Abstract
We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action.
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Notes
Wegner speaks here of conscious will, but it is clear from his earlier discussion that he equates conscious will with conscious intention. He claims, for example, “the conscious intention is… the mind’s ‘call’ for the action it will do, and so the intention seems to be the [mental state] most immediately involved in the causation of the action” (Wegner 2002: 20).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection.
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Romdenh-Romluc, K. Time for consciousness: intention and introspection. Phenom Cogn Sci 10, 369–376 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9201-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9201-7