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Do possible worlds compromise God's beauty? A reply to Mark Ian Thomas Robson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2012

JON ROBSON
JON ROBSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK e-mail: jonvrobson@googlemail.com
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Abstract

In a recent article Mark Ian Thomas Robson argues that there is a clear contradiction between the view that possible worlds are a part of God's nature and the theologically pivotal, but philosophically neglected, claim that God is perfectly beautiful. In this article I show that Robson's argument depends on several key assumptions that he fails to justify and as such that there is reason to doubt the soundness of his argument. I also demonstrate that if Robson's argument were sound then this would be a problem for all classical theists and not just those who hold the possible worlds view.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 515 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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