

The Metaphysics of Love: An Annotated Bibliography

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Union Accounts

1. Nozick, R. 1989. 'Love's Bond', in his *The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations*, New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 68-86.

Keywords: Union view, Functional, New identity, We, Bond, Social recognition, Partial independence of reasons

Description: Romantic love is a way of loving where there's a *bonding* of well-being, decision making, mood, etc. such that the persons form a new entity – a “we”, a *couple*. Entering a “we” involves *acquiring* a new identity and *altering* the individual one you had, while still having it. The “we” is either part of your identity, or an extension of it, or one can be a part of the “we”. Differently from other collective entities (e.g. societies), a couple doesn't continue to be the same entity when there is replacement of some constituent parts. Its treatment as an additional (functional?) entity is *justified* (though tries to avoid the ontological question (ft. p.73).) by (1) persons involved think of themselves as forming a new unit, (2) each party has power to have its say and affect each other's actions, given boundedness (decisions taken unilaterally are a threat to the couple); (3) others perceive and treat them as a unit – when social recognition is absent we have a “serious impediment” for the new entity.

To be in love is to desire to form a “we” with this particular person (where this is a desire about identity, not mere “sharing”). It implies i) a desire to possess that person completely (as one's own identity), ii) a desire for her autonomy, iii) a desire for sexual monogamy (as sexual desire is the vehicle of expression of romantic love: p.82).

Critique of value views: love can't be dependent on characteristics, otherwise some people would deserve no love. “To be worthy of (romantic) love, then, is simply to have the capacity to love in return” (p.76). Parallelism to one's relation to one's own identity – partly but not completely dependent on reasons. To desire to form a “we” with someone with properties X, Y, Z is not to be in love (p.80); to desire the same *with Paula* is, and this desire tends to remain even if she changes.

2. Delaney, N. 1996. 'Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal', in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, pp. 375-405.

Keywords: Union view, Western ideal, Interests, Nozick, Grounds for love, Reasons, Self-conception, Plasticity and conditionality of love

Description: Articulates the modern western ideal of romantic love. Building on Nozick's view, Delaney has a middle ground position (with respect to union views and value views) that aims to explain 1) what is for A to take B's interests as his own: A's well-being depends on B's advancement of them, 2) the intuitions that there are right and wrong reasons to love somebody: A loves B for the right reasons iff the grounds (not the object) of A's love are properties that B takes to be central to her own self-conception (vs. peripheral, like money), and 3) the plasticity of romantic love to accommodate changes in its parties and the “we”: historical-relational properties push

towards an unconditional attitude towards the beloved insofar she has been committed to, and reciprocated, the common project.

3. Friedman, M. A. 1998. 'Romantic Love and Personal Autonomy', in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 22, pp. 162–81.

Keywords: Autonomy, Union, Ontology, Federation, Stability, Asymmetry, Imbalance

Description: Friedman adopts Delaney's "federation" view of romantic union, whereby romantically-united individuals nonetheless retain individual autonomy whilst pursuing joint ventures; according to Friedman, individuals can retain autonomy because the "we" of a union isn't stable, but fluctuates in and out of being. With a thin conception of autonomy as a social competence of self-governance, Friedman then details the way romantic union can result in autonomy-asymmetries in the features characteristic of romantic union: needs and interests; care and protection; familiarity; attention; decision-making; division of labour; mutual awareness; evaluative perspective; mirroring of self-conception; long-term plans (and degree of adjustment, voluntariness, autonomy-competence, and responses from others). Friedman then discusses the asymmetries in the light of gender issues, detailing feminist writers – Simone de Beauvoir, Shulamith Firestone, Jessica Benjamin, and Ann Ferguson (along with Soble's criticism of the gender imbalance in Nozick's account of love, and a criticism of Scruton's view about the "desirability of dependence") – who have interpreted asymmetries as issues of gender inequality. Friedman discusses three objections to her view: i) autonomy is not a zero-sum game (Friedman says it need not be, but it can be); ii) long-term autonomy gains can offset short-term/initial autonomy losses (Friedman agrees with the view); iii) autonomy might not be an important value for romantic love, e.g. as Nussbaum thinks temporary losses of autonomy can be "romantically wonderful", or even that women devalue their own autonomy (Friedman argues that such regard for autonomy ultimately either dooms relationships or else makes one unable even to realise one's desire for them).

4. Grau, C. 2010. 'Love and History', in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 48, pp. 246-71.

Keywords: History, Loving Relationships, Irreplaceability, Concern, Rationality, Justification, Kripke, Rigidity, Descriptions, Change, Persons, Personal identity

Description: Grau's focus is our concern for the irreplaceability of our lovers, and specifically an account of the rationality of that concern. He begins by drawing attention to Robert Kraut's analogy between referential behaviour and loving attachment: attachment is like rigid designation, in that just as a name attaches to a particular concrete individual with a particular history, so lovers attach to particular loves. Grau considers Rorty's response to Kraut, who claims that our concern for irreplaceability is really a concern about the continuation of love, about whether we will be able to continue to love and so interact with our beloveds. Here, the concern is whether our love will continue through changes our beloveds undergo, especially if they lose the qualities we now love them for. In opposition to Kraut, Rorty defends a

“dynamically permeable” view of love, which allows that partners grow and change through love; the account is presented as if it is at odds with Kraut’s, but Grau argues that Rorty’s criticism is here based on a misunderstanding and misuse of the term “rigid”, as implying that love must persist through *all changes* one’s beloved undergoes.

Grau points out that an account of love between persons is unlikely to float free of a metaphysical account of persons, and then leans on a conception of persons by which they are not mere description-satisfiers, and not just bundles of properties, but nor are they some underlying property-less substratum. Noting that changes in a loving relationship do not track changes in properties (and nor should we expect them to), he argues that in fact a property view of love cannot explain how love continues through changes because it can’t explain in virtue of what we transfer our love onto the new set of properties; by contrast the property-less view of love can, because underlying the change is *the person* who persists. Grau reminds us that love is for *persons*: the *object* of love is not a set of properties but a particular concrete individual exemplifying them.

Grau details how Kraut’s notion of history differs from the notion used by both Rorty and LaFollette. He points out that though both Rorty and LaFollette appeal to psychological features – primarily memories – when discussing history, their concern in doing so is regarding future interactions with the person; indeed, their accounts appear to entail that we would be rational to transfer our love onto a qualitatively identical individual – psychology and all – because we could continue the loving relationship, i.e. the shared projects etc. that the couple have begun. In contrast, Kraut’s notion of history implies resistance to substitution with exact duplicates with “simulated histories”, for it emphasises the backwards-looking value of commitment.

Ultimately Grau, taking his lead from Kenneth Henley (who argues that love is neither rational nor irrational) and from Mark Johnston (who claims that self-referential concerns – i.e. a concern for one’s own well-being – do not require justification but are instead a basic pattern of concern) comes to claim that a concern for the irreplaceability of the beloved is a fundamental concern. He accepts that there are things we can cite to *explain* our concern over irreplaceability; the fact that our lovers are persons and persons are the subjects of experience helps do this, as does the fact that as agents, the people we love are responsible for what they do. Finally, there is the fact that the history of the concrete, particular individual we love may have large parts which are shared with us. But these reasons are not justificatory reasons. Grau we thinks we have already gone wrong if we even think that the fact that it’s important to us that we love concrete, particular people with their own histories needs justifying.

Criticisms of Union Accounts

1. Kisolo-Ssonko, J. 2012. 'Love, Plural Subjects & Normative Constraint', in *Phenomenology and Mind* 3, pp. 54-64.

Keywords: Normative constraint, Collective intentionality, Union views, Plural subject theory, Westlund, Gilbert, Pooling of wills, We, Relationships, Justification.

Description: Union theories of love present lovers as forming a plural subject via jointly committing to pool their wills. According to Gilbert, plural subjects are willed creations of individual agents, in which they *pool part of their agency*. The joint pool of wills and agency normatively constraints the individuals' actions, in a similar manner in which the intentions of an individual normatively constraint her. Westlund finds that view subject to the problem of reciprocity: an essential part of romantic committed relationships is that lovers *reciprocate* in valuing each other's interests; but if the interests of the other have dissolved into a *we*, then it is not possible to value the lover's interests. For her, the plural will is always a work in progress, is merely a "joint product of collective deliberative agency" (2008, 567) when discussion ends in joint acceptance. Only then can an intention be normatively constraining.

Kisolo-Ssonko presents two reasons to reject Westlund's rejection of direct normative constraint. First, to assume that the plural subject's normative authority arises directly from joint commitment is a central piece of Gilbert's collectivist account, with which he sympathizes with. Second, direct normative constraint *seems* to be part of the phenomenology of being in a committed romantic relationship. What justifies my lover's complaint when I turn down a plan we had together (e.g. "you can't go back! We said we will go to Majorca!") is the normative constraint arising from a collective "we". But if sustained joint acceptance is *necessary* to normatively constraint the lovers, such that one of the lovers changing her mind suffices to make the collective will disappear (as Westlund proposes) then it cannot justify my lover's complaint. The problem here is the source of the normative constraint: even granting Kisolo-Ssonko his reading of Westlund, it is still possible that I am normatively constrained by something other than the joint pool of wills (e.g. having given my word on the Majorca plan, my partner's reliance that I will do what I said), which justifies my partner's complaint. If this is the case, then it is not clear how these sorts of situations pose a problem for Westlund's account. Joseph Kisolo-Ssonko ends the paper arguing that Gilbert's set up is overly restrictive, as it doesn't account for the different levels "normative pain" may have.

Robust Concern Accounts

1. Frankfurt, H. 1999. 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love', in his *Necessity, Volition, and Love*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–41

Keywords: Necessity, Obligation, Volition, Care, Robust Concern, Kant, Active, Passive, Hypothetical imperative, Categorical imperative, Authority, Power

Description: Frankfurt advances a Kantian conception of autonomy (obedience to self-selected rational dictates of moral law). "Volitional necessities" are actions that we must perform which are wholly voluntary – neither compulsive nor compelled – but to which we have no real alternative. Alongside necessities of ambition and prudence (what we must do as indispensable to our goals), and those of duty (our moral obligations) are the necessities of love. Love compels and commands us, but because love is "a defining element of our volitional nature" (p. 132), it satisfies the (Kantian) conditions for autonomy. Frankfurt offers only a thin conception of love as care or robust concern: love is a certain kind of a care, and is different from and indeed need not involve the recognition of the thing's value (though it often does). Love is volitional – action guiding – not cognitive or affective, for love consists in care, and care has most to do with the motivational structures that guide an individual's conduct. The object of love is typically a concrete individual, but apparently can also be an abstract concept, e.g. "social justice" or "family tradition". Love is a matter of personal circumstance, and only binds the lover (not anyone else) to their beloved; yet as the commands of devoted love are unconditional (categorical), love and (moral) duty can conflict (Frankfurt sets the issue aside). The authority of love is not the authority of the moral law.

For love to meet the standards for autonomy, it must be active, and in active love the primary goal is to provide benefits (not receive them, as in passive love based on self-interest) – this makes loving an *activity*. Active love is selfless care for the beloved; moreover, the selfless devotion is *not* a matter of choice – their beloved captivates the lover. Love structures the will, but it is not chosen by it; love is a configuration of the will. Love differs from the passions (e.g. jealousy, by which we may also be enslaved) in that the passions don't really make claims on us but rather move us through "brute force" (p. 137). Being overwhelmed by love is not being overwhelmed by an external force, but overwhelmed by yourself. Because love entails volitional attitudes towards the beloved, it also entails volitional attitudes towards the lover, concerning how they act in matters concerning the beloved; thus loving *qua* activity comprises an effort to releasing some ideal in one's self. Therefore, the authority of love (not merely its power) over us is closely related to the need to protect personal unity.

2. White, R. J. 2001. *Love's Philosophy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Keywords: Friendship, Parental love, Love of humanity, Romantic love, Erotic love, Religion, Fusion of the souls, Union view, Concern view, Romantic ideal, Sex, Abandonment, Subjection of women.

Description: White examines different sorts of love from classical and contemporary perspectives: friendship, humanitarian, parental and romantic. The ideal of romantic love (as opposed to Platonic or courtly love) only became a popular idea at the beginning of the modern age. Romantic love is the desire “for *some* kind of unity or shared identity with the beloved” (p. 58), which explains the ideal of romantic love involving a “fusion of souls”. In other regards, love is very similar to religion: one becomes self-indulgent, worships the beloved, and the devotion makes one capable of all sorts of foolish acts. Romantic love distinctively involves a deep, passionate yearning for the beloved, which is not present in other sorts of love. This yearning signifies the idealization and absolute valorization of the beloved. By comparison, one lowers the estimation of himself. According to D.H. Lawrence and Percy Shelley, to whom White sympathizes, the oneness of romantic fusion can only be achieved by its erotic expression. To experience and complete a union, the lovers must lose control over their bodies in sex, in a manner similar to that in which they have lost control emotionally and spiritually over their personas.

In other respects, White’s understanding of romantic love sounds like a concern view: love involves “not only desiring the beloved’s happiness and well-being but also desiring that it should be oneself, and not another lover, who actually brings this about” (p. 59). White also points to some inherent contradictions in romantic love: idealization of the beloved requires projecting a distance between the lover and beloved, but on the other hand they must desire to form a union. The lover feels less worthy than the beloved but on the other hand she wants to make him her own.

Finally, the ideal of romantic love has promoted the subjection of women: historically it has been one of the few areas where (theoretically) women were offered the possibility of personal fulfillment, while at the same time the ideal of romantic love requires self-suppression, sacrifice and radical transformation of one’s identity. Although nowadays many women have more options for personal fulfillment, romantic love is still culturally presented as the locus of self-understanding and personal fulfillment.

White also proposes a new model for the ideal of romantic love that involves individual autonomy.

3. Chang, R. 2013. ‘Commitment, Reasons, and the Will’, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 8, pp. 74-113.

Keywords: Reasons for action, Commitment, Bratman, Will, Intentions, Kant, Normativity

Description: Chang defends the idea that romantic love is a special sort of commitment. The paper elucidates how such commitment should be understood. After considering many candidate analysis that take commitments to be mental states, dispositions, etc., she defends an approach inspired by Bratman’s (1987) treatment of “policies”: commitments are, roughly, *willings* for the beloved’s interests and well-being to be a special *reason* for action. A commitment is a voluntary activity in which

one holds the intention of considering how something would affect the beloved as a reason for action in one's deliberations. Chang also defends a metanormative theory, "hybrid voluntarism", in which some reasons are given whereas others (like those romantic love provides) originate in one's will.

4. Liao, S. M. 2006. 'The Idea of a Duty to Love', in *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 40, pp. 1–22.

Keywords: Kant, Commandability objection, Duty to love, Parental love, Emotion views, Moral obligation, Behavioral inducement, Emotional aspect of love, Attitude

Description: Liao focuses on romantic and parental love. Can there be a duty to love someone? Kant's answer is "no", given the commandability objection: to attribute a duty we must presuppose that one *can* do that very thing, but love is an emotion, and we cannot bring about emotions at will. Thus, love is not commandable – there cannot be a duty to love.

To debunk the commandability objection Liao's strategy is to note that the emotional aspect of love is one over which a subject has agency. This doesn't get us all the way to love proper, given that loving relations involve more than a feeling, but is a first step.

The claim that the emotional aspect can be induced is an empirical one. Liao brings attention to certain facts. Sometimes we can successfully bring about an emotion by giving ourselves particular reasons to have it, as when we make ourselves feel grief during someone's funeral. Sometimes reflection suffices to discontinue having particular emotions, as when reconsidering one's reasons to feel angry or jealous. Sometimes deliberately placing ourselves in certain situations brings about the desired emotion, as when going to a homeless shelter to feel compassion. Also, one can cultivate emotional capacities, by acting as if one had that emotion, as when smiling and singing in order to feel joy, or by reflecting on why and when do we feel certain emotions. Liao argues that the same can be done with love, via behavioral inducement. We can come to love someone romantically by giving ourselves reasons to love that person, or by getting ourselves into situations that are likely to bring about affection and warmth towards them.

There are several objections. One may argue that guaranteed success is necessary for an action to be commandable, while in these cases at most we can have reasonable success. Liao's response is that all or most duties in fact only require a reasonable chance of success (for example, a doctor's duty to treat critically ill persons). Further, given that duties *arise from facts of the world* (e.g. promises) and not from our feelings, failure to have the appropriate feeling doesn't undermine one's duty to act in certain way. (However, Liao is silent as to which facts of the world source the duty to love somebody.)

A second objection is that the duty to love is too demanding to be commanded, to which Liao seems to bite the bullet somewhat, considering it very demanding albeit not too much. A third is that love involves an attitude dependent on facts, and certain facts

(e.g. Sara's character) are independent of us. To this he answers that we can change the valuational aspect of our attitudes towards such facts. A fourth objection is that the experience of romantic love presents it as falling out of one's control; this Liao regards as a socially constructed appearance. A fifth: loving is valuing a person for her own sake, so loving someone for the sake of a duty is not really love. Liao responds by saying that these two motivations have the same content (and even if they didn't, if the objection is posing a normative constraint to have only one motive, which Liao argues is self-defeating).

Criticisms of Robust Concern Accounts

1. Ebels-Duggan, K. 2008. Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love. *Ethics* 119. 142–70

Keywords: Happiness, Well-being, Flourishing, Kant, Practical love, Pathological love, Specified benefactor, Frankfurt, Robust concern, Interaction, Shared ends, Respect, Choice

Description: Focuses on Kant's *practical love*, pertaining to Kantian maxims: part of what it is to love someone is for them to provide you with reasons for action. (Another is pathological love, the feeling towards another; Ebels-Duggan takes the practical and the pathological to be two sides of the same coin). Ebels-Duggan asks how to understand the content of such reasons. She opposes the *benefactor* view, or the *specified benefactor* view of love (aka the Robust Concern view, attributed to Frankfurt), which holds that the reasons for action I gain from loving are reasons to promote my beloved's happiness/well-being/flourishing. Ebels-Duggan's criticism of Frankfurt's view is that it treats the beloved as a passive object, failing to see the importance of interaction, which she diagnoses as resulting from Frankfurt's taking the parent-child loving relationship as his paradigm. Whilst such relationships might be apt for the benefactor treatment, precisely because children don't seem *able* to take care of themselves, relationships between adults are intuitively different. (Indeed, treating an adult as a child is a mark of disrespect, and undermines them as an agent.) Ebels-Duggan considers enriching the notion of well-being, and first looks at Scanlon's (Neo-Kantian) account, that well-being includes in it specification of and so success at realizing rational aims. However, well-being and rational aims are not one and the same; sometimes we have reason to choose against our own well-being, as when for example a doctor wishes to give up her comfortable GP practice to work in inner-city trauma clinics. On the now-modified benefactor view, a lover of our doctor who is focused on her *well-being* would have reason to *sabotage* the Doctor's choice. Ebels-Duggan then criticizes an Aristotelian enrichment of "well-being", that rejects the above claim that well-being and rational aims are not one and the same, on the grounds that such a position makes the notion of self-sacrifice inexplicable.

She then proposes the *shared ends* view of love, emphasizing two norms that compel us to take our beloved as having a kind of authority. *Selection authority* encodes the idea that by choosing from a set of permissible projects, our beloveds give us reason to pursue the chosen ends *with them* (though choice must be constrained in certain ways, such as not being overly unilateral). *Authority in judgment* encodes the idea that we treat our beloved's choices of ends as evidence that those ends are worthwhile, so we're not merely humoring our beloved's choices: we take them to be choosing well (though this is defeasible). Reciprocal acknowledgment of these two norms is what sharing ends consists in. Finally, after detailing advantages of her shared ends view, Ebels-Duggan attempts to dispel the intuition that one's beloved's well-being should have an important practical role.

Emotion Accounts

1. Scruton, R. 1986. *Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Keywords: Erotic love, Sexual desire, Intentionality, Objectification, Jealousy, Politics, Conservatism, Union view, Emotion view, Essentialism, Embodiment, Heterosexual monogamy, Plato, Hegel, Kant

Description: Scruton claims that erotic love cannot be completely understood from a scientific standpoint because it depersonalizes the actors involved. Instead, he thinks we should be concerned with the meanings of the actions involved in sex from a phenomenological, first-person perspective. We are embodied persons whose *intentional* acts are also manifest in unintentional body behaviors (e.g. blushing) which complete us as actors and are thus significant. This is supposed to break with a tradition inherited from Plato and “libertarianism”. According to Scruton’s Plato, there is a dualism between the involuntary promptings of the body (sexual impulse, shared with animals) and the experience of interpersonal relationships. By contrast, Scruton claims that human sexual desire is not merely a biological response but has an epistemic component: we want something of the other person to be revealed, to unite with them. This is meant to explain jealousy. To detach the two components of erotic love is to use one’s body instrumentally, to objectify oneself, which creates cognitive detachment from oneself. Sexual virtue is a way to reconstitute physical desire as interpersonal feeling.

Scruton also wants to break with what he calls “libertarianism”, according to which sexual acts don’t have moral characteristics (i.e. sexual action X cannot be morally condemnable or praiseworthy) other than those that derived from the circumstances that surround them. In contrast to that view, for Scruton, both desire and sexual acts can be judged according to how they contribute to the flourishing of the self. What is morally relevant is the presence (or absence) of the epistemic component directed to an irreplaceable person that complements one.

According to Scruton, masturbation, fetishism, one night stands, etc. are morally objectionable because they are not directed to a unique other person. He also thinks that persons of the same gender cannot “complement” each other. Scruton thinks of romantic love as an exclusivist emotion directed to an irreplaceable individual, which has friendship and erotic love as components, but which (by contrast with desire) tends to grow with time and develop into a sort of companionship.

2. Velleman, J. D. 1999. ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’, in *Ethics* 109, pp. 338-74.

Keywords: Love, Morality, Emotion, Partiality, Psychological conflict, Respect, Attitude, Valuation, Seeing, Freud, Drive, Object

Description: Considers the supposed psychological conflict between the demands of love, which seems to essentially involve partiality, and the demands of morality, which

are meant to be impartial within the framework of Kantian moral theory. Velleman holds that if we even concede there is any conflict in spirit between love and morality, then love would at best be an amoral (and at worst an immoral) emotion. Velleman proposes a reconciliation between Kantian respect and love. He argues that Kantian respect for the moral law is the same thing as the respect for persons. The ideal will is that which acts on universal laws, and it is the ideal will which commands our respect; reverence for the law is thus reverence for the intelligible aspect of the will under which it is ideal. That is why the proper object of respect is possible enactment of universal laws, not simply the law itself. And so, if respect for the law is respect for the will, and if the will is the essence of the person, then respect for the law is respect for that which constitutes the person.

Velleman argues that the conception of love offered by Freud is morally dubious because it takes the form of a drive – it focuses on an object (the beloved) only insofar as the object can “scratch” the “inner itch” of the drive. He further claims that the accounts advanced by analytic philosophers express a “sentimental fantasy” (p. 353). Relying primarily on the example of a troublesome relative whom one loves but intensely dislikes, Velleman argues that love really need not involve such caring and sharing.

Velleman, after considering the Kantian distinction between ends and aims, puts forward the notion of a “negative second-order motive” – when we respect a person, we are deterred from violating them (contrasting with a positive motive, which compels action) – and then applies it to love. Whilst respect (for others) arrests self-love, love (of others) arrests our tendency for emotional self-protection. All other things typically associated with love (empathy, attraction, sympathy etc.) are effects of our emotional disarmament. Crucially, Velleman’s account discourages positing necessary connections between love and particular outcomes (such as the flourishing of the beloved). Velleman holds that love arises in a wide-range of situations.

The problem of partiality is discussed from the perspective of the beloved, by considering how we want to be loved. Velleman considers the paradox of being loved for uniqueness: if I am loved (by my parents) because I am special, and if everyone is special, then why do *they* love *me*? And being loved for my qualities is no better, for it implies I am replaceable by qualitatively identical beings. Kant to the rescue: persons have dignity whereas objects have price; a distinction of value that corresponds to the distinction between ends as possible results and self-existing ends: the former are comparative, the latter not. So one cannot compare the value of persons. It is this value that we respect, and also this value that we sometimes love. We respect others because our capacity for valuation cannot take its valuations seriously unless it takes itself seriously, and so it must afford respect to the instances of itself it finds in others; the respect leads to love when we deem our emotional defences towards a particular person unnecessary. So, we are loved on the basis of our personhood, and being valued for our personhood accords with being special because our value is dignity (p. 366).

Finally, Velleman explains partiality by explaining the differences between Kantian respect and love. Love, but not respect, requires acquaintance with something

“concrete” in the person: we respect persons in the abstract, but we can only love the manifest person. We love people for their observable features, not for the value of these features but as expressions of the value of the person. The selectivity of love is further explained by the finitude of our natures – we can only be emotionally vulnerable to so many people. In closing, though, Velleman makes the point that the heightened sensitivity to another that love brings should not diminish our sensitivity to those others whom, although we respect them, we do not love.

3. Naar, H. 2013. ‘A Dispositional Theory of Love’, in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 94, pp. 342-57.

Keywords: History, Desire, Emotion, Attitude, Mental event, Disposition, Pattern, Tying, Disruption

Description: Naar first claims that the prevalent accounts of love found in the traditional Anglo-American literature on love can be all termed *mental state* accounts of love, for according to them love is either a *desire*, or an *emotion*, or some kind of *pro-attitude*. He then points out that there are two main ways to understand mental states: as *events* or as *dispositions*. He presents the history view of love as standing in opposition to all event accounts, for it does not entail that a way to assess whether someone is really in love is to just peer into their head. According to the history account, love consists in temporally extended *patterns* of events in and between lovers. (Naar cites Rorty (1986), Baier (1991), Jones (2008), and Helm (2009).) The advantages of the history account over mental event accounts are that i) it captures the idea that love is a persisting state, ii) it accommodates the depth of love, iii) it captures the facts that love is expressed in many different ways, and iv) it allows for the fact that all loves may differ in some respect.

Naar notes that the history view of love still owes us an answer to the question of what love is – is it the *pattern* of events/actions? Just one of them? All of them? The *sum* of them? – and details two problems in this connection. The first is that the possibility of ‘going through the motions’ suggests that to be expressive of love, the relevant events must be connected to each by virtue of something *other* than being of the same pattern. The second is that the history view doesn’t properly accommodate *disruptions* in the pattern, and that such views would struggle to answer the question of how much disruption a pattern can tolerate before it breaks down completely. Furthermore, once a pattern is reestablished following disruption, history views don’t seem able to allow that it is *the same* pattern being exemplified. Jointly, these two problems imply that a pattern of events characteristic of loving is neither necessary nor sufficient for love.

Naar then considers dispositions, and our practice of attributing them to things. The *simple conditional analysis* (SCA) of dispositions has it that something *x* is disposed at time *t* to give response *r* to stimulus *s* iff if *x* were to undergo *s* at *t*, *x* would give *r*. Three counterexamples to the SCA are then discussed. *Finkish* cases are where the acquisition/loss conditions for a disposition are the same as its manifestation conditions. In *masking* cases, a disposition is not removed but is blocked, so that the disposition ascription is true whilst the corresponding conditional is false. Finally,

mimicking cases recognise the possibility of mischievous supernatural entities (and the like) deciding that, for example, some non-fragile object will nevertheless shatter when dropped. Dispositions are properties associated with certain collections of possible events but non-identical to those events, and as such disassociations are possible and so dispositions should not be construed as behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, Naar then says that some dispositions still can be associated with behavioural patterns, and then does so with love. He argues that such an account can capture what historical accounts were praised for capturing, i.e. that love is a persisting, many-varied, deep thing. It can also provide an answer to the problem of “tying”, for what ties a number of otherwise disparate events into the same sequence/pattern of behaviour is that a disposition, *viz.* love, is their common origin. Further, it can accommodate the problem of disruption by casting it in terms of a case of masking. Finally, Naar points to three benefits: first, it is impervious to the critiques of the mental-event accounts of love; second, it is adaptable to many phenomena and competing explanations of those phenomena in love; third, it accommodates the epistemological notions that one *discovers* one is in love, and also that one can be in error about a love attribution.

4. Abramson, K. and Leite, A. 2011. ‘Love As A Reactive Emotion’, in *Philosophical Quarterly* 61, pp. 673-99.

Keywords: Reactive love, Quality views, Reactive attitudes, Responses to objects, Virtues, Love as an attitude, Strawson.

Description: Following P.F. Strawson, “reactive attitudes” are interpersonally directed emotional *responses* to objects that involve morality or virtue. For instance, anger is an appropriate reactive response to someone’s wrongdoing. Some varieties of love seem to be an appropriate response to morally significant character traits of the love-object, such as her compassion, loyalty, empathy or generosity. Abramson and Leite argue that there is a variety of love – call it “reactive love” – that is a sort of attachment to the other person, such that (a) it is appropriately felt as a disinterested response to morally laudable features of character of the person which are noticeable in one’s interaction with her; (b) is generally manifested in acts of goodwill and certain motivational responses, such as being concerned for her and wanting to be with her.

To assume that a variety of love is a moralized response explains why we feel that love which responds to non-moralized features of the person (e.g. physical beauty) is shallow or superficial. According to this view, moral character traits would be essential or central features of a person. To assume the existence of “reactive love” also explains how love is linked to other desires, affects and motivational responses.

The context in which love can arise is that of one’s relationship with a beloved person. Abramson and Leite note that, while love is a response to morally praiseworthy character traits, the object of the love attitude is the person herself. The person is loved on account of her good traits (as love is a direct response to them) and not instrumentally, because of the benefits those can provide the lover with. Thus the account is going beyond reasons for love.

Abramson and Leite's account of "reactive love" is similar to quality views in that love is grounded (as a response) in non-relational qualities of the beloved. In contrast with quality views, however, they say (a) reactive love is not subject to the substitutability problem: the qualities here wouldn't be reasons for love, but love is a response to such qualities; (b) it doesn't have as a consequence that one should stop loving the person when she changes her qualities: reactive love motivates one to do things for the beloved's own sake, and because leaving her will cause her harm when one is already motivated to do her good, one often stays with the beloved and encourages her to change her behavior to cultivate morally praiseworthy traits.

5. Schopenhauer, A. (1856). 'The Metaphysics of Sexual Love, in *The World as Will and Representation*, volume 2, trans. E.F. J. Payne, edn. of 1958, New York: Dover Press, pp. 531-67.

Keywords: Pessimism, Instinct, Illusion, Craziiness, Sex, Reproduction, Heterosexuality, Aberration, Species, Emotion views

Description: Schopenhauer reduces romantic love to a temporary illusion or craziness that performs a crucial role in the perpetuation of the species. Individuals feel attracted to an individual of the opposite sex because of her desirable characteristics: everybody seeks in the other what s/he is deficient in, so that one's defects get neutralized for the next generation. The features we associate with love – the uniqueness of the beloved, our willingness to perform foolish acts for her, the roles distributed, the friendship that is developed through time, the things that capture our attraction, etc. – are derived from the instinct for sex, the purpose of which is to make us mate and have a stable home in which to raise a child. The function of romantic love is procreation, and Schopenhauer seems to treat romantic love that fails in this purpose as an aberration. In claiming that romantic love is an "illusion" he argues what is good for the species merely appears to the individual as if it was good for himself: we think that our beloved is unique when in fact many other persons would do to make us as happy. The illusion vanishes with time, the expiry date coinciding with when a child would have been raised long enough to survive. Love is a sort of craziness because it drives us to do foolish things that are detrimental to us that we wouldn't otherwise do.

Criticisms of Emotion Accounts

1. Smith, M. MS. 'The 'What' and 'Why' of Love's Reasons', draft available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~msmith/mypapers/TheWhatandWhyofLovesReasons.pdf>

Keywords: Actions, Reasons, Dispositional theory of value, Desire-realiser, History, Respect, Friendship, Mutual receptivity, Self-conception, Alignment

Description: Smith considers the question of what reasons for action we have when we love someone, by looking at why we have reasons for action generally and then considering the difference loving someone makes to our circumstances. According to Smith, ideal agents are optimal desire-realiser, with the capacity to form and realise "dominant desires" to help and not interfere in those circumstances. (This corresponds to Kantian maxim of respect for persons.) Smith criticizes Niko Kolodny's account of the difference love makes to our circumstances (history brings vulnerability to favourable and unfavourable emotions) on the grounds that a) it's left unclear how a historical relationship is reason-providing and b) it's not obviously true that lovers must have history together (love at first sight).

Smith also criticises Velleman's position (love is an optional maximum response to recognition of a person's value) on the grounds that it seems to permit rational stalking/invasions of privacy generally – it fails to cohere with social mores. Drawing on Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett's idea that a distinctive mechanism of desire-formation is necessary for friendship, and their remarks on the dynamic nature of love (lovers build their self-conceptions around each other), Smith advances the following account of the difference loving someone makes to our reasons for action: loving someone involves mutual receptivity to direction, so when we love someone we possess desires – to "align" ourselves with our lover(s) – and have (non-moral, selfish) reasons to satisfy these desires; as our beloved will in turn base some of their actions on their understanding of our character, we have moral reasons for acting to fulfill their expectations.

Value Accounts

1. Kolodny, N. 2003. 'Love as Valuing a Relationship', in *Philosophical Review* 112, pp. 135-89.

Keywords: Normative reasons, Reasons for love, Quality theory, No-reasons view, Relationship theory, Relational properties, Partiality

Description: Love seems to be a psychological state for which there are *normative reasons*, that is, an appropriate response to something other than itself. "Quality theory" proposes as reasons for love the beloved's *non-relational properties*. However, this leads to the substitutability problem: if love is responsive to reasons, it will also be an appropriate response to any person similar to my beloved. The "no-reasons view" (attributed to e.g. Frankfurt) denies that love is a response to antecedent reasons.

Kolodny doesn't think possible to characterize love as a distinct state without appealing to reasons. A "relationship theory" proposes as reasons for love the relational features of the beloved or one's relationship with her. But this seems to point the wrong object: we don't love relationships, but people; moreover, it seems to make love a reason for itself. Kolodny defends the existence of normative reasons for love: to the person experiencing love, it seems that there are appropriate constitutive emotions and motivations of love. To the external observer, that love or its absence is inappropriate in certain cases (e.g. abusive husband). To the theorist, that love consists in certain kinds of psychological states (e.g. emotions) which are in general considered responsive to reasons.

Kolodny defends a sophisticated version of the relationship theory by outlining seven conditions for A to love B (pp. 150-51). His view overcomes the two objections above: the theory doesn't pick out the wrong object; although one's relationship provides the *ground* for love, the beloved person is the *focus* of such love. Kolodny concedes that friendships and romantic love are reasons for love, but defends this consequence using a historicist perspective. Finally, he reflects on how this theory clarifies why our relationships are sources of reasons for partiality.

2. Kolodny, N. 2010. 'Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General considerations and problem cases', in B. Feltham and J. Cottingham (ed.s) *Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships and the Wider World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 169-93.

Keywords: Partiality, Agent-relative reasons, Basic partiality principles, Moral norms, Consequentialism, Resonance

Description: Kolodny wants to draw a principled distinction between the relationships that support partiality (e.g. friendship) and the ones that don't (e.g. racism). Assuming that there are agent-relative reasons for partiality, we can describe all such relationships via partiality principles describing those towards whom we are partial, and organize them in a List. "Reductionism" holds that no partiality principle is basic, but that they

are derived from other normative principles via deduction and facilitation. However, when people act being partial they are not doing so based on reasons derived from these normative principles. In contrast, “non-reductionism” holds that *some* partiality principles are basic in the sense that they are not explained via deduction and facilitation from more basic normative principles.

Kolodny develops and defends a non-reductionist position, and tries to explain the basic principles for partiality using *resonance*. Proper responses to common personal histories *resonate* with proper responses to discrete encounters. The latter are the realm of impartial morality; partiality comes as a continuation that recognizes the importance not just of the encounters but also of the common history. Partiality is not opposed to impartial morality principles. The appeal to resonance gives us two relationship types for which partiality principles are basic. We have “resonance of histories of encounter” – one has a reason to respond to such histories similar to the reasons that apply to discrete encounters plus the importance of the history shared with that person – and the “resonance of common personal history or situation”, which is similar and captures cases of distance relationships as well.

Resonance also explains why certain sorts of relationships are not on the List. In the case of trivial relationships (e.g. coinciding with the same person on the bus to work), there is nothing substantive for partiality to resonate with, and in negative relationships (those involving wrongdoing to an external or internal party) any resonance would be built upon the guilt of the wrongdoer and the reparations and apology the victim demands on discrete occasions. The case of racism doesn’t involve partiality, as the idea that one race is superior to others is not implied by, nor does it imply, the belief that one should be partial to the members of certain race.

3. Shand, J. 2011. ‘Love As If’, in *Essays in Philosophy* 12, pp. 4-17.

Keywords: Romantic love, Normativity, Reasonableness, Rationality, Vaihinger, Useful fictions, Dual treatment of love

Description: There is an apparent contradiction in our understanding of romantic love: on the one hand, we treat it as a non-rational occurrence, and on the other, we make it subject to normative standards for which reasons are relevant to its assessment. Is love like a matter of taste in that *normative* provisions shouldn’t apply to it? Normativity doesn’t apply where one has no choice, and our talk of *falling* in love has the connotation that such event is out of one’s rational control. On the other hand, we give reasons for our partner to continue to love us; and sometimes we do consider that love is something we have some choice over.

Shand argues that the incoherence is genuine but can be accommodated by a treatment of love *as if*. Love doesn’t have a true single nature. Circumstances make us treat it, at some times, *as if* it were non-normative and non-rational, and at other times *as if* it were subject to reasons and arguments. The practical dual treatment *as if* avoids running up against the contradiction.

4. Bransen, J. 2006. 'Selfless Self-Love', in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9, pp. 3–25.

Keywords: Love, Self-love, Self-interest, Moral point of view, Disinterestedness, Frankfurt, Reflective rationality, Alternative of oneself, Euthyphro question

Description: The moral point of view seems to be adequately described as that which foregoes the priority of self-interest considerations. The paper's goal is to show that selfless self-love (self-interest being moral) is a coherent and respectable conception.

The first argument is negative, aimed to show that not all self-grounded reasons are not morally respectable. To take the moral point of view involves putting in brackets the motivational force of one's psychological attitudes in order to rationally evaluate the normative import of the content of such attitudes. In a rational deliberation, only certain contents (of self-interested reasons) have the *force* to be normatively significant. It is possible that the content of some self-interested reasons, given the features of the agent and her context, are morally respectable.

This seems to be in tension with robust concern views. Frankfurt described love as disinterested caring for the well-being and flourishing of the beloved, for her own sake. Selfless caring would be similar to unselfish willingness characteristic of the moral point of view. However, Bransen challenges the apparent similarity: in Frankfurt's account, the second is a matter of reflective rationality, while love is a matter of volition. Further, Frankfurt's position seem to imply that the lover is worthwhile because one loves her, and not because of her features. This is an undesirable outcome that shall be rejected: love is not merely a matter of volitional strength, but reflective rationality has a role in focusing one on the value of he beloved and her well-being.

The final argument is positive: self-love can provide morally respectable self-grounding reasons. It is possible to conceive oneself as an external object which could be the object of an attitude of self-love, while at the same time being unmotivated by any self-interested concern (i.e. selfless). Reasons of selfless self-love have their source in a particular beloved alternative *of* oneself, concern one's flourishing and well-being, involve volition, and are morally respectable because one's concern for the quality of one's own flourishing is indirectly a concern for the quality of one's attitudes to the normatively significant features of one's context. Thus, not all self-love is selfless, but some might be.

5. Pettigrove, G. 2012. *Forgiveness and Love*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keywords: Forgiveness, Excusing, Apologising, Grace, Loving perception, Value, Affects, Cognitive

Description: Chapter 5 deals with love. Pettigrove emphasizes ideas central to union views – we organize and shape our identities around love, and such identity-shaping love is “inescapably normative” – but offers a value account of love. He examines the affective, cognitive, and volitional dimensions of love. There are many different *affects*

that accompany love; he follows Melanie Klein, Gerald Clore, and Linda Isbell in holding that what's common to all is that they are ways of valuing one's beloved, value in the sense of assigning positive worth. The *cognitive* dimension of love pertains to the so-called "loving perception": the perception of the beloved's goodness and resulting belief in that goodness. Crucially, the perception of/belief in beloved's goodness are not/need not be the *cause* of love.

Pettigrove responds to three objections. Frankfurt objects that love need not be prompted by, nor involve any notice of, the beloved's value. Pettigrove agrees with the first claim but shows the argument for the second to be deficient (due to a poorly chosen example). Hurka argues that the focus on perception of goodness is overly restrictive. Pettigrove diagnoses this worry as resulting from running together the causes of love and the perception of love. He then considers a worry arising from a passage of Roald Dahl's, to the effect that perceived goodness is really projected (exaggerated!) goodness, but argues that just because love may make us eager to see good, and so prone to mistakes, it does not endanger the loving perception. Finally, on the cognitive dimension, he points out that the subjectivity-objectivity debate over value has ramifications for the loving perception, but leaves it at that.

Coming to the *volitional* dimension, it encompasses an inclination and commitment to promote the beloved's well-being: love is in part constituted by things that we do. Love also involves a commitment to loyalty, characterized as constancy in affection. Pettigrove then responds to two objections. Velleman raises the worry that promoting well-being could license overly-intrusive lovers. Pettigrove responds that the notion of benefiting others is itself normative, requiring recognition of individuals' interest in privacy, being "left alone". Ebels-Duggan argues that promotion of well-being is best understood as the sharing of ends, otherwise it might be that to promote our beloved's well-being, we must sabotage their own self-selected projects. Pettigrove responds that the well-being of an individual cannot be understood apart from that individual's rational aims.

Though they can overlap, forgiveness is not exhausted by nor contained in loving. The connection to forgiveness pertains to their three dimensions. Re. the cognitive, love and forgiveness are compatible, because we can perceive someone as good without them as good in every respect, i.e. perceiving them as flawed. Indeed, loving our flawed partners is part of the maturity of love. Re. the volitional, love and forgiveness involve a commitment to the other's well-being, but with the latter that commitment need not be sourced from an interest in that well-being. Love need not causally lead to forgiveness, but it does so normatively – we cannot love where we will not forgive. Regarding the affective, the affects of love need not yield forgiveness, but love and the hostile attitudes forgiveness overcomes are unhappy bedfellows.

Criticisms of Value Accounts

1. Millgram, E. 2004. 'Kantian Crystallisation', in *Ethics* 114, pp. 511-13.

Keywords: Velleman, Kantian, Emotion, Perfection, Fantasy, Crystallisation, Seeing, Awareness

Description: Criticises Velleman's attempt to combine elements of the philosophies of Kant and Iris Murdoch into an account of love. The Murdochian element pertains to Murdoch's conception of love as "an arresting awareness of value in a person" resulting from "really looking" at the person, rather than just projecting our own fantasies and desires (about what they're really like) onto them; the Kantian element is that we love people as rational beings, for what we love in them is their capacity to be actuated by reasons. Millgram points out the tension between these two elements: the Kantian rational self that is supposedly one's "true self" and which is that that your lovers love, is an ideal at best and a fantasy at worst; the closer we get to people so as to "really" see them, warts and all, the less ideally rational and more quirky they appear. (Millgram points out that usually, when it is said of some individual, *S*, that *O* is her "true" *x* – where *x* may be "desire", "self", etc. – one can be fairly sure that *O* is not in fact among *S*'s desires.) Thus Millgram, drawing inspiration from Marie-Henri Beyle (aka Stendhal), suggests that Velleman's account of love is a *crystallisation* account: one never loves someone just as they are; rather, one loves an idealized fantasy or perfection that obscures the real person from view. By sticking to his Kantian guns, Velleman pays no more than lip service to Murdoch.

Miscellaneous

1. Sinhababu, N. 2008. 'Possible Girls', in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89, pp. 254-60.

Keywords: Modal Realism, Trans-World Love, Counterparts, *De Re* Attitude, Closeness, Distance, Kraut

Description: Sinhababu argues that if David Lewis's modal realism is true, then one can be in a romantic, loving relationship with non-actual individuals. He thinks that such trans-world relationships differ little in form from long-distance relationships. Furthermore, lovers are able to pick each other out across worlds, as individuals desiring each other specifically; they do so via the use of descriptions. Though descriptions are how one picks one's lover out, Sinhababu then maintains that one holds a *de re* attitude towards the beloved, not their characteristics. Sinhababu's discussion is tongue-in-cheek, but brings out questions about both the spatiotemporal contiguity of lovers and the volitional (or not) nature of love.

2. Schuler, M. 2008. 'Love as Knowledge: the Metaphysics behind the Emotion', in *Lyceum* 9, pp. 1-20.

Keywords: Personal identity, Metaphysical core, Knowledge, Epistemic relation, Love at first sight, Immutable and contingent properties, Critique of emotion views, Critique of value views

Description: Schuler claims that romantic love is fundamentally different than other affections we also call "love"; "fondness" would be a better category for those. Romantic love is a form of attachment that predisposes us to host a variety of emotions. It is a necessary condition for love to stand in certain epistemic relation involving an *attitude* towards the metaphysical *core*, essence, or *daimon* of the beloved. Love must involve an attitudinal component, Schuler reasons, given that the opposite of love is an attitude, indifference. He explains away the usual identification of love as an emotion by saying that love predisposes us to feel a wide range of emotions: joy, disappointment, etc – we mistake this disposition for an emotion itself. Also, in cases where deep knowledge of the person is absent but we experience those emotions, we mistakenly assume we are in love. The metaphysical core of the person is immutable and makes her personal identity constant through time; it is different from the cluster of contingent features she happens to instantiate at a given time.

Critique of value views: value views are in tension with the intuitive data points that we love the wholeness of the beloved, that the beloved is an irreplaceable individual, and that (s)he continues to be suitable for one's love after her/his properties change.

Critique of emotion views: love doesn't have three of the core features that are characterizing of emotions according to R. C. Robert's (2003): "(5) ordinarily the subject of an emotion "believes the propositional content of his emotion"; (6) it is possible to have emotions "without being able to articulate (all of) their content," some of which may be non-propositional; (7) it is sometimes possible to "exercise voluntary control" over a given emotion, and sometimes not" (section II). Schuler denies that love

satisfies conditions (5), (6) and (7), partly because of the difficulty identifying love's content.

3. Keller, S. 2000. 'How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Properties', in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 37, pp. 163-73.

Keywords: Conditional love, Unconditional love, Properties, Value, Personal affirmation, Ideal relationships, Change, Personal transformation, Shared experience

Description: Keller defends the properties view of love and the idea that love is conditional. The properties view of love finds the question "what justifies your love of him/her/them?" a sensible one, and holds that ideal lovers respond by appealing to their beloved's properties. It does not imply that lovers know the properties they love their beloveds for; just that continuing love is justified by the possession of a certain set of properties. Nor does it imply that lovers love properties rather than people; the idea is that two (or more) *people* stand in the loving relation, in virtue of properties they instantiate. The kinds of properties that motivate romantic love should be: non-essential; contemporary; reasonably intrinsic/not overly extrinsic; and intrinsically/objectively attractive in the eyes of the lover.

Keller notes that the properties view makes sense of why being loved is self-affirming: if I'm loved for my properties (in accordance with the constraints) then I have good reason for being affirmed by this love. Furthermore, thinks Keller, the properties view allows for love to be freely chosen and bestowed, because properties will form the basis of a continuing free choice to remain in the romantic relationship. Keller notes a mismatch between love and personal affirmation in Velleman's theory, which has it that our lovers perceive and appreciate the value we have in virtue of being persons; yet such value is hardly the basis for why most of us feel valuable.

Keller argues that the property view of love is compatible with the fact that people and relationships are dynamic. He contrasts his view with that of Delaney, who claims that the properties we're loved for should be those central to our self-conceptions. Keller's criticism of Delaney's view is that a) it doesn't allow for alterations in our self-conceptions brought about by what our lovers love in us, and b) Delaney's view offers no reason to presume that future changes in the properties of one lover will be such as can be loved by the other. In fact, says Keller, romantic love is a source of personal transformation, and that what's distinctive about the transformative power of romantic love is that it comes via experiences shared, in some way, between partners. The definitive question of love is: is this a person with whom I would like to change?

Finally, Keller responds to objections. One should not always be prepared to “trade up” partners because a) such preparedness would be damaging to present relationships, and b) ideal romantic relationships will result in there being no better partner to be found. The properties view does not divide people into those worthy of love and those unworthy of love (Keller thinks no one *deserves* to be loved). Fetishism is avoided because of the constraints of the kinds of properties we should be loved for. Finally, loving *commitment* can (but need not always) avoid the worry of losing love with (temporarily) losing the properties one is loved for.

4. Hales, S. D. 1995. ‘The Impossibility of Unconditional Love’, in *Public Affairs Quarterly* 9, pp. 317-20.

Keywords: Conditional love, Unconditional love, Contingent properties, Essential properties, Irrationality, Parental love, Judgment

Description: Hales defends the claim that unconditional love is impossible. Unconditional love is love not conditioned on *any* properties of the beloved or lover, but Hales argues that all love must be conditioned on *some* properties of the beloved or lover. Though love often appears to be conditioned on intrinsic properties – e.g. being loved for one’s sense of humour – Hales points out that love can even be conditioned in part on relational properties: it matters to whether my romantic interest will love me back that she not be in a competing romantic relationship.

Hales critiques Nozick’s claim that mature love is unconditional (according to Nozick, love begins conditional but eventually we should love unconditionally), but argues that nevertheless love *can* die when the beloved acquires undesirable properties that “overcome” the love: all this shows, Hales says, is that mature love is conditional on the absence of undesirable properties (or the instantiation of negative properties, e.g. *not being a drunken philanderer*). Nor, holds Hales, is parental love unconditional; parental love is conditional at least on the child having the property *being one’s child*. It is the child’s having this property that explains continued parental love. Hales considers that what we mean by “unconditional love” is love based on essential properties, and asks whether we should find such love aspirational. Hales notes an oddity with thinking it is: there are certain attitudes taken towards people that we judge to be irrational, and part of the reason they’re irrational is because the judgment is based on properties that the person can’t change and didn’t choose (racism being the prime example of such an attitude). As unconditional-*qua*-essence-based love appears similar in structure, it may well be irrational itself.

5. Edyvane, D. 2003. ‘Against Unconditional Love’, in *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 20, pp. 59-75.

Keywords: Conditional love, Unconditional love, Properties view, Frankfurt, Justification, Commitment, Love’s vision, History, Flourishing, Value, The will

Description: Edyvane observes that the idea that unconditional love is the highest form of love deviates from the norm that, in other contexts, we typically think that conditional commitment – commitment that can be rendered *intelligible* with reasons – is superior (a worry being that commitment without reason is arbitrary). He proposes that we should think the best kind of love is conditional, i.e. can be rendered intelligible. Edyvane details the property view of love (whilst also noting another peculiarity about love: it seems that as love deepens, the relevance of the properties that may have initially been at the root of the love disappears), rejecting simplistic and “extreme” versions for their phenomenological inaccuracy. Subtler versions of the property view – versions which don’t assume the criteria for love are static, and build in the fact that partners grow and change in their outlooks and values (and, moreover, grow together) – are also rejected on the grounds that they don’t deliver the kind of conditionality sought after: on subtler versions of the property view, we do not, and it seems *cannot*, know the properties our love is based upon, and so we cannot render our love intelligible with reasons.

Edyvane describes a tension between a common intuition and Frankfurt’s account of love as “disinterested concern for the flourishing of the beloved”. On Frankfurt’s account the objects of love acquire value because we love them. We have the intuition that the best kinds of love are well-grounded, that is, based in more objective factors. Put simply, it is better to value valuable objects than valueless ones. There is a worry about arbitrariness in Frankfurt’s account, because all love requires is that a person takes a disinterested concern in the flourishing of some person and that this impulse be *endorsed* by the person impelled. Love is a configuration of the will. Love need not speak to the nature of the beloved; all love seems to speak to is that something has become central to someone’s self-conception, and this doesn’t seem enough. If Frankfurt’s account were true, it seems I could become willfully central to someone’s self-conception without any real awareness on their part of what *I* am like, and it’s not clear that such love would be desirable to *me*.

Edyvane’s proposal is that we recognize two perspectives on love: one perspective is the narrowly subjective perspective that Frankfurt endorses, and the other perspective takes into account how the love might be understood by others. Edyvane thinks such an account makes the best sense of mistaken love (love we can look back on and think of as mistaken), as well as best accommodating the swathes of literature about mistaken love. He draws a distinction: although it’s not strictly true that love is *grounded* in reasons (the objective criteria that render our love intelligible to others), it is still the case that such reasons *matter* to us and our love, and the reason they matter comes from the perspective of the beloved, not the lover: when someone loves me, I don’t want that love to be a subjective whim, but would want it to be intelligible to others why that person loves me. Love that is not so intelligible strikes us as less meaningful than love that is. This allows us to render the notion of mistaken love intelligible, for with a set of objective criteria in hand, we can form a judgment about whether our love for some beloved was indeed mistaken or not (whereas when all we have is the subjective judgment, such a possibility seems closed to us). Ultimately, Edyvane is suggesting that the narrowly subjective view and the non-subjective view do not constitute a division of the will into competing commitments, as Frankfurt would have it.

6. Armstrong, J. 2003. *Conditions of Love: the Philosophy of Intimacy*. London: the Penguin Press.

Keywords: Imagination, Infatuation, Falling in love, Maturity, Love's vision, Feeling, Experience, Projection, Disillusionment, Understanding, History, Loving relationship, Union

Description: Advances an account of love that appears to aim to describe the average loving relationship as depicted throughout literary history. His account of love is interesting because it attends to various stages of love – from infatuation to maturation – and emphasises a different aspect for each. He discusses both the genetic and the psychological-cum-sociological aspects of the historical evolution of the feeling of love. Armstrong claims that our *experience* of love – and here Armstrong's concern seems primarily to be with the feeling associated with falling in love – is a function of both our genetic dispositions and the socio-psychological roles and climates through which those dispositions play out. There is a compelling (enough) story to be told about how a disposition to feel love would be reproductively advantageous, at least in a species such as ourselves; however we should not think that, even if our genetic makeup has remained relatively unchanged for generations, the dynamic contents of our minds do not affect how we experience love, and how we love. Nevertheless, our genetic and physiological makeup *does* place certain bounds on how far we can push the boundaries of relationship norms.

Armstrong expends considerable effort describing and theorizing about the process of falling in love. The imagination, he tells us, is *essential* for love to come to be. When falling in love with someone we imagine scenarios with them, in which we do pleasant things together – e.g. travel – and so come to think of them as being certain ways – e.g. adventurous – whether or not they in fact are; scenarios are projected from what may be incidental remarks or events in that person's love – e.g. "Oh I'd love to go to India..." said after passing a curry house – so that their least quality can take on "extraordinary charm and force" in our eyes. Armstrong's story of falling in love results in a "*projected* properties" view of love, where we love someone in virtue of thinking they fulfill (or will fulfill) some almost-theatrical picture of them we have in our minds: a character exemplifying enlarged or shrunken, augmented or omitted versions of their features.

When falling in love we desire to promote the beloved's happiness, which involves discovering their virtues and vices, and their interests; in understanding them in this way, we come to bind ourselves more closely with them. Yet, as Armstrong describes, coming to truly understand the nature of our beloved destroys the distorted image we had of them. This destruction is part of the process of how love *matures* when love and a loving relationship continues and develops. He notes how this process is often painful, and can even be fatal for some relationships. Ultimately, he comes to advance a relationship/union view of mature love; we love our partners in virtue of the relationships we've built with them – children, house, adventures etc.

7. John, E. 2013. 'Love and the Need for Comprehension', in *Philosophical Explorations* 16, pp. 285-97.

Keywords: Love, Comprehension, Second person, Knowledge how, Knowledge that

Description: John begins by setting aside the debate as to whether love requires comprehension of the beloved before stating her position that love is a "second-person relation", whereby the lover has to address their beloved as someone who asks to be known in certain ways. John's first task is to argue that love involves a success condition that (putative) lovers do not control: first, she points out that a point of love is that it reach and be received by the beloved, which requires that the beloved be able to recognise themselves in that love; this then suggests that to love someone as/for themselves requires that the love contain some of the beloved's self-conception as they understand it. John then discusses the idea that loving someone involves somehow promoting their interests, briefly discussing the union theories of Nozick and Scruton, and the robust concern theories of Helm and Frankfurt, before saying that taking on your lovers' interests as your own (in any way) raises the question of what knowledge is required of those interests in order to do so. She details the forms of knowledge she thinks required: specifically, she says that although "tick-box" knowledge of *what* a person's interests are – i.e. knowledge-*that* – is necessary, it must be supplemented with comprehension, which she characterises as knowledge-*how*: knowledge of those interests' motivational force to our beloved (though she doesn't give a strict account of the knowledge that-how distinction).

John discusses the fact that love does sometimes cross gaps in comprehension. Such love can happen when the overlooked interest is sufficiently trivial, but John doesn't think triviality can be the direct reason; rather, she says, it is because the beloved does not "ask" for such interests in comprehension – the person themselves doesn't regard such interests as important, and so they can be overlooked. Lovers assess the importance of the failures (in comprehension) of each other. (John then criticises Frankfurt for taking the love a parent has for their child as the paradigm of love when discussing romantic love, as romantic love occurs between two (or more) *adults*, each with a wealth of personal experience, a self-conception, and a sense of an autonomous *I*, whereas children (especially younger children) are not such fully-formed individuals).

In closing, John highlights work being done on understanding second-person relationships generally, citing Stephen Darwall, who discusses second-personal claims in the context of morality, saying of them that they presuppose a mutual common competence, and Martin Buber, who argues that becoming a fully-formed person requires reciprocity with a "you", and notes some interesting issues that arise. First, love is not being cast by John as making *moral* demands of us, though there are similarities with Darwall's understanding of moral demands; second, on Buber's portrayal, love is the relation where we interacting as *persons* and not just as *things*.

Finally, she considers two complications with love as a second-person relation. 1) Does the idea that we inevitably have authority to set conditions for knowledge as a basis for love fall foul of "unreasonable narcissism" – the worry that we're making too much of

our lives depend on self-knowledge and self-comprehension? And 2) if we (seriously) misconceive what we value, do our demands for comprehension have any weight? John ends on a cautionary note: *some* degree of self-understanding is necessary if we want to be loved.

8. Protasi, S. Forthcoming. 'Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back)', to appear in *European Journal of Philosophy*.

Keywords: Unrequited love, Love's reasons, Value of love, Properties view, Experiential/perspectival view, Relationship view, Loving relationships, Social relationships, History

Description: Protasi begins by proposing that theories of love must accommodate the existence and value of unrequited love, then points out that the human experience is replete with cases of unrequited love, and that whilst she concedes that unrequited love is not the *ideal*, it nevertheless makes up a sizeable portion of the examples of love found "on the ground". Protasi's critique of the relationship view of love – the view that every form of love consists in valuing a relationship – begins by noting the distinction, recognised by the relationship view, between a loving relationship – grounded in the fact that people love each other – and a social relationship – grounded in social reasons ranging from a notion of social duty (e.g. to care for people in need) to the desire to not be lonely. Reciprocity of love is built in to the relationship view as a requirement of love. Thus, the relationship view cannot recognise the existence of unrequited love. Furthermore, the relationship view cannot account for a crucial difference between loving and social relationships: one can still have reasons to love someone even if they do not love you back, and one can have social reasons to continue a relationship even if you no longer love the person. Unrequited love is still the recognition of something precious in the world, yet the relationship view cannot accommodate its value.

Protasi moves past the simple property view, on the grounds that it falls prey to problems associated with issues of "trading up", "substitution" and change, to consider the relational-historical properties view, which avoids such problems (hereafter the RH view). Distinctive of the RH view is that it is *relational* properties that are taken to be salient: specifically, it is properties germane to the relationship between lovers, for example the "special tenderness" that lovers might reserve just for each other. These are properties that depend on there being a relationship for their instantiation (as opposed to, say, someone's intrinsic tenderness or disposition to be tender to everyone). The RH view avoids the problem of change by emphasizing the historical character of certain relational properties, and the fact that they can only be experienced with sufficient time and intimacy. Yet for its perks, the RH view still doesn't allow for the existence or the value of unrequited love.

Finally, Protasi advances her perspectival property view. Perspectival properties depend for their existence on a subject's perspective; e.g. if I love Joanna because of her beauty, it is because she seems beautiful *to me* (just as a square top can appear rectangular, depending on my perspective). Protasi's view also allows that in a reciprocal loving relationship, the properties that ground the love will also be historical

and relational; it's just that in unrequited love they will be perspectival only. The view is called "the experiential property view" because one has to "experience (in some way) the object of one's love, and their properties, for oneself". We need not be forced into thinking that perspectival properties are *projections* not grounded in fact and so threaten to make people interchangeable (because *anyone* could fit the projected mold), though they are certainly heavily dependent upon the perceiver's own psychological makeup.

9. Plato, *Symposium*

Keywords: *Eros*, Beauty, Good, Completeness, Other half, Platonic love, Kinds of love, Love's object

Description: Phaedrus and Pausanias think that there are two kinds of love: love is good, or morally praiseworthy, if it gives to virtuous conduct, and is bad if disconnected with virtue. On the contrary, Aristophanes and Agathon argue that all love is of the same kind, the function of which is to seek completeness. Aristophanes presents a story according to which, in the past, humans were happy bi-headed creatures with 8 limbs, but the gods cut them in two, leaving each person incomplete and searching for their other half.

Many seem to agree with the truism that we love what is beautiful and/or good, but is love good and beautiful itself? Agathon thinks so. Socrates replies that he has confused love with its object. If love is love *of* beauty, then it must *lack* beauty: if love is a desire for beauty, and a desire presupposes a lack, then love cannot be beautiful itself. The same argument applies to goodness. However, one might object that there is nothing contradictory about wanting what I already have.

Then Socrates changes method when talking about a conversation he had with Diotima. Instead of finding the common features to all love without distinctions of value among them, she talked about what love *ought* to be: she distinguished superior and inferior modes of love depending on their object. This hierarchy of love-objects culminates in the absolute good; but to be able to appreciate it, one needs to progress from one beauty to the next. This speech may be the origin of our conception of "platonic love".

At the end, Alcibiades crashes the party and starts hitting on Socrates. The discussion here seems to pose problems for Diotima's ideas: Alcibiades says he felt in love with Socrates because of his wisdom; Socrates responds that, if he knew and loved the absolute good, or something high in the hierarchy, he wouldn't love Alcibiades. One might think that, if this increasing ladder view of objects of love is right, then love shouldn't generally be reciprocated.

10. Plato, *The Republic*

Keywords: *Eros*, Justice, Reproduction, Multiple partners, Good, Soul, Negative conception of love

Description: *The Republic* is one of the early works of Plato and there is room for very

divergent interpretations of it, especially given its internal incoherencies and in light of Plato's later works presenting love as something positive. In *The Republic*, the human soul is described as having three aspects or elements: the appetitive (linked to experiencing a-logical desires and pleasures), the high-spirited (by which we have courage, temper and higher passions), and the rational element (reflective, seeks and judges what is true and what is good). The human soul is harmonious when the rational element subjugates the other two. There is a parallel between the organization of the ideal human ψυχή and that of a well-ordered city-state. The society of the ideal republic is constituted by three classes, and each person's task is suited to her nature. The city is ruled by a philosopher who facilitates the harmonious cooperation of all elements in the city. Justice is achieved, for both soul and city, when its parts are each performing its specific function. Under the guidance of reason we can become closer to the Good, and that for the city-state amounts to the following: human reproduction regulated according to eugenic principles, parents and offspring ignorant of their biological connection, enforcement for one to have multiple partners but nobody to call its own, etc. Thus it seems that for Plato, *eros* (including parental love) is something negative, something that should be subjugated to reason. On the other hand, it doesn't seem suited to one's nature to focus only on eugenic mates, so harmony would seem endangered. Finally, the discussion about arts on book V seems to imply that *eros* is something positive, which seems inconsistent. If the arts attune the soul to beauty, a beauty-attuned soul is an erotic soul, and an erotic soul is one also capable of appreciating measure, proportion, symmetry in our reasoning processes and thoughts, then it seems erotism can bring us closer to the Good, not further away.

11. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*

Keywords: *Philia*, Friendship, Self-love, Virtue, Union view

Description: Using a virtue ethics approach, the theme of the book is how individuals should best live. The goal of practical thinking is *eudaimonia*. One of the virtues is to be a good friend, which Aristotle discusses in books VIII and IX. *Philia* is a fond appreciation for the other, for her own sake, and occurs in the case of friendships. *Philia* is important and good on itself, not just instrumentally. Motivation is what distinguishes between kinds of friendships, and those based on utility or pleasure aren't genuine cases. Virtue, and being alike in virtue, is the objective proper base of *philia*. In genuine cases of *philia*, people love each other because of who they really are. Through their joint activity, friends improve each other. A condition for *philia* is self-love, not in a egoistic sense, but in wanting and reflecting on what is good and virtuous for oneself. Book IX also explores the question of how many friends one should have. One can only attend to so many people at a time, and with friendship based on virtue there seems to be a limit. Very strong friendship can only be developed with a few people. Romantic love is a sort of excess of friendship, so it can only occur with one person. Love is described as "two persons and one soul".

12. Aristotle, *Politics*

Keywords: Politics, *Politike philia*, Justice, Regimes, Civism, Friendship

Description: Addresses the role that politics should have in bringing about the common good and virtuous life in citizenry. In a just society, citizens experience a sort of civic friendship or *politike philia* with each other: they do things for fellow citizens collectively and individually, have a common sense of values, goals and justice, and care for each other for their own sake. The citizens express *politike philia* by following the norms of civic behavior, and in doing so they stabilize and unify the city. There is a continuation between *politike philia* and other sorts of *philia*, this being the only kind that can be felt with a quasi-anonymous group of people. Friends wish well for friends for their own sake when they know mutual good exists, and personal knowledge is not necessary to know that mutual good exists between the citizens of a just regime, as they are already bonded politically with each other. *Politike philia* is not present in tyrannies or oligarchies, but it is in just regimes, and distinguishes them from others.

13. Hiller, A. 2013. ‘Object dependence’, in *Essays in Philosophy* 14, pp. 33-55.

Keywords: Identity conditions, Primacy of identity, Ontological dependence, N-tets, Species, Union views, Romantic relationships

Description: Discusses identity conditions for objects. *Primacy of identity* holds that “n things have their n-identity conditions in virtue of each thing having its own identity conditions” (p. 34). Hiller argues that some objects depend ontologically on others at-a-distance, and for such objects *primacy of identity* doesn’t hold. Such ontological dependence is of the class of object-dependence: modally construed, *A object-dependes* on B iff in every world where A exists, B exists. On an essentialist reading, *A object-dependes* on B iff B is part of A’s essence. These two are equivalent if essence is construed modally. Call *N-tets* the cases in which there is object-dependence between n-objects. N-tets are better construed assuming that the n-identity of n individuals is primary, and where the n-identity conditions require the dependence relations between individuals to be structured in certain way. There are several kinds of n-tets along at least three different parameters:

- (time) N-tets with *temporal* object-dependence are those in which each member shall exist at a time for the others to exist at that very time. E.g. the identity of the members of the band *qua* members of the band depends on the singer being on the band.
- (time) N-tets with *atemporal* object-dependence are those in which the identity of each member is defined by its modal relations with the other members in an atemporal sense. E.g. A might essentially be B’s lover given how they formed each other, even if B is currently dead.
- (replaceability) *Generic* x-tets are those that allow for the replacement of members. E.g. biological species and certain collective entities.
- (replaceability) *Specific* x-tets are those that require the exact same members to be members of the n-tet. E.g. certain romantic relationships.
- (number) *Open* n-tets (or x-tets) are those that have no pre-determined n that is the number of members of the –tet; x-tets can add or loose members. E.g. a

- family typically can add or loose members.
- (number) *Closed* n-tets are those that don't allow for the addition of a new member. E.g. a musical duet.

There are different combinations of n-tets, combining the parameters of generic/specific, open/closed, and also the temporal dimension. There are many examples of cases of n-tets that seem to fit the author's proposal. In biology, taxon membership determined by lineage can be considered a case of dependence-at-a-distance; species could be understood as generic, open x-tets. Applied to romantic love, unions of lovers can be seen as n-tets, in which it is part of one's nature to be each other lover. One of the virtues of Hiller's proposal is that it allows for different sorts of romantic relationships.

14. Zangwill, N. 2013. 'Love: Gloriously Amoral and Arational', in *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 16, pp. 298-314.

Keywords: love; reasons; rationality; causes; emotion; morality, romantic theory, value view.

Description: Which are the criteria of adequacy that should apply to any theory of love? Zangwill argues that the value of love (real and apparent to us) should constraint theories of love.

If love had moral and evaluative content, then love itself wouldn't be valuable. Evaluative views, such as Velleman's or Kolodny's, propose that love is a sort of valuing the other person and/or the relationship we have with her. These views would be subject to the "trading up" objection, according to which it would be acceptable to change my lover for a similar person to which I hold a similar relation. Further, if love had evaluative content, then it would essentially involve the properties of the person, relational and/or non-relational. Both considerations undermine the value we take love to have. On another line, it also seems implausible. Evaluative attitudes are held towards propositional objects (I am angry that P) even though they are directed to a person. Love cannot be held towards a propositional object, so love isn't a kind of evaluation. Love doesn't have moral or evaluative content – it is amoral.

Love doesn't have rationality conditions either. If there were reasons for love, then love would be subject to rational requirements and constraints. Maybe we could even rationally decide to love somebody because of how she is. Maybe it would be rationally better to trade up one's partner for somebody else. Furthermore, if love involved rational reasons it wouldn't be a moral flaw, but a rational flaw to not love one's kids or to stop loving one's partner. All of these consequences seem absurd. Thus, love doesn't have rationality conditions: it is arational.

Instead, Zangwill proposes the "romantic theory" of love, according to which love is anchored in contingent causes. These can be of two sorts: on the one hand, history and habit; on the other, attraction when we "fall in love". This is how arranged marriages

could be defended if they should be. Love is just a fact. Even if love has only causes and lacks reasons, this doesn't imply that we cannot reason (deliberate) about love.

15. Oord, T. 2010. *Defining Love: A Philosophical, Scientific, and Theological Engagement*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

Keywords: Theology, God, Science, *Agape*, Intentional action view, Value, Constitutive relations, Deontology

Description: Aims to provide a definition of love that is scientifically, theologically and philosophically adequate; that is, a unifying definition. Oord's proposed definition is that to "love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic/empathetic response to others (including God), to promote overall well-being" (p. 29). To "act intentionally" requires both decision and deliberation, and these occur when one does love the object. Love is a matter of the will, and requires actions motivated by good intentions. We have freedom to love within certain limited options. In making love a matter of intentional action, Oord differs from much anglo-philosophical literature.

Next, love requires actual relations with others such that those involved are mutually influencing. Through the empathy/sympathy the lover feels with the beloved, the beloved is metaphysically constitutive of the lover. The reasoning here seems to be the following: one's experience is partially constituted by the one perceived; one is (at least partially) constituted by one's experiences. Thus, one is partially constituted by those one loves. Sympathetic feeling logically precedes the decision to love. Finally, love has a positive aim – "to promote overall well-being" – so it always has a positive value, even if the consequences turn out not to be good.

Oord rejects views on which love is fundamentally a desire of some sort, because some desires can be "inappropriate" or "unfitting" and have negative value. He also rejects union views of love because they accept as genuine cases of love those relationships with negative value. Instead, love is always positive: there could never be "bad love", only "no love".

Chapter 2 discusses the forms of love *eros*, *agape* and *philia*, and argues that *agape* is the form of love most commonly referred to, although it has a plurality of meanings. The middle chapters discuss love in psychology, social sciences and biology, and chapter 5 discusses love in theology and cosmology.

16. Gowans, C. 1996. 'Intimacy, Freedom, and Unique Value: A "Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of Persons', in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, pp. 75-89.

Keywords: Unique value, Irreplaceability of the beloved, Value views, Freedom, Intimate relationships

Description: The Uniqueness Thesis (hereafter UT) claims that each individual person has unique value. Support for UT typically comes from the phenomenology of intimate

relationships of love and friendship: if the beloved is irreplaceable or incomparable, then she must have unique value. The beloved seems irreplaceable, as we experience an un-patchable loss when she dies. Beloveds seem incomparable: we can't choose which one of our friends or children is more valuable. We wish to be treated by our intimates as the individual persons who we are, thus we think we have unique value. Since everybody is somebody's intimate, then we all have unique value.

However, these arguments can be seen as mere expressions of sentimentality. There's a second argument against UT: either (a) persons are valued for their qualities, or (b) persons are valued as bare persons. If (a), then intimates are valued because of their qualities. It is at least possible *in principle* that two persons have the same qualities. Then it is possible in principle that two persons have the same value. Thus, UT is false. If (b), then any person is as valuable as any other; thus UT is false. Gowans argues that there are many responses to this dilemma, but neither of them is satisfactory.

A third problem with UT is that it seems to us that dogs, animals, forests and so on have unique value, however we don't value them as we do human beings. So unique value is insufficient to explain the value we give to objects. A fourth problem is that UT seems incompatible with the idea that persons are equally valuable and deserve to be treated as moral equals.

Gowans proposal is to abandon UT and adopt instead an alternative view inspired by Kant: human dignity is linked to the idea that persons are free. The Freedom Thesis (hereafter FT) states that the phenomena of intimacy is explained by "our understanding of ourselves as able to freely choose our way of life and character". Free choice is attributed to whole persons, hence we love the whole person. Irreplaceability is felt because one has many shared experiences with one's intimate; experiences are important when understood within a life of free choice; nobody else is partially defined by such experiences; thus the person's loss is irreplaceable. The paper ends responding to some objections to FT.