Abstract
Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.
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Notes
This kind of account of epistemic luck is called a safety account (Orozco 2011). It is by no means an uncontested account. For example, see Lackey (2006) for some problems with the account. However, I will adopt it as a good working definition since it allows me to be precise in explicating the counterfactual relations that render the beliefs lucky in my case.
It should be noted that Pritchard’s focus is on understanding why.
Kvanvig also mentions justification as a necessary condition for understanding. However, since the focus of this paper is on whether understanding can be lucky, I will not discuss these further conditions.
Not everyone thinks that the beliefs grasped need to be true (Elgin 2004). I will not address that issue here.
Lipton takes understanding to imply knowledge. So, I am slightly modifying what he says, focusing on the link he identifies between exemplars and understanding, since ultimately this paper denies the idea that understanding implies knowledge.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Matthew McGrath for very helpful comments and suggestions on multiple drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and Zachary Ernst and André Ariew for helpful discussion
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Rohwer, Y. Lucky understanding without knowledge. Synthese 191, 945–959 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0322-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0322-0