Summary
A. Vagueness is not definable in terms of behaviour (Section 4).
B. Variations in the application of a term T is neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for T to be vague. Nor are such variations an indication — a loose criterion — for vagueness (Section 3).
C. That Black's and Hempel's theories contain negations of A and B as central theses. They are therefore irredeemably false.
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Rolf, B. Black and Hempel on vagueness. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11, 332–346 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800914
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800914