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*Leibnitz wählt zwischen der
alten und neuen Philosophie.*

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“the divine attributes must necessarily be compatible, or as it is explained by our theologians, harmoniously united [*harmonica*]. God, though he is not only charitable [*barmherzig*] but charity itself, can nonetheless undertake no exercise of it which goes against his justice – and also no exercise of his justice through which his charity would be left behind.”³²

Any exercise of divine omnipotence [*Allmacht*], Leibniz goes on to say, must be limited by God’s “goodness” and “wisdom” – leading finally to “justice” [*Gerechtigkeit*]. This same *Gerechtigkeit* is insisted on by Leibniz, over and over, in his long and important letter to Molanus of July 18, 1698 – especially in the paragraph in which Leibniz treats Christ as “a just judge” for charitably saving “the woman taken in adultery” (*John VIII, 15*) from the legal penalty of death by stoning, for benevolently saying, “Go, and sin no more.”³³ (It is not surprising that Leibniz should give primacy to the Johannine Gospel – which in effect “foresees” Leibniz’ notion of anti-legalistic *caritas sapientis* and *benevolentia*.)

Leibniz goes on to say, in the “Unvorgreifliches Bedencken,” that “the eternal truths of goodness and justice, or ratio and proportion,” as well as all other “necessary truths,” have “their ground in the eternal being of God himself: not, however, in his free decree.” (“Now consist justice, goodness, beauty, no less than mathematical things, in equality and proportion, and therefore no less *aeternae et necessariae veritatis*,”³⁴) He adds that “true justice, as it is grasped by all understanding and honor-loving people, consists not in impunity, but means a universal good-willingness, in which wisdom is included.”³⁵ (Given Leibniz’s standard moral equivalences, *allegemeine Gutwilligkeit* = *benevolentia universalis* = *caritas sapientis* = justice.) And finally he plays the “ontological proof” trump card: if *all* truths were divinely caused *ex nihilo*, then the truth about the necessary existence of God himself (as revealed by St. Anselm) would be “a product of the free will of God, which is absurd in the highest degree [*absurdissimum*].”³⁶

³² Leibniz, „Unvorgreifliches Bedencken,“ Gr. I, 430.

³³ A, I, 15, 702-703.

³⁴ Leibniz, „Unvorgreifliches Bedencken,“ Gr. I, 428 ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 431.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 432.

Markku Roinila (Helsinki) Leibniz on Emotions and the Human Body

In the *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes argues that a common source of our errors of acting rationally is due to bodily perceptions (CSM II, 52)¹. In other words, passions of the soul are the effects of changes that occur in the body. Descartes’ view is essentially related to his interactionist view between the mind and the body. At the same time, while these perceptions may be the source of our theoretical errors, passions are useful for daily living. In *Passions of the Soul* Descartes presents himself as a physicist who strives to find the causes to our passions from the movement of animal spirits.

With Leibniz, we have a wholly different picture because of his different view on the relationship between the mind and the body. He agreed with Malebranche and other occasionalists that they do not affect each other directly. In fact, Leibniz’s view is much closer to Spinoza’s double-aspect theory than the Cartesian view². Although Leibniz did not discuss passions to any great length in his writings, one can find some passages (especially in *New Essays on Human Understanding* (NE)) which can give us a glimpse of his views. In this paper I will discuss how the passions affect the mind and the body and how the Leibnizian psychophysical parallelism functions with respect to passions.

Metaphysical Background

First, however, I should say something on the metaphysical underpinnings of psychophysical parallelism. In the Leibnizian system the two kingdoms of nature and grace correspond perfectly with each other through the pre-established harmony. There is no direct causation between the physical and the mental realms: “...bodies act as if there were no souls...and souls act as if there were no bodies; and both act as if each influenced each other” (*Monadology*, §81; GP VI, 621; AG, 223; See also NE II, viii, §21). Perhaps the most well-known description of this kind of parallelism is from Leibniz’s letter to Basnage de Beauval from 1696 where Leibniz used the metaphor of two different clocks which are synchronised perfectly by God. Both of them are a kind of automaton that works in a parallel mode (GP IV, 498-99).

¹ I use the following abbreviations: CSM refers to *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984-1991, RB refers to Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996 (page numbers of RB are identical to A VI, 6), H refers to Leibniz, *Theodicy*, translated by E. M. Huggard, Open Court, La Salle, 1985, AG refers to Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989 and L to Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, edited by Leroy E. Loemker, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969.

² However, Leibniz himself argues against Spinoza’s view in his *Comments on Spinoza’s Philosophy*, AG, 275. For a brief account on the psycho-physical parallelism in Leibniz, see Daniel Garber and Margaret Wilson: “Mind-Body Problem”, in: *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, edited by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, pp. 845-849. See also R. S. Woolhouse: “Leibniz’s Reaction to Cartesian Interaction”, in: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 86 (1985-6), pp. 69-70.

In addition, there is another kind of correspondence which has to be taken into account. This is the mutual correspondence between action and passion. Leibniz adopted his model from Aristotle and his commentators (such as Thomas Aquinas) who held that there are two kinds of potentialities – potentiality to act and potentiality to be acted on. When something is being acted on, it loses something in the process³. The active and passive powers are the basic causes for physical change. A good formulation of Leibniz's views is in *Monadology*, §52:

"...God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons that require him to adjust the other to it; and consequently, what is active in some respects is passive from another point of view: *active* insofar as what is known distinctly in one serves to explain what happens in another; and *passive* insofar as the reason for what happens in one is found in what is known distinctly in another" (GP VI, 615; AG, 219-220).

One might say that his view on the mind-body-relation includes both his theory of the pre-established harmony and the Aristotelian theory of action and passion. Action for Leibniz is something which happens spontaneously in the substance as opposed to something which affects the substance (passion). Whenever a substance has more clear perceptions than another substance, it acts on the latter. As human mind or spirit is higher in the hierarchy of substances, it usually governs the human body which consists of lower-level substances (GP II, 74; see also *Discours on Metaphysics* (DM) §15). For example, when I will to move my arm, the will is active as it has more distinct perceptions than the arm which is passive in the process.

Passions of the Soul

In the Leibnizian world, no soul is distinct from the metaphysical framework. Thus a (non-mutual) relation of action and passion can be posited between God and men. Virtuous men strive to follow God in perfecting themselves as much as possible:

"...we have ideas of everything in our soul only by virtue of God's continual action on us, that is to say, because every effect expresses its cause, and thus the essence of our soul is a certain expression, imitation or image of the divine essence, thought, and will, and of all the ideas comprised in it" (DM, §28, A VI, 4, 1573; AG, 59).

As God represents perfection, it is quite natural that the perfection of rational souls is related to action and final causes. In NE II, xxi, §72 Leibniz says:

"...If we take 'action' to be an endeavour towards perfection, and 'passion' to be the opposite, then genuine substances are active only when their perceptions... are becoming better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions are becoming more confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of pleasure and pain every action is a move towards pleasure, every passion a move towards pain" (RB, 210; see also *Monadology*, §49 and *Principles of Nature and Grace*, §3).

Action and passion are closely related to pleasure and pain and by this to emotions which Leibniz discusses in *New Essays*, book II, chapters xx and xxi. Against Locke's theory of emotions as modes of pleasure and pain where our action is prompted by a violent pain in

³ James, *Passion and Action*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997, p. 50.

the form of uneasiness for an absent good, he argues that not all of our perceptions are conscious and that our desires are not always recognized by ourselves. The passions that affect us are usually the result of a process of increasing disquiet (which is Leibniz's term for Lockean uneasiness) which is built from minute, insensible perceptions.

According to Leibniz, there are always in the mind dispositions or spurs of desire in the form of rudiments or elements of suffering (Leibniz uses the word semi-suffering) which we are not aware. Opposing these minute semi-sufferings, we can gain semi-pleasures which happen when we satisfy or resist a certain spur of desire. When we can successfully oppose the minute semi-sufferings in a continual manner, the semi-pleasures became a whole, genuine pleasure. There is no state of complete pleasure in itself – it can be analysed into smaller semi-pleasures which combine and generate the notable, genuine pleasure. Therefore pleasure and pain come in degrees and there is no complete change.

Whereas Locke argues that the violent state of uneasiness is the chief motive of our actions and an essential part of our passions, Leibniz thinks that there are all kinds of impulses present to the mind from disquiet to passions:

"Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet which impels us without our seeing why. There are some which join forces to carry us towards or away from some object, in which case there is desire or fear, also accompanied by disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. Finally, there are some impulses which are accompanied by actual pleasure or suffering" (NE xxi, §39; RB, 192).

In Leibniz's theory disquiet gives rise but is not identical with passions. It is directly related to the degree of clarity and distinctness of our perceptions. We may experience certain disquiet without knowing exactly why, but in the case of passions we feel genuine pleasure or pain when we have a clear object in view which affects us although there is always some disquiet involved and present in the mind (NE II, xx, §8). But the disquiet is also related to perfection and imperfection.

"I believe that fundamentally pleasure is a sense of perfection, and pain a sense of imperfection, each being notable enough for one to become aware of it. For the minute insensible perceptions of some perfection or imperfection [...] which are as it were components of pleasure and of pain, constitute inclinations and propensities but not outright passions. So there are insensible inclinations of which we are not aware" (NE II, xxi, §41; RB, 194).

The pleasure of the mind is understood as a feeling of perfection and pain as a feeling of imperfection (NE II, xxi, §42). Likewise, activity is conceived as agreeable feeling and passivity as disagreeable. This perpetual conflict between pleasure and pain affects the human action in the sense that the decision which follows from this conflict is usually a kind of compromise between clear and distinct perceptions and insensible perceptions of pleasure and pain. All our mental states are affected by the minute perceptions which may emphasize a certain aspect in our minds or confuse our judgements which otherwise consist of clear and distinct perceptions.

This creates problems for rational decision-making. Leibniz argues that the struggle between the flesh and the spirit is nothing more than a conflict between two different kinds of endeavours - those coming from confused thoughts and those coming from distinct ones

(NE II, xxi, §35). If the moral agent does not have a sufficiently developed understanding, he or she may easily err in his or her judgement of the good.

"Confused thoughts often make themselves clearly sensed, whereas our distinct thoughts are usually only potentially clear: they could actually be so if we only applied ourselves to getting through to the senses of the words or symbols; but since we do not do that, through lack of care or lack of time, what we oppose lively feelings with are bare words, which are too faint" (NE II, xxi, §35; RB, 186-187).

Lack of attention is a common problem for men, but Leibniz admits that there is also a possibility for a genuine case of *akrasia* or weakness of the will (NE I, ii, §11). The weak-willed agent judges one course of action to involve the greater good, but is inattentive to it, while he or she is sensitive to the good involved in the worse course of action⁴.

On the other hand, the minute perceptions can also be useful. They act as a kind of pre-taste of what is to be expected. In Leibniz's words they "let us enjoy the benefit of discomfort without having to endure its consequences" (NE II, xx, §6; RB, 165). Because we are not aware of our desires or needs most of the time, we have an occasion to think of more pleasant things. Minute perceptions also prevent indifference in the mind. We are never indifferent in the sense that we do not know whether to turn to left or right – our choices are always affected by the minute perceptions or disquiet of some degree. These mingle with the objects of our desire or hope and what happens in our body.

Action and Passion in the Body

What, then, happens in our bodies? In general, Leibniz seldom discusses emotions in bodily terms, saying that inclinations, passions, pleasures and pains belong only to the mind or the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). But as we saw, the pre-established harmony guarantees that there is a perfect correspondence between our mind and the body which Leibniz attributes to the minute perceptions in the Preface to *New Essays*:

"It is also through insensible perceptions that I account for that marvellous pre-established harmony between the soul and the body, and indeed amongst all the monads or simple substances which takes the place of an untenable influence of one on another [...]" (RB, 55).

Therefore passions must be present also in our bodies. In addition, Leibniz argues that the mind perceives its "own" body more distinctly than other bodies.

"...everything which happens to the soul and to each substance follows from its notion [...] but they correspond more particularly and more perfectly to what happens in the body assigned to it, because the soul expresses the state of the universe in some way and for some time, according to the relation other bodies have to its own body" (DM, §33, A VI, 4, 1581; AG, 64-65; see also *Principles of Nature and Grace*, §3)

Thus when other monads affect the composite substance which is our body, our mind is also affected. Leibniz describes the relation in a draft after §14 of DM⁵:

⁴ See E. Vailati, "Leibniz on Locke on Weakness of Will", in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28, 2 (1990), pp. 213-228.

⁵ A VI, 4, 1551-1552; translated by Daniel Garber in his *Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.

"We attribute to ourselves all of the passions of this body, and this with very good reason, since even if we are not aware of them [passions], we do not fail to perceive the consequences, as when we are transported from one place to another while asleep. We also attribute to ourselves the actions of this body, as when we run, strike, fall, and when our body, continuing the motion already started, produces some effect" (Garber 2009, 208).

So what happens when a passion takes hold of our body? Let us say that my finger is pricked by a pin. I feel a sensation of pain which I attribute to the body and thus I know that the body is being acted upon. My reaction to this kind of passion may be the volition to move my arm in such a way that the pain is stopped. This volition, again, is action which is directed to my body and which is meant to overcome the passion, to abolish the pain. The process is described in Leibniz's draft of a letter to Arnauld of 28. 11. 1686:

"One is quite right to say that my will is the cause of this movement of my arm, and that a dissolution of the continuum in my bodily matter causes the pain; for one expresses distinctly what the other expresses more confusedly, and one must ascribe the action to the substance whose expression is more distinct"⁶.

This change is related to metaphysics in an interesting way which we have already discussed. For in the draft after §14 of DM, Leibniz adds:

"...when several substances are affected by a single change [...] one can say that that which through this passes immediately to a greater degree of perfection or continues in the same degree of perfection acts, but that which becomes by that immediately more limited, so that its expressions become more confused, is acted upon [*patit*]" (Garber 2009, 211).

Thus action and passion with respect to body is related to (metaphysical) perfection and imperfection. If our body becomes less what it is, it suffers and if it is active, it affects other substances and experiences pleasure. Similarly as in the soul, there can be various degrees of pleasure and pain in the body. The pain which follows from a prick pushing our finger is clearly a passion as we can easily recognize its cause. Another picture emerges when our body is subject to less clear sensations. These might include various sensations (of pain, for example) of which we do not know the cause of or certain bodily feelings which affects us by making us feel uncomfortable and restless such as gradual perspiration.

According to Leibniz, pleasure and pain are comparable to the sensation of warmth or light which is the result of many tiny motions (NE II, xx, §6; see also NE II, xxi, §41). In this he agrees with Descartes who in his *Third Meditation* argues that one can have so little clarity and distinctness of the ideas of heat and cold that one cannot separate one from the other (CSM II, 30). Leibniz defines pleasure in NE II, xxi, §42 as follows:

"Now, although pleasure cannot be given a nominal definition, any more than light or colour can, it can like them be defined causally: I believe that, fundamentally, pleasure is a sentiment of perfection, and pain a sentiment of imperfection, provided that each is notable enough to be apperceived" (RB, 194).

We feel little moments of suffering all the time, but this does not drive us into genuine pain unless these minute perceptions combine and capture our attention. In the end of NE, II, xxi, §6 Leibniz employs a metaphor of a clock where a continual balance exists. The

⁶ GP II, 71; *The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence*, edited and translated by H. T. Mason, Garland, New York, 1985, 87.

German word for this balance is *Unruhe*, that is, disquiet. Leibniz argues that the clock can be taken as a model of our bodies which can never be at ease. In the body each tiny change affects the other parts of the body and forces it to restore its former balance. Thus there is a perpetual conflict which makes up the constant disquiet of the body.

Leibniz gives hunger as an example of a bodily disquiet or disposition. It eventually grows in us, but only when it gets pressing enough we became aware of it. This is a good thing – Leibniz praises God for not making us aware of everything which happens in us because we would be disturbed by even the smallest changes such as breathing and could not concentrate on the most important things in our lives:

“...if these elements of suffering (which do sometimes degenerate into suffering, or genuine displeasure, when they grow too strong) were real suffering, we could be continually wretched as long as we pursued our own good with disquiet and zealously” (NE II, xxi, §36; RB, 188-189).

When the disquiet in the body grows into a passion which has a clear object (and develops from a confused, minute perception to a clear and distinct one), it forces us to take action to overcome the passion. Because the Leibnizian moral agent has at all times minute, unconscious perceptions, whatever the degree of activity of the human mind, it is always to some degree passive, or responsive to the state of the physical world⁷.

“[Joy] appears to me to signify a state in which pleasure predominates in us; for during the deepest sorrow and amidst sharpest anguish one can have some pleasure, e.g., from drinking or from hearing music, although displeasure dominates; and similarly in the midst of the most acute agony the mind can be joyful, as happened with martyrs” (NE II, xx, §7, RB, 166; see also *Theodicy*, §255 and the example of Socrates’ feet itching in Plato’s *Phaedo* 60b-c to which Leibniz refers).

Compared to the pleasures of the mind, bodily pleasures come always second. Leibniz says in *Theodicy*, §254 that “The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service in making joy endure” and goes on to criticize the Stoics whose tranquillity of the mind he saw as forced patience (GP VI, 267; H, 282-283). Likewise, he holds that bodily pleasures are more dangerous than mental ones. At every moment outer objects may give rise to vivacious confused perceptions, in other words, sensual pleasures (for example, odours and visions) comprise inclinations that may lead us to strive for wrong goals. These sensual pleasures are short-term pleasure which should be avoided. Instead, one should pay attention to well-being or health of the body (*Theodicy*, §251).

“The confused perception of some perfection constitutes the pleasure of the senses, but this pleasure may be [productive] of greater imperfections, as a fruit with a good taste and a good smell may conceal poison. This is why one must shun the pleasures of the senses, as one shuns a stranger, or sooner, a flattering enemy” (*La Félicité*, §6, Grua, 579-580).

Therefore one should aim at rising above bodily passions and concentrate on intellectual pleasures which give us the greatest joy and happiness. Bad passions should be fought with good habits and other means which Leibniz describes in NE II, xxi, §36 and elsewhere. For example, in *Theodicy*, §64 he says:

⁷ Rutherford, “Leibniz on Spontaneity”, in *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*. Edited by Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 173.

“[The soul] has nevertheless some power over these confused perceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For although it cannot change its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end with enough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits [...] For we can seek means beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding step of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponement of our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be judged” (GP VI, 137-138; H, 158).

Intellectual Passions

We have seen that the mind and the body correspond perfectly in Leibniz’s system. He describes this parallelism in *Theodicy*, §66:

“In so far as the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that body is impelled to execute its order. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its perceptions are confused, God has accommodated the soul to the body, in such sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal representations. This produces the same effect and the same appearance as if the one depended immediately upon the other, and by the agency of a physical influence. Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts that the soul represents the bodies which encompass it” (GP VI, 138-139; H, 159).

While bodily passions, such as our elbow being poked, affect the mind, the passions of the soul can also affect the body. The effect is an action which is directed to the body, such as running away when we encounter an angry Kant-scholar. But the effect can also be less direct. In reply to Locke in NE II, xx, §3 Leibniz says that emotions are accompanied with exterior movements. And because we usually are not aware of the minute perceptions which constitute the emotions, our bodily changes take often place without our noticing. So our expressions can give away the fact that we are feeling fear, for example. Therefore our body can also be affected by feelings which are not necessarily passions in the strict sense.

So far, we have discussed mostly negative passions which bring us pain and lead to imperfection. Now it is time to move to those emotions which are related to perfection and which I shall call intellectual passions or emotions. They can be called passions in the Leibnizian framework although, properly speaking, they are closer to actions because they affect both the human mind and the body in a positive way. They have to be distinguished from the proper passions of the soul, the ones which have an object and are thus clear and distinct perceptions. Of those Leibniz says in his *Meditations on Cognition, Truth and Ideas* (1684):

“A distinct concept, however, is the kind of notion which assayers have of gold: one, namely, which enables them to distinguish gold from all other bodies by sufficient marks and observations. We usually have such concepts about objects common to many senses, such as number, magnitude and figure, and also about many affections of the mind such as hope and fear; in a word, about all concepts of which we have a nominal definition which is nothing but the enumeration of sufficient marks” (GP IV, 423; AG, 24).

The intellectual passions I have in mind here are founded on clear, but confused perceptions of perfection in contrast to clear and distinct perceptions which are typical for clear-cut passions. The intellectual passions motivate us to act rationally, giving rise to actions of the will. One can also find a distinction between passions and intellectual passions in Descartes (and Spinoza) who introduces a distinction between joy and

intellectual joy, and sadness and intellectual sadness. For Descartes, intellectual joy and sadness are not passions, properly speaking, for they come into the soul by the action of the soul itself and not by the action of the body (*Passions of the soul* II, 147-148, CSM I, 381-382; see also James 1997, 196-207).

As Leibniz's psychophysical parallelism is different from the Cartesian interactionism, he does not make the same distinction but there are clear similarities. In the first book of NE he argues that we have an innate instinct which guides us to joy and averts us from sadness. Thus we have a natural disposition towards perfection which is manifested in the fact that our will is directed to the apparent good.

"Although it is correct to say that morality has indemonstrable principles, of which one of the first and most practical is that we should pursue joy and avoid sorrow, it must be added that it is not a truth that is known solely from reason, since it is based on inner experience – on confused knowledge; for one only senses what joy and sorrow are" (RB, 88).

These internal emotions of the soul or intellectual passions can be thought as spontaneous in the Leibnizian sense because they are related to activity. Thus one can distinguish between two kinds of passions in Leibniz. The first are those which are caused by external things, such as a dangerous animal. Our clear and distinct perception of a dangerous tiger on the loose, for example, creates a passion of fear in us which leads quickly to action, that is, running away. The second class of passions in Leibniz are intellectual passions and their cause is within us, that is, in our innate dispositions which are related to God. These include such emotions as joy, hope and (pure) love which are related to perfection and happiness and are possible for higher substances such as spirits (*Theodicy*, §254; GP VI, 267). According to Leibniz, the pleasure of an intelligent being consists of beauty, order and perfection (GP VII, 290). Because the intellectual passions are essential to striving for perfection, they are in fact closer to actions than passions:

"...Anything which occurs in what is strictly a substance must be a case of "action" in the metaphysically rigorous sense of something which occurs in the substance spontaneously, arising out of its own depths; for no created substance can have an influence upon any other, so that everything comes to a substance from itself (though ultimately from God) (NE II, xxi, §72, RB, 210).

But as we saw, the motivating factor in one's pursue of happiness is a kind of intellectual disquiet. Pursuing good is based on a feeling which is founded on minute perceptions rather than on clear and distinct perceptions. This is because perfection is such a complex concept that we cannot have clear and distinct knowledge of it. Leibniz describes it in various ways and always in kind of mystical or aesthetical way. For example, in a letter to Wolff he says:

"Agreement is sought in variety, and the more easily it is observed there, the more it pleases; and in this consists the sense of perfection" (Leibniz to Wolff, 18. 5. 1715, AG 233; compare also NE II, xxi, §41).

Perhaps an even more mysterious description is given of love towards God in *Principles of Nature and Grace*, §17:

"And it is easy to love him as we ought to [...] for although God cannot be sensed by our external senses, he does not cease to be extremely worthy of love and to give great pleasure. We see the extent to which honours are pleasurable to men, although they do not at all consist in qualities derived from the external senses" (GP VI, 605; AG, 212).

Joy and the Body

To see better what Leibniz means by these kinds of descriptions, it is useful to look closer at one of the intellectual passions. Joy follows from perceiving perfection or harmonious properties of the world; in other words it is a sentiment of perfection (see A I, 4, 315). It represents the source of pleasure, that is, God and his perfections. Therefore joy makes us "alert, active and hopeful of further success" (NE II, xx, §8; RB, 167) and can be seen as an endeavour towards perfection, that is, action⁸. Perfection elevates the person to a higher state and makes him or her freer than he or she would otherwise be: "...perfection shows itself in great freedom and power of action, since all being consists in a kind of power; and the greater the power, the higher and freer the being" (GP VII, 87; L, 426).

With respect to joy, Leibniz was clearly influenced by Spinoza's views. In his definition of joy [*laetitia*] Spinoza argues that moving from inadequate ideas (smaller perfection) to adequate ideas (greater perfection) increases our power and consequently our joy and therefore we should increase our knowledge of God or nature⁹. The joy comes in degrees – the more adequate ideas we have, the more perfect we will become and the more we will understand God or nature. For Spinoza, joy is not a delight; it is a species of desire being the power of acting or activity (moderate joy)¹⁰. This concerns both the body and the mind because of his psychophysical parallelism. In other words, for Spinoza joy and sadness is equally a mental and physical phenomenon. All this fits well with Leibniz's parallelism.

But it is not easy to find in Leibniz explicit arguments of the bodily reactions to joy or other intellectual passions. It is clear that the body is active rather than passive but how does this manifest itself? Joy is defined as a sentiment [*sentiment, voluptas, delectatio*] of increasing perfection¹¹ and consequently, the soul feels togetherness, order, freedom and power (*Initia et specimina Scientiae novae Generalis*; GP VII, 88), but how does this manifest itself in the body? Sometimes Leibniz describes the world perfect as both mentally and physically, for example in *De rerum originatione radicali*:

"...moral perfection is in reality physical perfection with respect to minds. From this it follows that the world is not only the most admirable machine, but insofar as it is made up of minds, it is also the best republic, the republic through which minds derive the greatest possible happiness and joy, in which their physical perfection consists" (GP VII, 306; AG, 152-53).

Judging from this, Leibniz seems to think that joy affects our bodies by strengthening them, that is, it improves our health and gives us energy, well-being and joy of life, in a word power, which can be understood as a kind of physical perfection and is perhaps comparable to primitive active force in his dynamics. This picture would fit to Leibniz's description of perceiving perfection in general:

"We do not always observe of what the perfection of pleasing things consist, or what kind of perfection within ourselves they serve, yet our character [*Gemüt*] perceives it, even though our understanding does not.

⁸ Related to spontaneity is free will. In *Theodicy*, §288 Leibniz says: "The free substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without compelling it" (G VI, 288; H, 303). On spontaneity and freedom in Leibniz, see Rutherford 2005.

⁹ *Ethics* 3p11, Scholium. See also E3p1.

¹⁰ *Ethics* 3p57.

¹¹ See a letter to Ernst August, A I, 4, 315.

We commonly say, "There is something, I know not what, that pleases me in the matter" (*Von der Weisheit*, GP VII, 86; L, 425.)

One can compare the feeling of joy to perceiving musical harmony which Leibniz discusses in many writings¹². Musical harmony has strong aesthetic values and he stated in *Résumé of Metaphysics* (ca. 1697) that "an intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection" (GP VII, 290). In other words, pleasure consists of perceiving harmony, which is perfection. Even though Leibniz does not specify his views with respect to bodily action (although he was very interested in the medical sciences of his time), one can perhaps discuss harmony in the body which can contribute to the joy of the mind, reflected in the body as activity.

On this point, I will again compare Leibniz's views to Spinoza. *Ethics* 3p11 reads as follows: "The idea of any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking"¹³. As the psychophysical parallelism of Spinoza and Leibniz are in many ways similar to each other, I think one can take this description to apply to the Leibnizian system as well. There is also some textual evidence for this. In NE II, xx, §6 Leibniz again refers to hunger in the context of imperceptible perceptions, saying: "when the disturbance of the stomach becomes too strong it causes [mental] discomfort" (RB, 164). Likewise, he shows pity for people who have an excessively susceptible nature:

"How many insects we swallow without being aware of it, how many people we observe who are inconvenienced by having too fine a sense of smell, and how many disgusting objects we would see if our eyesight were keen enough!" (RB, 165).

To conclude, when our body enjoys great health and is being active, it can help us to think straight and practice virtue. In the case of illness or other bodily passions, it is more difficult for us to think rationally which again leads us to subordinate to negative emotions. And, as we have seen, our mind can affect the body in many ways. Besides action, confusion in our minds may lead us to passions in the form of succumbing to sensuous temptations and bad habits. By preferring good habits to bad ones we can overcome the passions little by little and transform them to actions.

¹² In a short memoir *Felicity* he also argues that music is a pleasure for the ears and aesthetical symmetry is a pleasure for the eyes (Grua, 580).

¹³ *A Spinoza Reader*, edited and translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994, p. 160.

Markku Roinila (Helsinki) Uneasiness and Passions in *Nouveaux essais* II, xx

Chapter xx of book II of John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (henceforth E) discusses emotions or passions which to Locke are modes of pleasure and pain. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only four and a half pages in the Nidditch edition) it is arguably the most extensive discussion of passions available in Locke's corpus. The same applies to Leibniz's discussion in the *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* or *New Essays on Human Understanding* (NE). In addition, they offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and the good life.

The chapter also provides a great platform for studying Leibniz's argumentative techniques and the differences between the two philosophers in general. Locke strives to explain the emotions with the single, unifying theory of uneasiness, while Leibniz's conception of the mind is more complex and he finds more unique ways to explain different emotions in each context. In this paper I will first present their discussion on uneasiness and then show how the differences of their views affect their discussion of some individual passions. My discussion relies mostly on chapter xx of *Essay* ("Of modes of pleasure and pain") and the *New Essays*, but as the following chapter xxi of book II ("Of power") is closely related to the theme and offers significant help in understanding their views, I will refer to it frequently.

Uneasiness and Disquiet

In NE II, xx, §6 Locke's spokesperson, Philalethes goes on to discuss how pleasure and pain affect our behaviour. He argues that the chief if not the only motive for human action is uneasiness which a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing he draws his delight from. In other words, uneasiness is equivalent to desire in the sense that if a man has no desire for a certain good, he does not feel uneasiness. While delight is drawn from the present good, uneasiness is desire for the absent good. If the moral agent can be easy and content without the proposed absent good, he senses bare *velleity* (wish) which is almost an indifferent state, but not quite. It is more like the lowest degree of desire. If the desired good is impossible to obtain, the uneasiness is also "cured". Locke contrasts uneasiness with delight. Positive emotion such as love or joy is a delight of the mind whereas hate or sorrow is described as uneasiness.

"Delight, or uneasiness, one or two of them join in themselves to almost all our ideas, both sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain" (E II, vii, §2, 128)¹.

I refer to the following editions: Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Edited with an introduction, critical apparatus and glossary by Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996 (RB; the page numbers are identical with A VI, 6) and Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989 (AG).