is therefore not in a position to "accept really foreign orientation" and "... the otherness of the other". [161] - Incredible! Obviously, the bishop fails to recognize the evil that he justifies. For it is undoubtedly precisely the absoluteness claims of the religions that prevent peace and understanding between them. Not Voltaire, Goethe and Lessing, but the claim to absoluteness, fanaticism and fundamentalism are the real enemies of the "otherness of the other"! Therefore I repeat: we must, as often and for as long as possible, trust the effect of our own behavior as long as it is tolerant and reasonable as possible, including the power of better arguments and convincing speech - and in an emergency we must not be afraid to choose *legal recourse*, which of course includes the right to self-defense. Then we can hope to fight intolerance effectively without becoming intolerant ourselves, that is, without betraying the principles of tolerance - and their limits. It will be important to understand, observe and actively cultivate tolerance as an achievement of *the history of emancipation of mankind* and as part of the development of being a person.

Love - humility - selflessness - wisdom. From the writer *James Baldwin* (1924-87) comes the saying: "Love does not begin and end the way we seem to think it does. Love is a battle, love is a war; love is a growing up. " One rubs one's eyes in shock and asks what love is supposed to have to do with "a battle" and with "a war". Could one perhaps think of the struggle between good and evil to be the test of being a person? More information would arise if one researched Baldwin's works for the relevant connections, which would lead too far here. Instead I quote Baldwin's following other statement about love: "Love takes off the masks we fear we cannot live without and know we cannot live within." Love frees us from the masks that we fearfully consider indispensable, even though we know that we cannot live under them. So love frees you to the truth, removes any reason to disguise yourself, to fool yourself and others.

And: Love is the first and last end of wisdom. It probably arose from the 'setting in form' (= in-formation) that already took place in the original matter, according to the principles of association and cooperation. One cannot command (neighborly) love, but *recommend* it, as Jesus did, knowing full well that love is threatened by hatred, as well as by everything negative, antagonistic and senselessly destructive in human nature. Which was for Kant reason enough to presume a 'peccatum originis', "original sin" (Sigmund Freud's "Destrudo") in humans, to which he opposes General legislation and the active participation of it - and to which we confidently can add *love and wisdom*.

For *Lao-tse*, *Gautama Buddha* and *Confucius*, those who obey natural reason , give up self-addiction and instead strive for "filial love", harmony and peace are on the right path . *Francis of Assisi* goes even further in that he trusts humility and love to endure all nastiness and cruelty. Also against blatant injustice? Not necessarily, because San Francisco rebelled against the machinations of the powerful, such as the bankers. Active charity and solidarity with all the poor, oppressed and disenfranchised can only be practiced by those who practice humility and selflessness. To which *Nietzsche* , the "bad Friedrich", would answer: 'How is that? You want to deny your self, the great reason of your body, which stands majestically behind your self? Locked out! Nobody can get out of their skin, escape their self! ' From where there is only a small step to take to Nietzsche's arrogant self-empowerment in the "omnipresent will to power"! To which one can object with Francis of Assisi and Sigmund Freud: Do not be presumptuous! Don't put too much pressure on your fragile selves! And, with the Delphic Oracle: Neque nimis, nothing in excess! Francis of Assisi is right: there can be no solidarity without love, humility and wisdom.

b) economy, society and politics

In all ethical heights, the old Brechtian wisdom should not be forgotten: "First the food comes, then comes the morality." But what about when you have enough to eat, is there only morality left? Rather a rhetorical question, considering the fact that elsewhere in the world millions of people still do not have enough to eat and are starving. Does therefore the food get stuck in your throat? Can we only eat more or less well with a guilty conscience? An annoying thought that we suppress because it spoils our appetite. And what is left then? Don't we have to act instead of theorize? But *what* can we do if even the professional politicians surrender to the international business bosses and managers ? Theorists then have only one option for action: rethinking, improving the theories, and hoping that he / she will regain influence as the levels of injustice and inequality in business, society and politics become increasingly unbearable.

Equal right for everyone - right to property - separation of powers. Economy, society and politics are entities that can only artificially be separated from one another. The foundations for *democratic* developments in these areas were laid by the US and French revolutions. *Aristotle* already called for freedom, equality and justice. Freedom, equality and fraternity are undoubtedly among the most important principles of the French Revolution, which began in 1789. No less than the American constitutional principles, these principles are still undoubtedly characteristic signs of liberal democracy. And so also in the German Basic Law: as freedom of the person, equality before the law - including "sisterhood": equal rights for men and women - as well as an invitation to solidarity, so in the sentence "property obliges". Which, however, suggests the question of whether the three principles or *ideals* or *guiding ideas* or *basic values* have already been fully realized somewhere in the world. Which is undoubtedly not the case. According to the *Declaration of Human Rights and Citizenship*, adopted by the French National Assembly on August 26, 1789, the laws are only valid as an "expression of the common will" (the 'volonté générale', a clear loan from Rousseau!). The sovereignty that corresponds to the common will always emanates from the nation itself (Art. 3), so that every citizen has the *personal* right, directly or indirectly, to participate in the establishment of the common will, and thus in the overall formation of political will. Since the *same law applies to all*, every citizen has equal access to all public offices that are to be filled according to the suitability and abilities of the applicants. Other articles guarantee, among other things, the *separation of powers*, the *right to property*, fair taxation, protection from arbitrary indictment and arrest, the legal presumption of innocence, which is one of the personal rights, and the establishment of the police and judiciary, to which every taxpayer has to contribute according to his income.

The word *fraternity*, meaning brotherhood, does not appear in the *declaration...* of 1789. Undoubtedly, however, indirectly, and so also in the related meanings of the terms 'solidarity' and 'justice'. Without solidary recognition of fellow human beings, there is no recognition of the original freedom and basic personal freedoms, no equality before the law, no "common benefit", no "happiness for all". *Justice* can only exist where there is such recognition (or *tolerance*!).

All the more disconcerting is the fact that the core values of *equal rights for all* and *the separation of powers* apparently *completely* still nowhere have found both normative-legal and factual validity, even not in democratic states.. If there were equal rights for everyone, "structural discrimination in the context of racism, gender and social inequality" [162] could not occur. A lecture program for 2019 published by Darmstadt's 'Studierendenwerk' (a student council) says: "Discrimination in the form of unequal treatment, disadvantage and degradation pervades all areas of everyday social life. Personal devaluations are just as little an exception as legal disadvantages and difficult access to work, education and living: They are part of the regular experiences of all people who are considered 'not normal' and 'not belonging' in public space. This fact contradicts the basic claim of German society that sees itself enlightened as democratic and emancipated." Supplemented without further, this accusation is by pointing to the millions of unemployed and precarious workers, not only in Germany but worldwide.

Only with the means of politics, these grievances can evidently be eliminated just as little as the democratic deficits in almost all areas of society, starting with the lack of economic democracy and the frequent lack of co-determination in companies to obvious discrepancies between the state constitution and the social reality.

Which unfortunately also applies for the principle and basic value of *separation of powers*. In the FRG, this division of state power "and its transfer to different, equal-ranking carriers ... has not yet taken place", it says in an internet article about the *idea and reality of the separation of powers in Germany* from 2017. Its author actually sees a clear indication for this deficiency in the fact that the German judiciary is almost completely subordinate to politics, i.e. to the governments with their ministers who decide on the appointment of judges and supervise the courts. This is also proof that the federated German constitution does not prevent "the bundling of power in a few hands", especially since the government and parliament are each ruled by a specific party or coalition of parties, which consequently also control the judicial system subordinated to the government. Conclusion of the author: "The German constitutional state has an open flank." Which of course puts into perspective the outrage of German and other European politicians about similar authoritarian developments, for example in Poland and Hungary. The cited examples clearly demonstrate the power as well as the impotence of politicians. Who wants to bring about the necessary changes here, most probably needs an alternative concept of society.

Human rights - common good - use, exchange and surplus value. *Karl Marx* certainly appreciates human rights, enshrined in the French Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, as an achievement of the Age of Enlightenment. He states that the French Revolution "produced ideas which lead beyond the ideas of the whole old world state". They are ideas that have flowed into the ideas of socialism and communism, albeit in a roundabout way. ("The International is fighting for human rights.") Nevertheless, Marx insists on criticizing what he considers to be inadequate in the *declarations* of human rights. For example: *Wherever "security"* is mentioned in the revolutionary constitutions, *what* is really only meant is the "insurance of egoism", the protection of the "selfish person". The citizen is totally degraded, namely put completely in the service of the "egoistic homme", so that only "man is taken as bourgeois for the *real* and *true* man". It is precisely through this that the political emancipation of the people is prevented. Whereas "the real individual human being has to take back the abstract citizen within himself", which is only possible if the human being recognizes his own forces ("forces propres") no longer as mere individual, but as *social* ones. Only then, being human is no longer separated from being a citizen and politics no longer

separated from society. (Cf. Karl Marx: *Zur Judenfrage*, in: Marx-Engels-Studien-Ausgabe, vol. 1, Frankfurt a.M. 1966, pp. 46-53.)

To this end, Marx in his later works develops theories of society, political economy and the proletarian revolution, with his analyzes of use, exchange and surplus *value* being of particular importance. In order to become a merchandise, a thing must, like Marx points out in *Capital*, definitely have a use value, but not so for the seller, but for the buyer, so that any use value necessarily is conditioned *socially*, especially since social *work* is necessary in order to give to the merchandise not only a use value, but also an *exchange value*. (It should be noted here that Marx, in contrast to Hegel's 'world spirit' ("Weltgeist") even considers work to be the "engine of history".)

A use value turns out to be quality, an exchange value as quantity, expressed in the *price* of a merchandise (or in the value of another merchandise exchanged for the merchandise). Exchange value serves as a means of actual exchange, more precisely: merchandises are assigned their prices through combinations of use value and exchange value. A pound of fresh bananas has a use value, but not always the same exchange value, the same price. And the price of a merchandise contains within itself another "secret": the *surplus value*. The wage worker who is dependent on the capitalist, works longer than is necessary to secure his survival or his livelihood. How much longer he has to work is determined by the capitalist owner of the means of production (factories, tools, raw materials, etc.), so that this private owner also decides on the extent of the additionally produced amount of value. Marx calls this set of values *surplus value*. The capital-owner appropriates this added value and thus determines his profit.

But it is precisely this *appropriation of surplus value by the owner of the capital* that is not without serious social consequences. On the other hand, there is the *exploitation of the labor force of the wage earners*, which leads to class division and thus, according to Marx, inevitably to the proletarian revolution, that is, to the construction of a new society in which the workers themselves dispose and determine the means of production.

The goal of the revolution is the *common good*, i.e. the "free association of free individuals", the *realm of freedom* in a classless society. As is known, this prophecy was foiled, on the one hand through the late 19th century colonialism-imperialism preventing the collapse of the capitalist world system, and the other hand by the negative developments in Soviet communism. What began as a dictatorship *over* the proletariat under Lenin and Stalin ended in progressive bureaucratization, state capitalism, a planned economy that was not permanently competitive, etc. The fall of the Soviet system after 1989 can also be explained as a consequence of these undesirable developments.

Nevertheless, the question arises whether this also discredits Marx's *doctrine* in its entirety. Hardly likely! Because, in addition to the theory of *use, exchange and surplus value* and the theory of alienation, the goal of a "free association of free individuals", the *realm of freedom*, remains valid. Marx's analyzes of globalized capitalism also remain largely valid. To what extent other parts of his doctrine are in need of revision, I cannot discuss here.

Marxism criticism - religious socialism - theonomy - meaning of history. The Christian socialist Paul Tillich (see above p. 89 f.) is partly in favor of Marxism, partly in opposition to it. He considers Marx's criticism of capitalism, the dialectical method and the alienation theory to be understandable, but not atheism, the ultimate goal of a classless society, the alleged neglect of personhood and the often lacking self-criticism from Marxists and socialists. Nonetheless, Tillich considers syntheses from Christianity and Marxism to be possible, albeit only on the basis of a certain interpretation of the Christian message. Instead of a classless society, he calls for the "realization of a meaningful society". [163] *Orientation towards meaning* can only exist on the basis of God's saving act embodied in Jesus Christ. Tillich's reasoning: "The Christ is a historical event; God manifested himself in time as the middle of time and through his appearance gave time its meaning; ..." (loc. cit. p. 216). On the basis of this conviction of faith, he also considers the question of meaning to be resolved: As the historical center of time, Christ connects time and eternity, God and human beings, salvation history and world history, worldly immanence and supernatural transcendence, and thus creates every meaning, that of the whole and of all its parts. And this is also a tried and tested antidote to the feeling of senselessness that arises from the wretched situation of the proletariat, worse still: In contrast to other strata of the population, the proletariat lacks any possibility of "concealing the senselessness of existence" (op. cit. p. 156).

Accordingly, Tillich sees the most important task of his religious socialism in combining the unconditional commitment for the unconditional (the divine) with the struggle for *right, justice and what is right in general*. With *theonomy* ('God-Law legislation') Tillich means a "state in which the spiritual and social forms are filled with the content of the unconditional as the supporting ground, the meaning and the reality of all forms"; this theonomy creates "a holy and at the same time just reality" (op. cit. p. 51).

It is noticeable here that Tillich demands the unconditional (hence the divine) as the *content* of spiritual and social reality, namely as the basis, meaning and actual reality of the whole. Which is probably because he always looks at the whole thing from the aspect of the coming of the *kingdom of God*, which has already dawned with Christ, but can never be fully fulfilled in the earthly. After all, Tillich recognizes the true *meaning* of history in the kingdom of God, especially since in it all *tensions between power and value* are overcome, because God's power means the highest value. (See loc. cit. pp. 262 f., 284). Tillich immediately recognizes that this creates the risk of devaluing everything here and counters it by stating that everything that is conditioned is also part of the unconditioned, "place of the revelation of the unconditioned", so that in this respect, this world, but not the "utopia" of any kind is to be answered in the affirmative. Theonomics serve the individual, specific creative and is therefore not a utopia (see op. p. 52).

It is a remarkable attempt at a solution, which I still do not consider to be really convincing, and that is because Tillich only considers Christianity to be able to find *the only true meaning*. Socialism and meaning, however, refer to the entirety of human beings, i.e. also to atheists and people of different faith. Other religions have different value systems and therefore answer the question of meaning differently. Meaning goes all out, but the question about it is always answered by the individual, mortal individual, so that the embodiment of this answer is ended by the individual death. - But even this criticism hardly diminishes the indisputable merits of Tillich, which I have highlighted elsewhere (see p. 89 f., points 1 to 10, as well as Robra 2015, p. 132-134).

Liberation - grassroots communities - social criticism - social reforms - non-violence. Latin America in particular has shown that socialism and Christianity can come together. The *theology of liberation* (see above p. 90 f.) is based on a social revolutionary liberator who is still effective, even if only virtually present: Jesus Christ. It all begins in 1965, when Dom Helder Camara starts to found basic social congregations, one of the starting points being the question: "How can a Christian, as a Christian, live in the midst of poverty and injustice?" In the basic congregations, one does not want to accept any longer as "God-given" the stark contrasts between the poor and the rich, but to provide concrete remedies, for example through aid programs and social reforms. Whereby one obtains the theoretical tools for the necessary criticism of capitalism and society, not least from *Marxism*, without renouncing the basic Christian principle of *non-violence*. And also not to criticism of "actually existing socialism". When it came to a conflict with the Vatican, the Brazilian theologian and philosopher Leonardo Boff (born 1938) took the following position: 1. The christological justification of the absolute claim of the Catholic Church was not biblically verifiable. [164] 2. The Catholic Church derives its power and exercise of power not only directly from Christ, but also from an early onset of "secularization", on the basis of which the "Roman and feudal style of exercising power" shaped the Catholic Church. And this is "one of the main causes of conflicts with our awareness of human rights" (op. cit. p. 187). 3. "The freedom to diverge thinking" is suppressed in the Catholic Church (op. P. 189). 4. In Protestantism a "new church" had emerged, which was the only one that offered "the possibility of genuine creativity and freedom in the face of power" (p. 193). This means that further disputes with the Catholic Church were inevitable, which continue to this day, even if Boff and his 'Movement for Human Rights' are now placing great hopes in Pope Francis.

Grassroots democracy. The basic question of ethics is still how the subjective maxims and the common good, subjective and objective ethics of values, can be reconciled. In my opinion, Kant's general legislation still plays a key role here. But how should the indispensable general participation in legislation be made possible if the division of power fails in representative democracies like the FRG (see above)? Alternatives offer themselves, especially through the Internet, in new forms of *grassroots democracy*. Leonard Novy writes about this: "With the Internet, an instrument is now available with which the knowledge and experience of citizens can be integrated more effectively than ever into political planning and decision-making processes. Examples from all over the world show that dialogue and cooperation between state actors and citizens can have a positive effect not only on the legitimacy but also on the quality of political decisions. After all, today neither politics nor administration can claim to comprehensively map the diversity of knowledge that is disseminated in society. The Internet: it is both an expression and a driver of a comprehensive social change that calls traditional hierarchies into question and arouses expectations in terms of transparency, dialogue and participation. However, it also harbors opportunities for a new, participatory understanding of leadership, which could make obsolete the call for "federal grassroots democracy". [165] Novy therefore wants to eliminate deficiencies in representative democracy through grassroots democratic elements without questioning the existing political system as a whole.

In contrast, Jacques Schuster (2011) expresses his rejection of any form of basic-democracy. Because behind this, there is no serious alternative, but "a vulgar democratic Jacobinism", in which the so-called "true" will of the people has repeatedly proven to be "highly capricious, unpredictable and misleading" [166] Schuster evaluates referendums as "votes of no confidence in MPs". "Well-networked minorities" are able to impose their will on the majority of the population through skillful manipulation. The question arises, however, whether such criticism can finally discredit the model of grassroots democracy. In order to gain more clarity on this, the counter-arguments put forward by Schuster are undoubtedly insufficient. Rather, one can fall back on the ideal-typical ideas that Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) put forward in 1919 in his work *The key points of the social question in the vital necessities of the present and future*. One of its main goals is "the self-determination of the individual". To this end, the state, economy and society would have to be disentangled, through a new type of social threefold division into intellectual, legal and economic life. The spirit (in education, science, culture and religion) can only come into its own and fully develop when it is freed from the tutelage of politicians and business leaders. A *constitution based on the rule of law*, which is able to penetrate all areas of public, economic and intellectual life, is to contribute to this liberation. Under this prerequisite, democracy could also be

realized in the economy, but not through nationalization, but rather through the transfer of private ownership of means of production into "trust property" that would have to be controlled by the cooperative.[167] This requires a new labor law that is no longer determined by random economic principles such as business cycle and price formation, but rather forms solid foundations for ending exploitation, oppression and dependence. Instead of wages, there should be a "contractually agreed share of the profit" (loc. cit. p. 4). All this not on a utopian, but on a realistic basis, i.e. on the basis of "an empirical knowledge of the necessary living conditions" (op. p. 2).

Economy, law and spirit are each subject to their own laws, but can and should work together through the desired reorganization and bring about a new, harmonious whole in the spirit of freedom, equality and fraternity. It is noticeable that Steiner assigns freedom to spirit, equality to law, and fraternity to economy, but always attaches great importance to the principle of *self-administration* by declaring: "The spiritual life can only obtain its strength, if it is detached from the state, when it is completely on its own. What lives in the spiritual life, especially the school system, must be handed over to its self-administration, from the top management of the spiritual life to the teacher of the lowest school level." (Ibid.).

Unfortunately, after the First World War, Steiner tried in vain to translate these ideas into political practice. He was apparently in a similar situation to today's socialist theorists in the face of globalized turbo-capitalism; with the huge difference that at that time additional threats such as those from the atomic Holocaust, eco-crisis, digitization, robotization, trans- and post-humanism could not be foreseen. Steiner's demands for grassroots democracy and self-administration have not become obsolete, on the contrary. However, necessary is this

Criticism of Steiner: Freedom, equality and fraternity should shuerly prevail equally in *all* areas of economy, spirit and law. The unity of these areas can be better illustrated by the universally recognizable subject-object relationships of the mind. But: The mind is *work*, and this produces both general history and values and thus ethics. To have disregarded these connections seems to be the main reason for the illusion of Steiner's assumptions and demands, with which he failed politically.

Work - Health - Sexuality - Upbringing - Learning. If work is the basis not only of any history but also of any ethics of values, one should know about its essence. "Work makes life sweet, laziness strengthens the limbs," says the vernacular. Work means a lot to people, but not everything. They also appreciate leisure, idleness and even laziness[168]. Can this adequately explain the nature of work? No, because this requires further analyzes of its characteristics and properties. An undertaking that is proving to be very difficult, if only due to the fact that work is not only the engine of history, but is itself subject to historical changes, with the industrial revolution and current digitization as the strongest turning points.

Further difficulties arise from the enormous scope of meaning of the term 'work', all the more if one takes into account the word combinations customary in German, of which in Meyer's *German Dictionary* (1979) on pages 179-184 approx. 400 (1) are listed, from common combinations as 'Arbeitnehmer' and 'Arbeitgeber' (workers and employers), unemployment, employment agency, labor movement, fond of work, work-shy and the like, to such exotic (or "obsolescent") formations such as work usefulness, job creation changes, "Arbeitskörbchen" ("little basket of work"), work-bigotry, workers' and peasants' Faculty, working hours failure, or also, work-community Andernach of fencing associations'. - But even if you would admit looking at this almost chaotic extensional shape, the huge meaning and association-scope of 'work', it would not be expected that then the intension, the core meaning of the term, becomes recognizable.

I consider recourse to the analyzes and conclusions of Marx and Engels as a way out of the dilemma. The latter has shown how primitive man emancipated himself from his ape-like ancestors through work and developed into *homo sapiens*, verifiable from the fact that primitive man began to manufacture *artificial tools* at a certain stage of evolution in the Paleolithic and, cooperatively and according to plan, to use it to improve his living conditions. That man actually differs significantly from animals in this way, Marx recognizes when he states: "The animal only forms according to the measure and the needs of the species to which it belongs, whereas man also knows how to produce according to the measure of each species, but, at the same time, everywhere knows how to apply the inherent measure to the object; therefore man also forms according to the laws of beauty." (Marx 1962, p. 568). People are able to "apply the inherent measure to the object" because they work according to plan, i.e. target- and purpose-oriented, and are able to work "also according to the laws of beauty", i.e. creatively and freelance. In no way does Marx ignore the social embedding of creativity, on the contrary, he emphasizes: "It is precisely in the processing of the objective world that man really proves himself as a *species being*. This production is his working life of species ("werkstätiges Gattungslieben"). Whereby nature appears as *his* work and his reality. The object of the work is therefore the *objectification of the species life of man: in that he not only doubles himself intellectually, as in consciousness, but at work, and therefore looks at himself in a world he has created himself.*" (ibid.). Which of course includes all the outstanding qualities of the genus *Homo sapiens sapiens*, including the most highly developed language and signs, art, thinking, cognition and intelligence. Particularly with regard to language, Marx observes that it is "the practical consciousness that exists for other people, that is, that which really exists for myself", and even more clearly: "Language itself is just as much the product of a community as it is in other respects itself the existence of the community and its self-speaking existence".[169]

Marx is not satisfied with the discussion of his ideal type of work concept, but declares unambiguously, *what* in capitalism always prevents the really *free objectification* ("Vergegenständlichung") of man: Therefore, "Alienated labor wrests man from the object of his production, wrests his / her *species life*, the real species objectivity and transforms his / her preference over the animal into the disadvantage that his / her unorganized body, nature, is withdrawn from him / her" (ibid.). So that humans are alienated not only from themselves but also from nature and, in terms of their sensitivity to production, appear to be in a worse position than any animal.

There are provisions that also show what Marx really means with the "abolition of labor" in the *realm of freedom*, the aim of proletarian revolution, namely the abolition of *alienated* work so that here I would have to deal closer with the Marxian theory of alienation, which is possible for me only in a condensed form. For Marx, alienated work means: "1. The product of labor confronts the worker as an alien power independent of him, the purposes of which are external to him; 2. alienation takes place in the act of production itself, because labor is not itself an objectification of its subject, but a means of alien purposes; the alienated work consequently means 3. alienation from the human species, which consists in free self-activity in exchange with nature. This exchange takes place in capitalist production independently of the needs of the producers; after all, in wage labor as the relationship between domination and servitude; 4. leads to an alienation of man from man." [170]. On the other contrary, man would have to realize himself in work as "free objectification" in his own work according to his abilities, decide on the use of his product himself, recognize himself in work as a generic being and find and enjoy freedom, equality and solidarity everywhere. What Marx does not consider possible in capitalism, but only in a post-revolutionary *association of free individuals*, in which the free development of each individual would be a condition of the freedom of *all* individuals.

What is human labor? As a definition, following Marx, Engels and Ernst Bloch, I adhere to the following: *Work is that goal-oriented and purpose-oriented activity that enables people as a species, that is, in social cooperation with their fellow human beings, to satisfy certain needs by changing, in a meaningful way, certain objects (e.g. raw materials and substance contents) and / or produce new objects.* - Work cannot be understood only from the point of view of the subject or only from the point of view of the object. In any case, it is a question of dialectic subject-object relationships that apparently apply to any kind of mental and / or physical work.

The "abolition of work" is currently in full swing, but very different from what Marx imagined. Progressive technization, computerization, automation and robotization can not just any physical-mechanical work, but in the long term perhaps any kind of work become feasible *without the people*. I will still have to discuss the problems that arise from this (see below).

Health. = Just "the absence of illness", as doctors want us to believe? With the following consideration, the philosopher *Thomas Schramme* wants to show why such a definition is not sufficient to understand the phenomenon of health. In a *medical* sense one could be sick and healthy at the same time: "To have a disease, is not incompatible with feeling better or living a good life." [171] Disabled people could also feel subjectively healthy and, objectively, definitely have a quality of life. - My objection: As soon as an illness is found, no doctor will claim that the person affected is still healthy. Apart from that, there are of course cases in which being sick and being healthy flow into one another. Not every infection is noticeable quickly. Incomprehensible symptoms, such as itchy skin, can prove to be harbingers of diseases. And every hypochondriac repeatedly claims to be sick, although he is perfectly healthy (unless hypochondria is viewed as a disease). Th. Schramme admits that "in today's rich societies" health is accorded a very high value, but he does not state what this value and thus its ethical relevance consists of.

This is in contrast to the health expert *Doris Ostermann*, who (2011) proposes a holistic health concept that includes "the aspects of nutrition, relaxation and stress management as well as the topics of the environment, work, balance of life, the art of living and questions of meaning and, last but not least, exercise" [172] It is important to develop "values about health", especially since health means a "value in itself". Here she refers, surprisingly, to a *theory of alienation* that she does not take over directly from Marx, but from the psychologist and health coach *H. Petzold*. Alienation can cause disease. "It is about alienation from the body, from life, from fellow human beings, from work, from the living environment and alienation from nature." (op. cit., p. 6). Revealing is the fact that D. Ostermann directly connects the phenomenon of alienation and "the question of values". For example, those who impose on themselves too rigid principles of a sexual-ethical nature run the risk of letting the erotic wither away and thereby becoming alien to themselves, that is, to their own body. The author gives further examples of this from the field of the fashion industry with its sometimes questionable aesthetic specifications, which, in "skinny models", can lead to eating disorders. The author is convinced: If there were no such alienation, prevention programs and measures for health would be superfluous, and people would generally act according to their high appreciation of health, e.g. by diet and exercise. Then could occur "prudence, serenity, clarity, clearness and courage" as well as "cooperating reflecting" on health (op. p. 9).

However, it seems to me to be questionable how such goals can be achieved in light of the calamities of working life in neoliberal turbo-capitalism. As I mentioned earlier, *Karlheinz Geissler* warned off the dangerous consequences of multi-jobbing, multi-tasking, "simultization", non-stop and turbo time (p 208 f.). However, it should be noted

critically that Geissler partially neglects the problem of the relationship between the self and the world, the individual and society. If it can be proven that our unconscious is constantly, if not conditioned, influenced by the outside world to a great extent, the question of the social organization of the world arises again – a very political question that I unfortunately cannot go into here. (cf. Robra 2015, p. 473).

Nevertheless, there are new developments that numerous entrepreneurs have brought about for the working life of new, apparently even more health-conscious generations of employees. One wants to "move away from rigid order, command and obedience, towards small, decentralized organizational structures, maximum flexibility, right to have a say and self-determination," explains *Anke Hoffmann* in 2019. [173] To this end, new, flexible working models were introduced, in which the new opportunities created by digitization should also be optimally used. It should be easier to combine work and private life, for example through the increased use of home offices.

The downside: The turbo has not been turned off everywhere! On the contrary, more and more wage earners are complaining about too high a pace of work and increasing stress. It has been proven that there is more and more pathogenic distress. And quite a few "continue to work despite exhaustion and illness and forego the urgently needed regeneration in favor of work", so that from this suffer their work results (Hoffmann op. cit., p. 7). Who is responsible for that? The company management or the employees themselves? In order to be able to answer this, one has to consider that in the last few decades the proportion of mental illnesses caused by distress has risen rapidly, namely to approx. 15% of all illnesses. Early retirement even rose from around 15 to over 42 percent between 1992 and 2015. And even if I can not go further into the examples and details offered by Anke Hoffmann, I agree to her demanding: "measures of modern operational prevention and health-promotion should be focused on the reduction of excessive psychosocial stress, and for example to help to reduce chronic time pressure, work interruptions and excessive demands" (op.p. 12).

In addition, I believe that still fully valid is what H. Petzold and D. Ostermann have pointed out about *alienation* as a cause of illness. But even that is not the last word on the health issue. Mental and physical health do not only depend on the conditions of working life. The *value of health* [174] can and must be protected and supported by a multitude of other values. Last but not least, I also include certain ecological, ideological, aesthetic and religious concepts (see below). I also remind you that when someone sneezes, they say "health", although this can be a sign of illness; while *Nietzsche* allegedly defined health as "that degree of illness that still allows me to pursue my essential occupations".

Sex / love / marriage / family. The strongest upheaval in matters of sexuality in our culture took place in the 1960s. The sixty-eight wanted, at almost any price, to emancipate themselves from the traditional ("rotten") bourgeois morality. But for quite a few the price became very high, too high. Instead of emancipation and real, even spiritual freedom, at the end remained just frustration, disappointment and even anger about themselves and others. So where love has turned into hate – a catastrophic result, especially when love in the form of sublimated sexuality and eroticism can continue to be considered a desirable ideal. What undoubtedly is not self-evident, for sex, love and eros are not identical. Have they ever been? Maybe only in art? Here is a prime example: In *The Magic Flute*, Mozart lets Pamina and Papageno rejoice in the highest tones: "Man and woman, and woman and man, / reach to the deity." Often only these two verses are quoted, but in which the invoked sublimation of sexuality in love is barely discernible. Which is why I am now presenting the passage in full:

PAMINA: With men who feel love / A good heart is not lacking either.

PAPAGENO: To sympathize with the sweet instincts / It is women's first duty then.

PAMINA, PAPAGENO: We want to enjoy love, / We live through love alone.

PAMINA: Love sweetens every plague, / every creature sacrifice to love.

PAPAGENO: It spices up our days of life / It works in the circle of nature.

PAMINA, PAPAGENO: Its lofty purpose clearly shows / Nothing is more noble than woman and man. / Man and woman, and woman and man, / Reach to the deity. "

But: aren't these mere dreams of more or less naive fictional characters? Well, Pamina hopes rightly that men who feel love do not lack goodness of heart. But then the reply of the "nature boy" Papageno is all the more revealing that a woman can be expected to return the "sweet urges" of her partner at any time – understandably only in view of the background of the role distribution that was undoubtedly still common in Mozart's time: the man is going on, the woman has to follow him. ... A calamity that Mozart and Schikaneder try to counteract by the allusion to the "sweet instincts", followed by a duet of praise to the omnipotence of love, which the two protagonists then even try to generalize through their appeal to creation as a whole. So that finally the "high" natural purpose of love comes into its own, namely as the noblest of all purposes at all: to share the work of the deity.

The philosophical counterpart to this high Masonic morality can be found in Mozart's contemporary *Hegel*, who writes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (from 1807): "The divine law that rules in the family, for its part, has ... differences in itself, whose relationship constitutes the living movement of its reality." [175] From here Hegel develops a philosophy of family, and especially of the relationships of men and women, which essentially reflects the traditional patriarchal roles in which only the man is "sent out into the community by the family spirit", and there "finds his self-conscious being" (loc. cit. p. 339).

Our current understanding of roles, however, largely corresponds to *Ernst Bloch*, who writes in the *Spirit of utopia* (1923) in the chapter *So the woman and reason in love*: "One becomes ripe for love at different speeds, and the air between girl and man is charged with the suddenly connecting lightning considerably earlier than a soul can understand such a confusing summons to the table: meanwhile, the mind is excited, enthusiasm and chivalry." [176] From where open out really only two ways, one of which leads to adventuring and chaotic roving about, while the other leads to the "safe harbor of marriage." On this Bloch: "The true, the once seriously trodden path of love can no longer be concluded anecdotally at all. Unless through the challenging adventure of loyalty, which is called marriage" (ibid.). "Breadth and duration" are required for love permitting to find ways out of frustrating wandering. Therefore, sexual life must blossom into *eroticism* – reason enough for Bloch to sing a song of praise to *the woman*: "Nothing can be completely wrong or lead away from the path where a woman went, looked into what she wretched, what she felt ahead, what her deeper imagination aroused, what she found adequately echoing; ..." (loc. cit. p. 265) and finally, with astonishing exaggeration: "... the last thing that ever awaits man is *woman in form and essence*" (p.266). A strange exaggeration, which Bloch unfortunately did not explain in more detail. It is conceivable that he equates the feminine with the naturally and spiritually creative as such; this in the learned hope for the "completely new" in the evolution of nature, which may contribute decisively to the emergence of the *realm of freedom*.

All of this is incompatible with mechanistic determinism. Bloch received *Freud* very thoroughly, but rejected his thesis of the omnipotence of the unconscious, especially as to sexuality. Bloch cannot stop at Freud's mechanisms of repression, on the basis of which the "ego instincts" come into conflict with the sexual instinct. It is important to recognize that "it is precisely the higher psychic processes, with the permanent influence of the changes in the environment that they cover, that act on the affective and the organic; and that they are by no means only dependent, or even substitutes insubstantial in themselves" (Bloch 1977a, p. 62). – Freud built up an artificial permanent conflict between the "ego drives" and sexuality, for example by equating the ego drives with self-preservation and equating sexuality with the object drives. – On the contrary, I think that sexuality also serves very well for self and species preservation, for example through reproduction. Without therefore denying that there can be conflicts between the self and sexuality. Just think of the criminal perversions in which the ego fails to maintain a responsible balance between id, ego and superego. Nevertheless, I hold to my view that the latter is fundamentally possible, based on *Nietzsche's* concept of the I, according to which behind the I stands the self identical to the body, which is "a great reason", "which does not say I, but *does I*", so that the instincts also belong to the I, which however is not exhausted in the former (even if sometimes *through* them). Especially since the ego-consciousness reflects all these connections and, according to Freud, has to mediate between the claims of the ego, the super-ego and the instinctual layer. However, this is complicated by the fact that the *unconscious* is also constantly involved in these attempts at mediation.

Bloch's view here largely agrees with that of *Jean-Paul Sartre*, who rejects Freudian determinism as "crampe mécaniste", mechanistic spasm, even if Sartre, due to his rationalistic foreground, goes so far as to completely deny the power of the subconscious to. Greater clarity is also here to win by the *Libet experiments* doing justice both to the subconscious and the free will.

Incidentally, for the entire problem area of sexuality - love - marriage - family, applies Kant's demand to respect the dignity of every human being as a moral person and as a legal person. Only those who respect themselves and others are able to behave sensibly, prudently and appropriately, and so not only in matters of love.

Education and learning. *Education means: conveying values and setting limits, and this within existing limits, especially since humans are unpredictable, vulnerable beings.* This only makes sense if the need for upbringing is not denied, as, for example, *Ruth Abraham* (2019) does in her contribution *Children learn by themselves, we do not have to educate them* [177] and thereby assumes a position that was similarly propagated by *Ellen Key* in 1902, in her book *The Century of the Child*. According to what the supposedly autonomous learning of the children should take the place of any education. Which is completely ruled out if Kant is right in his view, which he presented in his lecture *on Pedagogy* in 1776: "An animal is already everything through its instinct; for it, a foreign reason has already taken care of everything. But humans need their own reason. He has no inside stinks, and must himself make the *plan of his behavior* [178]. But because he is not able to do this immediately, but is born raw: so others have to do it for him." Here, one could at best object to the fact that children, even before birth and especially after birth, constantly make experiences from which they can learn without the involvement of parents or educators. But does this mean that children can *raise* themselves completely? To answer this, one needs to be clear about the social conditions under which children learn from their experiences. Because learning of course does not take place in a vacuum, but always under the influence of certain social

conditions; which in our country meanwhile led all learning to massive impairment of the basic requirements, most notably as to *capacity and willingness, pertinent and easy objectivity, concentration, discipline, efficiency and readiness to perform*. So that again and again there is talk not only of an “educational emergency”, but also of an *educational crisis* and even an *educational catastrophe*. That is why it is to be assumed that *self-education through learning does not really work in our society, that it cannot work*.

If you now ask about the causes of this undesirable development, you will inevitably come across a phenomenon that has been spreading for about three decades: the *fun society*. On this, thorough investigation has been achieved by *Albert Wunsch* (2004) in his work *Farewell to the fun pedagogy*, so therefore in the context of the problems of education. From a representative expertise of a social research institute, Wunsch quoted that “in spring 2001 64% of German citizens had stated fun as the meaning of life” [179]. This is in striking contrast to the situation before 1990, when “for most people the meaning of life was still securing a satisfactory existence” (ibid.). How can this serious change be explained? Wunsch refers to the pampering and seduction mechanisms that have increasingly gained the upper hand in the consumer and fun society; although he defines the term ‘fun’ in a problematic, if not inadmissible, way, namely initially correctly as a “mix of joke, farce, lark and foolishness”, but then, incomprehensibly, concluding from it: “in short: condensed nonsense” (ibid.). So *nonsense as sense* for two thirds of the population? I think that’s short-circuited. Because jokes, farces, etc. are not nonsensical *per se*, on the contrary, they have always served to entertain people, to cheer them up, to make life easier for them at least temporarily. Emperors, kings and princes hired court jesters as ingenious critics who made jokes and told some “nonsense”, but consistently with refined subtlety.

All these meanings seem to have flattened out in today’s fun society. The result, however, is not “condensed nonsense”, but worse things, namely the current education and upbringing crisis, among other things. Albert Wunsch mentions the following symptoms: 1. “The concept of life for those who are fixated on fun is based on hanging around, eating and drinking a lot, watching TV, surfing the Internet, shopping, sex and super action. It has to be gigantic. Some contemporaries even enjoy bullying, defamation, violence and horror. And because the same fun is no longer fun in the long run, a mega-plus program is needed soon. The people want more, to the point of being unbearable, as some TV formats reveal.” (ibid.). Media addiction has become even more acute in recent years due to the rapid development of smartphones with Internet access. 2. On the other hand, “personal and shared responsibility, effort, usefulness, achievement, social values and future-creating” (ibid.) fall into disrepute. 3. Not only the parents are affected, but, to a great extent, also children and young people. What is expressed in children in defensive attitudes towards fundamental tasks such as learning to speak, adhering to rules, tidying up rooms, doing homework, etc; with young people, for example, in refusal to perform and irresponsible use of drugs and alcohol; parents are afraid of difficult arguments and problem solving, show lack of reliability, too little commitment for the common good or even only for their own partnership, as soon as troublesome problem solving is required. 4. Consequences: lack of conflict capability, pampering, unmotivated accuracy, indifference, educational calamity.

But what is all of this due to? What concrete causes are there for such undesirable developments, for the “dwindling between human values and the system of meaningfulness”, for the propagation of “freedom without the duty of personal responsibility” (op. p. 4)? Surprisingly, Albert Wunsch only cites the following: “It is too much satiety and caring for many people! Because if the challenge of securing livelihood does not apply, the search for meaning concentrates all too easily on a constant maximization of happiness for one’s own being” (ibid.).

But here, I see an attempt to explanation that definitely falls short. There must be deeper reasons for the fact that the addiction to fun and entertainment has spread more and more over the past 30 years. I see it in the unrestrained, ruthless advance of neoliberal turbo-capitalism, which has stylized *consumerism* as the only decisive mediator of meaning and happiness and which declares any alternative to be absurd and insane.

The fact that A. Wunsch does not take this into account at all, puts into perspective the relevance of the countermeasures proposed by him, including the mere references to the paramount importance of upbringing, of “functioning schools” that are essential to every learning (including the playful!), the necessary attention and effort and values such as “social skills, personal responsibility, courage, strength, motivation, creativity and the ability to deal with conflict in order to cope with future challenges in partnership, family, work and society” (op. p. 5).

These demands can undoubtedly be answered in the affirmative; but the question arises as to how such values can be conveyed to children and young people in a turbo-capitalist fun society. Only through their own (learning) experiences? Certainly not! And even the best-intentioned, qualified upbringing comes to the limits constantly produced by the economic and social system with the symptoms mentioned above. A system that obviously breeds people who are not even able to become aware of their own *situation of total alienation*, let alone attempt to break free from it. All the more, I see myself confirmed in my view that an upbringing is necessary that conveys values and sets limits.

Communicate values and set limits. Of course, I cannot present a “watertight” theory of learning and upbringing at this point. And with regard to conveying values and setting limits, I have to limit myself to a few fundamental considerations. I have already indicated the limits within which values can be conveyed. Note, however, not only the system influences (consumer and fun society, etc.), but also, and primarily, those limits and factors that arise from different kinds of personal structures and peculiarities of the persons concerned; special features that diverge to such an extent that they are neither theoretically nor practically manageable. The age of the pupils must always be taken into account. Little children first have to learn social values such as compassion and respect, that is to say they have to be largely taught through upbringing. [180] Whereas this, as well as any other form of education, at the age of puberty is apparently no longer possible. Within these limits there must be clarity about the educational goals. *Antje Bostelmann* states: “Children should become strong, be able to take responsibility and become courageous, self-active members of a society that is able to integrate everyone, respect them and secure their basic rights.” [181]. These are, of course, very ambitious goals (especially in turbo-capitalism, see above), surpassable by the thoroughly legitimate claim to provide young people arguments that can serve to remedy existing grievances and to prepare better future. For which a lot of informative and educational work must certainly be done; although it seems controversial how this work should take place: rather through the creation of freedom spaces (“allow them to be free”) or rather through deliberate drawing of boundaries? Decisions cannot be made on a purely situational and *ad hoc* basis, but always *value-oriented*, whereby the role of the subconscious should not be underestimated (see above). If this is disregarded, the adolescents remain exposed to the negative influences of the capitalist ideology of consumption and fun.

Experts have investigated which *educational values* are to be used. The psychologist *Wayne Dosick* states: “Respect, truthfulness, fairness, a sense of responsibility, compassion, gratitude, friendship, peacefulness, striving for personal maturity, the ability to believe in something” [182], which can be supplemented, for example, with “right action, love and non-violence”. [183] Whereby the values of the “ability to believe something” and “doing the right thing” can easily lead into dangerous terrain. Fanatic, hateful and violent attitudes of faith are to be resolutely rejected and combated, with the prospect of success only if, as with other educational values, the Kantian demand for absolute respect for people is observed and followed. The same applies to the right to “do the right thing”; here, too, the end cannot justify the means.

It is a requirement that experience has shown cannot be met by simply letting it be granted. But how should borders be drawn instead? A. Bostelmann essentially suggests to educators: 1. rituals, i.e. *regulated* processes, 2. age-appropriate demands of the rules, 3. being a role model, 4. making no false promises, 5. if possible, do without using a reward system (“carrot pedagogy”), 6. explain the consequences and implement them according to the situation, without instilling fear (author principle: “Anyone who breaks something must repair or replace it.” (op. p. 5), 7. respect and fairness in dealing. Adolescents are entitled to fairness and equal treatment. Peace and non-violence in the home and at school depend on it.

I see a particularly difficult problem in the fact that *educators*, and even more so the adolescents entrusted to them, act partly on the basis of *unconscious* guidelines and imprints without being really clear about their own unconscious. Especially since access to the unconscious is often only possible in the dream, after prolonged self-observation and reflection or through helpful conversations, e.g. with relatives, psychotherapists, pastors or other people you trust. Adolescents are hardly able to do this on their own. Whether at all, it should be possible to find out at least to some extent in confidential individual or group discussions. In addition, I would like to point out that values of upbringing do not exist in isolation, but rather in branched, individually different value syntheses. These also include:

c) ecological value syntheses

“Back to nature”!? This much-quoted bon mot supposedly does not come from *Rousseau* at all, but from *Voltaire*, who wanted to make his arch rival ridiculous. After all, *Voltaire*, wrote to him one day he would have read “his newest work against the people-gender”, but, for him *Voltaire*, it was no reason “as to walk again on all fours.” Be that as it may, it is clear that *Rousseau* was *through and through with nature*, and always recommended a way of life based on “sensible naturalness”. In his cultural criticism, he went so far that he even warned against going to the theater and concerts. Instead, one should exercise much more outdoors, play, do sports (e.g. in regattas on Lake Geneva), take long walks in the *great outdoors*, etc. Famous are *Rousseau's Dreams of a lonely stroller* written after such marches on foot.

Rousseau earned undeniable merits not only through his warnings against an alienated life distant from nature. His political philosophy in connection with his new definition of the value of the “inalienable person” had also a very lasting effect. Clever personalism turned out to be a first-rate power in the history of ideas and politics. This philosophy influenced such important poets and thinkers as *Goethe*, *Schiller*, *Kant*, *Fichte*, *Herder*, *Marx*, *Nietzsche*, *Pestalozzi* and *Basedow* and thus trends such as *Sturm und Drang*, *Romanticism*, *Socialism*, *Philosophy of Life*, *Personalism*, *psychoanalysis* and the *reform-pedagogy*. *Supporters of today's eco-movement also refer to Rousseau*. It should be noted that *Rousseau* always invokes the “absolute inalienability of the person” as the basis of his philosophy (a thought that *Ernst Bloch* emphasized on 350 pages in “*Natural Law and Human Dignity*”). It is only in relation to this *inalienability* that the extensive analyzes of personhood that *Rousseau* carried out in his philosophical and literary works can be explained. [184]

Marx's early ecology corresponds to his *humanistic naturalism*, developed already in his early work *Economics and philosophy* (1844), specifically due to a) his criticism of Hegel, b) his reception of Feuerbach and c) his criticism of capitalism. In Hegel's system, human beings and nature appear only as objects of the absolute idea and thus ultimately as "nullities". This is what first *Ludwig Feuerbach* recognized (1804-72), considering "the negation of the negation" as a contradiction of philosophy with itself, restoring only religion and theology. Marx therefore describes it as a "great deed" by Feuerbach to have opposed the negation of the negation "the positive that rests on itself and is positively founded on itself" [185], which does not mean, however, that Marx has now turned into a positivist and renounced the dialectic!

Marx evidently relies on Feuerbach's anthropology when he defines the essence of human beings as follows: "The human being as an objective, sensual being is a *suffering being* and, because it feels his suffering, a *passionate being*. Passion ("die Leidenschaft") is the essential force of man energetically striving for his object"(op. cit., p. 651 f.). In developing his new theory, Marx surpasses Feuerbach, by stating: "If the real, bodily *human being*, standing on the solid well-rounded earth, in- and out-haling all natural forces, *sets his handy, objective essential powers* by its alienation as foreign objects, the subject is not this act of setting, but the subjectivity of objective essential forces, the action of which must therefore also be *objective*"(p. 649).

Marx first characterizes such objectification as a practical, *social activity*. The other person meets the person in and on the object of value-creating work, whereby nature and man form a unity in which *freedom* can only be formed and realized. In capitalist society, however, the free objectification of man is prevented because exploitation based on private property always leads to *alienation*. It therefore appears necessary to abolish the ("functioning") private ownership of the means of production that is suitable for exploitation, and so not by "taking the object back into consciousness" (as in Hegel), but through a revolutionary appropriation of the object. In this negation of the negation, Marx recognizes a presupposition of what Feuerbach calls "the positive grounded in itself". In this sense, Marx calls his teaching an "*implemented naturalism or humanism*" which differs from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time is their unifying truth" (ibid., P. 649).

From "nature subject" to nature alliance: Ernst Bloch. For his concept of nature, and thus also for his ecology, Bloch was inspired by Marx, but even more so by *Schelling*, who was influenced by Bruno, but also by Spinoza ("God or nature"). If nature is its "own legislator", so Schelling, one can and must even ascribe to nature the *ability to act* like the "world builder" (= God). Schelling accuses the natural scientists of his time of overlooking this by claiming: "Philosophizing about nature means lifting it out of the dead mechanism in which it seems to be trapped, apparently invigorating it with freedom, and setting it into its own development, which means, in other words, to tear oneself away from the common view, which in nature only sees what happens - at most action as a fact, not action itself in action." [186] But who then acts "in action" if not God himself? A theological position without which there could hardly be any talk of "purpose in nature".

Without this theological background, Schelling's definition of the "spirit in nature" as "objective subject-object" is just as incomprehensible as his subjectification of nature as "*natura naturans*": "We call Nature as a mere product (*natura naturata*) an *object* (all empiricism is based on this alone). Nature as productivity (*natura naturans*) is what we call nature as subject, and this alone is the focus of theory." [187] It is therefore clear that Schelling considers "nature as a subject" to be a *theoretical concept*! It is also amazing that the opposition of empiricism (concrete research) and philosophy (or theory) to our own time continues, *with evil consequences, especially with regard to the ongoing destruction of environment*.

Nevertheless - or precisely for these reasons - Bloch was inspired by the aforementioned Schellingian concepts, for example by the "nature subject" ('Naturesubjekt'), which he, however, transforms into a "hypothetical nature subject" and interprets it by no means idealistically, but entirely materialistically. So that the assumption "hypothetical nature subject" does not mean that it is something completely unreal. Rather, it is about what is supposedly actually possible, the realization of which is still pending, especially since it is not clear how an "action of nature" (as its purpose!) could be reconciled with human action. Bloch realistically recognizes: "Certainly, a nature subject ... remains problematic as long as, with this concept, no concrete mediation by man, as the youngest son of nature, has ever succeeded. But the possibility of doing this remains open and is mapped out in the object, not just in our comprehensibility, which without natural material would not even be possible as problematic. To summarize without speculating anything: *There is the system, the real possibility of a nature subject ...*" [188]

From here Bloch saw the possibility of establishing a new goal: the "co-productivity of a possible natural subject or concrete alliance technology". [189] What Bloch means by this, he clarifies briefly and succinctly in the *Experimentum Mundi*: "A ... non-exploitative behavior towards nature was already, according to the objective-real possibility, meant as *friendly, concrete alliance technology that tries to bring itself into harmony with that hypothetical nature subject*." (op. cit., p. 251, emphasis added by me.) And Bloch immediately cites a valid, almost completely topical reason for his demand: "This is all the more necessary since the accident has long since grown into a threatening self-extermination of humans, thorough destruction of a natural condition of existence by disregarding ecology." (ibid.) That sounds like the program for a movement that only started fully after Bloch's death, namely in the 1980s: the *green movement* almost at all levels, right up to the spectacular actions of *Greenpeace* and others, although it should be noted that Bloch, in contrast to almost all politicians of the "Green", requested a *social revolutionary* assisted reorientation of ecology by stating: "natural flow as a friend, as technology delivery and mediation of the creations sleeping in the lap of nature, that belongs to the most concrete of concrete utopia. But even only the beginning of this concretization presupposes interpersonal concretization, that is, *social revolution*; rather there is not even a staircase, let alone a door to the possible natural alliance." (op. p. 813 (emphasis added))

Nature alliance and social revolution are tasks that Bloch sees all humanity faced with. As history has shown, already each of these two tasks in itself seems to be hardly solvable. *The creeping environmental catastrophe continues, the social revolution (towards the "realm of freedom") has either failed to materialize or not taken place at all. Whether the former is just a consequence of the latter seems questionable.*

Nevertheless, I still subscribe to what *Rainer E. Zimmermann* remarks at the beginning of his article "*Nature Alliance, Alliance Technology*" in the "Bloch Dictionary" (2012, p. 349 f.): "The question of a peaceful synergy between man and nature arises now as before and more urgently than ever. The unreflected, unscrupulous incorporation of nature into privatized production is expanding across the world and leads to enormous damage for the general public in the short term and to serious survival problems in the long term. The oblivion of nature in the prevailing industry, which nature wants to make itself submissive without listening to it, is based on an understanding of technology, the model of which is always submission: >Our previous technology<, writes Ernst Bloch, >stands in nature like an army of occupation in enemy territory, and it knows nothing about the interior of the country.< (PH 814). For Bloch, reason therefore dictates a nature alliance, which he explicitly undertakes to anticipate: namely as the real incorporation of human beings [...] into nature" (ibid., 817). The communication of technology with nature takes place within the framework of a concrete alliance technique, by means of which the "co-productivity of a possible natural subject" (ibid., 802) is taken into account: "The more an alliance technique should become possible instead of the external one, one with the co-productivity of nature, the more surely the formative forces of a frozen nature will be released again." This is a concrete utopia, the realization of which is to be demanded the more emphatically, the more the creeping ecological catastrophe spreads.

d) World view and change

Change of values. Values come and go. What seems to be valid today can be questioned or overridden tomorrow. Old values are replaced by new ones, and vice versa. Individuality instead of personality and community; Self-realization instead of tradition; free time instead of work, etc. Manifold mixes of values occur. There is personal freedom, subject-object, "cooperative individualism", liberal socialism, religious intolerance, being-in-and-for-itself, etc. But which values are recognized and / or realized by which individuals and / or communities at which times., is decided by value-change, about which I have already set forth a lot of details (see p 18 ff.).

Values decay. The following compilation of advertising slogans may *reveal* what is currently in the process of *evaluations*. I happened to read: - It's okay to be pampered. - As colorful as life. - Just awesome. - Are you against it? Then be there! - Naturally beautiful. The new collection. - I love these chickens! - The everyday skills are the most valuable. - As versatile as your favorite city: Our new treatment concept. - How do you recognize good meat? - You can tell good coffee by its taste!

You can smile or laugh about it, be surprised if not disgusted or even start thinking. But: Why can we even care about something like that? What is it that appeals to us? What is *in us* addressed, prompted us perhaps other emotional and mental associations? If we think hard enough, we will probably find the other side of the colorful, suggestive coin: attempts at manipulation! Because no matter how we feel: we should buy, buy, buy ... Because: "Buying apparently offers variety for the bored, comfort and security for the sad, hope for those who dream of a better life. And something that everyone probably wants: recognition." [190]

If our "budget of values" starts to falter, for example due to failures and / or disgruntlement, we look for opportunities to compensate: "The lower the self-esteem and the greater the uncertainty, the greater the promise of valuable products. This does not only apply to shopaholics." (ibid.) - What happens in our consciousness, and, moreover, especially in our subconscious, is the subject of extensive scientific research. I would like to single out only the phenomenon of compassion, empathy, and its dark side: What our mirror neurons spontaneously understand, e.g. when observing a certain movement sequence in a living being, is not only positive, not only edifying: a weight lifter shows his art and advertises drinks, which we like to imitate with the appropriate hand movement. Without realizing at once in what a curious, frightening way we thus are *manipulated*. It is a manipulation that goes as far as the establishment of a new "religion": that of *consumerism*, which marketing strategists have repeatedly rekindled, and for the promises of which we have "become increasingly receptive": "Because the family, the association and the church are losing meaning, people are looking for new things and activities that create identity and community. Many believe they can be found in consumption." (loc. cit. P. 2).

And a new "credo" reads: "I shop, therefore I am" (loc. cit. p. 3), a particularly treacherous change in values, in view of which *Descartes* would turn in his grave. Because

this change leads to nothing, because consumption causes isolation and, in the worst case, loneliness, but not the longed-for new bonds.

With particularly fatal consequences for insecure, depressed, oversensitive people who are unable to cope with the increasing consumer terror in connection with information and stimulus overload, so that even their innate and acquired value systems threaten to disintegrate. Other possible consequences: Increasing disorientation, loss of opportunities to find and give meaning. So that *Karl-Heinz Hillmann* states: "Sometimes life seems pointless. Feelings of fear of the future, pessimism and resignation spread. The growing gap between changing values and one's own personal existence gives rise to the feeling that one no longer fits into society and instead ends up on the sidelines."^[191] Which can even lead to suicidal thoughts and attempts! Another danger: Flight into extremism, of a political, religious, esoteric, secret type. So that the feared social exclusion inevitably occurs.

All of this can be prevented by those who reflect on their own, perhaps only buried or repressed value horizons as well as those of historical tradition, on horizons that are not always identical. Everyone can, for oneself, find a new value orientation, certainly also in those value systems and value syntheses that I have presented in the present work.

Still binding values? The question arises, however, whether there are *binding* values on the basis of which such a reorientation is possible. Freedom, equality and solidarity are apparently everywhere recognized basic values, worldwide accepted or demanded human rights. And yet these values are repeatedly disregarded, trampled with boots, so to speak, as was already evident in the tragic course of the French Revolution in Kant's time.

Of the three terms mentioned, *equality* apparently causes the most difficulties, especially since, in addition to the (required) legal equality, there is *natural inequality* between people: We are born with different gifts and talents. And the ways of the world, on which our differences gradually develop, are always different, and unfortunately not always in a positive way. A wide field.

Real equality remains a long way off as long as social inequality persists and is constantly worsening in many places. As long as the social question is not satisfactorily resolved, equality can at best endure as equality before the law, provided that this is not undermined, e.g. by class justice.

Perhaps *Babeuf* is even right when he declares not only equality but also *freedom* to be illusory as long as social inequality prevails. All the more if Kant's assertion is true that no one is really free until *everyone* is free. Nevertheless, no one will be willing to forego *the concept, the value and the ideal of freedom*. If people "are born free", are and should remain so, we must ask why so many in the course of their lives are not free, internally and / or externally. Which at least suggests that we should constantly rethink the concept of freedom, for which Kant can offer help.

The same applies to solidarity. Confessions to it, also in the form of human rights declarations, are not sufficient as long as they do not effectively combat lack of freedom, oppression, hunger, malnutrition and other forms of misery; which is certainly also a *question of behavior*. Are there standards for morally impeccable behavior? Kant tried to answer this question too.

He trusts the basic questions of what we can know what we hope and what we *ought* to do: to anthropology, the philosophical doctrine of man, namely the central question: "What is man?" And he gives to this also an answer: "The human being is person!" (also the title of a work by *Johannes Schwartländer*, with the subtitle: *Kant's teaching on human beings*, 1968).

As a person, people have their purpose in themselves and can therefore set goals and realize *values* in a self-determined manner. Whereby Kant sees one of the highest values in acting morally *objectively correctly*. However, he is realist enough to know that such morality cannot be taken for granted, is not possible without preconditions. As one of the basic pre-settlements, he calls the *good will*, that only is able to neutralize the malevolence latent in every human being. Because only the good will is what "could be considered good without restriction". The most outstanding "*talents ... of spirit ...*" and "*of temperament*" can be extremely harmful if not curbed and controlled by goodwill. - This shows that Kant in his moral doctrine, at least as a tendency, intends the *whole* human being and not just his reasonable part (which is occasionally overlooked!). (See Kant: *Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Hamburg 1965, p. 10 f.)

However: with Kant, the good will already become good through *wanting the good*, not only through good action. Good will is a prerequisite for morality, not the morality itself, which makes good action possible. And morality can only be justified philosophically when good will is combined with good disposition, and especially with *reason* and a *sense of duty*. Only then does such an attitude *gain infinite value* and consequently the highest level of commitment. What Kant stated in 1788 in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Hamburg 1967, p. 147 f.): "The *value* of an attitude that is *completely* appropriate to the moral law is infinite: because all possible happiness in the judgment of a wise and all-wealthy dispenser of the same has no other limitation than the lack of the adequacy of reasonable beings to their duty." Obviously Kant thus raises the reference to duty as a criterion for any moral obligation and develops from it his categorical (i.e. "absolutely valid") imperative: "Act *only according to the maxim through which at the same time you can want it to become a general law.*" <

At this point at the latest, however, the cat will bite its tail. Because I have been able to show that a) the claim to absoluteness with which Kant justifies the Cat. Imp. is not tenable and b) some of his basic concepts (duty, ought, general legislation, etc.) are at least questionable, if not are brittle (see p. 7 ff.). But what helps in this situation? Possibly a new justification that is not absolutely valid, but claims to be coherent. So in

Materialism. If values arise through work in and on the material, which I do not doubt, theoretical and practical knowledge about the matter can also be understood as the basis of every value ethic. The comparative instance, the *tertium comparationis*, for matter and spirit can only be man, more precisely: man as a person. Materialism as the basis of life can be concretized through a multitude of concepts from materialistic theoreticians, from Democritus (see p. 54 f.) to Gassendi and Lamettrie (see p. 101 ff.), to Marx, Engels (see p. 121 ff.) and Bloch (see above p. 171 ff.). In the following I refer to the teachings of *Pierre Gassendi* (1592-1655) as an example.

Descartes is regarded as the new founder of philosophy, his critic Gassendi as the innovator of materialism, i.e. of a "developed materialistic worldview", as *Friedrich Albert Lange* expresses it in his "*History of Materialism*" (1866). Gassendi owes this reputation mainly to his revival of the philosophy of Epicurus, but also to atomistics (atomic theory). He even succeeded in reconciling Epicureanism with Christianity and thus offering an alternative to the Aristotelianism and scholasticism that had prevailed until then. This in itself was a great achievement, especially since Epicurus had been misunderstood and frowned upon in the Christian West for centuries.

Gassendi criticizes Aristotelianism and scholasticism in the ground because he considers their schematism and conceptual games to be unscientific. Because Gassendi himself, as a physicist and philosopher, is convinced that all knowledge has to be based on *experience*. So he is an empiricist. He finds reasons for this view first and foremost in matter itself. In "First Matter" he sees the "persistent substratum" of all things. This matter is ungenerated and indestructible. All forms of being emerge from it. It consists of atoms that are substantially identical, but can be changed in terms of their figures or shapes. Things come and go according to the way atoms connect or separate from each other. Knowledge of these processes determines any further experience. Incidentally, Gassendi orientates his atomic theory largely on the corresponding teachings of Epicurus.

Gassendi's empiricism, his insistence on experience, is incompatible with Descartes' metaphysics. This makes the *Cogito* seem questionable. In order to assure oneself of one's own existence, one can proceed from any other action instead of thinking. Besides, it doesn't make sense to ask *whether* you are, but rather *what* you are. Descartes did not answer this question correctly. It is absurd to deny a thinking being physical qualities such as expansion or mobility. Descartes had not succeeded in adequately appreciating the basic physical and mental state of human beings. With a (moreover, untenable) theory of substance this is not possible, especially since Descartes cannot prove that thinking is the actual substance of man, so that he only consists of spirit and not also of physical. It is clear that no human being exists or can exist without his or her body. An "incorporeal" person could not feel pain, an allusion to the argument that Descartes makes in the 6th "*Meditation*" rather surprisingly in favor of the body and soul unity of the person. For Descartes this is a unity of physical and non-physical. Gassendi considers this to be illogical when he states: "How should what is physical grasp what is incorporeal, in order to keep it in connection with itself, or how should the incorporeal grasp the corporeal in order to reciprocally perceive it to keep tied up, when there is absolutely nothing in it by which it can grasp or be grasped?"^[192] If body and mind have been separated by the substance doctrine, they cannot be brought back together again by a few affirmations of functional unity. Descartes did not even see that the mind was also in a certain way extended.

Descartes rejected all of this as allegedly "unfounded". Gassendi had by no means succeeded in bringing forward valid counter-arguments or even in refuting the Cartesian conclusions. It should be noted, however, that Descartes did not go into an essential thesis of his critic, namely that of the supposedly "innate" ideas.

To my mind, Gassendi's materialism rather than Descartes' rationalism can serve as a practical life-foundation. This does not mean, however, that materialism can in any case make possible a *final justification* of ethics or even just a Kantian claim to absoluteness for the Cat. Imp. Rather, this is already ruled out by *Heisenberg's* theory of the uncertainty relation. In addition, if atomic physicists want to get to the bottom of the elementary particles, and thus to the "basic building blocks" of matter, they have to rely on experiments, for example with particle accelerators, and must find that the results of their observations come from the experimental ones, among other things Conditions and preferences that you set up yourself as an observer.

The person as body-soul-spirit being is to be understood both in terms of matter and spirit-soul, which in no way implies any kind of dualism of body and soul. This seems to be excluded because the original world-matter undoubtedly also underlies the existence of man. The facticity of man, including his mental and spiritual being, is based on

matter, more precisely: on the in-possibility of matter or the information and finalities inherent in it. The "Logicon" of matter (Bloch), i.e. the telos-structures of matter, their latent possibilities of aim, purpose and meaning, brought about the human spirit, not the other way around. This is the basis and at the same time the *ultima ratio* of materialism. And only materialism, not positivism, idealism or spirit philosophy, can, for the reasons mentioned, serve as the first basis of explanation.

This does not affect the fact that *new* information (= setting into form) is constantly being produced in the universe, which, in the end, it is not manageable. What we know about matter depends on the extent to which the information about it in the universe is recognized and deciphered, up to now not more than approx. 6 percent! In addition, there is the fact that E-particles act entelechetically, i.e. with the aim of making new combinations possible. What in the course of evolution in the human brain has led to the fact that the possibilities of neural combinations are neither manageable nor mathematically comprehensible. (This in astonishing parallel to the unmanageability of the universe as a whole!) - However, the *behavior* based on the neural combination possibilities is by no means arbitrary, but requires *orientation towards values* (see above). The in-possibilities of matter is thus the basis of ethics and morals.

Language, cognition, science, ingenuity, technology. According to Aristotle, the human being is 'zoon logon echon', a being with reason, understanding and language, and at the same time 'zoon politikon', a community being. Both belong closely together. Reason and mind are, among many others, expressed in language, which in turn allows and largely assures targeted communication and thus Community. In the community, on the other hand, language is constantly evolving, through new words, concepts, expressions, means and expressions of speech, new terms. So that a person's linguistic ability also gains the greatest importance for the personal being, i.e. for each of the individual syntheses of self and community consciousness. In any case, personality concerns the totality of the human being ("le volume total de l'homme", as Emmanuel Mounier noted, see above). In the Indo-European linguistic area, there are certain peculiarities of the language structure, such as the prevailing relationship patterns "subject-predicate" and "subject-predicate-object", which has literally set in motion the "expansion of the personal and subjective area as well as its independence from things and processes"(W. Luther 1970, p. 193, see also Robra 2003, p. 173 ff.).

This results in the so-called "Sprachapriori", a priority position of language, which is supported by the fact that our language, as inner speech, constantly accompanies us and controls our behavior or at least strongly influences it. Nevertheless, this language priority has recently been more and more questioned or relativized. *Werner Meinefeld* (1995) , for example, suggests a "magic" triangle in which 1. the "subjective cognitive organization", 2. the "linguistically formulated social interpretation of reality" and 3. the "reality" itself constantly influence one another, without it being possible to determine which of these three factors is the strongest; while it cannot be doubted that all three factors come into play in the cognitive process.[193]- I do not agree with Meinefeld's pragmatic view that the three factors of the triangle are connected "via action" (ibid.). Because nature also *works* in man who is not only a cultural being. Acting is only a *part of the effective reality*, which also includes the unconscious!

But what is *cognition*? I assume that it is always accompanied and influenced by language, but that it is gained decisively only through thinking and other, also non-linguistic experiences. "Objective knowledge" is considered to be possible or at least approximately achievable in the most common cognition theories. In his Critical Realism, *Nicolai Hartmann* takes the view that the subject is "determined" by the object when it comes to knowledge, especially since the subject, contrary to Kant's assertion, in no way "prescribes laws" to nature, but can only *discover* its laws. *Sir Karl Popper* dedicated an entire book (1972/1995) to the subject of "objective cognition". Whereas in his Critical Rationalism he admits that knowledge, of course on the subject side, is always guided by theories. Theories are valid as long as they have not been refuted (falsified). Popper advocates accordingly an *Evolutionary epistemology*. According to this, objective knowledge is possible because nature and human spirit come from common origins and therefore a relationship of "fit" exists between them.

Marxists, on the other hand, assert the primacy of the dialectic of subject and object. In *dialectical materialism* Karl Mar seeks to "put Hegel from his head back on his feet". This means that certain truths of idealism are to be linked with those of materialism. The subject's work on his objects can not be understood as "purely spiritual". The dialectic gets a material substructure, in the last instance: the economy.

On the other hand, *Lenin's* additions to an official "DiaMat" (dialectical materialism of the Soviet system), for example in terms such as "Abbild" ("image modeling") and "reflection" ("Widerspiegelung"), are now considered inadequate and outdated, not only in neuroscientific terms .

Linguistically, the possibility of exerting influence is based, among other things, on the always subjective associations of senders and addressees. Different, ultimately unmanageable word associations result in different semantic fields accompanied by different evaluations. So that it is presumably impossible to explain *understanding* (that is indispensable also for the process of cognition) just by means of the philosophy of language.[194] Here, too, it should be remembered what the philosopher *AJ Ayer* (1910-89) gave for thought in his Oxford introductory lecture of 1959, namely that "the investigation of the use of language is not sufficient to elucidate the factual questions".[195]

Science. Heidegger has done the famous-infamous saying that science "doesn't think". In fact, however, science is about person- and subject-specific subject-object relationships, i.e. processes of *thinking* and cognition that serve to find out scientific truths in order to work out the respective solutions to problems, which cannot be done without theory and a reference to truth. That means: Science does not work without making use of the correspondence, coherence and consensus theories of truth, so that scientists can work not only in a team, but also individually, but always on the basis of the knowledge and experience of the other experts. In addition, for ethical and practical reasons, for every theory the *practical relevance* must be taken into account as far as possible. But what is the subject of science? And: How does theory relate to practice? The object can be "everything that is", as Aristotle already demanded for philosophy, thus any practice as an object of theory. And any theory must be measured against practice, true to Kant's thesis: "What, for reasons of reason, applies to theory also applies to practice." [196] Which forbids scientists to withdraw to ivory towers as well as to unethical positions. Even if science is not the only one responsible for its results. For theory and practice are not just about science, but also philosophy, especially ethics as the theoretical science of morality, and morality itself, as conditioned by social practice. Ethics and morals are largely related to one another like theory to practice.

Ingenuity. "People have to know how to help themselves" is a common saying. As long as this is not possible for *all* people, there is a danger that the acute threats get out of hand (see above p. 1-2). People who are actually able to help themselves are in constant advantage because they can rely on their abilities. Not all, but many people also and especially in everyday life have the ability to master unforeseen situations and problems because the right thing occurs to them at the right moment.

All inventors are naturally gifted to have ideas. But where do the ideas come from? Certainly not from the sky or from the airless room, but from one's own "neural" possibilities (which are known to be unlimited). Anyone who can bring knowledge and experience to bear creatively, i.e. apply them to new facts in new, original combinations, has the talent for inventing, which, consequently, is not only given to the genius. So that it is incomprehensible why the term 'invention' is nowadays more and more reduced to its use for *technical purposes* (e.g. in the sense of patent and utility model law). Invention undoubtedly retains its justification (and necessity!) for existence. And also for science, art, literature and philosophy.

Prime example: dealing with the ecological disaster. If this could be averted by purely technical solutions, namely in the areas of environmental technology, we would have had ample opportunity to do so for at least 50 years. The reason that this is not, or not done to a sufficient extent, so that rather the disaster has attained more threatening dimensions, is due not only to defects in the technology and its application of technology, but on political, social and ideological shortcomings. An extremely difficult, serious problem, to which I will come back in the final part of this work, including the chapter 'eco-ethics (II)'.

The ascending hierarchy of values should not be underestimated here: discovery - knowledge - invention. A discovery is made by those who find something that was previously unknown. Knowledge proves who makes correct statements about previously unknown facts on the basis of sufficient reasons; while the invention arises from creative activity through which something new, something *not yet* given, is produced. What these three levels have in common is that they are associated with certain experiences, paired with thinking, imagination and cognition. In inventing, there is consistently a high level of emotionality and joy, allegedly even in the brain, where inventing releases dopamine, which also plays a role in emotional life, for attentiveness and concentration and as "accompanying music" to ecstatic states of mind . [197]

Technology is there, similar to ingenuity, not only in economy and industry, but also in science, art, literature and philosophy, where the meanings of the term itself everywhere intersect with others, so with process, method, procedure, craftsmanship and the like. In 1950, Heidegger (1889-1976) named "being", "das Ge-stell" ("the frame", "the thing-put-there") and "bringing forth" as synonyms for technology. A good quarter of a century later, shortly before his death, in the SPIEGEL interview of May 31, 1976, he remarked that the term "Ge-stell" had perhaps been chosen somewhat "clumsily" by him and was often "laughed at" by others; however, it remains to be noted: "The rule of the frame says: Man is posed and challenged by a power that is evident in the essence of technology and that he himself does not control. To help to this insight: thinking does not ask for more. The philosophy is at the end." (loc. cit. p. 209). Shortly before, he had asserted that philosophy had already been almost completely replaced by the sciences and would ultimately be completely absorbed in "cybernetics". - This is of course a declaration of bankruptcy of philosophy and at the same time a capitulation to the alleged omnipotence of technology.

How could this happen? Answers can be found in the lecture on *The Question of Technology* that Heidegger gave in 1950 at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. In this he wants to find out the *essence* of technology. This is not in the technical , not to be found in the technology itself , but in one of the ancient Greek basic meanings of the term 'techne', namely the 'poiesis', the primeval 'creation', in which there is always a "bringing ahead" ("Her-vor-bringen").[198] However, this also applies to physics, nature, and indeed "in the highest sense", since nature itself is the creator, which in humans, in art, handicraft, etc., can only indirectly be the case; while everywhere in nature, art and

other creation the "causing" or the causality can be found, which Heidegger also calls "revealing", for which the term "truth" (Greek "aletheia") is to be used, but not as mere "accuracy of representation", but in connection with the 'Episteme', the detection: the *bringing ahead of the previously hidden* (op. p.12 f.).

However, *modern* technology is not satisfied with that. It renounces any claim to art in favor of the pure use and exploitation of nature, which has to "provide energy". It is no longer just a matter of "revealing", but rather of "*challenging*" (= "Heraus-fordern"!). To what Heidegger makes several other, sometimes strange assertions. Nature becomes an "object that can be ordered" (p. 15) and the challenge to nature always takes place under the aspects of "control and security". "Ordering" leads to "existing" ("Be-stand") as the "way in which everything comes into play that is affected by the challenging uncovering" (p. 16). In addition, all of these provisions have their basis "in what comes up to language" (p. 17; which I think is highly informative, because Heidegger obviously means what comes up with *his* "language", i.e. in his strange denominations and interpretations, including the "Ge-Stell", which H. also defines as "the gathering of that constellation that confronts people, that is, challenges them to reveal the real in the manner of ordering as "existing" ("Bestand"). 'Ge-stell' is the name of the method of revealing that prevails in the essence of modern technology, but is not anything technical itself" (p. 20).

This also makes obsolete the common view of the "only anthropological determination" of technology, according to which technology means nothing else but *'doing' as a means to an end* (pp. 20-21). - In my opinion, this alone makes technology scary, downright demonic, because, in Heidegger's view, it relates to the whole of nature and culture, ultimately to the whole of "*being*", which always not only encompasses but also transcends human existence, right down to the Primal and abyssal in it: "Technology, the essence of which is being itself, can never be overcome by man. That would mean that man would be the lord of being" (p. 38).

Modern technology becomes a *danger*, especially because it is a "fate" ('Geschick') that is of incomprehensible, cryptic origin; whereby Heidegger, however, becomes entangled in contradictions. Because suddenly, albeit on the basis of new considerations, he claims that the *Ge-stell* disfigures "the appearance and rule of truth" (p. 27, while he had previously referred to Ge-stell and 'aletheia' = truth as synonymous, p. 20). Not as such, but through the rule of the frame in "fate", modern technology becomes a danger for people; for which Heidegger, however, immediately, with *Hölderlin*, presents an effective antidote: "But where there is danger, there grows / what is saving, too." (p. 28). What then is no longer about technology, but about a typical Heidegger interpretation of the Hölderlin verse, whereas the question arises: If the frame no longer only "disfigures" the poiesis, but also the truth, what then is still the "saving" in modern technology? In 1950, H. thought it could still be named: It was the "essence of technology" that people learn to "preserve" better and better. Although one must "keep extreme danger in mind" (p. 33), but all was in vain if "all uncovering consists in ordering and everything is presented only in the unconcealedness of the "existing" ('Bestand')" (p. 34). Where against Heidegger recommends to reflect on the basic meaning 'poiesis' of 'techne'. Only the poetic can reveal what is essential in the beautiful. Artistic reflection leads back to the "shining" of truth" (p. 35).

But: At the end of his life, Heidegger apparently no longer believes in this shining either. When technology has become so overwhelming that it "tears more and more people away from the earth and uproots them", man finally even loses the earth, there is no more salvation, and philosophy (that of Heidegger!?) is actually at an end! ("We only have purely technical conditions. This is no longer an earth that humans live on today," says H. in the cited SPIEGEL interview of May 31, 1976, p. 206.)

Heidegger criticism. Heidegger was certainly an important thinker of a special kind. I could and can fully agree with his explanations of understanding as existential, and especially with his concept of time, with which he succeeded in reconciling subjective and objective aspects of the phenomenon.^[199] - It is different, however, with his ambitious goal to explain *being* ('das Sein'), in contrast to "being it" ('Seiendes'). He did not achieve this because in the analyzes of "Dasein" ("being there", 'existence') presented in *Being and Time* and elsewhere he did not get beyond the subjective description of beings. All the more important is the fact that in the 1950 lecture he identified being as *technology*, for relatively obvious reasons. If one wants to find out the *essence* of technology, one cannot avoid finding out and analyzing its characteristic features and properties. Heidegger does not undergo this effort, however, but immediately proceeds to the *interpretation*, relying entirely on his own "coming up" associations, terms and verbiage ("Ge-stell", etc.) that incidentally come to his mind. It should be noted that Heidegger sees no problem in this, because for him language is an over- personal, non-individual entity. He considers the "language of essence" to be the essence of language. - But: Which being *is speaking* if not the individual human being? As is so often the case with Heidegger, irrational assertions take the place of rational explanations. How easy it happens when you rely on your own fantastic linguistic associations instead of concrete factual analyzes.

This kind of fantasy leads the author to constantly new word and concept formations, the object of which is often barely recognizable. In my opinion, however, behind this are not mere whims, but tangible ideological interests and intentions. Why does Heidegger initially combine technology, being, truth, art and structure in order to later explain the "challenging structure" of modern technology as the antagonist of truth? Why does he reject the common, "purely anthropological" definition that technology is human activity as a means to an end? Why does he stylize the existential threat emanating from modern technology as a "fate" of being, from which he, with Hölderlin, promised "salvation" in 1950, whereas in 1976, the year of his death, he sees everything, even the whole earth, victim of the alleged omnipotence of technology?

Behind all this, I presume Heidegger's involvement in national socialism, from which he never distanced himself. Anyone who talks about modern technology as the "greatest danger" for humanity in 1950 and conceals what happened a few years earlier in Auschwitz and Hiroshima must have compelling reasons for this. Heidegger had them. He should have admitted that the Nazis' assiduity and obsession with technology was one of the main causes of the catastrophes mentioned. Why did the Nazis develop terrorist weapons like V2 rockets, supersonic fighter planes, and almost even the first atomic bomb? But only to realize their megalomaniac plans for world conquest. ("Today Germany belongs to us, tomorrow the whole world!") Fortunately, the rest of the world, which remained reasonably sensible, stopped the Nazis and their war allies, but at a terrible price: the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the danger of a nuclear holocaust that continues to this day. Heidegger obviously did not want to admit the Nazis' complicity in this; he preferred to remain a staunch Nazi until the end of his life. And why did he shortly before deny any possibility of making the technology controllable by humans? Did he recognize that the equation of technology = Ge-stell = Being = Art = Truth, which was established in 1950, does not work, that it is precisely this equation that reveals the Nazi attitude of its author?

That's what I'm expecting. It is the insight into these contexts that apparently reveals the true meaning of the outrageous interpretations and verbiage that Heidegger allows himself. And this may also be the reason that he completely ignores what actually constitutes the essence of the art of technology: *inventions* resulting from *ingenuity* (see above). It was not nature, but primordial humans who invented what we call 'technology'; in the following period, however, including the development of weapons from the hand ax to the atom bomb. I have described the abysses that open up as a result (see above). Heidegger had to fear accusing himself of criminal acts, if he had dealt with the causal interactions mentioned above. - If mankind one day succeeds in mastering all kinds of technology, including their consequences, this would probably be due to ingenuity in all areas, not least of society, politics and ethics. If we don't succeed, we are threatened with doom, for example through AI and super robots (see below).

Technology assessment (hereinafter: **TA**). Is technology now a curse or a blessing for humanity? Undoubtedly a highly philosophical question that has been part of the discussion about TA worldwide for a long time, i.e. since the 1960s. Until then, if one disregards some skeptical to hypocritical theorists like Heidegger, scientific and technical progress was regarded as an "unreservedly positive driving force for social development". ^[200] This changed apparently not by the world-wide protest movement against nuclear war, nor by occasional US criticism of the "Manhattan Project" (that during the 2nd World War had promoted the development of US nuclear-bomb). Rather, the impetus for rethinking was the resistance to *undesirable ecological* developments since the 1960s, which in 1973 led to the establishment of an "office for assessing technological consequences at the Bundestag", the predecessor of the definitive German parliamentary office for TA. Its task was and is primarily to evaluate not only assessments of the opportunities and risks of technology, but also to develop "political recommendations for action or guidelines for avoiding risks and making better use of opportunities".^[201] For the expert reports suitable for this, there is, to this day, apparently neither a criterion of prognostic certainty nor a "generally valid concept for the design and implementation" of the TA studies (loc. cit. p. 4). The reason for this is that, on the one hand, "effects cannot be easily foreseen as long as the technology is not yet sufficiently developed and widespread" and, on the other hand, "designing and changing" becomes all the more difficult, "the more firmly the technology is rooted" (op. p. 2).

At least some main topics can be listed that are dealt with in TA and in whose projects *sustainability* criteria are primarily applied to proposals for solving certain social, economic, ecological and related ethical problems. In detail, it is mainly about: 1. Environment, including, for example, surface sealing, resource, bio and genetic engineering; 2. traditional and renewable energy; 3. transport, including space travel and electromobility; 4. health, from diagnosis and therapy to nursing robots and to synthetic biology and nanotechnology; 5. work, including automation, digitization and robotization; 6. security, including with regard to armaments, among other things cyber war and data protection; 7. information and communication, also primarily on data protection, also on the Internet, cyber attacks, mobile communications, etc. (see also p. 4).

Although these topics are not only interesting for everyone, but existentially important, it has so far not been possible to include society as a whole in the TA. And this regardless of the fact that there are citizens' summits, juries and hearings almost everywhere, the latter also in parliaments, as well as interdisciplinary working groups, interview meetings and other forms of participation. More public attention has only emerged through the eco-protest movements and grassroots activities that have grown stronger since the 1990s. However, the TA experts still have problems with "provoking social participation, contributing to the formation of opinions on science and technology and thus ultimately increasing the > social planning security < with regard to complex decisions." (op. p. 4) .

Once again it is clear that those who pursue emancipatory goals are moving on difficult terrain, that of politics and society in theory and practice. The question arises to what extent the justified demands that follow from the TA, for example for climate and environmental protection, have a chance not only of acceptance in the population but

also of real implementation in a capitalist system. In that connection, I quote the article by S. Ehrenberg-Siliex (footnote 200, p. 5): "However, the pluralism leads in developed democracies to a very extensive differentiation of opinions, arguments and interests manifesting themselves in the emergence of numerous NGOs, (citizen) initiatives, associations, etc. and also create new political parties. At the same time, the long-term commitment to such interest groups is reduced, and in their place comes a situation-dependent pragmatism, especially among young people." If so, fewer and fewer decision-makers in politics, business and society will probably recognize the need for effective (immediate) measures to be resolved, a dilemma that, in my opinion, cannot be resolved without answers to the *system question*.

Alliance technology. Technology has made use of nature from the start. To push the destruction of nature through technology to extremes, up to the possibility of general self-destruction, was reserved for the 20th century. Ernst Bloch concluded probably rightly, that overcoming the lethal confrontation between technology and nature is not possible under capitalist systems (see above, pp. 246 f.). The question, therefore, is how a different kind of Marxism of technology should be constituted. In my opinion, Bloch does not go beyond certainly valuable, worth considering approaches, for example when he writes: "Nature is not over, but *the construction site that has not yet been cleared, the building material that is not yet adequately available for that inadequate human house* . . . That is why it is certain that the human house not only stands in history and on the basis of human activity, it is above all also on the *basis of a mediated nature subject and on the building site of nature*." (PH loc. cit. p. 807). But this is exactly where my skepticism arises. How should the "ground of a mediated nature subject" - as the basis of a new, harmonious coexistence of nature and technology - be explained when Bloch himself admits that the "nature subject" is a mere *hypothesis*? That "a subject of nature . . . remains problematic as long as no concrete mediation by man, as the youngest son of nature, has succeeded with it." (loc. cit. p. 810)?

I consider another concept to be helpful in this search, which Volker Schneider (born 1954) presented as early as 2004 following Bloch's 'Allianztechnik': an "alliance technique of thinking". V. Schneider rightly criticizes the "analytical-functional way of thinking" demanded and promoted in capitalism[203], a manifestation of factual belief and objectivism, which has led to various forms of *reification of consciousness*. Namely even to objectify the ego and self-being and, beyond that, our image of "nature around us" (ibid.). At least Schneider succeeds in correcting Nietzsche's shortening of the ego and self to the "body" (which is "a great reason"). On the other hand, V. Schneider states: "The self means the I, but it also means the we, and it means more than both: just a human becoming identical." (op. p. 171). However, man cannot come to himself if his consciousness is reified through objectivism, among other things. V. Schneider contrasts this with the recent neuroscientific finding that thinking is a process in which "information processing in the brain appears as a discourse between populations of neurons" (op. p. 169). In the alliance technique of thinking, therefore, the activity of the ego is reflected as *self and we* and as a prerequisite for "human identity" (see above). The I is not a static being, not a "factum brutum", but what Bloch means when he says: "I am, but I don't have myself. That is why we only become." (Cited above, p. 171; perhaps even another, genuine "image of *hope against death*"!).

Volker Schneider concludes: "If we look at what these neurons 'do' after the findings of more recent research, Bloch's approaches to an alliance technique and natural alliance do not seem so absurd. Neurons as collective actors who *do not* bear the mark of Cain of fixed boundaries, but are an individual-general one with an infinite status (Leibniz was probably on the trail of this). The only thing is that, to the numbers and the associated mathematics, when processing them, life would first have to be breathed. What in the processing of the defects of the living environment appears as the not-yet-settled, not-yet-achieved, *not-yet-existing*, but desired, is governor of the *natura naturans* as yet-unsettled. Here, dialectic-materialistic, and not analytical, thinking is required in order to solve the mind-body problem." (ibid., p. 169). - Which I tried a few years later, on the assumption that the mind-body problem can be solved by a dialectic-materialistic concept of information (see above, p. 99, footnote no. 89).

So I fully agree with Volker Schneider when he comes to the conclusion: "We only understand the alliance technology of neural communication and cooperation within us when we give up the dualistic view of the world." (op. p. 172). Especially since dualism and objectivism are mutually dependent. What is required is not objectivism and factualism, but dialectic-materialistic thinking in relation to the moved-moving connections between theory and practice, a way of thinking that is always committed to the *Not-Yet of the incomplete entelechy of matter*. Because: "We haven't arrived yet," as Volker Schneider says at the end of his lecture on the alliance technology of thinking.

Philosophy and religion. Fortunately, philosophy is not dead (as Heidegger claims), but continues to deal with "everything that exists", as Aristotle noted. Is philosophy therefore still "its time captured in thought", as Hegel expressed it referring to *the whole*, which he also called "the true"? Not at all, if Hegel's claims to *absolute* are maintained. We today do not have an overview of the whole thing - or no longer or *not yet* again? - and therefore we cannot build on the absolute. Nevertheless, still valid seems to be Hegel's definition that "philosophy is the history of people with themselves and with the subjects of their thought". Nobody is excluded from philosophy, everybody can practice it by means of common sense (*le bon sens*).

Religion is somewhat different. Whether God exists, as Absolute Spirit or whatever, cannot be proven by our, the human spirit; and neither does Nietzsche's daring assertion that "God ... is dead". However, this does not mean that any religion has therefore lost its right to exist. On the contrary: Subject to *agnosticism*, every religion is to be respected as long as it is able to coexist peacefully with other religions and world views. More on this in Chapter 10: *Values in Religions*, see above pp. 39 ff.

Enhancement of life, creativity, eco-feeling and -awareness. Eco-Feeling - by this I mean, above all, compassion, empathy, feeling with the well-being of the environment, nature, society, fellow human beings, and oneself. Also pity and compassion, without ignoring the dangers of exaggerated self-pity, and without the arrogance that is the pleasure to want to increase one's own privileges by the "luxury" of compassion for the underprivileged. Which is certainly not an enhancement of life, but only a mockery of all those people to whom it is not permitted to enjoy life to the fullest. Just think of the billions of unemployed or precariously employed, of starving people, people living in miser, who are denied or far removed from the eco-feeling. For well-known reasons of system, which make it clear to anyone who is sufficiently informed that an eco-feeling is illusory or superfluous as long as it is not supported and accompanied by an *eco-consciousness*. - I mean the knowledge of the causes - and the causers - of the eco-crisis, which not infrequently has expanded into a creeping eco-catastrophe. The latter is the case if irreparable damage has occurred due to environmental degradation, e.g. to the health or reproductive ability of humans, animals and plants, to the preservation of flora, fauna and infrastructure.

Problems of this kind overshadow all attempts to enhance life, such as those undertaken by Nietzsche or Camus with his "Mediterranean thinking". Except for a small "elite" of privileged people, an increase in life is still largely a utopia, even if it is a concrete one that can be concretised and needs to be concretised. What Nietzsche suggests, has thus largely model character, even though with his "Right of the strongest" can be founded no ethics and therefore no ethical justification of life. But maybe with Zarathustra, the "superman", who presupposes that the human being wants to surpass himself in every respect, to overcome everything inherited "bad" and to set new values? Undoubtedly *not* if this striving is also tied to the "right of the stronger" and the "will to power". Then the hope of mobilizing and increasing all vital forces can lead straight to fascism. ...

But how would it be if we succeeded in combining the enhancement of life with normative ethics of values? Again, this is not possible with a Nietzsche in whom the contempt for pity, Christianity, equality and solidarity results in political-ideological hatred of democracy and socialism. Not with the arrogant superman ("Herrenmensach"), who devaluates all conventional morality to "slave morality". - But, on the contraRY with a Nietzsche who wants to be completely "self", completely body, completely sensual person and yet also the sensitive spirit person, who sets new values (and thus a new morality!) And seeks a new "meaning of the earth". This Nietzsche calls for the total "reevaluation of values" in order to ensure that life is no longer subjected to values or even sacrificed, but rather the other way round: values have to serve life. And everything is valuable to him that can improve and enhance life and mobilize the spiritual powers of the human being (see below on: "Artists, philosophers and saints"). It is a worldview in which the Aristotelian *Dynamis* celebrates a happy birth. (Read up in Nietzsche's "Solution for all riddles", one of the drafts for "The Will to Power".)

In this dynamic world arises everything possible, everything conceivable, including the goal of "superman". All life should increase, should strive for higher, better forms. Nietzsche concretizes this incentive quite purposefully in his early work '*Schopenhauer as an educator*'. Here he formulates unmistakably teleologically: "This is the basic idea of *culture*, insofar as it only knows how to give just *one task* to each and every one of us: to *promote the creation of the philosopher, the artist and the sacred in and outside of us and thereby to contribute to the perfection of nature*." [204] With regard to art, he goes so far as to cite Goethe's appeal to "dramatic poetry" as the true "*causa finalis* of world and human trafficking" (ibid.). Nietzsche's world therefore lacks, in spite of all strength orientation and strength mucking, neither the cause of the goal nor the purpose. They are the highest cultural goals of creative action, of further thought and of unselfish altruism and common sense (of the "sacred", the "holy"), which should ultimately even contribute to the "perfection" (= telos!) of nature, to which Nietzsche explains: "And so in the end, nature needs the holy ("der Heilige"), in whom the ego has melted together and whose suffering life is no longer or almost no longer felt individually, but as the *deepest feeling of equality, sympathy and one* with all living things: the sacred, in whom that miracle of transformation occurs, to which the game of becoming never falls, that finite and highest human incarnation, towards which all nature pushes and drives towards its redemption from itself." (ibid., emphasis added). -These are partly puzzling, partly utopian or even concrete utopian impulses, which can undoubtedly also be made useful and fruitful for the current terms 'eco-feeling' and 'eco-consciousness'. Although to this aim, probably Nietzsche's whole *oeuvre* must be used, made available through countless special studies, such as to Nietzsche's "integral health philosophy", his philosophy of life (with all the most instructive references to the unconscious!), his anthropology and, not least, but primarily: his philosophy of art between Apollo and Dionysus. It is not possible for me to go into this special work here. Instead, I allow myself to let Nietzsche speak for himself once more to show the great extent to which heightened life, creativity, eco-feeling and eco-awareness come together and come to fruition in his work. They are all excerpts that anticipate Camus' *Mediterranean thinking and feeling*, as in:

"*Epicurus*. - Yes, I am proud that I perceive the character of Epicurus differently than anyone, and with everything I hear and read about him, to enjoy the happiness of the afternoon of antiquity - I see his eye look on a wide, whitish sea, over rocks on the shore, on which the sun lies, while large and small animals play in its light, safe and calm like this light and that eye itself. Such happiness could only be invented by a perpetual sufferer, the happiness of an eye before which the sea of existence has become silent and which can no longer see enough of its surface and this colorful, delicate, shivering sea-skin: there has never been such a modesty of volition." [205] And that the author

is able to present such lofty feelings, such expressive images and metaphors in combination with highly philosophical reflection, even in rhyming verses without falling into mental poetry, is evident from the following poem, that belongs to the 'Songs of Prince Outlaw' accompanying 'Gay Science'.

To the mistral

A dance song

Mistral wind, you cloud hunter, / tribulation murderer, sky sweeper, / roaring transmitter, how I love you! / Are we two not of one womb / firstfruits, of one lot / predestined for ever?

Here on smooth rocky paths / I run dancing towards you, / Dancing like you whistle and sing: / Who you, without a ship and oars / As freedom's most free brother / Jump across wild seas.

... ..

Now dance on a thousand backs, / wave-backs, wave-perils -/ hail who creates new dances! / Let us dance in a thousand ways, / Free - be called our art, / Merry - our science!

Let us gather from every flower / One blossom for glory / And two more leaves for a wreath! / Let's dance like troubadours / Between saints and whores, / The dance between God and the world!

... ..

Let us chase the heavens-clouders, / world-blackers, cloud-sliders, / let us brighten the kingdom of heaven! / Let's roar ... oh all free spirits / spirits, together with of you / Roars my happiness like a storm. -

- And that forever the memory / Of such happiness, may take its legacy, / Take the wreath up here with you! Throw him higher, further, further, / Storm up the ladder to heaven,
 / Hang it - on the stars! (loc. cit. pp. 316-318)

Which, in another poem from the same collection, succinctly and sounds like this:

Sils-Maria

Here I sat, waiting, waiting, - but for nothing, / Beyond good and evil, now of light / Enjoying, now of shadow, all just play, / All the lake, all midday, all time without a goal. / There, suddenly, friend! became one to two - / - And Zarathustra crossed my way ... (op. cit. p. 315 f.).

In the face of such bold poetry, I remind you that the word 'poetry' is related to the ancient Greek 'poiein' which means 'to make, to manufacture; to invent poetry'. Does it follow from this that the *creativity* that unfolds in poetry, "well pragmatically", can be reduced to pure "doing" ? Hardly likely. Because the "create" in "creativity" means more, namely: "creating", so that "being creative" means: creating something *new* and unprecedented. But: What is the new thing, the trademark and distinguishing feature of valuable, i.e. in producing *new values* in research, philosophy and technology? Novum, the new, is a term for which, according to *Johan Siebers*, there was "no place" in pre-Marxist philosophy. [206] It was only through Marx's 11th Feuerbach thesis that the decisive turning point occurred here. If it is not enough that philosophers interpreted the world differently, and everything depends on changing the world into a better one, "a new constellation of theory and practice becomes conceivable, which also makes the New itself visible, not by subordinating the theory to practice, but by showing the fundamental practical revisability of theory" (Siebers op. cit. p. 414). This is in clear contrast to Soviet communist dogmatism, which claimed absolute power over all theory and practice and often did not even consider the really progressive novelty, such as basic democracy, to be worth discussing.

Ernst Bloch, on the contrary, characterizes the not-yet as a "tendency in the material process". The latency, as the still hidden new, becomes in the not-yet a tendency in the unfinished matter of the world process. The new should therefore not exist for the sake of pure novelty, but should be checked for its significance for front and ultimate, latency and tendency. Because there is undoubtedly also negative, destructive new things, such as the H-bomb, neutrons, AI and cyber war weapons, data abuse, incitement to hatred, fake news ("new"), populism, fun ideology, environmental and climate crises, epidemics, natural disasters, etc., with incalculable consequences for the well-being and continued existence of humanity .

Those are further valid reasons for legally securing the possibilities of life enhancement, in the ascending hierarchy: work [^] values [^] standards [^] general legislation [^] moral law.

Realm of freedom. For a long time the existentialist *Jean-Paul Sartre* was considered to be the embodiment of the *idea* of freedom *par excellence*. It was a freedom that all human beings were "doomed" to. It was limited only by the individual's sense of responsibility. What was allowed was what one could answer to oneself and to others ("the hell"), because after all the responsibility of the individual should bind "the whole of humanity". - A concept that Sartre did not change much even after his final turn to Marxism (from 1960). How can freedom be combined with dialectics? is now his question. Freedom remains a highest value, from which Sartre even discovers the meaning of being. What is new compared to conventional Marxism is the fact that Sartre continues to grant people freedom, namely as the ability to control *themselves* instead of outside control.

To what extent Sartre has moved away from Marx remains to be investigated . What capitalists call "freedom", Marx recognizes as the elbow freedom of the owners of capital and means of production. Where capitalistically "freedom, equality and property" seem to rule, in reality *egoism* is at work. ... "[208] But how can freedom be realized at all in such a state of total alienation? Not for Marx as long as the following applies under capitalist conditions: "Time for human education, for intellectual development, for fulfilling social functions, for social intercourse, for the free play of physical and spiritual life forces, even the celebration time on Sunday ... pure frippery!" (loc. cit. p. 3). Non-alienation is illusory as long as it is not the individuals as such but the capitalists that are "set free" in the so-called "free competition".

For Marx, freedom can only become relevant and really practical if the categorical imperative is followed to overturn all conditions in which "**man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being**" (see p. 124 f.). Freedom *for everyone* only prevails when: "In place of the old bourgeois society, there is an association in which the free development of everyone is the condition for the free development of all." [209] How this *free association of free individuals* can be achieved, Marx discusses in III. volume of '*Das Kapital*', where he writes : "Indeed, the realm of freedom only begins where work, which is determined by need and external expediency, ends; in its nature it is therefore beyond the sphere of actual material production. ... Beyond this begins the development of human strength, which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which can only flourish on that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is the basic requirement. "(MEW 25, p. 828). However, it is a change that must begin in the "realm of necessity", i.e. under the now existing conditions. Marx and Engels have recognized that for this it is necessary to stand up for the freedom of the individual that already exists in bourgeois capitalist society, including, not least, "freedom of the press, right of association and assembly", without which there can be no *labor movement*. The aim must be to "transform the state from an organ that is superordinate to society into one that is *entirely* subordinated to it" (op. cit., p. 6). How free or unfree a form of government is, can be recognized by the extent to which state power is restricted in it in favor of overall social control.

To which even the best-intentioned, legally "watertight" constitutional articles do not change anything. "Freedom of the person" and "free development of personality", as promised, for example, by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, remain rather non-binding as long as "property obliges" - what for? Above all for capitalist profit maximization? To neoliberal, worldwide safeguarding of private profit interests, even against national sovereignty and legislation? The Basic Law is silent on this as well as on the question of how this silence can be broken, which of course is at the same time a *highly moral* question. More information can be found in my chapter on eco-ethics and eco-socialism (see below).

e) aesthetic values

I - world - renaissance - art . Almost everything begins with a look, or several looks, that start from painted people and are aimed at the viewer. An "I" speaks to you - the basis of a new personalism, yes, a new image of man. For the first time, one paints persons as they really look: a clear break with the medieval-byzantine tradition of painting, in which, in two-dimensional representation, almost all figures look the same and are the same size. Apparently, *Giotto* (c. 1266-1377) was the first to experiment with perspective. *August Buck* discusses the following innovations: "The new thing about Giotto's painting, as it is expressed in his main works, the *frescoes of the Arena Chapel in Padua* and the *enthroned Madonna of the Uffizi*, is the clarity of the composition and the monumentality of his figures, who, as people, turn to the viewer. While the medieval portrait only reckoned with God and not with the viewer, this is the first time that the artist is addressing him. "[210] Giotto represents a new "personality

awareness" (Buck); his person is a person as I and you, he becomes a personality as an active, creatively active person, as a 'homo faber' who develops his abilities as widely as possible.

Francesco Petrarca (1304-74) partially anticipates what triggered the "real" Renaissance after 1453: the turn towards the self and, last but not least, the revival of the study of antiquity, through the commentary and publication of texts by ancient authors that were hardly known, like that of the stoic Cicero. They help him to found a new humanism. Scholastic abstractions no longer determine him, but poetic empathy, subtle psychology, emphasis on human abilities without denying his weaknesses. *He* seeks and finds *happiness*, in the sense of stoics like Seneca and Cicero, not in outward appearances, but in the personhood of the human being.

The diversity and versatility that Renaissance people of the 15th and 16th centuries will have at their disposal, can already be anticipated from the works of *Giovanni Boccaccio* (1313-1375). Humor, irony, imagination and seemingly boundless realism pervade his work, which does not stop even before the sex, but no more representing the rough acting out of oneself, but subtle eroticism, and so in wide-spread life contexts.. In his 'Decamerone' and other works, Boccaccio anticipates much of what later universal geniuses such as *Leon Battista Alberti* (1404-72) and *Leonardo da Vinci* (1452-1519) embodied. Alberti is already a real 'uomo universale', especially since he combines extraordinary intellectual gifts with unusual physical qualities and abilities.

Leonardo was not only a painter, poet and thinker, but also an athlete (fencer, jumper), sculptor, architect, engineer, musician, cantor, instrument maker, anatomist, astronomer, mathematician and natural scientist.

Genius cult in the 'Sturm und Drang' - aesthetic education - play. To combine body and soul, reason, intellect, sensory activity and feelings harmoniously with one another, who wouldn't want that? Kant's imperative attempt is at the expense of feelings. The opposite, the rejection of the pure rule of reason, is attempted by the authors of the literary movement of "Sturm und Drang" (approx. 1770-1780), whereby they often slide into pure irrationalism, for example by rebelling against the Enlightenment. This goes with an exaggerated *cult of genius*, which *Arnold Hauser* describes in his *Social History of Art and Literature* (Munich 1972, p. 636) as follows: "The genius rescues himself from the misery of everyday life in a dreamland of limitless arbitrariness. Here it not only lives free from the fetters of reason, but is at the same time in possession of mystical powers which make ordinary sensory experience superfluous. > The genius suspects, that is, his feeling takes precedence over observation. The genius is not watching. It sees, it feels. < "

Even the classics *Goethe* and *Schiller* also take part in this movement for a short time, but then find more sophisticated forms, content and problem solutions. This is how *Schiller* (1759-1805) succeeded in perfecting the classical ideal of humanity in a new philosophy of art, society and the state (see above p. 110 - 117).

F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) goes nearly as far as *Schiller*, especially since he also places art higher than anything else. In nature, *Schelling* sees an "unconscious spirit" at work, the highest product of which is nature. But art exalts and completes this spirit by combining intuition, thinking, knowing and acting. Only in this way does man come to himself, so that art (including the divine power of creation) must be placed above everything else.

Schelling's college friend *Hegel* (1770-1831), who recognizes the "sensual shimmer of the idea" in art, opposes this view with a completely different hierarchy, namely that the ascending levels follow art > religion > philosophy, which he defines for transitional stages or forms of increase of the "Absolute Spirit". The philosopher surpasses the artist because he is not satisfied with the actualization of the creative, but thinks about it. Art is surpassed by religion, because in this creativity and creature come together, so that arise further horizons that encompass all of reality.

The *value of aesthetics* is presented differently in the period of **Romanticism**, which was at times heavily criticized by *Hegel*. Romanticism? Isn't that the "moonlit magic night"? And what can it still mean today, in a time when all cats may be gray at night and people don't like to be alone? Can romanticism be explained on the basis of some basic terms? In any case, it would be completely wrong to isolate these terms and then try to explain their individual usage. Because in romanticism there is nothing fixed, everything is in the balance, in transition, including the terms that overlap, intersect, merge, sometimes remain unclear. If so, the question arises as to where there can still be peace for humans in this "restless contradiction". Only in yourself! is the romantic answer. The work by *Novalis* (actually: *Friedrich von Hardenberg*) is an example of this. In his *hymns to the night* (approx. 1800) he turns night into day and day into night, or better: into a figment of the night, so that here too the boundaries are blurred. In it he presents, among other things, a great fictional world theater, albeit in a metaphysically exaggerated and transfigured form, always in highly poetic, enthusiastic language. Dream, longing, love, activity, infinity, mystery, eternity - they turn out to be the basic concepts, basic *values* of *Novalis's* romanticism, in which, as with almost all romantics, *Christian love*, as is well known, also plays a supporting, emotional role. All people should experience and seize these values.

What *Novalis* created actually seems to be a *new mythology*, perhaps also in the sense of the *oldest system program of German idealism* (1796). Nonetheless, the anxious question remains whether such romanticism can also decisively advance *political emancipation*. (Apart from the advances in women's emancipation actually achieved in Romanticism.) Overall social political emancipation was the most important concern, the most important legacy not of Romanticism, but of the *Enlightenment*, which it heavily criticized.

On the other hand, there are many indications that the romantics build poetic castles in the air in order to cover up their own political resignation and powerlessness. Almost everyone was terribly disappointed with the outcome of the French Revolution, but also, after initial enthusiasm, with *Napoleon Bonaparte*. After 1806, many romantics joined the German hurra patriotism of the "Wars of Liberation", but with the restoration that spread from 1815 onwards, many fell back into political abstinence and apathy.

Nietzsche between Apollo and Dionysus. The contrast between the Apollonian and Dionysian can be relatively easily reduced to the formula that Dionysus symbolizes everything intoxicating and dreamlike, deep and subtle, whereas Apollo symbolizes everything beautiful and perfect, everything clear and harmoniously reasonable. The really new thing that Nietzsche brings to the philosophy of art, however, is the Dionysian, about which he writes in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1871): "Under the magic of the Dionysian, it is not only the bond between man and man that is formed again: the alienated, enemy or subjugated Nature also celebrates again the festival of reconciliation with her prodigal son, man. ..." Nietzsche claims of this "song of jubilation" that it was realized in the Attic tragedy. And the 27-year-old author announces very ambitious goals: people, nature and society should be reunited and no longer be alien to each other. (What *Marx* had already asked for, see above)

It is a Dionysian song of jubilation in which both romantic and anti-romantic traits can be recognized. Romantic is the total turn to (primeval) nature, depicted in highly poetic images and metaphors. Anti-romantic is the fact that Nietzsche here gives up man as I, subject, person and individual and lets him merge into the "art of all nature". The abolition of the ego (which is supposed to become "free" by disappearing!) corresponds to the development that the author carried out in later years up to the all-dominating "will to power"; at the cost of radical "masculinization" (*Karl Joel*), a master class that does not shy away from brutality and human contempt. It is hardly surprising that with Nietzsche such a "reevaluation" goes hand in hand with an ever increasing devaluation of Christianity, culminating in the pamphlet *The Antichrist - Curse on Christianity* (1888), bought again by the loss of the dignity of the individual. Which, of course, cannot have been the last word in philosophy of art.

Positions of the 20th and 21st centuries

Cast shadows of modern aesthetics: destruction, uncertainty, floating. At the beginning of what is called 'modern art' there seem to be some works by the Russian artists *Malevich* (1878-1935) and *Tatlin* (1885-1953). In 1915 *Kasimir Malevitch* presents *The Black Square on a White Background* in St. Petersburg, a picture that the painter himself described as "the framed icon of my time". The square was created by *Malevitch* laying all the paintings of the past on top of each other so that all colors and shapes were finally lost in pure black and thus in "pure feeling". What was left was a pitch-black square surface, into which a few whitish, curlicue-like streaks shimmer through here and there, faint but symbolic. Together with the black square and the white "nothing" of the surrounding back- and underground, these streaks seal the end of a tradition, because here white stands for the nothing of nihilism. Also for the end of the subject? In the 'black square' it only has an indirect, profound effect, in the non-representational symbolism of a "pure feeling", which *Malevich* also calls "suprematism". He expresses his firm conviction that he has reached a zero point in tradition, at which the final separation from it takes place. Beyond that: is there behind such symbolism only the intention of "seeing black" or "painting in black and white"? I find a completely different assumption astonishing: Here *Malevich* apparently foresaw the terrible catastrophes the 20th century would bring to mankind ...

With other types of funds and materials also *Vladimir Tatlin* tried a break with tradition and new beginnings by using table legs, rusty pieces of sheet metal and other arbitrarily collected matter pieces and shreds which had previously been considered not worthy of art. *Tatlin* processes, bends and reassembles some of these sheet metal parts, using them to form fantasy structures, sculptures without a base, bizarre and simply hung on the wall. So that surface and space can be opened up anew, new possibilities can be recognized. This later also included figurative, colored, subject-like elements without blocking the path that the two pioneers paved: towards completely new art forms and currents such as Expressionism, Dadaism, Fauvism, Surrealism, Cubism and Constructivism. To art phenomena that no art philosopher can ignore. The question now is what followed the "death of tradition", what new avant-gardes have emerged. A question that cannot be answered without concrete work analyzes and a reference to time. What is the essence of art now? What are their distinctive features and properties? Hasn't art been transformed into non-art since *Malevich* and *Tatlin*? What lying around previously unnoticed on piles of garbage - broken (utility) objects and their parts, knickknacks, junk, dirt and filth of all kinds - suddenly become arrangements and assemblies to museums and exhibitions. Often hardly understandable, but always with emotion and stimulation, sometimes commented by a shrug of the shoulders or incredulous amazement.

Similarly, but more far-reaching and radical, *Antonin Artaud* (1896-1948) no longer just wants to "represent" in his 'Théâtre de la Cruauté' (1935, the theater of 'cruelty' or sensual-emotional directness and intensity), but to shock: "The performance is supposed to attack the audience. The shock effect is deliberate, it should go back to paraesthetic target citations. Violence, somnambulism, madness are essential in intensified form. The depiction is about pure actions without the provided interpretations." (Schulz op. cit. p. 97). *Peter Handke* staged an *insult to the public* in a less ambitious way in the 1960s (!). – Also with *Georges Bataille* (1897-1962) eroticism, death intoxication, cruelty, self-wasting and holiness enter into new, unholy syntheses: "Human freedom lies in the revolutionary uprising of his nature, not in its oppression." (Schulz *ibid.*). How far can that go? Can this be represented with the conventional means of rational discourse? Absurd theater, 'écriture automatique' (automatic writing), concrete poetry, confused collages, video and photo montages, happenings, op and pop art distort and disrupt conventional rational discourse, turning meaning into nonsense. Why is that? Can we no longer bear alienation and dreary everyday reality in any other way? And why is the art business still going on in the traditional style alongside the new art forms?

In any case, the "sovereign" subject loses itself more and more, gets into ever new ambiguities and *states of suspension*. Since the traditional safeguards fail, the time has come for the "philosophy of floating", as Walter Schulz explains (op. pp. 416 ff.). In a "broken relationship to the world", modern man feels torn between trust and uncertainty, especially since in art and philosophy "negativity and floating appear as the primary object of representation", especially in an art that embraces all innovations and upheavals in spite of still "playing and relieving the pressure of reality" (loc. cit., see footnote no. 215, p. 323). What this means for the relationship between modern art and reality, Schulz explains, among other things, by stating that art can create or pretend (!) a "higher reality" through its syntheses of truth, appearance and deception. Because this "higher" reality (similar to Nietzsche) actually only exists in art itself: "Art reality does not exist before art; the artist creates it through "intellectual power." The higher reality is the work of a transformation that does not establish objectively, but presents a vivid picture, concealing its activity of conceiving." (op. cit. p. 424).

In that case, however, the question must be allowed as to whether there is not a danger here that appearance will defeat reality, and deception will defeat truth. Art would then be just "beautiful" fiction and utopia, which could never become *concrete* in non-artistic reality, could never affect the often dreary everyday reality as a pre-semblance of a better world.

'Schein and Vor-Schein' (semblance and pre-semblance) with Ernst Bloch and Joseph Beuys. From Bloch, one learns 1. **What art is not**: "It is said of beauty that it is happy, even enjoyed. But it doesn't have its reward yet, art is not food." [217] Bloch turns against the contemporary trend of completely commercializing art, so that every work of art can degenerate into a mere commodity and lose its uniqueness, its "aura", as *Walter Benjamin* recognized. Hardly bearable, because art is not kitsch, not just "pleasing"; Bloch: "What pleases is nice, but that alone is not enough. It is precisely the kitsch that can book the most votes for itself, and it is not without reason that every *exposed surface* is related to covering up and lying. What only pleases has removed the sting of dissatisfaction that is in everything, however beautiful. Art then serves all political whitewashing, and again it is not without reason that a lot of ideological fogging is also called whitewashing." [218] Art is also not religious "truth". – In all of this, art is neither history nor natural science, but "something other than a source of historical, natural history, even knowledge" (p. 246). And finally, art is not an illusion either, should it not be: "Art is non-illusion, because it works in an extension of what has become, in its more designed and appropriate expression." (p. 248). What grows on the ground of what has become cannot be illusory, even if it finds new, concrete-utopian perspectives, namely in that

2. **what art is or can be**. Because it begins in the *daydream*: "... people don't just dream at night, not at all. The day also has twilight margins, and there, too, desires are satisfied. Unlike the nocturnal dream, the dream of the day draws freely selectable and repeatable figures in the air; it can rave and babble, but also think and plan. It hangs idly (but it can be closely related to the Muse and Minerva) after thoughts, political, artistic, scientific. The daydream can provide ideas that do not call for interpretation but for processing; it also builds castles in the air as blueprints and not always only fictitious." (op. cit. p. 96). The ego always remains present, namely as a "model of what a person would like to be and become utopian", and not as a moral authority: "Daydreams have ... no censorship at all by a moral ego, like the night dream; rather: their utopian exaggerated ego builds itself and its own as a castle in the air in an often astonishingly light-hearted blue." (p. 101).

But how does the daydream affect art, what does it mean for it? Bloch's answer: "*The daydream as a preliminary stage of art* intends in a particularly meaningful way to improve the world, and has this as a perfectly healthy and real character; ... In daydreams, art contains this utopian being, not as recklessly gilding, but as one that also has deprivation in itself and that, if this is certainly not overcome by art alone, it is not forgotten in it, but is embraced by it of joy as a coming figure. ... People, situations are driven to their end by the end of the daydream in great art: the consequent, even objectively possible, becomes visible." (PH p. 106). Thus art exceeds its own present time and contemporary limitations, it brings the new, i.e. new perspectives of future to:

Appearance; for even the *appearance* of art, for example of the theater, is "nowhere illusory appearance, but *simply more sincere*, it too 'in an extension of what it has become, in its more designed and appropriate expression'". (see above) So that the appearance doesn't just "come out", but becomes a *pre-appearance* that is not an illusion and is not religiously transcendent, but rather has an artistic and world-immanent foundation. Bloch succeeds in offering catchy definitions for both pre-semblance and art. Regarding the pre-appearance: "In this way the slogan of the aesthetically attempted pre-appearance is: How could *this world be completed without, as in the Christian-religious pre-appearance, being blown up and apocalyptically disappearing*." (p. 248) And on art, with a formula that summarizes Bloch's aesthetics in perhaps the shortest possible form and at the same time identifies it as part of his *learned hope* ('docta spes') and *concrete utopia*: "*Art is a laboratory and also a festival of executed possibilities*, including the alternatives experienced therein, whereby the execution as the result happens in the manner of the well-founded appearance, namely the worldly perfect pre-appearance" (p. 249). With which Bloch ultimately means nothing else than the pre-semblance of the *realm of freedom for all people*, even if not already pre-grip on this ultimate goal. Because he is not only a utopian, but a realist enough to admit: "Whether the call to perfection – one can call it the ungodly prayer of poetry – becomes even more practical and does not just remain in the aesthetic pretense, is not decided in poetry, but in society." (*ibid.*)

Critical appreciation. My portrayal could have given the impression that Bloch only recognized and appreciated the daydream and not the nightdream as a possible source of artistic creation. It would be a misleading impression, because Bloch has also addressed the night dream accordingly, albeit far less intensively and in detail. In *Principle of hope* he devotes only a few pages (111-116) to the night dream as a source of art, in addition to the aspect of "playing nightly and daily dream together". Accordingly, his references to works by *Gotfried Keller* (p. 112) or to the 100 notes 'Dreams' by *Friedrich Huch* are short. Like Freud, Bloch recognizes the "royal road to the unconscious" in the night dream, but nevertheless describes it as the "poetry of the layman", even if he admits parallels between the dream work of the unconscious and the "poetry of art".

Like in the night dream, in art imagination, feeling, thinking and perception work together. Nonetheless, Bloch is undoubtedly right when he does not allow the night dream, but the daydream to have the potential for immediate usability in works of art. Even if it is unclear whether there is no moral censorship of daydreams, as Bloch claims. Because the unconscious is also always involved in daydreams, i.e. also the norms of the super-ego stored in it, based on *values*.

Another possible misunderstanding must be prevented. If Bloch sees a sediment and a supporting element of art in the pre-appearance, this does not mean that he is limiting his concept of art to this. Especially since he regards art as a "*laboratory and also a festival of realized possibilities*, including the alternatives experienced in it" (see above). The "unclosed" is for him a trade-mark of art, consequently also openness to new perspectives of future.

To **Joseph Beuys (1921-86)**. I heard about him in the early 1980s that he claimed that everything was art. Later I found out what he had really explained, namely: "Everyone is an artist." This is probably a modification of *Novalis*' saying: "Everyone can be an artist." So the question immediately arises as to which of these two bon mots comes closest to the truth. Beuys clarifies his point of view by considering how he sees his fellow human beings as "more and more alienated from their life, from their work, from their inwardness, from their creativity", as he expressed in a conversation with *Louwrin Wijers* in June 1980 at Düsseldorf. Which already mentions one of the key terms, the *creativity* that Beuys sees at work everywhere, when he adds in the conversation: "That means at work, in the hospital, in industry, on the railroad, at the university, that would have to be a new concept of creativity, so to speak, but one that has the consequence that one understands this system. That is the anthropological concept of art that one is entitled to say: **Everyone is an artist**. Of course, I'm not saying: Everyone can be a Rembrandt."... You should first think about how you feel about yourself as a person. ... Well, I always wanted to remind people to start thinking. So, whether they can answer themselves ... That would be the real creative task for me. So, these questions of the whole creative inwardness, the powers of will, the powers of feeling, the intellectual ability to think. It's all too easy to turn it off with this brush and the paper." [219] – But where does creativity begin? For Beuys, above all in people themselves, more precisely: in their *thinking*, because every thought forms a certain content "plastically", especially in every new idea. This happens completely autonomously, in the exercise of full free will. If so, free-creative activity accompanies every life, every action and creation. With far-reaching consequences for the concept of art. Apparently following Schiller's prophecy that "what we perceive as beauty here will one day meet us as *truth*", Beuys states that beauty is "the shine of the true" (op. cit., p. 1). But what is the "true" thing? According to Hegel it is "the whole", and for Beuys apparently the same, even if for him beauty "comes from the inside out of the truth", i.e. arises in creative imagination and not as a mere 'l'art pour l'art', to art only for the sake of art, but leads to new *knowledge*, so that art and thinking become equal means of knowing.

This opens the way to what Beuys calls the *expanded concept of art*, but which is just another expression for the general artistry he states, to which he notes: "Well, the expanded concept of art says nothing else than that every human being is an artist." [220] On this, i.e. on the freedom of individual thought and general artistry, Beuys bases his hope and claim not only to create his own completely new art forms, but also, in cooperation with *all* (!) people, to be revolutionary and reformist to have an impact on society as a whole.

But this philosophical basis is not the only source of Beuys' ambition and inspiration. A very personal trigger for this was a severe depression, a life crisis that he had to struggle with in the mid-1950s. He suffered from a state of exhaustion and a loss of motivation, allegedly caused primarily by psychologically unresolved war experiences. (Beuys was a volunteer in the Wehrmacht and was shot down over the Crimea as a dive fighter pilot in 1943 and was seriously injured.) But he succeeded in transforming the depression of 1955 into a personal "process of renewal" that he "focused on his art, on society, on politics and on its understanding of a democratic state" [221] in order to develop, among other things, his new, expanded concept of art from this. This inevitably was in opposition to the conventional concept, operation and management of art of his time, since the latter has lost all reference to people and society and exhausted itself in "formal style exercises". Beuys, on the other hand, uses new methods and new theories. If everything depends on *freedom*, this is rightly true of art, that is, both for "the choice of matter" (or materials) and for the creative process itself, which Beuys describes as "one of intuition, a process borne by the will and the strength of the heart, which, according to an idea, finds a form from the chaotic initial matter in which the idea becomes visible" (in: 'home', see footnote no. 219, op. cit. p. 1). It is a creative process that cannot simply be brought about arbitrarily, but rather proceeds from intuition and inspiration. Beuys said: "I only start work when something reports that I have to take action." (Ibid.) Against the conventional conception of art, he sets the equation: "Art = man = creativity = freedom" (St. Marx op. p. 1). In this, the person becomes the "master builder of the new society", that is, the "bearer of the revolution, the revolutionary innovations", which is only possible if everyone participates, "everyone gets involved in actively shaping" (ibid.).

The social sculpture. If the free creative thought is a work of art, "a sculpture", the term plastic can encompass everything, especially since it is, as such, extremely ambiguous and rich in associations. By the "plasticity of the sexual instincts" *Freud* understood, among other things, their "ability to change their goals". "Neural plasticity" is understood to mean "the peculiarity of synapses, nerve cells or even entire brain areas to change their anatomy and function depending on use in order to optimize ongoing processes" (Wikipedia), while *plastic rubbish* is now on spread across the planet into an ecological disaster with unforeseeable consequences. In any case, Beuys wants to achieve that society as a whole is redesigned, that is to say justly, through social behavior and that democracy becomes "more true", namely *direct*. He himself founds an association for direct democracy, an eco-social student union and a 'Free International University' and joins the Green Party.

In order to achieve widespread impact, Beuys uses ever new means of *provocation*, such as in completely forms of new op and pop art, happenings as rabbit slaughter, planting 7000 oaks, chairs with fat corners, original exhibitions, speeches and discussions etc. He deliberately provokes in order to get into conversation with people, even if he has to accept rejection, for example when the Munich bourgeoisie echoed: "We will not let ourselves be beuysened ('verbeuysen')!" Beuys: "It doesn't matter if people get aggressive. ... Then we at least get into conversation ... provocation always means: Now suddenly something becomes alive. If it's all so hardened, then you really have to toggle it so that it all comes up ... But I achieved that through my sculptures, that people got excited about it and then talked about it." [222] - Social sculpture becomes a personal and at the same time a social event that neither needs to be understood nor interpreted, as Miriam Sowa (op. cit. p. 1) explains: "For Beuys, understanding does not mean finding a self-contained interpretation. His works want to stimulate thought processes and associations through their radiation, release hidden human experiences and change consciousness." So it is enough that the viewer is intuitively stimulated by the social sculpture and brought to think further.

Critical appraisal. If every sculpture, as a result of being put into shape, represents a work of art, then all of nature consists of works of art, i.e. indeed the entire universe, which is constantly in shape (= in *in-formation*). Even from *valuable* works of art, as soon as the physical concept of work is used to explain the origin of values. Then something is constantly *working* in nature, among other things due to the fact that goal-oriented and purposeful nature is "its own legislator": an indispensable basis for eco-ethics with considerable consequences; which Beuys apparently gave little or no thought to.

Nonetheless: expand the freedom of thought and will to the realm of freedom for all is a captivating thought! But: How did Beuys' attempt fail? And: are we really all artists, do we want to be? I am asking these questions and leaving them open for now. And what about our freedom? Does it exist as pure freedom of thought and will? Are all people already free because they all have such freedoms? And if everyone is already free, why are such profound changes necessary as Beuys demands? Especially since not only freedom of thought and will, but also night and day dream are sources of artistic inspiration, so I claim: *Not all people are artists per se, but potential artists, because everyone knows about creative dream work, feeling, thinking and imagination.*

Since *Freud*, and at the latest since the *Libet experiments*, we have known to what extent our thinking is influenced or even conditioned by the *unconscious*. What is stored on the non-hard drives of natural memories and in the collective memory of mankind, cannot simply be erased and replaced with new ones. We have freedom of thought and will, but not without the sub- and background of the unconscious with its imponderables, unpredictabilities and incomputabilities. In addition, people do not use their free will for exclusively positive purposes, but defend their own interests, often at any cost, sometimes even with criminal means, especially since the leading rulers in capitalism not only suggest such misconduct, but often also approve in principle.

In addition: Who is actually as free as an artist? The reality is nevertheless like that the vast majority of people can not be free-creatively active, but is forced to either (partly precarious) alienated to perform work or to suffer from unemployment, while the social inequalities and injustices are constantly increasing. So that it becomes clear why Beuys failed, and with him probably the Green Movement: As long as the socio-economic realities are ignored to such an extent that criticism of capitalism does not take place, green protest has no chance of sustainable success. Mere freedom of thought and will does not create the realm of freedom of all people.

Finally, this: Instead of "art", *thinking* can also be defined as "work". When the philosopher *Fichte* was asked when he was actually working, you couldn't see anything, he replied: "I always work." Which seems to be true, because thinking always goes on, even in dreams. And now I ask: Which *artist works always*?

26. Eco-ethics (II)

The neo-digital revolution or: the end of freedom? *Werner Meixner* re-coined the term 'neo-digital' in 2017 as a combination of 'neo-liberal' and 'digital', which is supposed to mean that the digital revolution is primarily taking place under a neo-liberal-capitalist guise. [223] My question: Does 'neo-digital' therefore only refer to the capitalist West, not also to the People's Republic of China? In a party-dictatorial regime there can certainly be capitalism, but not neoliberalism. In China, 'neo-digital' means something different than it does in our country. To what extent will have to be clarified in the following.

The global digital revolution of our time, for example through the Internet ("WWW", the "worldwide web"), computerization and robotization, on the one hand opens up completely new possibilities for being a person, but on the other hand endangers it to an unprecedented degree. As the NSA espionage affair has shown, among other things, it is to be feared that not only the public but also the private life of every single person will be fully spied (or can be spied on). Freedom then goes completely lost, as is the possibility to attain, in the long run, real freedom, a *realm of freedom for all*. Both the individual and society will have to defend themselves against this, be it through private protective measures (encryption of online communication, etc.) or through legislative measures.

Incidentally, you can quickly find out about the advantages and disadvantages of the Internet on the Internet. Main advantages: information galore; you can find out more about almost everything faster and better than ever before. You can establish contacts worldwide at any time, and communicate inexpensively and in a variety of ways (of course also professionally and commercially); you can shop cheaply, book trips, do banking, etc.

But this also makes the downsides visible: Criminals can infiltrate online banking as well as practically any other form of online communication. Illegal business is possible as a result of insecure or missing legal bases. Children and young people can be endangered by violence and porn videos, among other things. Manifold, criminal misuse cannot be excluded.

It is not (yet) possible to conclusively determine what value, or disqualification, the digital revolution actually represents. Much, very much is expected of individual freedom of choice, especially when weighing up the opportunities and risks of digital freedom. The question to be asked is how much self-control is possible, how much external control, even manipulation (e.g. also by the personal and collective unconscious), is to be feared.

In any case, it is important to consider the actual balance of power. Which position of power in the capitalist West the conglomerate Google alone has already won, *Stefan Aust* and *Thomas Ammann*, in their book on the *Digital dictatorship*, describe as follows: ">Googling< has changed our way of understanding the world. Google decides what is important and what is unimportant, and what Google does not show is not available. >If you googled something, you researched it, otherwise not. In any case, I would like it if people ultimately thought this way and not differently<, says Google co-founder *Sergey Brin*. But Google not only has the largest search engine in the world, it also has the largest video platform with YouTube, the most widely used browser with Chrome, the most widely used e-mail service with Gmail and the most widely used operating system for mobile devices with Android." [224]

In the meantime, among other things, sophisticated spy glasses have been added, the invisible mini cameras of which make the respective environment completely recognizable in images for Google. Incidentally, the Google board promised back in 2013 to turn science fiction into everyday reality as soon as possible, namely: ">driverless cars; automated wardrobes; mind controlled robots; virtual versions (holograms) of ourselves that we can send to other places; intelligent medication and micro-robots in the body that keep us constantly up to date on the dangers of illness <." And let Google find out more precisely "what people do in their own four walls" (op. p. 178). To what Aust and Ammann, well understating, noted that with such prospects, "not everyone feels well" (ibid.), drawing certain conclusions in response to the neo-

digital revolution as a whole. With *Julian Assange* they want to "redefine the balance of power" and propose as a first step "to finally establish the right to informational self-determination across Europe so that no national loopholes remain as before, which have been exploited by US corporations for their purposes." (loc. cit. p. 341). In addition, large corporations should be asked to pay more immediately: "If the Internet giants make billions of dollars in business with our data, the question should be what they are willing to pay for it. After all, we are the raw material suppliers, perhaps even the raw material for the > fuel of the 21st century <." (op. cit. p. 342). Which apparently remained a pious wish. After all, the authors close their book with demands for complete "control over as much as possible of all stored data" and for the "right to be forgotten". Without the "restoration of the power of disposal over the data" there would be "no democracy in the long run" (p. 343). - The "right to be forgotten" has actually been guaranteed in a new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, I dare to doubt whether an individual "control over as much as possible stored data" was guaranteed.

All the more ambitious seem the suggestions that Werner Meixner made in response to the neo-digital revolution (see above). He is striving for nothing less than an "ethical reformation" (op. cit., p. 22 ff.). To this end, he demands, in some cases going beyond Aust and Ammann, the "protection of communication and traffic routes of all kinds from influence by monopoly corporations or imperialist states" (op. p. 22) in order to prevent the fatal development towards a perfect surveillance state. Meixner is not satisfied with appeals, however, but also relies on his own concrete behavior, from which he derives recommended immediate measures, including: only buy books in bookstores, cars without an Internet connection, only open expected e-mails, encrypt permanent e-mail contacts etc. - My question: Can this promote the "Ethical Reformation" or even question the power of the neo-digital large corporations? Hardly likely. Because: As long as employers can use digitization undisturbed to assert their interests, the power position of large corporations will not change.

It is a feeling of powerlessness that creeps up on you when you realize how the turbo-capitalists are using digitization to increase productivity and profit maximization and to keep the wage earners dependent, for example by "increasing the turnover rate, reducing labor unit costs, increasing the efficiency of work, diversifying constant capital, reducing circulation costs and creating completely new areas of business. The effects of these interests consist in the compression of work, the lowering of the relative wage, the reduction of work in the circulation sphere, the extended surveillance of the employees and an intensification of competition." And so to highest degrees, e.g. "when people lose work because a robot takes it over". [225] Those all are factors through which *social inequality and injustice* are constantly exacerbated.

Some of these factors can be found not only in the West but also in the People's Republic of China, in particular the rationalization of jobs through digitization and automation. In addition: We have received contradicting reports regarding the environmental policy of the CPC. On the one hand, China, in contrast to the USA of Trump, is sticking to the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 and is accordingly promoting the use of renewable energies, but on the other hand it is still pushing coal consumption and thus CO2 emissions, which will only be significantly reduced after 2030. A 'taz' article from January 23, 2019 states: "No country in the world invests as much money in renewable energies as China. In 2017, around 200 billion US dollars flowed globally into new solar cells, wind parks, hydropower plants and biomass plants, 45 percent of them in China. But that's only half the story. A new report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) shows that China is also providing significant funding for the global expansion of coal-fired power plants." [226]

It should be noted that China is currently responsible for around a third of global consumption with around 10 billion tons of coal annually. This in strange contradiction to the environmental policy successes that China has to show, for example in the fight against smog in the metropolitan areas, the massive expansion of electric mobility, the ban on garbage imports, etc. Although the dependence on coal-fired power plants, said to be 64% will be reduced in 2015 to 58% in 2020; but this is relatively little in view of Xi Jinping's announcement that they want to forego the previous growth targets in favor of "sustainable development".

It should also be borne in mind that environmental policy in China is fully controlled by the Communist Party - a circumstance that would probably never meet with majority approval in our society. Especially since the very different political and ideological framework has to be taken into account, in which the very difficult balancing act of ecology and economy is attempted in China, based on a monitoring system of a special kind, in which is being worked on state-of-the-art media, big data and artificial intelligence. The latter, the AI, allegedly already makes it possible to identify each individual within 1 second by facial recognition, and this with a population of around 1.4 billion! In addition, a so-called "social credit system" is currently being introduced, whereby "credit" means not only financial but also *general "trust"*. According to this, every person appears either on a red or a black list, as stated in an interview in 'Cicero online': "The red lists contain citizens or companies that have distinguished themselves through particularly social behavior according to the standards of the Chinese government, for example, for having done volunteer services or donated money. The black lists include citizens or companies who, according to government standards, have attracted attention due to particularly unsocial or illegal behavior." [227]

In reality, it is a system of total control and surveillance, a kind of modern *1984*, which, however, surprisingly, does not seem to be perceived as such by most Chinese. According to surveys, around 80% of the Chinese surveyed even rate the new system as positive. Reason for this: Many people expect the system to offer discounts that have been denied to them so far, e.g. train and plane tickets, cash credits, etc. The catch: You can find out your own score at regular intervals, but not the reasons why you have got allocated more or fewer points. This makes all the more astonishing the high level of acceptance for this highly efficient system of the Transparent Man.

I see the only advantage of this system in the fact that the artificial intelligence is apparently kept under control in it; this is in contrast to the wild fantasies of super intelligence, "singularity" and immortality, which are associated with AI in Silicon Valley, for example.

But neither here nor in China is there an *ethic of behavior control* that the physicist *Christoph von der Malsburg* called for in view of the threats posed by AI (see below). One could assume that for the CPC it was about the complete implementation of the "general legislation" sought by *Kant*. Which is not the case, however. Because obviously the main concern of the CPC is to cement its *legislative omnipotence*; and not, as with Kant, about guaranteeing the freedom and dignity of the person on the basis of general legislation. On the contrary: freedom and dignity of the person fall by the wayside. (Which does not change the fact that the Chinese law professor *Feng Xiang* has recently allegedly announced that the AI will "usher in the end of capitalism" and enable a "digital planned economy" [228])

In any case, no new synthesis of ecology and socialism, no new concept of eco-socialism can be derived from the Red Chinese model. - The extent to which artificial intelligence has become a problem can be seen from the assessment that Christoph von der Malsburg gave in a video on YouTube. Accordingly, the basic problem of AI cannot be solved at all technologically, i.e. with the means of technology. This is why Malsburg calls for a new "ethics of behavior control". Ethics of behavior control, that is: Clear ethical standards must be found for as much as possible any action, also and especially with regard to artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence. Difficulties have been around in the definition of the term, mainly so, because confusion reigns over the content and scope of the term 'intelligence'. It is therefore not surprising that the definitions of the term AI also diverge. Wikipedia (article "Artificial Intelligence") states that AI is "a sub-area of computer science that deals with the automation of intelligent behavior and machine learning" (op. p. 1). First of all, it is astonishing how many areas of human activity are increasingly being affected by the effects of AI research, and at ever shorter intervals. These *subdivisions* are so far the actual domain of the AI, namely the so-called "weak" AI, while the Strong AI corresponds to *Irrgang's* criterion, i.e. includes the totality of mind, the pluridimensional intelligent achievements of people.

The overall picture of AI research, especially in view of some of the future prospects that are already recognizable, is rather ambiguous, if not frightening. The rapid development has prompted the AI and futurologist *Ray Kurzweil* to prophesy a "singularity" for the year 2045, the dawn of a new world age. Although the choice of words is striking, because the term 'singularity' is mainly used to characterize the so-called "big bang". In the context of AI, however, the term means something like "the development of a >superintelligence< through the continuous use of new technologies". [229]

In fact, Kurzweil holds out the prospect of a total break with previous human history, and even its demolition. In doing so, he relies on the allegedly not linear, but exponentially advancing development of computer technologies. The corresponding expert knowledge doubles in ever shorter intervals, so that by 2045 at the latest the contents of the human brain would be transferable to *robots* without exception, which, due to their immeasurably increased intelligence, not only completely replace humans, but also completely would initiate a new era in the history of the universe. These super-beings will succeed in conquering the entire space. With pre-stages already now: More and more inadequate ("fragile") body parts of people are being replaced by prostheses. The *bioelectronics* aims in the long term shall be to forge cyborgs, half-human beings consisting primarily of technical implantations and thus are on the way from "biological human to posthuman Cyborgs (Wikipedia 2016, p.3). The dangers that this creates for the human person, who has hitherto been given inalienable rights, currently already can be seen in an invention that every secret agent should welcome: the espionage 'Google Glass project' (see above p. 296).

Nonetheless, Kurzweil, who now works as a technical director at Google, considers the development of the cyborg and ultimately the perfect AI robot to be irreversible and, so to speak, a natural necessity. He believes that one can completely technically copy mind and consciousness, even the emotional life and psyche of man and reproduce them at will, especially since he is convinced that he has discovered a parallel between the supposedly hierarchical structure of the universe and that of the human brain, according to which both are organized according to certain "information patterns". The "300 million patterns recognizable in the human neocortex ... which serve to recognize the information patterns contained in the world" can be modeled.

Moreover, Kurzweil apparently summarizes "all his reflections on the human brain, artificial intelligence and the possibility of their merger in the concept of pattern-recognition theory of mind". [230] Accordingly, there will be "conscious machines", robots with human consciousness, as early as 2029, so that they will be able to achieve by 2045 the AI "singularity" mentioned. Kurzweil ends his book *'The Singularity is Near'* with optimistic references to the alleged evolution of humans from a biological to a

purely technological machine being and the bold prophecy: "It will continue until the entire universe is at our fingertips." [231]. However, this leads to a stark contradiction, because not we humans, but the machine beings who replace us are supposed to conquer the entire universe after we humans have disappeared ...

Criticism of transhumanism and posthumanism . Transhumanism goes beyond being human up to now; Posthumanism starts with the "end of mankind". Kurzweil combines both directions in his ideas, although he not only neglects important facts; he also makes several mistakes in reasoning. The facts: The human mind is not just made up of pattern recognizers in the cerebral cortex. Rather, their functions are inextricably linked with the activity of the entire brain. This activity - and with it the *entire neural combinatorics* - is, however, neither completely manageable, nor completely researched, nor can it be mathematically recorded . [232] It is a thoroughly *creative* activity that enables new knowledge to be gained, which is dependent on pattern recognition, but goes far beyond this.

Unfulfilled, and probably even permanently unfulfillable, consequently remains a basic requirement for the technical modeling of the human brain. What especially counts for mind, consciousness and psyche because they manifest as a comprehensive subject-object-action, which is by no means restricted to the brain-activities.

In addition, Kurzweil overlooks the fact that the recognition of patterns happens not directly, but mediated through *linguistic and non-linguistic meanings*, that means through semantic, syntactic, associative and emotional assignments. These, too, are ultimately unmanageable, especially since linguistic meanings occur not only in the form of denotations (basic meanings) and connotations (secondary meanings), but also in purely individual, subjective association meanings that are decisive for any imagination, creativity and decision-making activity. In other words: Kurzweil's AI concept is not only flawed, but also inapplicable. Mind, consciousness and psyche of the human being, always closely connected with his emotional world, are technically neither modelable nor reproducible.

If the transhumanist presumptions were to become a reality, we humans would be denied access to a possible *realm of freedom* forever. Mankind would have to abdicate, to give up themselves, even if, as the transhumanist *Hans Moravec* proposes, robots should work only as *super intelligent slaves*; because they too could one day use their super-intelligence to destroy humanity.

In order to prevent such fatal developments, legislative countermeasures are likely to be required now. In the long term, I believe that society as a whole will have to take control of key industries (including the IT sector, of course). Any attempt to force people to give up on themselves is out of the question. Whoever wants to abolish human beings is robbing himself of his human dignity. Personality is lost to the extent that one destroys the unity of the human being, which consists of spirit, psyche and body matter, in order to ultimately reduce it to technically manipulated inorganic matter. Any such attempt exacerbates the prevailing competitive situation in which the people of this earth find themselves.

This view confirmed *Richard David Precht* in his essay '*Künstliche Intelligenz und der Sinn des Lebens*' (*Artificial intelligence and the meaning of life*) (2020), in which he sees mankind before the alternative either to overthrow capitalism or its own human-being (ibid p 9 ff.). His presentations on the subject of "*machines and morals*" (p. 146 ff.) are extremely interesting. Precht rightly considers any form of "ethical programming" (= technical production of ethics!) to be out of the question.

Advanced eco-ethics. If you read Ray Kurzweil, you could come to the conclusion that humans must be ashamed of their own *nature* and therefore forego it, as soon as possible, in favor of AI and "super-intelligent" robots. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that even as *part of nature*, and not only as free-creative cultural beings, we have intrinsic value and purpose in ourselves. Which is vital to any eco-ethics. If eco-ethics serves to protect nature, then it serves all the more for self-preservation and self-respect of people. Without this "expansion", which is in reality an indispensable requirement, eco-ethics cannot exist. Accordingly, I would like to show to what extent eco-ethics is to be seen as the basis of an ethics of behavior control. I would also like to refer to my discussion of the relationship between ethics, anthropology and the philosophy of history (see pp. 202 ff.).

In nature, every passing is apparently followed by a new emergence, whereby it should be noted that matter and nature as such are neither good nor bad. Rather, such black-and-white categories only gain importance in our *evaluations*. As *evil* we feel and denominate as such the *absurd destructive*, the senseless destruction of supposed enemies, such as seen in the pure bloodlust that supposedly, that and the other, already began in ancient times in the animal kingdom, according to Wilhelm Reich.

The senseless destructiveness is also called *cruel aggression* or *the pure criminal*, that *Hans Mohr* described dramatically as follows: "We all know that the tendency to torturing and killing in *Homo sapiens* is particularly pronounced and a terrible mortgage which we recorded since the time of the Pleistocene and could not get rid of. Murder, manslaughter, torture and genocide mark the cultural history of man." [233]

What follows from this? Aggression, even in its destructive, nonsensical form of malice, is part of the genetic heritage of humanity. A heavy mortgage that everyone has to deal with and sometimes has to struggle with, whereby upbringing, socialization, environmental and milieu conditions and personal experience, e.g. of frustration, rejection and refusing, play a major role. Good and bad, positive and negative tendencies struggling within us often to each other, while we can gain valuable assistance in our fighting against evil in the original, positive attachments to contact, communication and cooperation. Where this does not succeed, crime can gain the upper hand.

In any case, it is now understandably and scientifically confirmed why Kant considered it out of the question to be able to base ethics on inclinations. There is no guarantee that the inclinations, deeply rooted in the subconscious and the corporeal, automatically produce the good for which usually, already for reasons of self-preservation, we are ready to decide spontaneously or after a more or less careful consideration. Of course, it is not just about ourselves, about being a person, but also about that of our fellow human beings, so that not only "radically evil" but also the question of being a person plays a role here. There are existentially important ethical issues that Kant has dealt primarily in connection with his discussions of the categorical imperative, which, however, I have reformulated to a *legitimate request*, so that the Cat. Imp. largely preserves its validity, but not as a compulsory and ought *ethics* with the claim to absoluteness, but as *personal ethics of values* (see above, p. 3-16). My **legitimate request** is:

In everything you do, make sure that you respect yourself and your fellow human beings as legal entities and personalities and that you always obey the moral law as far as possible.

"As possible" because there are exceptional situations, such as *self-defense*, in which the rights of one's own person have to be defended against existential threats and law violations of all kinds.

Nature, eco and animal ethics. As I already mentioned, *Karl Marx* calls for the "categorical imperative to overturn all conditions in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, despicable being" (see pp. 124 f.). With this reference to the quasi-all-encompassing object area of "conditions", the Kantian concept of person loses its latent anthropocentric limitation. The environmental catastrophes caused by humans, the mistreatment of animals, contempt for nature etc. humiliate people, violate their sense of honor and their right to a life in dignity. Marx, on the other hand, anticipates what *Hans Jonas* called the *ecological imperative*: "Act in such a way that the effects of your actions are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth!" (Jonas 1979, p. 36)

In addition, it is important to note parallels between the specifically human personality and the general history of evolution. A new human being, and thus a new person, is created when human egg and sperm cells fuse together. During pregnancy, the unborn child repeats all stages of evolution from cell division to *Homo sapiens*. In this, the becoming of the person takes place in the initial stage. From the moment of birth, at least in Western cultures, a *person* is considered a *legal person*, although his / her personality is not yet fully developed. For a long time, that is, until all physical and mental-emotional abilities have been developed, the person is in the preliminary stage of being a person.

And this applies analogously to the entire evolution, so that *pre-forms of personality* are to be assumed in matter and nature, whereby being-a-person can apply as the basis of being-a-subject (cf. Ernst Bloch's hypothetical "nature-subject!").

Nature, animal and ecological ethics can be derived directly from the intrinsic value of nature. *Klaus Sojka* names "compatibility with the unity of life" as the main criterion for eco-ethics and explains: "This means that self-preservation, which is made compulsory, requires the preservation of animals of all types and properties that live in community with humans, as well as renouncing the consumption of existing substances, unless it is absolutely necessary to cover emergency needs. Conspicuous measures have the effect of averting damage to living beings of any form, in particular through torture, mutilation or destruction, because they claim solidarity as part of the unity and fate of the community." [234] Everyone has to ask himself whether his / her behavior is useful, harmful or neutral on nature and the environment. Everything harmful must be avoided.

In animal ethics in particular, the question of whether animals should also be granted *personal status* has long been controversial. Which is impossible if being a person is defined as "the total scope of man" (Mounier). In contrast, the Californian ethics and economics researcher *Thomas White* suggests distinguishing people from things as follows: A person is a *who?*, a thing a *what?* so that the animals, which are not things, would probably be called people without exception. A possibility that White does not go into. Instead, he drafts a special catalog of criteria for a personhood that animals and humans alike would have to be granted. According to this, people are characterized by factors such as life, consciousness, perception, feelings, "an idea of oneself", control of one's own behavior, recognition of other people, highly developed cognitive abilities (e.g. for solving problems), memory and the ability to communication of thoughts. [235] According to White, these criteria are applicable to all people, but not to all animals, but only to elephants, "whales and dolphins, great apes, birds, reptiles and, if necessary, even to extraterrestrials" (where unfortunately there is something becoming dubious ...). In relation to this classification, however, the question immediately arises as to where the exact boundaries of personhood in the animal kingdom would be drawn with it.

Don't ants, bees, dogs, cats and horses, for example, also show intelligence and other abilities that roughly correspond to the criteria mentioned? A dilemma, for the solution of which I propose that *the entire non-human world and all human children in the prenatal stage be given pre- personal characteristics, whereby gradual differences can be made.*

Under this assumption, I think it is possible to supplement the ethics of the person by an ethics of nature, for which I have suggested a *natural formula of the categorical imperative* in considering the fact that in dealing with nature *legitimate interest considerations* can be to request. It is a formula that cannot or should not prejudice the ongoing discussions about (possible) rights of nature, the environment, the animal and plant world (natural, ecological, animal rights). It is:

Behave in such a way that you always treat nature in every person and in every other form of appearance as a purpose - and as a means only for ethically and morally justifiable ends.

If now is to clarify what specific rights and obligations can be justified with this new formula, raises the question of the justification of the respective legislative measures. What is legit? Legally positivist is undoubtedly the current written and spoken law. And in cases of arbitrary state decisions? Or even in unjust states? First of all, always helpful is the natural law recognition of the *intrinsic value of nature* and the *self-purpose of the person*, which is also contained in Kant's self-purpose formula of the categorical imperative, for which my *natural formula* only serves as a *supplement*.

If, with Schelling, creative nature ('natura naturans') is to be accepted as its "own legislator", this applies both to nature in humans and to non-human nature. > What is "legitimate" must be ethically and morally checked and justified. There are *general, fundamental rights anchored in natural law* (such as human dignity, freedom of the person, natural and environmental rights), which are to precede any public law. <[\[236\]](#) I can only reaffirm the claim of the content of these quotations from 2015. May they be heeded and taken to heart!

27. "Abolition" of ethics in the concrete utopia of a democratic eco-socialism

I put the "abolition" here in quotation marks because abolition usually means something like "elimination", "removal", that is, in relation to ethics, one wants or can do without them entirely. Which is known not to be possible. Hence: "Abolition" in quotation marks; in fact, because I use the term here in the Hegelian sense, that is, as an upgrading and further development of a theorem or concept on a higher level. In detail, there are the following reasons for this: Answers to the threats I mentioned at the beginning - eco-crisis, digitization, trans- and posthumanism, supplemented by the nuclear holocaust, are possible with my extended eco-ethics, especially if they can be supported by historical and current value syntheses. But not to the threat posed by the current globalized turbo-capitalism, and also not to the question of how the "answers", for example in the form of my *legitimate requests* (see above), can be put into practice so that they have an impact on society. Unfortunately, this is not possible even if it can be illustrated how *norms*, i.e. internalized, binding rules of behavior or "maxims" can be developed from values. This probably applies to any kind of conversion of values into norms, such as a) innate values that serve the original self-preservation and initial orientation; b) in the standardization of values through upbringing and socialization, which take place on the basis of different social and cultural framework conditions; c) through political and other legislation. The factors mentioned under a) can apparently hardly be influenced, while in b) and c) the "ensemble of social conditions" comes into play. Including, in the turbo-capitalist West, *the power of manipulative facts*: employer interests, "fun" ideology, analytical-positivist thinking etc. Against what ethical principles stand in a very difficult position and often even have no chances of being realized. Where knowledge bounce interests, mostly knowledge is compromised, as *Marx* noted. To enforce legitimate ethical requests, e.g. for justice, equality and solidarity, often encounters insurmountable obstacles in a class society ("with master and servant"), caused e.g. by digital surveillance, capitalist ideology of domination, lobbyism, stigmatization and persecution of those who think differently, violent measures (e.g. dismissals in times of crisis), etc.

To rebel against this is not possible with ethics and morals alone. Rather, it requires persistent political resistance, especially when there is neither a "revolutionary subject" nor a corresponding class consciousness. Nevertheless, the ethical requests do not need to capitulate. Much more they are to be integrated in the anti-capitalist *change ethics* as Ernst Blo has designed it (p.p. 172 et seq.). Such ethics can and must also support the reformist as well as the revolutionary struggle, true to Marx's motto that philosophy cannot be realized without "abolishing itself" (see above).

Markus Gabriel ignores this boundary between ethics and morals in his study *Moralischer Fortschritt in dunklen Zeiten (Moral Progress in Dark Times, 2020)*. He also disregards the development of values through work and Ernst Bloch's *ethics of change*. Lot to a small extent, M. Gabriel treats the large value traditions as well as the relationships of labor, value, standard and general legislation. Not an issue for him is therefore also the following, which arises from the necessity to "abolish" ethics and morals:

Eco-socialism - a new synthesis.

What is commonly referred to as the "triumphant march of neoliberalism" is nothing other than the advancing dominance of capitalism, which is worsening social inequalities and contradictions all over the world and is driving entire economies to ruin, not just in Africa. Those critics who claim that neoliberalism has nothing to do with capitalism would contradict this. A demonstrably false claim; for neoliberalism is undoubtedly the current form of capitalism and thus of what Marx called the "permanent crisis of capitalism". A crisis that has, however, intensified in an almost unbearable way due to the environmental and climate crisis. So that even today our answer to the crisis cannot simply be: socialism as Marx and leading Marxists conceived it.

On the concept of socialism. Its despisers like to equate socialism with totalitarianism, dictatorship and lack of freedom. The best way to deal with this is by means of an understandable concept of socialism that is as capable of reaching a consensus as possible. I found such a concept in my old Tübingen teacher, *Ernst Bloch*, whose socialism is based not only on the teachings of the Marxist classics, but also on the teachings of history. The battle cry of the Paris Communards in 1871 was: "Vive la sociale!" (The feminine form 'la sociale' is probably explained by the fact that the 'révolution sociale' was primarily thought of). Anyway: Without the Paris Commune Marxism might become not substantial - in terms of revolutionary subject substantiality. Because: Above all through the Paris Commune, we know that direct democracy, workers' control and solidarity that tends to be free of domination are possible as long as such achievements are not destroyed by overpowering enemies. Precisely from this, *Friedrich Engels* concluded, in the foreword to the 1891 new edition of Marx's work on the *Civil war in France*, that the road to socialism could (and may have to) lead through a "dictatorship of the proletariat". A conclusion that in history on the one hand has proven as very significant and secondly as fully disastrous.

Bloch's discussions of the relationship between substance and socialism are all the more valuable, since they can also help us today to gain clarity about the nature and goals of contemporary socialism. Bloch declares: "The truth of the social is socialism".[\[237\]](#) And what is this truth? Well, it is one that Bloch gets on the track not only realistically, but also in a concretely utopian way. That means: He outlines the vision of the *substance goal socialism*. What does he mean with that? The utopian unity of substance and subject is called *final substance in unalienated being in and for itself*. There can be no doubt that this goal coincides with those that Marx and Bloch gave to the struggle for socialism.

Nevertheless, the question arises as to how these goals can be achieved under today's conditions. As really humane, i.e. as a model for a humane socialism, a *socialism with a human face*, I have considered ever since 1980, in addition to the 'Prague Spring' of 1968, the French *Projet socialiste* from 1980 to 1983. This socialist attempt was really humane because it was not based on violence, oppression and terrorism of opinion, but on social, liberal and democratic principles. One finally wanted to replace the capitalist exploitation system frozen in arrogant domination by a new humane socialism in freedom, equality and solidarity = brotherhood / sisterhood.

Unfortunately, after promising beginnings with positive social achievements, this resulted in a number of negative consequences, namely an exorbitant increase in national debt, among other things as a result of the high compensation payments to nationalized companies, an increase in the trade deficit to almost 100 billion francs, and massive capital flight = massive decline in investments, decline in the exchange rate of the Franc, etc. An increasingly catastrophic development that led to the termination of the socialist experiment and a radical change in policy as early as 1983 (austerity programs, freezing of wages and salaries, etc.).

What lessons can be learned from this debacle? 1. Against the concentrated resistance of big business, socialism (unlike Lenin!) is apparently not enforceable today. 2. Without the mobilization of broad sections of the population, especially the working class, a socialist experiment cannot succeed. The following *conclusion* therefore deserves the greatest attention: "The reasons for the failure to mobilize the population are to be found in the socialists' understanding of politics. French socialism combined a radical rhetoric of, for example, the "break with capitalism", with the idea that socialist economic policy is the best way to protect the interests of French entrepreneurs. But the entrepreneurs saw it differently. When the implementation of the program met stiff resistance from capital and society polarized, the French socialists were not prepared for it. Within a short period of time, this led the government to adopt the entrepreneurial course." [\[238\]](#)

These bitter experiences, this failure of a humane socialism, can certainly not be generalized, although they should be extremely instructive. The lessons that can actually be learned, however, depend entirely on the respective local and global circumstances. On top of that, almost 40 years after the French experiment, the situation has become considerably more complicated, especially, as I said, due to the globalization crisis, the environmental and climate crisis and the digital revolution. So that in the following I cannot avoid addressing two other major issues in connection with the question of a possible socialism: a) eco-socialism and b) digital socialism.

Eco-socialism.

In the Brazilian port city of Belém, in January 2009, a *World Social Forum* took place resulting in "*The eco-socialist declaration of Belem*", at which the social found its alleged truth in the demand for a radical eco-socialist upheaval. *Sustainability*, its main goal, however, was only considered achievable under extremely far-reaching, sometimes problematic premises, namely a) the "collectivization of the means of production", b) the introduction of the planned economy, and c) a drastic shrinkage of production, with the following justification: "In order to avoid the global warming and other dangers that threaten the survival of humans and the environment, entire sectors of industry and agriculture must be eliminated, reduced or restructured and others developed, while ensuring employment for all. Such a radical upheaval is impossible without collective control over the means of production and without democratic planning of production and exchange. Democratic decisions about investment and technological development must replace control by capitalist corporations, investors and banks in order to do justice to the long-term horizon of the common good, both in relation to society and nature." [241]

With which the authors of the 'Declaration' demand no more and no less than a *comprehensive eco-socialist revolution, worldwide*, so that finally "the most oppressed part of human society, the poor and the indigenous peoples" of the Third World, can be freed of misery, underdevelopment and injustice (e.g. through unequal, unfair trade). In the course of this liberation, full equality between men and women, "gender equality" as an "integral part of eco-socialism", could be guaranteed all over the world. It is a program for which the majority of the population can be won everywhere.

In further concrete terms, the authors propose radical upheavals ("transformations") that deserve to be quoted in full, namely: "1. Transformation of the power system by means of replacing fossil and bio-fuel by clean energy-sources under control of the communities: wind, geothermal, wave, and particularly solar energy; 2. transformations of the transportation system by drastically reducing the private use of trucks and cars and replacing them by a free and efficient public transportation system; 3. transformations of the current type of production, consumption and construction based on dissipation, built-aging, betting competition and pollution, by producing only sustainable and recyclable goods and developing a "green" architecture; 4. transformations in the area of food production and distribution by advocating local food self-sufficiency as far as possible, by eliminating polluting agricultural industry, by creating sustainable agro-ecosystems and actively restoring fertile soil."(op. p. 5)

The authors also recommend their program as a guide for urgently needed *reforms in the here and now*. Hunger, hardship, misery, the destruction of nature and the environment can no longer be postponed. Remedial action must be taken immediately wherever possible.

Digital socialism. Computers and "social media" alone cannot solve the problems of society, especially since the complexity of the human person, also and especially in the communities, eludes the merely quantifying and classifying access of computers. In the words of *Wolf Lotter* : "Computer science is a pair of glasses with excellent optics, but neither an eye nor a brain. Computer science can help us expand our minds, but it cannot spark a flash of inspiration. Only we can do that ourselves." [242] (Especially since *mind* does not exist in a mere digital form, but as a comprehensive, dialectical subject-object relationship.) In addition, although society is based on communication and contact, it does not fulfill its essence in this. So that in relation to socialism the question arises as to the social significance IT media.

Are there really "*alternatives from the computer*"? As *W. Paul Cockshott* and *Alin Cottrell* claim in their book of the same name in 1993, announcing their main thesis in the subtitle: "For socialist planning and direct democracy". Since both, ruling capitalism and centralist Soviet "socialism", fail (or have failed) on both levels, the search for alternatives becomes inevitable.

Alternatives which, in the opinion of the two authors, are immediately obvious as a result of the digital revolution, albeit under well-known, age-old socialist premises: collectivization of key industries and a planned economy, so that ideal-typical ideas and requests become recognizable again, albeit in connection with extensive, realistic analyzes, which at least also refer to economic, scientific and political phenomena such as work, capital, macroeconomics, budgetary policy, consumer goods marketing, foreign trade and many more. However, the focus is, in each case ideally, on:

1. Socialist planning Computers and the Internet open up entirely new possibilities for socialism. Macroeconomics, but also detailed problems such as working hours, can suddenly be calculated with unimaginable speed: "When using today's supercomputers, the calculation of working times for an entire economy can be done in just a few minutes." [243] Which cannot be realized at all as long as the real capitalist companies, allegedly for reasons of data protection and computer security, keep their files strictly under lock and key. Whereas in a new IT socialism matter of course would be "macroeconomic planning, strategic planning and production-planning" for the public good (op. p. 94). Which would considerably raise not only the standard of living, especially of the working class, but also the general cultural level (p. 93).

2. Direct democracy. Amazingly, the authors fall back on the "*demos*" of *Attic democracy*, which they oppose both to Soviet centralism and to the capitalist exercise of power. Not commercial power elites and so-called "experts", but the people themselves should make all important decisions in direct coordination. The more citizens have a TV and a PC that can also serve as an electronic voting device, the less problematic it appears from a technical point of view. In the new, socialist-democratic "Acephalus State" there is neither centralism nor hierarchy, "no government, no prime minister, no president, no head of state" (op. cit. pp. 226, 229). The people themselves would finally be in control of their own house by granting positive rights, the most important of which the authors name: "(1) The right to earn a living, (2) The right to the full value of their work and (3) the right to freely dispose of the value of their work as they wish." (loc. cit. p. 245). These would be new types of property rights, and at the same time the end of inequality, injustice, exploitation, alienation and heteronomy: "Only when all citizens are enabled to play an active role in the economy, the well-being of society as a whole can be maximized." (ibid.) So that sensible solutions could also be found for environmental problems including the use of resources. At which the authors propose no longer to allow national special routes and eccentric idiosyncrasies, but to create a new "global authority", an international (UN?) Authority that watches over the sensible use of global resources and, for example, the protection from excessive pollutant emissions (p. 256).

Overall: a beautiful new world of freedom, justice and solidarity. But: *How should it be achieved, how should it be created, how should it be implemented?* And why have we come almost no step closer to it since the Cockshott and Cottrell proposals appeared in 1993? The failures of both the Soviet and the French (pseudo-) socialist experiments, should they not have led to quite different conclusions? More on this below, namely on the

Market socialism. I agree with the economist *Siegfried Wenzel* (born 1929) that it makes sense to use "the market and economic regulation mechanism developed in the six thousand year history of merchandise management alongside macroeconomic planning as a main control instrument on the way to a new type of socialism to benefit from economic development". [244] It should be noted that Wenzel was a GDR citizen and had extensive practical economic and political experience, especially since he worked, among other things, in the GDR State Planning Commission. Today, he pleads for *market economy*, though not under capitalistic sign. Capitalistically, the producer of goods is always financially and socially favored, while the consumer is disadvantaged, so that class differences and antagonisms are permanently reinforced.

In socialist terms, the opposite of this should be achieved, namely a development towards a solidary, just, classless society. In practice, this could probably only be possible if the market economy is subjected to overall social control, macro- and microeconomically by competent control authorities, if possible at all levels, from workers' control in companies to local and national institutions to international bodies, also, for example, through corresponding innovations in the UN.

The capitalist market economy would therefore have to be transformed into a new market socialism, for which, in addition to political power, the consent of the majority of the population is required. To this end, Wenzel writes: "For such a way, there is no need of sudden, fundamental change in the economic relations, the control-instruments and the everyday culture grown in centuries, as Social development could take place in an environment that people are familiar with; this could also reduce the fears of a majority of the population in developed countries and make it easier to win them over for a democratic change in the existing system in the direction of solidarity, ecologically sound social development. There is a lot to be said in favour of the goal-oriented and sensitive continuation of what has grown over the centuries." (ibid) For Wenzel, the order of the day is not a break in tradition at any price, but sensible reorientation and transformation.

In order to make a *peaceful, non-violent transition to socialism* at least conceivable in view of the current world situation, a new market socialism must be compatible with a democratic constitution of the community. At least that is how the American mathematician and philosopher *David Schweikart* (born 1942) sees it, who, unlike Wenzel, considers a macroeconomic state planning authority to be superfluous. The economist *Michael R. Krätke* (born 1950) recognizes three main elements in Schweikart's concept, which he summarizes as follows : "1. All companies are independent, independent from the state, organized as cooperatives and administered by the comrades themselves in accordance with a democratic company constitution. 2. There are markets of free competition for most goods and services. There is no central production planning. But there is also no so-called "free labor market". Rather, citizens are free to join a cooperative or to found a new cooperative with others, but not to sell their labor. 3. The investments are subject to social, democratically organized control. ... The use and allocation of these investment funds is decided democratically, not by a planning authority, but by parliaments (at different levels)." [245] In this model, "citizen-comrades" take the place of capitalists and wage workers. Their new *socialist market economy* [246] should function without private companies and owners of capital. While in this "comrades' socialism" there is no full employment guarantee, but a democratic investment planning and control that does no more follow the principle of profit maximization, but the satisfaction of needs for all citizens. Whether this is permanently possible without macroeconomic and social framework planning (of macroeconomics etc.), seems to be highly questionable.

Synopsis. Short-term and long-term goals of a democratic eco-socialism can be derived from what has been set out on the topic, although not automatically. Rather, it

is important to observe certain criteria, including above all historical-political experiences, in particular with the failed experiments of Soviet communism, but also of French socialism (see above). Dogmatically defended theories of revolution prove to be inadequate throughout. *Peaceful, non-violent, democratically controlled transitions to eco-socialism seem to be possible*, although I consider the findings of Schweikart and Wenzel (see above) to be particularly relevant and helpful.

If, in the following overview, I differentiate between short-term goals and long-term goals of ecology, democracy and socialism; this primarily serves to make it easier to understand. In reality, the five terms are mutually dependent, the rubrics do not represent "windowless monads".

Short-range goals	Long-term goals
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Ecology:

1) Sustainability = guideline for any environmental policy. 2) Energy system: conversion on clean energy sources 3) local food self-sufficiency, sustainable agricultural eco- systems	4) Economy: only with renewable resources 5) Production: only sustainable, recyclable goods 6) Transport: changeover to free, efficient public systems 7) International Authority for the Protection and Sensible Use of Worldwide Resources.
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Democracy:

1) Education and mobilization of the population. 2) Full equality of Man and Woman. 3) General Right on one's own income for a living 4) Publicly controlled PC loading calculation of working hours 5) General democratic right to cooperative organization of work	6) Publicly controlled PC calculation of the working hours for all economies. 7) Collective control of the means of production 8) Cooperative organization and democratic self-government of all establishments 9) investment planning and control 10) General plebiscite for all important decisions. 11) Right to the full value of one's work. 12) Right to freely dispose of the value of one's own work. 13) maximizing the Common good through general active participation and co-determination
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Socialism:

1) Strengthening and expanding the welfare state. 2) Gradual elimination of the social injustices and inequalities. 3) Constantly reinforced social control over the market economy. 4) raising the general cultural levels.	5) Overall social control over the market economy. 6) Eco-market socialism instead of capitalist market economy. 7) Participation at all levels of society. 8) Abolition of capitalism. 9) Solidarity; fair, classless eco-society.
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And how can a democratic eco-socialism become a reality? On the teleo-logic of socialism in transition societies ("The truth of the social is socialism.") If the truth of the social is socialism, both a truth theory and a theory of the social are required. It cannot be doubted that there are social issues at all, for example in the form of the social state ("welfare state") and social achievements. Socialism, on the other hand, as envisioned by Marx and Bloch, for example, in the ideal of the realm of freedom, does not seem to exist anywhere so far. Consequently, the social is similar to the truth: there is the social, but not yet in *full* truth, not in that of socialism.

Much has been written about possibilities to find ways to socialism in the twenty-first century. The basic requirement (*conditio sine qua non*) is the achievement of political power in the state. The Marxist *Heinz Dieterich* states: "The decisive power condition for the transition to the new socialism is, as in all phases of class society, the control of the state. In theory, this can follow five models: the Soviet, Chinese, Venezuelan, Iranian or the implosion model of certain real socialist European states." [247] I agree with the first sentence of this analysis, but disagree the second. Even *eco-socialist* transformation will not be possible if the state power does not "go along with it". I do not consider the approval of a large majority of the population to be less important, which initially requires intensive involvement in political activity and awareness-raising work. I do not consider Dieterich's reference to the "five models" which "theoretically" should serve to gain and exercise power to be very helpful. All five models have proven to be inadequate and mostly unsuitable and in no way applicable in highly developed, digitally revolutionized industrial countries. When Dieterich also uses the adverb

"theoretical", he reveals his unspoken, serious reasons for doubt: What only makes "theoretical" sense remains irrelevant for political practice; and all the more so from a Marxist point of view, according to which theory and practice must always be understood as a dialectical unit.

Transition strategies other than those implied by the "five models" must therefore be developed, at least for highly developed industrialized countries. If the social is to flourish to full truth in socialism, it must itself serve as a starting point for the transformation, so that first of all the existing social achievements, especially the welfare state, must be linked.

For a specific analysis of the specific situation. It is essential to get the clearest possible overview of what is already social. With regard to social achievements, Germany has long been considered exemplary, due to the welfare state principle that, among other things, Germany had highly developed in well-organized systems of social and health insurance, medical care and, since 1949, also in a free and democratic basic order Constitutional state. And even today there is a globally recognized "Granting Range of the German welfare state" with a) for-care benefits such as unemployment benefit, housing benefit and income support, b) disposal services such as child benefit and civil service pay, c) insurance benefits such as pensions, health, nursing, mother-hood and invalidity insurances. [248]

Global questioning of these systems is happening relatively rarely, perhaps the most violently during the student revolt of 1968, which, however, did not question the social-oriented state principle. Serious crisis symptoms have appeared since the "triumphant march" of neoliberal turbo-capitalism, which began around 1990, intensified by the global financial and banking crisis of 2008. The emergencies that were to be lamented in this case came from a request of April 2012 in the German Bundestag, submitted by the DIE LINKE parliamentary group, which states that "in the European Union", "social achievements fought for decades are in danger", especially since "even after four years ... the financial and economic crisis and its causes remain unsolved" and "several southern and eastern European states would stand on the verge of financial ruin, their citizens on the verge of social collapse" [24]. Not the German economy, which was artificially favored by wage dumping, but several so-called "poorer" EU countries were close to social collapse, due to the crisis due to massive cuts in social benefits, increases in consumption taxes, wage and pension cuts, etc., which did not lead to remedy, but to exacerbate the crisis. In contrast, the Left Party called for new protections, inter alia, for the public budgets as well as for job creation and social policy, including "an effective, pan-European future investment program for socio-ecological reconstruction, short-term economic stimulus packages in the crisis countries and sanction-free minimum backup-systems" (Printed Matter ... op. p. 3).

I do not know whether or to what extent these requirements have been met in the meantime. Nonetheless, on the basis of the undesirable developments described, it is possible to show, by way of example, how the immediate goal of strengthening and expanding the welfare state has failed so far. In order to finally make progress again, active political commitment at all levels is required, which applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to other goals of a new eco-socialism (see above). Enlightening agitation and propaganda, 'agitprop' in the best and broadest sense of the term, are needed in order, if possible above all party and Ethos-boundaries, to come closer to the overall social emancipation, the pre-appearance of the *realm of freedom*.

Oscar Wilde realizes socialism in art. In my Personalism book (2003) I have shown how a *personalistic aesthetic* can be constituted, so that I can summarize myself briefly below. Artists enjoy the privilege of non-alienation, the truly free development of their personality in their works. Already in the present, they are working on the establishment of the realm of freedom, which one day, under truly socialist auspices, will grant everyone full freedom in the sense of artistic creativity. *Ernst Bloch* has suggested a definition of art that is appropriate to this: "*Art is a laboratory and also a festival of executed possibilities*, including the alternatives experienced therein, whereby the execution and the result take place in the manner of the well-founded appearance, namely the world-like fulfilled pre-appearance." [250] Dialectically-materialistically, such perfection lies in the realm of the possible, especially since *matter itself* is in the flow of the "in-possibility-being". Because art embodies "the sensual shimmer of the idea" (Hegel), new syntheses of personality, spirit and matter arise in it again and again.

Realizing the idea of freedom as far as possible, for *all* people, is the goal of socialism: the "free association of free individuals", which Marx speaks of, without, however, specifying in detail how this freedom is concretely shaped or defined. In which *Herbert Marcuse*, a Marxist of the 20th century, follows him by declaring that "one cannot paint socialism".

Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), the creator of outstanding linguistic works of art, foregoes this restraint. Wilde sees socialism as the prerequisite for realizing *individualism* as true freedom of the person; and he also imagines which art could best do justice to this ideal, namely in his essay *The soul of man under socialism*, published in 1891, in German: *Der Sozialismus und die Seele des Menschen*. [251] In socialism there would be neither poverty nor forced labor. *Self-realization*, as so far attained only by "the poets, the philosophers, the spirit-people ... the people who have realized themselves", should any individual be allowed, namely, to "do the Beautiful" (op. 11, 32): general freedom through art! For Wilde, individualism as art is the "destructive and corrosive force" which aims to eliminate "the monotony of the type, the slavery of habit, the tyranny of custom and the humiliation of man to the level of a machine", and to replace it through creativity (loc. cit., p. 40 f. And: "If a person is happy, then he / she is in harmony with himself / herself and his / her surroundings. The new individualism, in whose service socialism, whether it wants it or not, is at work, will be perfect harmony. "

What kind of art can match this ideal? Or, as Wilde asks: "What is a healthy work of art and what is an unhealthy work of art?" (op. p. 44) Wilde relates these questions a) to the style of a work of art, b) to its object and c) "to both at the same time". And he states: "In terms of style, a work of art is healthy if its style reveals the beauty of the material it uses, may it consist of words, of colors or of ivory, and if it uses this beauty as Means to create the aesthetic effect. With regard to the object, a work of art is healthy, if the choice of this object is conditioned by the temperament of the artist and arises directly from him. In short, a work of art is healthy if it has both perfection and personality." (ibid.)

Wilde sees significant aspects of materiality and personality combined in the work of art. There are no limits and no "decadence" for artistic expression. Artists cannot tolerate any political coercion, no "authoritarian power" over themselves: "*The form of government that is most suitable for the artist is: no government at all.*" (p. 59) And this is exactly what Karl Marx understood as the *realm of freedom* and the *free association of free individuals* .

Instead of a summary: core principles of an ethics of behavior control

On Kant's Categorical Imperative (Cat. Imp.)

1. Kant's ethics are unique because in and with them for the first time the dignity of the person recognized as unconditional is not only justified and secured morally, philosophically, but also legally and politically, which among other things already guarantees a *right of petition*. The *moral law*, described and defined by Kant, maintains nearly all its original validity. (see pp. 4 ff., 305 ff.)

2. *Criticism*: Kant's dualism of thing-in-itself and appearance is not tenable, so that the absolutizations of Kant's ethic of ought become questionable or invalid, including above all the absolutization of the validity of the Cat. Imp., the "General Legislation" and the terms "Duty" and "Ought" (see p. 9-16) .

3. The universalization of the maxim of the will requested by Kant cannot be demanded *categorically* (see above p. 16) .

Values and norms

4. Values arise through *work* in the broadest sense; some values are innate, such as the drive for self-preservation and the striving for orientation. Ernst Bloch: "Only work plus raw material and material content creates all values", whereby "desire" always plays a role (p. 173).

5. No value change alters something in the fact that values have positive or *good* connotations and serve the common good as well as the good of the individual, so that from values repeatedly also arise norms or requests perceived as reasonable ("legitimate"). (pp. 18 ff.)

6. All virtues are values, but not all values are virtues.

7. Inner harmony is apparently preferably achieved through *value-imagination*. (p. 24)

8. If values become norms, they are saved and secured in them. These are processes in which value ethics and normativity unite, normative value ethics becomes *concrete* (p. 21 ff.). Values become norms a) from innate values which serve the original self-preservation and initial orientation; b) in the standardization of values through upbringing and socialization, which take place on the basis of different social and cultural framework conditions; c) through political and other legislation. The factors mentioned under a) can apparently hardly be influenced, while under b) and c) the "ensemble of social conditions" comes into play.

9. **Limits of ethics**: Ethics cannot compete with mathematics, and cannot establish anything irrevocable. The areas and possibilities of action of individuals and societies are not manageable and sometimes only extend as far as their judgment. They are spheres of activity that cannot be determined in every detail by any ethics. It is not uncommon for conflicting goals to be dealt with only temporarily using ethical means (p. 25 ff.). Especially since there are also *negative* "values", even if values, and with them morals and ethics, always arise from *work*. The more it is necessary to combat the effects of negative values and ratings, such as weapons-abusing and other criminal acts of all kinds. Here, too, ethics has its limits, as it can in no way replace the judiciary. Further, highly significant limits can be seen in the political and social system conditions (see

Traditional ethics of behavior control

10. Already the primal ethos of the indigenous peoples is based on valuations, while the values themselves gradually develop, change and also disappear again (p. 28).
11. Regarding the *Ten Commandments*: Moral and ethical orientation can still be gained from the *10 commandments*. However, they alone do not justify a binding ethics of behavior control, especially because the 10 commandments as such no longer imply *any legally binding force*. (pp. 39 ff.)
12. All religious values also seem to be based on non-religious values and evaluations. (pp. 41 f.)
13. 'Parliament of World Religions' (1993), Principles of a *Global Ethic Declaration*: 1. Non-violence and respect for life, 2. solidarity and equitable economic order, 3. tolerance and life of truthfulness, 4. equality and partnership between men and women, each as *culturally obliging*, ie obligation to act accordingly. (As an ethical guideline, the *Golden Rule* is intended to be applied to *everybody!*) (pp. 43 f.)
14. *Kant* (1785) on the Golden Rule: "... it cannot be a general law, because it does not contain the basis of duties to oneself, not of duties of love towards others ..., finally not of owed duties to one another ..." (pp. 44 f.)
15. *Hinduism*, 'Dharma': "the practice of personal and social responsibility within the cosmic order". (see p. 45)
16. *Buddhism*, system of values: 1. *Wisdom and knowledge*, plus: right thinking, commemoration, recognition and belief, 2. *Ethics and morals*, with rules of conduct for speaking, doing and living as a whole, 3. *Collection and meditation*: "correctly sinking in". (see pp. 45 ff.)
17. *Christianity*. The novelty of Jesus' theory of values reduced to a simple denominator: the completely new justification of human dignity in the equality of all human beings before God.
18. Jesus presents himself as one of the highest norms by declaring that he is "the way and the truth and the life".
19. Paul has impressively demonstrated the essence of *love* in his 'Song of Songs', namely in the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians letter.
20. Faith, hope and love are to be regarded as fundamental values of the Christian *person*. (see pp. 64 ff.)
21. *Augustine*'s hierarchy of values has unfortunately led to or contributed to undesirable developments, for example to intolerance towards those who think differently and those of different faiths. (pp. 70 ff.)
22. Like no other, *Francis of Assisi* embodied the ideals of mutual respect for all creatures and complete equality in fraternity. Jacques le Goff: "*The criticism of money and the bankers, poverty and solidarity bring San Francesco very close to our worries, especially in times of crisis.*" (see p. 73 f.)
23. On *Thomas Aquinas*: "The cardinal virtues are determined as the best possible constitution of natural faculties. Thus, wisdom and prudence are assigned to reason, justice to will, bravery to striving and temperance to desire." (see p. 75 ff.)
24. Regarding *Meister Eckhart*: "Instead of the absolute subject beyond human subjectivity, to which the Augustinian and nominalist voluntarism had absolutized God, there is the mediation of divine and human subjectivity." (see above p. 77 f.)
25. Regarding *Martin Luther*: It remains to be said that with regard to the image of man, the pessimistic views of Moses, Paul, Augustine and Luther cannot be considered as valuable, on the contrary to corresponding teachings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, among others, which *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, among others, has adopted for the 18th century. (see p. 78 ff.)
26. Regarding *Thomas Muntzer*: It seems advisable to finally learn from history, i.e. also and especially from what intrepid fighters ("historical heroes"?) like Thomas Muntzer and Karl Marx have tried. Both would only become tragic figures if no one was prepared to deal with them any longer, to learn from them and their history, to look for answers to the irrefutable questions of values, norms and senses in them. (see p. 85 ff.)
27. *Christian socialism*. *F.R. de Lamennais* has succeeded in uniting ideas from Christianity, socialism, liberalism and even Marxism in new syntheses. (p. 88 ff.)
28. *Theology of Liberation*. *Leonardo Boff* (2013) rates the fact that in Latin America even conservative clerical dignitaries have adopted the "option for the poor" as extremely encouraging (ibid.). A religious-socio-political movement has even become a general cultural-political one. (p. 90 f.)
29. The *Catholic social teaching* rests philosophically and theologically on at least three pillars: 1. the law of nature, 2. the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Neothomism, 3. personalism. (p. 91 f.)
30. *Protestant social ethics*. The "freedom of a Christian human being" probably lies in its reliance on its own, ultimately, God-given powers, including the freedom of will and conscience. (p. 92 f.)
31. *Other, non-Christian religions*. In *Islam*, more important than belief is, similar to Judaism (!), the *right action* of human beings, which is all the more strictly regulated by the *Sharia*, the legal system, the law, the "totality of human actions regarding the precepts of Allah". (p. 93 ff.)
32. *Sufis and Alevis*. The fact that Islam does not necessarily have to result in fundamentalism, is shown by Islamic religious communities such as those of the Sufis and Alevis, who emphasize less the reasons of the law and the letter than the *reasons of the heart and humanity*, and thus want to meet the desires and longings of people. (p. 95 f.)
33. **Ancient Greek metaphysics**. The *Delphic Oracle*: "Know yourself!" and: "Nothing in excess!". The three basic components of *gnothi seautón* are: 1. self-knowledge, 2. the ego, 3. the self (see p. 50 ff.). *Pre-Socratics: Heraclitus and Democritus*. *Heraclitus*: Mankind has a reliable compass, the *logos* - and thus language, reason, understanding, meaning, speech, structure and "the general law", factors which at the same time give meaning to all beings. - *Democritus*: Only "fools" can get by without any *zest for life*. Against excess, Democritus does not set the ultimate goal of pure gain in pleasure, but rather "good cheer ..., well-being ..., imperturbability ... which is achieved by keeping restlessness and violent movement away and, in everything, by seeking the true measure." (p. 54 f.) *Socrates and Plato*. To *Socrates*: "Virtue is ... identified with knowledge. I cannot at the same time know what is good to do and not act morally well." Regarding *Plato*: "The objects of knowledge receive from the *good* not only the ability to be known, but also their existence and essence; while the good itself is not a being, but exceeds this in grandeur and power." And: "Wisdom as the knowledge of good is ... not only an individual, but also a political virtue." (p. 55 ff.) - *Aristotle* demands an inner, *moral* attitude and a corresponding behavior in dealing with values, by which he essentially understands two things: 1. the external goods of happiness (i.e. above all things of the outside world) and 2. the "higher", spiritual and psychic Values that are striven for for themselves. *Kant's criticism of Aristotle's ethics of happiness*: there could not be "general happiness" as an ethical maxim, but there could be moral law as an obligation. (p. 57 ff.) - Last but not least, *Epicurus* derives his theory of values from a twofold teleological approach: the goal, purpose and meaning of human existence is *happiness*, enhanced by *joy*. Those who strive for happiness can best achieve it through joy. (p. 62 f.) - *Stoic happiness: Ataraxia through virtue*. Every action in the Stoa becomes good if it is based on, or is accompanied by, reasonable deliberation and moral insight. Bad is everything that goes against it, especially actions that are based on *affects*, to which the Stoics include "pleasure, displeasure, desire and fear" (ibid.). This affliction can only be combated by correctly using reason. (p. 63f.)
34. **Philosophical values and norms since the Middle Ages**. *Freedom and Emancipation Movements in the Middle Ages*. In the *Magna Carta Libertatum*, proclaimed in England in 1215, the legal protection of the individual, in particular protection against arbitrary arrest, is of central importance. Any attack on the person, such as expropriation, ostracism, banishment or imprisonment, is prohibited as long as there is no corresponding decision by a professional court or on the basis of state law. Everyone has complete freedom of travel. (p. 96 f.)
From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. The new worldview of the Renaissance: that heliocentric, Copernican, established against the resistance of the Church. The human being moves into the center of interest. *Action* becomes decisive. Philosophy (e.g. in the newly founded Platonic Academy of Florence), science and culture come to new deployment, never known before. (p. 97 f.)
From the baroque to the enlightenment. A large rift goes through the 17th century, the age of the Baroque and the Thirty Years' War. The first thing that will be torn is the bond of values that previously held society together. (p. 98)
Descartes: Common sense ('bon sens') is what is "best distributed" in the world. This finding,, in conjunction with the *Cogito* and the theory of ideas, has proved to be revolutionary. (p. 98 f.)

Thomas Hobbes' ingenious trick is that he distinguishes between "natural" and "artificial" persons, so that he, apparently effortlessly, can adapt the term person to the theory of the state. (p. 99 ff.)

35. Values and norms of the Enlightenment. Empiricism was systematically founded by Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), who declared *observation and experiment* to be the indispensable basis of all research. (p. 101).

Lametrie's *ethic of forbearance* is based on subtle psychology and careful observation of social realities. If everything is materially conditioned (as Lametrie assumes), there cannot be something detached from it, or even absolute. (p. 101 ff.)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The individual ('la personne particulière') becomes a community person ('personne publique') and thus a *legal person* by first relinquishing all rights to the sovereign, the common will, who in turn, that is, so to speak, in return (as 'équivalent'), guarantee each person all rights and thus the largest possible freedom. (p. 103 f.).

The idea of tolerance in Voltaire, Lessing and Goethe. Voltaire: "Tolerance is the dowry of humanity. We are all full of weaknesses and errors: Let us forgive each other our stupidities! - this is the first law of nature." - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) considers as inadequate any tolerance seen as mere toleration and endurance (in the sense of the Latin 'tolerare': 'to tolerate, to endure'). Rather, it is important to show fellow human beings not only tolerance, but compassion, respect and recognition (which people are quite capable of due to their ability to *empathize*). Lessing: "What establishes the value of the *person*, is not the truth that any person is in possession of, or supposed to be, but the sincere effort that he has made to discover the truth". (p. 104 ff.)

36. Human rights. *The American Revolution:* "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." - *The French Revolution:* The coincident with the general will of sovereignty always goes from the nation itself, so that every citizen in *person* shall have the right, directly or indirectly, to participate in the production of the general will, and thus in the entire formation of political will. (p. 107 ff.).

37. On the classic German ideal of humanity and on German idealism. Friedrich Schiller: "In a beautiful soul it is where sensuality and reason, duty and inclination harmonize, and grace is its expression in appearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature possess freedom and preserve its form at the same time, since it forfeits the former under the rule of a strict mind, the latter under the anarchy of sensuality." Schiller's merits: 1. Human nature is not dualistic to be split up, but to be understood *holistically*. 2. Duty and inclination do not have to be in opposition. 3. Affections and feelings, such as love, grace and dignity, can very well have a morally motivating effect. 4. The freedom of art should be developed to a *realm of freedom and equality for all human beings*. (p. 110 ff.).

Hegel: Not Schiller's "aesthetic state", but a society of free and equals, civilized by morality, should be desirable, a society in which perfect freedom is no longer limited to that of the artist. (p. 117 ff.)

38. Socialist Ethics - from Marx to Ethical Socialism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: To request is the *categorical imperative*, "to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despised being." In order to achieve true freedom for all people, the capitalist mode of production and with it class society must be abolished. The *normative immediate goal* of socialism is: "Everyone according to his abilities, everyone according to his needs." Only in a classless society can the *ethics of a decent life come into full effect* and a *realm of freedom* in a "free association of free individuals" will be established (p. 121 ff.).

Even if *Ethical Socialism*, which was always "only" a theoretical concept, failed at the beginning of the 20th century, it does not seem absurd to try to reconcile Kant and Marx. (p. 125 ff.).

39. From positivism to neoliberalism - via utilitarianism, pragmatism, critical rationalism. *Positivism:* Auguste Comte (1798-1857) expects everything from a factual knowledge in which everything absolute is replaced by relative. A global democracy should secure the future in alliance with industry. - *Utilitarianism*, Bentham: "You can ... of an act say it is consistent with the principle of utility ... if its inherent tendency to enlarge the happiness of the community is greater than any tendency to reduce it." (p. 141 ff.). - *Pragmatism.* William James (1842-1910) even wants to base his concept of *truth on action*, which can be derived from the *totality of experiences*. Incidentally, what is *useful* is always *true*. (A thesis that has been refuted by the *correspondence theory of truth*.) Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914): Every concept must be checked for what it actually contains, what it actually achieves and what consequences it has (could have), especially if that concept leads to convictions or justifications that are supposed to enable reliable action. - *Critical rationalism.* Sir Karl R. Popper (1902-94): Any theory can only be considered true as long as it is not refuted by new or overlooked facts. The validity of a theory cannot be proven, but it can be "falsified" (refuted). - *Neo-liberalism:* What once appeared to be largely liberating and even trend-setting through the Enlightenment, positivism, utilitarianism, pragmatism and critical rationalism, threatens to degenerate into a permanent nightmare in (neo) liberalism. (p. 128 f.).

40. Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (1844-1900): from denial of morality to fascism? Schopenhauer: "... all true and pure love is pity, and every love that is not pity is selfishness. Selfishness is *eros*; Compassion is the *agape*. Mixtures of the two often take place." For Schopenhauer, the *will* is the unquestionable primary reason by which Kant's *thing in itself* is to be replaced. Nietzsche's misunderstanding: Kant called for each individual, subjective maxim to be elevated to a general law; with which, however, he turns Kant's claim into the opposite. The undeniable power of evil (= criminal energy) does not disappear because one no longer distinguishes between good and evil. In this respect, too, Nietzsche's moral criticism falls fatally short and wrong. In addition, he obviously does not want to justify any new ethics with the "new values" he calls for, especially since these values are intended to be entirely in the service of the will to power and the creation of the "superman". But, to my mind, no ethics can be justified with the "right of the strongest", on the contrary: It justifies any, often senseless and destructive immorality. (pp. 133 ff.).

41. Ethics of values: only from Hermann Lotze to Nicolai Hartmann? Hermann Lotze's reduction to the activity of the "soul core" leads to misinterpreting or misunderstanding the actual soul activity, for example when *experiencing*: First the subject, i.e. the whole person, experiences something, not just the soul core, the 'mind' (by the way, a word that only exists in German with this meaning of *absolute inwardness*). If I abstract from this, I miss the process that actually leads from experience to recognition and, as in by far most cases, to the *re-recognition* of values. Lotze's doctrine of values is therefore a colossus on feet of clay and therefore unsuitable for the foundation of a value ethic. (p. 137 ff.).

Max Scheler. The shortcomings of Scheler's theory of values are reinforced in his old work. In order to secure the spirit as the highest *value* instance, he finally advocates a dualism of body and soul, whereby the body is finally downgraded to a "thing", so that the spiritual and the physical aspects of being a person diverge. But this is in stark contrast to Scheler's original intention to explain personality as a body and soul unity. (p. 142 ff.). - Nicolai Hartmann admits that value and meaning can relate to the *objective*, but does not draw any conclusions from this for his concept of "giving meaning". Value, sense, fining and giving of meaning, however, cannot just go up by subjectivity, if they contain *objective* components. Even with Nicolai Hartmann's in-depth, albeit questionable analyzes, which, as a result of their connection with the question of meaning, touch on the *problem of norms*, the last word on the matter of the possible justification of a normative value ethics has by no means been spoken. (p. 144 ff.).

42. Further positions of the 20th century. *Personalism.* Surprisingly, despite extensive provisions, it does not seem possible to develop a universally accepted definition of the term person. Emmanuel Mounier's statement that the person is "*le volume total de l'homme*", the whole "scope" of the human being, corresponds most closely to the 22 criteria I mentioned. (p. 148 ff.).

43. Existentialism: Sartre and Camus. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80): *Two basic values: freedom and responsibility.* Sartre, on the one hand, founds freedom by *value*, but vice versa denominates freedom as "the basis of all values", so that freedom in general now seems to be the highest value. Indeed, Sartre sets freedom as absolute: it has no other limits than your own - and those of your own *responsibility*. And thus also "bases" the being-for-himself of the human being, without therefore merely being a content of consciousness among many other (possible) ones. Freedom is freedom of the *ego* in being with other people and thus, at least as a "goal", freedom for all, freedom for all self. In the words of Sartre: "... I cannot aim at my freedom if I do not also aim at the freedom of others" (p. 152 ff.).

Albert Camus (1913-60): *the splendor of Mediterranean values.* With his 'Pensée de Midi', Camus offers the basis for an *eco-ethics*, also and especially nowadays still up-to-date, but fails to support it by the necessary criticism of capitalism. (p. 156 ff.).

44. Neo-Marxist Concepts. *Critical Theory of Society ("Frankfurt School"), Max Horkheimer.* I consider Horkheimer's realization to be correct that in capitalism the actual social conditions with their contradictions and conflicts keep standing in the way of the full effectiveness of the Cat. Imp. (p. 1 61 ff.). Jürgen Habermas: His ethics of discourse can in no case replace the categorical imperative. Decisive ethical and normative questions of value must be approached with different methods, be it in expert committees or through scientific cooperation of individual theorists. (p. 164 ff.).

45. There can apparently also not be an absolutely valid ethics of behavior control because the question of truth plays a decisive role in every ethics. (p. 170).

46. **Ernst Bloch (1885-1977): from Kant to dialectical-materialistic ethics.** Bloch *change ethics* is based on an *incompletely ended* morality; freedom is committed to the utopia of the realm of freedom, and only there *completely* will be realized. And thus at the same time it serves as a benchmark even higher than natural law, not only for the future, but also for all practice in the here and now. This corresponds to the fact that Bloch thinks and argues *genuinely ecologically*; this is due to his concept of nature, according to which nature is first to be understood as 'natura naturans', i.e. as a creative power and (possible) "nature subject", as a power of which *Schelling* declares that it is "its own legislator", which as such is in no way to be understood adequately in terms of natural science, for example through atomic and field theories. (p. 171 ff.).

47. **Core sentences of a dialectical-materialistic ethics:** p. 178

48. **Eco-ethics (I)** Hans Jonas' *imperative of ecological sustainability* : "Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth!" Eco-ethics leads apparently to eco-socialist concepts, even if these are not yet sufficiently ethically founded. Anyway, they contain goals based on global and local *needs*, goals that so far could be reached neither in capitalism nor in ("real-") socialism. (p. 181 ff.).

49. **New establishment of an ethics of behavior control:** p. 191

How is ethics created? An overview: p. 191

On the terms behavior, control and behavior control. In general, behavior is considered to be "the totality of all observable changes in state, especially the modes of reaction of matter". *Control* has been shown to take place in every human being, especially on the basis of *information*, both consciously and unconsciously. I differentiate a) between natural (biological, neural) and artificial (media) information and b) between self-control (or internal control) and external control (e.g. through digital or media acquisition). This corresponds to my hypothesis that the mind-body problem can probably be solved using a dialectical-materialistic concept of information. - *Behavioral control* : What initially looks like a mere stimulus-reaction process: the impact of the environment on time management, is increasingly developing into a model example of ethical behavioral control. I see the reason for this in the fact that it was not machines but humans who invented *cybernetics*, based on existing knowledge about control processes in humans. In addition, it has long been known that behavior control can take place anywhere where information (= setting in form) is meaningfully used. (p. 195 ff.).

50. **On the relationship between ethics, the philosophy of history and anthropology.** It can be assumed that the origin of the universe known to us is not an "action", but an *event* from which forward-moving, entelechetic factors have developed. For this reason alone, the philosophy of history and anthropology contain not only reference theories of ethics, but also belong to their founding instances. (p. 202 ff.).

51. **On the relevance of the philosophy of history and anthropology for an ethics of behavior control.** People want to know where they come from and where they go. So the philosophy of history must begin *cosmologically*, i.e. with facts and assumptions about the beginning and the end, past and future of the "whole", although the whole is not to survey. (p. 204 ff.).

52. **Anthropology, the "human resource".** Information qua communication can also be understood as a relationship between subject-object, object-subject. Which finally led me to the conclusion: "Dialectics as a unity of identity and non-identity fully affects the human body and soul, although there are limits to explainability, e.g. outside the human body and soul identity, which is limited by conception and death. In any case, we do not know the beginning and end of the whole of which we are a part. This also defines the limits within which a dialectical-materialistic theory of the human body and soul can move " (p. 210 ff.).

53. **Value syntheses that (can) control behavior.** A person's horizons of values are not always identical to those of historical tradition. Everyone can find value orientation themselves, especially in combination with *value syntheses*. These arise consistently in larger contexts, essentially in the areas of anthropology, psychology, economics, sociology, politics, ecology, world views, aesthetics, and religion. (p. 212 ff.)

54. **Anthropologically accentuated value syntheses.** *Value - goal - purpose - time - life - meaning*: Understanding of foreign cultural value traditions is a crucial prerequisite for any intercultural, cross-peoples and -nations *understanding about common and different values*, and not about vague or indefinable "being". (Whereby the 'métissage culturel', the mixture of cultures, is of particular importance.) Values prove themselves in everyday life, in *meaningful* actions and facilities. The "goals and purposes" related may be only properly investigated, if the doctrine of them, that is, of different forms of *teleology*, has been elaborated. (p. 214 f.)

Mutuality - justice - generosity - "eternal life force" - reverence for all life. Hans-Ernst Schiller: "The establishment of a lasting peace is a duty. It is therefore imperative, and ultimately perhaps even wise, to enter a state of rule of law in which the rules of justice apply to all - equally." (p. 215 ff.)

Self-worth of the person - tolerance - emancipation . Every human being experiences tests for the example of the intrinsic worth of the person by enduring and fighting the struggle between good and evil within himself and with his fellow human beings. Whether we gain or lose freedom is at stake in this battle. Which does not have to be justified metaphysically, especially since it is probably enough to ascertain the material basis of this circumstance: the imperfect, unfinished nature in us. Not Voltaire, Goethe and Lessing, but the claim to absoluteness, fanaticism and fundamentalism are the real enemies of the "otherness of the other"! (p. 217 ff.)

Love - humility - selflessness - wisdom. Is on the right path for *Lao-tse, Gautama Buddha* and *Confucius*, who obeys natural reason, gives up egomania and instead aims at "filial love", harmony and peace. *Francis of Assisi* goes even further in that he trusts humility and love to endure all nastiness and cruelty. (p. 219 f.)

55. **Economy, society, politics.** *Equal right for all, right to property, separation of powers.* Economy, society and politics are structures that can only be artificially separated from one another. The foundations for *democratic* developments in these areas were laid by the US and French revolutions. All the more disconcerting is the fact that the basic values: *equal rights for all and separation of powers*, have apparently nowhere, and not even in democratically constituted states, found *complete* validity not only in terms of normative and legal but also as factual validity. (p. 220 ff.).

Human rights - common good - use, exchange and surplus values. The French Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, *Karl Marx* certainly appreciated it as an achievement of the Enlightenment. He continues it in his theories of *utility, exchange and surplus value* and the theory of alienation, with the aim of a "free association of free individuals", the *realm of freedom*. (p. 222 ff.).

Paul Tillich: Marxism Critique - Religious Socialism - Theonomy - Meaning of History. Tillich sees the most important task of his *religious socialism* in combining the unconditional commitment for the unconditioned (the divine) with the struggle for *right, justice and the right thing in general*. By *theonomy* (= 'God-legality') Tillich means a "state in which the spiritual and social forms are filled with the content of the unconditioned as the supporting ground, the meaning and the reality of all forms"; this theonomy creates "a holy and at the same time just reality". - It is a remarkable attempt at a solution, which I nevertheless do not consider to be really convincing, and that is because Tillich only considers Christianity to be able to find *the only true meaning*.

Socialism and meaning, however, refer to the entirety of human beings, including atheists and people of different faiths. Other religions have other value systems and therefore answer the question of meaning differently. (p. 224 ff.).

Liberation - grassroots communities - social criticism - social reforms - non-violence. Latin America in particular has shown that socialism and Christianity can come together. The *theology of liberation* is based on a social revolutionary liberator who is still effective, even if only virtually present: Jesus Christ. - In the base communities people want no longer to accept the stark contrasts between rich and poor as "God-given", but to ensure concrete remedial programs and social reforms. Whereby the theoretical tools for the necessary criticism of capitalism and society are obtained not least from *Marxism*, without renouncing the basic Christian principle of *non-violence*. (p. 228 f.).

Basic democracy, including on *Rudolf Steiner*: Economy, law and spirit are each subject to their own laws, but can and should work together through the reorganization sought by Steiner, and bring about a new, harmonious whole in the spirit of freedom, equality and fraternity. It is noticeable that Steiner assigns freedom to the spirit, equality to law and fraternity to business, but always attaches great importance to the principle of *self-administration* . - Unfortunately, in vain Steiner tried, after the first World War, to practice these ideas in politics. (p. 227 ff.).

Work - Health - Sexuality - Upbringing - Learning. As a definition of *work* , I state, following Marx, Engels and Ernst Bloch: *work is the one targeted and purposeful activity that enables human beings as a species, i.e. in social cooperation with fellow human beings, to satisfy certain needs by changing certain objects (e.g. raw materials and substance contents) in a meaningful way and / or producing new objects.* Work is understandable neither only from the subject nor only from the object. In any case, it is a question of dialectical subject-object relationships that apparently apply to any kind of mental and / or physical work. - *Health*: Mental and physical health do not only depend on the conditions of working life. The *value of health* can and must be protected and supported by a multitude of other values. Last but not least, I also include certain ecological, ideological, aesthetic and religious concepts. - *Sex / love / marriage / family*. For the entire problem area, still valid is *Kant* 's requirement to respect the dignity of every person as a moral person and a legal entity. Only those who respect themselves and others are able to behave sensibly, prudently and appropriately, and not only in matters of love. - *Upbringing and learning: Communicate values and set limits.* Adolescents are entitled to fairness and equal treatment. Peace and non-violence in the home and in school depend on it. I see a particularly difficult problem in the fact that educators, and especially the adolescents entrusted to them, sometimes act on the

basis of *unconscious* guidelines and imprints without being really clear about their own unconscious. (p. 229 ff.).

56. Ecological value syntheses

Marx's early ecology corresponds to his *humanistic naturalism*, which he has developed already in his early work: *Economics and philosophy* (1844), specifically due to a) his criticism of Hegel, b) his Feuerbach reception and c) his criticism of capitalism (p. 244 f.).

From "nature subject" to nature *alliance*, Ernst Bloch: "A ... non-exploitative behavior towards nature was already, according to the objective-real possibility, meant as a friendly, concrete alliance technique that tries to bring itself into harmony with the hypothetical nature-subject." (p. 245 ff.).

57. Worldview and -changes (p. 248 ff.)

Change in values (see p. 18 ff.), *Decline in values*. Everyone can find a new value orientation themselves, certainly also in those value systems and value syntheses that I have presented in the present work. (p. 212 ff.).

Materialism: If values arise from working in and around the material, which I do not doubt, theoretical and practical knowledge of matter may be understood also as a basis for any value ethics. (p. 250 ff.).

Language, cognition, science, ingenuity, technology. According to Aristotle, the human being is 'zoon logon echon', a being with reason, understanding and language, and at the same time 'zoon politikon', a community being. Both belong together closely. *Cognition*: I assume that it is always accompanied and influenced by language, but that it is only gained through thinking and other non-linguistic experiences. *Science*: Not only science is about theory and practice, but also philosophy, in particular ethics as the theoretical science of morality, and morality itself as conditioned by social practice. Ethics and morals are largely related to one another like theory to practice. *Ingenuity*: A discovery is made by those who find something that was previously unknown. Knowledge proves who makes correct statements about previously unknown facts on the basis of sufficient reasons; while *invention* is generated by creative activity producing new, hitherto *not yet* existing. *Technology*: Should one day mankind succeed in mastering all technology, including its consequences, this would probably be thanks to the *ingenuity* in all areas, not least in society, politics and ethics. If we don't succeed, we are threatened with ruin, for example by AI and super robots. (p. 254 ff.).

Technology assessment (TA). From TA legitimate requests have been derived referring for example to climate and environmental protection; which raises the question of how far, in a capitalist system, such requests have chances, not only of acceptance by the public, but also of being realized (p. 262 ff.). *Alliance technology*: How should the "ground of a mediated natural subject", as the basis of a new, harmonious coexistence of nature and technology, be explained when Bloch himself admits that the "nature subject" is a mere *hypothesis*? (p. 264 et seq.) Volker Schneider: "We understand the alliance technology involved in neural communication and cooperation within us only when we give up the dualistic view of the world." (p. 267).

Philosophy and religion. Still valid seems to be Hegel's definition that "philosophy is the history of people with themselves and with the subjects of their thought". Nobody is excluded from philosophy, everybody can practice it by means of common sense ('*le bon sens*'). *Religion*: Subject to *agnosticism*, every religion is to be respected as long as it is able to coexist peacefully with other religions and world views. (p. 267 f.).

Enhancement of life, creativity, eco-feeling and awareness. Nietzsche calls for a total "reevaluation of values" in order to ensure that life is no longer subjected to values or even sacrificed, but rather the other way round: values have to serve life. And everything that can improve and enhance life and mobilize people's spiritual powers is valuable to him (see also: "Artists, philosophers and saints"). (p. 268 ff.)

Realm of freedom. According to Marx, freedom for everyone only reigns when: "In place of the old bourgeois society, there is an association in which the free development of everyone is the condition for the free development of all" (p. 273 ff.).

58. Aesthetic values

I - world - Renaissance - art. Giotto represents a new "personality awareness" (Buck); his person is a person as I and you, he becomes a personality as an active, creatively active person, as a 'homo faber' who develops his abilities as far as possible. (p. 276 ff.) Francesco Petrarca (1304-74) partially anticipates what triggered the "real" Renaissance after 1453: the turn to the self and, last but not least, the revival of the study of antiquity, for example through commentary and publication of hardly known texts by ancient authors such as those of the Stoic Cicero. (p. 277). Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) was not only a painter, poet and thinker, but also athlete (fencer, springer), sculptor, architect, engineer, musician, cantor, constructor of instruments, anatomist, astronomer, mathematician and scientist. (p. 277)

Genius cult in the 'Sturm und Drang' - aesthetic education - play. Arnold Hauser: "The genius escapes the misery of everyday life into a dreamland of limitless arbitrariness. This is not only lives free from the shackles of reason, but is also in possession of mystical powers, making unnecessary the usual experiences of senses." (p. 277 ff.). Friedrich Schiller calls for an *aesthetic state of reason* and sees art as a suitable means for its realization. Man should gradually bring into harmony his being and appearances, spirit and nature, duty and inclination. This can be achieved above all through art, because in it matter and spirit, content and form, reason and sensuality are combined with one another. "... people only play where they are human in the full meaning of the word, and they are only fully human where they play," says Schiller. The play instinct can resolve the tension between the conscious and the unconscious. (p. 278).

Schelling sees an "unconscious spirit" at work in nature, the highest product of which is nature. But art exalts and completes this spirit by combining intuition, thinking, knowing and acting. This only makes man come to himself, so that art (including the divine power of creation) is to be put above everything else. (p. 278 f.).

Basic concepts of romanticism: night, moon, magic, miracles, fairy tales and the "old splendor" of times long past. You could add terms such as dream, longing, unconscious, unknown, love, nature, forest spirit, mysticism, mystery, infinity, life and death, nothing and everything. Love is the value, which to the most romantics is at heart; they see in it the actual *meaning of existence*, while the poet Novalis even thought (1772-1801) that by romanticizing the world, the "original meaning" could be found again. (p. 279 ff.).

Nietzsche between Apollo and Dionysus. The abolition of the ego (which should become "free" by disappearing!) corresponds to the development that the author carried out in later years: up to the all-dominating "will to power"; namely at the price of radical "masculinization" (Karl Joel), of a "reign of superman" ('Herrenmenschentum'), which does not shrink from brutality and inhumanity. (p. 281 ff.).

Positions of the 20th and 21st centuries. Cast shadows of modern aesthetics: destruction, uncertainty, floating. It's not just about the irrational, but also about destruction and a new beginning, a new structure. The conventional object disappears, dissolves; nothing fixed and solid remains to the observer. Since the traditional safeguards fail, the time has come for the "philosophy of floating", as Walter Schulz explains. In a "broken relationship to the world", modern man feels torn between trust and insecurity, especially since in art and philosophy "negativity and floating appear as the primary object of representation", especially in an art that in spite of all innovations and upheavals has remained obliged to "playing and relieving the pressure of reality". (p. 283 ff.).

'Schein und Vor-Schein' (appearance and pre-appearance) with Ernst Bloch and Joseph Beuys. Bloch: "In daydreams, art contains this utopian being, not as carelessly gilding, but as one that also has deprivation in itself, and that, if this is certainly not overcome by art alone, is not forgotten in it, but embraced by joy as a coming figure." And: "In this way the motto of the aesthetically attempted pre-appearance is: How could the world be completed without this world, as in the Christian-religious pre-appearance, being blown up and apocalyptically disappearing." And about art, with a formula that summarizes Bloch's aesthetics in perhaps the shortest possible form: "Art is a laboratory and also a festival of executed possibilities, including the alternatives experienced therein, whereby the execution as well as the result happen in the manner of the well-founded appearance, namely the worldly perfect pre-appearance." (p. 286 ff.).

Joseph Beuys (1921-86): "That is the anthropological concept of art, which one is entitled to say: *Everyone is an artist*. For I do not say: Everyone can be a Rembrandt." On the freedom of individual thought and general artistry, Beuys finds his hope and aspiration not only to create completely new art forms of his own, but also, in cooperation with all (!) People, to influence, in a revolutionary and reformist way, society as a whole (ibid.). Expand the freedom of thought and will to the realm of freedom for all - a captivating thought! But: How did Beuys' attempt fail? And: are we really all artists, do we want to be? And what about our freedom? Does it exist as pure freedom of thought and will? Are all people already free because they all have such freedoms? And if everyone is already free, why are such profound changes necessary as Beuys is demanding? Especially since not only freedom of thought and free will, but also night and day dream are sources of artistic inspiration, so I claim: *Not all are artists per se, but potential artists, because everyone is capable of creativity in dream work, feeling, thinking and imagination* (p. 290 ff.).

59. **Eco-ethics (II)**. *The neo-digital revolution or: the end of freedom?* By contrast, both the individual and the society must be to defend, whether by private safeguards (encryption of online communication, etc.), whether by legislative measures. It is a feeling of powerlessness that creeps up on you when you realize how the turbo-capitalists are using digitization to increase productivity and profit maximization and to keep wage earners dependent, for example by "increasing the turnover rate, reducing the unit labor costs, increasing the efficiency of work, diversifying constant capital, reducing circulation costs and creating completely new areas of business. The effects of these

interests consist in the compression of work, the lowering of the relative wage, the reduction of work in the circulation sphere, the extended surveillance of the employees and an intensification of competition." And extremely: "losing work because a robot takes over what you have done before". (Peter Schadt). All of them are factors that continually exacerbate *social inequality and injustice*. (p. 295 ff.).

Neither here nor in China can we see an "ethics of behavior control" as demanded by the physicist *Christoph von der Malsburg* in view of the threats posed by AI. One could assume that the aim of the CPC is the complete implementation of the "general legislation" sought by *Kant*. Which is not the case, however. Because obviously the main concern of the CPC is to cement its *legislative omnipotence*; and not, as with *Kant*, about guaranteeing the freedom and dignity of the person on the basis of general legislation. In any case, no new synthesis of ecology and socialism, no new concept of eco-socialism can be derived from the Red Chinese model. (p. 298 ff.)

Artificial intelligence. Unimagined perspectives are opening up in the field of medicine: "The health app *Babylon Health* can use a voice system (chatbot) based on AI to create a diagnosis in conversation with the patient, which, according to the manufacturer, is about 10 times more accurate than a diagnosis by a general practitioner." And yet, the overall picture of AI research, especially in view of some future prospects that are already recognizable, is rather ambiguous, if not frightening. (p. 300 ff.).

Criticism of trans- and posthumanism. Transhumanism goes beyond being human up to now; Posthumanism starts with the "end of mankind". If the transhumanistic presumptions were to become a reality, we humans would be denied access to a possible *realm of freedom* forever. Humanity would have to abdicate, give up on itself. In order to prevent such fatal developments, legislative countermeasures are likely to be required now. In the long term, I believe that overall social control over key industries (including the IT sector, of course) will be inevitable. On the other hand, any attempt to force people to give up on themselves is out of the question. Whoever wants to abolish human beings is robbing himself of his human dignity. Personality is lost to the extent that one destroys the unity of the human being, which consists of spirit, psyche and body matter, in order to ultimately reduce it to technically manipulated inorganic matter. Any such attempt exacerbates the prevailing competitive situation in which the people of this earth find themselves. (p. 302 ff.)

Advanced eco-ethics. When you read *Ray Kurzweil*, you could come to the conclusion that humans must be ashamed of their own *nature* and therefore forego it as soon as possible, in favor of AI and "super-intelligent" robots. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that as *part of nature*, and not only as free-creative cultural beings, we have, in ourselves, purpose and intrinsic value. Which is vital to any eco-ethics. If eco-ethics serves the protection of nature, then it serves also the self-preservation and self-respect of people. (p. 304 f.)

My legitimate request is:

In everything you do, make sure that you respect yourself and your fellow human beings as legal entities and personalities and that you always obey the moral law as far as possible.

"As possible" because there are exceptional situations, such as *self-defense*, in which the rights of one's own person have to be defended against existential threats and law violations of all kinds. (p. 305 f.)

Nature, eco and animal ethics can be derived directly from the intrinsic value of nature. In animal ethics in particular, the question of whether animals should also be granted *personal status* has long been controversial. Which is impossible if being a person is defined as "the total scope of man" (*Mounier*). With this assumption, I consider it possible to supplement the ethics of the person with an ethics of nature, for which I have proposed a *natural formula of the categorical imperative*, which takes into account the fact that *legitimate interests* may be necessary in dealing with nature. It is a formula that cannot or should not prejudice the ongoing discussions about (possible) rights of nature, the environment, the animal and plant world (natural, ecological, animal rights). It is:

Behave in such a way that you always treat nature in every person and in every other manifestation as a purpose – and as a means only for ethically justifiable and morally justifiable ends. (p. 306 ff.).

60. "Abolition" of ethics in the concrete utopia of a democratic eco-socialism (p. 309 ff.)

To rebel against neoliberal turbo-capitalism is not possible with ethics and morals alone. Rather, it requires persistent political resistance, especially when there is neither a "revolutionary subject" nor a corresponding class consciousness. Nevertheless, the ethical requests do not need to capitulate. Rather, they are to be included in the anti-capitalist *ethics of change* as conceived by *Ernst Bloch* (see p. 172 ff.). Such an ethic can and must also support the reformist to revolutionary struggle, true to *Marx's* motto that philosophy cannot be realized without "abolishing" ('aufheben') itself.

Eco-socialism – a new synthesis. On the concept of socialism. *Ernst Bloch* explains: "The truth of the social is socialism". And he outlines the vision of *socialism* as a *goal of substance* as a utopian unity of substance and subject, i.e. as the end *substance in an alienated being in and for itself*. There can be no doubt that this goal coincides with those who *Marx* and *Bloch* gave to the struggle for socialism. But: 1. Socialism is apparently not enforceable against the concentrated resistance of big business. 2. Without the mobilization of broad sections of the population, especially the working class, a socialist experiment cannot succeed. (p. 310 ff.).

Eco-socialism. In the "*Eco-Socialist Declaration of Belém*" (2009), a *comprehensive eco-socialist revolution* is called for, *worldwide*, so that "the most oppressed part of human society, the poor and the indigenous peoples" of the Third World can finally be freed from misery, underdevelopment and injustice (e.g. through unequal, unfair trade). In the course of this liberation, full equality between men and women, "gender equality" as "an integral part of eco-socialism", could be guaranteed all over the world. It is a program for which the majority of the population can be won over everywhere. The authors also recommend their program as a guide for urgently needed *reforms in the here and now*. Hunger, hardship, misery, the destruction of nature and the environment can no longer be postponed. Remedial action must be taken immediately wherever possible. (p. 312 ff.).

Digital socialism. Computers and "social media" alone cannot solve the problems of society, especially since the complexity of the human person, also and especially in a community, eludes the merely quantifying and classifying access of computers. (p. 316)

Socialist planning. Computers and the Internet are opening up entirely new possibilities for socialism. Macroeconomics, but also detailed problems such as working hours, can suddenly be calculated with unimaginable speed. (p. 316 f.).

Direct democracy would mean: Those who create values through work would finally be in control of their own house, namely by granting positive rights, the most important of which the authors *Cockshott* and *Cottrell* named in 1993: "(1) The right to earn a living deserve, (2) the right to receive the full value of their work and (3) the right to freely dispose of the value of their work as they wish" These would be novel property rights, and at the same time the end of inequality, injustice and exploitation, alienation and heteronomy.

Overall: a beautiful new world of freedom, justice and solidarity. But: *How should it be achieved, how should it be created, how should it be implemented?* And why have we come almost no step closer to it since the *Cockshott* and *Cottrell* proposals appeared in 1993? Shouldn't the failure of both the Soviet and the French (pseudo-) socialist experiments (1983 and 1989 ff.) have led to very different conclusions? (p. 317)

Market socialism could probably only become possible if the market economy is subjected to overall social control, macro- and microeconomically by competent control authorities, if possible at all levels, from workers' control in the factories to local and national institutions to international bodies, also, for example, through corresponding innovations in the UN. The capitalist market economy would therefore have to be transformed into a new market socialism, for which, in addition to political power, the consent of the majority of the population is required. In the present world situation, in order to make at least imaginable a *peaceful, non-violent transition to socialism*, a new market socialism must be compatible with a democratic constitution of the common being. (p. 318 f.)

Short-term and long-term goals of a democratic eco-socialism: see p. 320 ff. !

61. **And how can a democratic eco-socialism become a reality? To teleologics of socialism in transition societies.** If the truth of the social is socialism, both a truth theory and a theory of the social are required. If the social is to flourish to full truth in socialism, it must itself serve as the starting point for the transformation, so that first of all the existing social achievements, especially the social state, must be the starting point. (p. 322 f.)

For a specific analysis of the specific situation. It is essential to get the clearest possible overview of what is already social. Enlightening agitation and propaganda, 'agitprop' in the best and broadest sense of the term, are needed, if possible across all party and disposition boundaries, in order to come closer to final social emancipation, i.e. to the *realm of freedom*. (p. 323 f.)

Oscar Wilde realizes socialism in art. *Wilde* sees significant aspects of materiality and personality united in the work of art. There are no limits and no "decadence" for artistic expression. Artists cannot tolerate any political coercion, no "authoritarian power" over themselves: "*The form of government that is most suitable for the artist is: no*

government at all". And this corresponds to what Karl Marx understood as the *realm of freedom* and the *free association of free individuals*. (p 324 f f.)

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Notes:

- [1] Aust / Ammann 2014 and, remarkably rich in details: Shoshana Zuboff: *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power*, New York 2019 (German edition: *Das Zeitalter des Überwachungskapitalismus*, Frankfurt a.M. / New York 2018)
- [2] see Arnsburg 2017, Schnetker 2019
- [3] cf. Robra 2019
- [4] Kant 1965, p.42
- [5] Kant 1967, p.36
- [6] Kant 1965, p. 18
- [7] Kant 1965, p. 52
- [8] loc. cit. p. 58
- [9] Kant 1967, p. 102
- [10] Kant 1965, p. 43
- [11] Stindt 2017, p. 2
- [12] Beyer 2018, p. 1
- [13] Kant op. cit. p. 86
- [14] cf. Kant 1967, p. 154
- [15] Kant 1965, p. 71
- [16] Kant 1965, p. 71
- [17] Kant 1965, p. 76
- [18] Kant 1956, p. 526
- [19] cf. Kant 1967, pp. 140-153
- [20] cf. Eisler 1964, p. 4
- [21] Quoted by Eisler loc. cit. p. 5
- [22] Kant 1965, p. 80
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- [213] In: Nietzsche. *Ausgewählt und vorgestellt von Rüdiger Safranski (Nietzsche. Selected and presented by Rüdiger Safranski)*, Munich 1999, p. 85
- [214] E. Fink: *Nietzsches Philosophie*, Stuttgart 1960, p. 25 f.
- [215] Cf. Walter Schulz: *Metaphysik des Schweben. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Ästhetik (Metaphysics of Suspension. Studies on the history of aesthetics)*, Pfullingen 1985, p. 95
- [216] Walter Schulz, in: see footnote No. 215, op. cit. pp. 73-80; Francesca Vidal, in: *Bloch Wörterbuch*, loc. cit. p. 13-38
- [217] In: *The principle of hope* (hereinafter: 'PH'), loc. cit. p. 242
- [218] In: *Experimentum Mundi*, loc. cit. p. 196
- [219] Beuys in: ‚home‘: *Erweiterter Kunstbegriff / Plastische Theorie ('home': Extended Concept of Art / Plastic Theory)*. www.org/beuys/erweiterter-kunstbegriff.htm pp. 1-2
- [220] Beuys in: Stefanie Marx: *Künstlerlegende Joseph Beuys (Artist legend Joseph Beuys)* (2008). www.grin.com/document/1211883, p. 1
- [221] Stefanie Marx, in: see footnote no. 220, loc. cit. p. 2
- [222] Beuys, in: Miriam Sowa: *Joseph Beuys - zwischen Kunst und Kult (Joseph Beuys - between art and cult)* (2009), www.grin.com/document/161204, p. 2. Meanwhile, Werner Jocks (in 2021) has published an even more critical view: *Mythenbildner mit Hut. Vor 100 Jahren wurde der esoterische Künstler und Rudolf-Steiner-Adept Joseph Beuys geboren*. In: www.jungewelt.de/artikel/402313.komm-aus-deiner-fettecke-mythenbildner-mit-hut.html
- [223] W. Meixner: *Total vernetzt. Auf dem Weg in die smarte Diktatur. Besinnung auf den ethischen Vorrang des Menschen oder Ethische Reformation (Totally networked. On the way to the smart dictatorship. Reflection on the ethical primacy of man or ethical reformation)*. www.mayr.in.turn.de/personen/meixner/TotalVernetzt-AufD..
- [224] Aust / Ammann 2014, p. 169
- [225] Peter Schadt: *Scheinsubjekt Digitalisierung*, in: www.jungewelt.de/artikel/380022..., p. 4
- [226] Ingo Arzt: *China investiert enorm in die Kohle. (China is investing enormously in coal)*, <https://www.taz.de/Kohlekraftwerke-weltweit-im-Bau/5564169/>
- [227] „Viele empfinden die Daten-Überwachung als praktisch“. Interview mit Genia Kostka vom 24.7.2018. ("Many find data monitoring practical "). Interview with Genia Kostka from July 24th, 2018) <https://www.cicero.de/.../Sozialkreditsysteme-china-ueberwachung-staat-vertrauen-markt-unternehmen-kredite>
- [228] Cf. Adrian Lobe: *Macht uns der Computer zu Kommunisten? - Big Data lässt den linken Traum der Planwirtschaft wiederaufleben (Does the computer make us communists? - Big data revives the left dream of planned economy)*. In: 'Neue Zürcher Zeitung' from August 14, 2019.
- [229] Hannes Beierlein (2014): *"Ist künstliche Intelligenz schon im Jahre 2045 möglich?" ("Is artificial intelligence already possible in 2045?")* www.cancom.info/2014/12/ist-kuenstliche..., p. 1
- [230] Cf. Wikipedia 2016, pp. 1-2, and Kurzweil 2014, pp. 35-74
- [231] Kurzweil 2005, p. 487
- [232] Cf. Gérard Weisbuch: *Dynamique des systèmes complexes*, Paris 1989, p. 193
- [233] H. Mohr, in: Christian Vogel: *Vom Töten zum Mord. Das wirkliche Böse in der Evolutionsgeschichte (From killing to murder. The real evil in evolutionary history)*, Munich / Vienna 1989, p. 110
- [234] Klaus Sojka: *Öko-Ethik*, Göttingen 1987, p. 59
- [235] Cf. Karsten Breising: *Persönlichkeitsrechte für Tiere (Personality rights for animals)*, Freiburg 2013, p. 198 f.
- [236] Cf. Robra 2015, p. 518, see also Robra 2017, pp. 133-143
- [237] Bloch 1977, p. 243
- [238] In: Guest contribution 2015: *„Frankreich unter Mitterrand - Wie das Kapital die Hoffnung zerstörte“ ("France under Mitterrand - How capital destroyed hope")*, <https://die.freiheitsliebe.de/author/salam>, p. 2
- [239] Elmar Altvater (2002): Review of Sarkar 2001, in: www.deutschlandfunk.de/saral-sarkar-die-nachhaltige-..., p. 2
- [240] Quoted in Athanasios Karathanassis (2009): Review of Sarkar 2001, in: www.glasnost.de/autoren/athan/oekosoz.html, p. 2
- [241] Belém 2009: <https://www.oekologische-plattform.de/die-oeko-sozialistische-erklaerung-von-belem/> p. 4-5
- [242] W. Lotter in the magazine 'brandeins', November 11, 2016, p. 40
- [243] Cockshott / Cottrell 2001 (1993), p. 83
- [244] Wenzel 2006
- [245] In: Krätke, Michael R. 2003: *Wirtschaftsdemokratie und Marktsozialismus (Economics Democracy and Market Socialism)*, www.praxisphilosophie.de/kraetkewd.pdf. In order to arrive at such a new synthesis, *Sahra Wagenknecht* (2016, p. 273 ff.) suggests four new legal forms for companies: "the partnership, the employee company, the public company and the company for the common good", so that "property only through own work" could arise and capitalist "economic feudalism" would be overcome.
- [246] Not to be confused with the official state doctrine of the same name of China and Vietnam, which, for historical and political reasons, is completely different.
- [247] Dieterich 2011, p. 141
- [248] Cf. *Der deutsche Sozialstaat (The German welfare state)* (see bibliography!). Among other things, wage dumping has meanwhile led to serious grievances, especially with regard to unemployment benefits (Hartz IV) and pensions. A bright spot, however: the introduction of the minimum wage.
- [249] Drucksache (Printed matter) **17/9410** (from April 25, 2012): dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/094/1709410..., P. 1
- [250] Bloch 1977a), p. 249
- [251] Wilde 1970

