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Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms

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Abstract

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between (1) Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, (2) Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for (3) the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem.

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Notes

  1. Given that all direct causes are contributing causes, I write the conclusion in terms of the latter.

  2. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Synthese for pushing me to clarify this section.

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Carl Craver, John Heil, Frederick Eberhardt, Lena Kästner, Lauren Olin, Isaac Wiegman, Mark Povich, and two anonymous reviewers for Synthese for comments on previous drafts. I also received helpful comments when this paper was presented at the 2012 Models and Mechanisms Conference, Tilburg University; and the 2013 St. Louis Area Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, University of Missouri in St.Louis.

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  1. Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO, 63130, USA

    Felipe Romero

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Correspondence to Felipe Romero.

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Romero, F. Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms. Synthese 192, 3731–3755 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0718-0

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