Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge
Issue Date
2014-01Author
Robins, Sarah
Publisher
Elsevier
Type
Article
Article Version
Scholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscript
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Debate over the nature of mindreading proceeds on the assumption that theory and simulation offer distinct characterizations of this ability. The threat of collapse objection questions this assumption, suggesting that simulation collapses into theory because both are committed to mindreading as tacit knowledge. Although both sides dismiss this objection, I argue that the threat is real. Theory and simulation are both accounts of mindreading as tacit knowledge and so the debate between them collapses.
Description
This is the author's final draft. Copyright 2014 Elsevier.
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Citation
Robins, Sarah. "Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge." Cognitive Systems Research 28 (2014): 1-11. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.07.002.
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