Abstract Objects, Ideal Forms, and Works of Art

Abstract Objects, Ideal Forms, and Works of Art

✦

An Epistemic and Aesthetic Analysis

Robert Rose-Coutré

Abstract Objects, Ideal Forms, and Works of Art
An Epistemic and Aesthetic Analysis

Contents

Introduction

The purpose of this book is to isolate a workable sense of terms such as "real," "actual," "objective," "subjective," and "abstract object"—then to develop a method determining the status of works of art, which can reliably resolve the following quandary: When do two versions of a work of art become two separate works of art? The method is developed using clearly laid out terminology and principles. Instead of limiting the method to general principles, the method and a specific "two-works argument" is illustrated using an in-depth study of a case in point: two versions of a novella by Henry James.

The book begins with an account of a chance meeting of Socrates, Plato, Wittgenstein, and Jung. The conversations center on a term I have coined: what I call the "Platonic Inductive Fallacy." This establishes the problem of chapter 1: the existence of abstract objects. The final section of chapter 1 provides a solution to the problem using Stalnaker's "real-but-not-actual" thesis regarding abstract objects. That is, abstract objects are real, but not actual, they are part of conscious experience, they all share the same metaphysical and ontological status; however, they do not all share the same epistemological status. Adopting Stalnaker's solution to the status of abstract objects provides a premise and direction for later arguments about interpreting works of art.

Chapter 2 uses the Tansellean model to demonstrate how the problem of abstract objects wears heavily on the concept of a Work of Art. The meaning experienced through art according to Tanselle is challenged. This book then analyzes the impact of the status of abstract objects on the status of the Idea of a Work of Art; for example, an abstract object's status determines the way art can have meaning.

With aesthetic "meaning" thus in question, chapter 3 provides a sound approach to deriving meaning in encounters with Works of Art. Levels of intimacy and intensity of experience determine the epistemological status of an aesthetic object, or Work of Art. Then, by way of clarification and historical context, the text establishes that aestheticists, phenomenologists, and Henry James, subscribed to generally this same way of deriving meaning.

Chapter 4 begins the analysis of James's linguistic construction of the character Daisy Miller, using the abstract-object-construction method to demonstrate

differences in the two Daisy Millers. Finally, chapter 5 presents a thorough explanation of the differences in the two Daisy Miller texts, to support the two-separate-works argument. This demonstration relies partly on the abstract-object-construction ideas that preceded, in order to clarify the significance of the differences: the epistemologically defined abstract objects, and the pervasive conflicts between the two texts, demonstrate that the two texts *must* represent two separate works of art. To ensure the thoroughness of this study, I consulted original texts at the British Library, and collated the 1878 "Daisy Miller: a Study" against the 1909 *Daisy Miller*, and conducted a word-by-word comparison between the two works.

A "Final Comments" section at the end summarizes the book's accomplishments and outlines the book's argument in a bulleted list.

1

Abstract Objects

How and why did Plato invent the Theory of Forms? Why does anyone attempt to "point to" generalized, abstract objects that cannot be pointed to?

The "How" part of the question, vis à vis Plato, leads to a linguistic process:

1. Initial perception of an actual object

2. Naming the object

3. Naming the generalization of attributes of objects

4. "Perception" of that generalization as being itself an "object"

5. Naming of that generalized "object," i.e. "Form"

The numbered items above will be referenced in the text later in this chapter, where they are explicated, indicated by numbers in parentheses which correspond, i.e., (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

A LANGUAGE GAME SHOWING PLATO'S INDUCTIVE FALLACY CONCERNING ABSTRACT OBJECTS

Explication of this linguistic process reveals the manner in which Plato's inductive fallacy leads to his Theory of Forms. For purposes of expedience, a single attribute (beauty) is used for this brief analysis. Plato commits an inductive fallacy regarding the existence of a Form for that attribute (the Form of the Beautiful). The same analysis could be applied to all attributes and objects to which Plato or anyone else ascribes a Form.

The "Why" question leads to a brief psychological inquiry, treating the Theory of Forms as myth, similar in structure to Greek Mythology. The two have a similar psychological derivation which comes to light in an analysis of Plato's invention of, and experience with, the Forms. First, the linguistic analysis will answer "how," then a brief psychological analysis will provide an explanation "why."

A Conversation with Socrates, Plato, Wittgenstein, and Jung

Socrates sees a flower. He considers its beauty, and how it is heightened by the beauty of the early morning, and the dew on the petals. He considers the beauty of the chance of circumstances that made him happen upon this flower on such a beautiful morning. The beauty of the morning diversifies in the cool morning breeze.

Later in the day Socrates converses with Plato. Socrates points out the beauty he finds in conversation. He says conversation is even more beautiful than his morning's experience, and proceeds to give Plato an account of that experience so that Plato will understand what he is saying. This leads Plato to inquire,

"If we had been in conversation this morning, on that same path, would all of the beauty you beheld have been redoubled by the inclusion of our conversation, or would all of that beauty you just described to me have been made paltry and ugly by comparison with the beauty of our conversation?"

Socrates responds,

"Your theory from relativity should not be invoked here. We are talking about different kinds of beauty, and therefore they cannot be compared. One beauty would not make the lesser beauty ugly. The pleasure of experiencing *different kinds of beauty at once* would have increased the level of experience."

Plato pursues this train of thought,

"It seems then that combining all these different kinds of beauty in an experience stimulates one to reflect upon beauty itself, a predicate that evokes reflection on the higher, more general Form. That is, the accumulation of the many manifestations of beauty, actual objects participating with beauty in different ways, begins to approximate something ultimate, the Ideal Form of the Beautiful. In fact, it is The Beautiful we unknowingly refer to when we talk about each manifestation of beauty in our experience."

Socrates left Plato in this reverie.

Plato, deep in thought, did not notice that a very young man had been passing by, and had stopped to listen in on the conversation. The man wore a long black coat and rubbed his chin in a troubled manner. Ludwig Wittgenstein approached Plato and introduced himself, and made the following comments. [Though no direct references are taken, this linguistic-analytic method derives from the method systematized in Wittgenstein's *Notebooks: 1914–1916*. However, the present application of this method to unpacking the linguistic process of constructing ideal objects and the use of induction in asserting objective reality, and showing the fallacy of that particular kind of induction, are my inventions.]

"I couldn't help overhearing your conversation. Now how can we refer to that which we do not really know? I mean, if I refer to beauty in a flower, I think I really mean the beauty only as it appears to me in my perception of that flower at that time. Yet you seem to say that unknowingly I refer to a Form, the Beautiful, from which this flower gets its beauty. But I know nothing of this Form, and yet somehow I refer to the Form instead of this beautiful flower. Perhaps if I can delineate the steps between your perception of an object and your supposition of the Theory of Forms, and what those steps entail, I will be able to point out where you have made a mistake. I believe we will find an inductive fallacy."

"The steps may be seen as forming a circle, beginning at the top of the circle with the actual object and ending with the abstract-object-ideal-Form: superseding the original actual object back at the top of the circle.

(1) "Firstly, we perceive the actual-object flower from our perception of qualities. These qualities are only those accessible to our senses. Part of our shared game in language is called 'naming.' When many people point to the same object and say the word 'flower,' they share a language game for flowers. When many people point to the same object and say it is beautiful, they share a language game for beauty.

"We begin with our actual-object-perception.

(2) "We take a kind of attribute that in some way strikes us as attractive, or appeals to our senses in a certain way, and we name that attribute 'beauty.' After a series of object-perceptions, and attendant sensations of beauty (like those in Socrates' morning experience), we build a variety, or 'repertoire,' of diverse characteristics of beauty. We now have double groupings of language games working together: e.g., 'flower' hooks into the flower-like object-perception; 'beautiful' hooks into an attribute that appeals to our senses in a certain way and is part-and-parcel of the flower-perception. I will call this an attribute-perception. Many people may share the new compound language game 'beautiful flower.'

"Conditions of a 'true' language game are as follows. Naming the 'beautiful flower' is like asserting a proposition: 'the object-perception I call flower and the attribute-perception I call beautiful occur in the world, and further, in the thing I'm pointing to.' Thus, naming the 'beautiful flower' involves applying a (compound) language game which entails the above (complex) proposition. The language game is true if the name hooks into the real world (the described state of affairs corresponds to the state of affairs in the actual world). In other words, the language game is true if the proposition it entails is true. So, after experiences with many object-perceptions with attendant attribute-perceptions (varieties of 'beautiful'), we accumulate the above-mentioned repertoire of instantiations of beauty. We accumulate this repertoire from a series of true complex propositions, or a series of compound language games where we apply the name of the attribute 'beautiful' to a variety of object-perceptions. As a result, Socrates accumulated those noncomparable manifestations of beauty this morning.

(3) "Each one involved a new language game and became part of his repertoire of 'beautiful.'

"What I mean by each one involves a *new* language game is as follows: the things beautiful are beautiful in this way and in that way, each attribute-perception 'beautiful' being different, for which each language game hooks into the world in a different way (beautiful glimmer from the dew, beautiful color, beautiful shape, and so on). Each experience of a new manifestation of beauty develops a new language game and contributes to Socrates' repertoire of 'true meanings' of beauty (remembering the above-stated conditions of 'true').

"Now that the repertoire of language games is built, one may be far from any flowers and utter the compound name 'beautiful flower'. The utterance of the name in the absence of the object/attribute-perception referred to, conjures up an object of reflection or mental image of what the name refers to (a mental image of the referent). To review, perception first triggers development of a language game in the naming process, and, in turn, later uttering the name triggers the language game which evokes the mental image of the thing named.

"This latter process, this utterance/language game/mental image process, occurs countless times every day. Also, in the case of Socrates reflecting on the varied manifestations of beauty of his morning's experience, each mental image will carry 'true meaning.' The pattern, by countless repetition, becomes entrenched in the mind, almost an automatic assumption, that these mental images of things beautiful carry 'true meaning,' because they are evoked by names that trigger language games that are true (which hook into the actual world of object- and attribute-perceptions).

(4) "Through this chain, each mental image is a true picture of a part of the world. Through the ongoing repetition of occurrences of this chain, a pattern is established that such mental images are generally true, over and over again. From this pattern, induction leads us to believe that our mental images will always be true, just as induction leads us to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, is true.

(5) "Now, Plato, you have your repertoire of 'beauty' language games just as Socrates has his. The amalgam of 'beauty' language games taken together in contemplation causes a sort of set intersection. You extract and keep only the one general element they all have in common—'appealing to the senses in a certain way'—you project the result of that set intersection, create an abstraction, and name it 'The Beautiful.' By definition now, 'The Beautiful' can never not appeal to the senses in that certain way. Now you are working with an abstract amalgam in your mind of all things beautiful. So instead of starting with the object/attribute-perception in the world, you now start with your amalgamated mental image (your created abstraction). The new generalized name "Beauty" (that refers to a Form) now supersedes the original initial-perception-name "beauty" (that referred to the first flower-experience).

"Now you are not naming anything in the actual world (e.g., beautiful flower), instead, you are naming something entirely in your mind (i.e., beauty). It is real in your mind, but you treat it as you would treat an object/attribute-perception from the actual world. You name it ('The Beautiful') and develop a language game which triggers a mental image. Now when you utter 'The Beautiful,' the language game triggers a mental image of an amalgamated abstraction. You trigger a language game that hooks back into only your created abstraction in your mind, not in the actual world. Your generalized amalgamation does not hook into any object/attribute-perception in the actual world. But by induction you reflexively take for granted that the language game will act the same for your created abstraction, that it will always be true.

The Platonic Inductive Fallacy: Assumption of Truth Derives from the Force of Induction in Using the Language Game

"Because the language game functions in a familiar way, you assume it is a true language game. You assume the compound name (Form of the Beautiful) represents a true complex proposition (an object 'Form' exists and furthermore, that

object possesses ultimate Beauty which is beyond the beauty that any single object in the world can possibly possess). You have named 'The Beautiful,' so by induction you think your mental image must refer to something that must actually exist.

"The former language game (*qua* object/attribute-perception) hooks into the world—the latter language game (*qua* created abstraction) does not: it does not, because you claim the status of objectified actuality for your Realm of Forms, not merely a reality of mind or conceptualization. The latter language game, false though it is, may be a powerful language game because it represents the link between, and the rarefied characteristic of, all the 'beauty' language games in your repertoire. It is the essential something that appeals to our senses in a certain way (by definition making it ultimately appealing), waiting for an object-perception to participate in it and take on the participatory role of attribute-perception.

"You have not only a mental image, but a powerful mental image, and by induction as stated above, you conclude that this mental image (the Beautiful) is true, by which you conclude that 'the Beautiful' is true.

"This might be called the 'Platonic Inductive Fallacy of the Theory of Forms' an name for the process invented by the author of this book.

"Thus you conclude that your mental image's name 'the Beautiful' must entail a true language game, which we have seen is not the case. The language game fails because one can't find an object/attribute-perception in the world that the name 'the Beautiful' hooks into. One only finds instantiated particular combinations of types of beauty. That the language game fails, shows that 'the Beautiful' does not represent what is the case in the actual world.

"Of course, the Beautiful must reside somewhere, epistemologically speaking, or we couldn't utter the name, for we can only name that which we can experience in some manner. The Beautiful is pure concept. It is a small step from the subjective concept of the Form to an inductive conclusion of an *actual* Form of the Beautiful. From there, because we do not see The Beautiful in the actual world of our normal acquaintance, it is another small step to positing a 'realm' that accommodates such rarefied Forms. Such a realm would accommodate not just the Beautiful, but the Forms of all significant object- and attribute-perceptions.

"I believe you have posited such a realm, and call it, 'The Realm of Forms.' Because this Realm is rarefied, unchanging, and pure, you ascribe higher value to it. Finding the Unchanging, or the Unchangeable, has long been an intellectual and emotional holy grail. Investing a superior objective actuality into a Realm of Forms seems to be the necessary outcome of the one inductive leap to the objec-

tive, actual existence of the Form of the Beautiful. You have a 'more real' place with 'more real' things which affords the luxury (albeit a fallacy) of 'more real' language games. The language game for The Beautiful hooks into a 'more real' world, which we can't see. So you might say that the language game is somehow 'more true,' so true we cannot even experience it, because the place hooked into is too refined for our human senses. Unfortunately these hooks must remain your hypothesis, hooking only in the mind, where the idea is hooked.

"Nevertheless, this is a powerful illusion indeed. The theory is constructed, the Theory of Forms is in place, and exists in a place. A question remains: Why did the fantastical, myth-like nature of the final product not alert you to the problems in your reasoning immediately?"

Carl Jung Explains the Compelling Nature of the Abstract Structure in the Psyche's Real Experience

By this time a crowd had gathered around the two men. A man by the name of Carl Jung stepped forward from the crowd in response to Wittgenstein's last question. The ensuing conversation began with Mr. Jung.

"It may be that there is something more powerful yet at work behind the Theory of Forms. Deep in the unconscious, our myth-generating Archetypes contain information not available to conscious or rational thought. Primordial images were passed to us from primitive man, who lived in a preconscious state. These are myth-forming structural elements. The psyche wields such power that primordial images become reality, equal to or greater than the actual world. They demand expression with metaphors borrowed from the actual world. It might be said that myths are not invented, but experienced. They are thrust upon the conscious mind when the psyche reveals bits and pieces of an Archetype through metaphors provided by the conscious mind. The Realm of the Forms might have emerged from archetypal origins in Plato's personal unconscious in much the same way that Greek Mythology emerged from Archetypes in the collective unconscious of Greek society (noting that types of attributes are ascribed to Greek gods). Ancient Greek culture is a setting amenable to the emergence of a Realm of Forms, an abstracted version of Mount Olympus. The mythical structure is similar as can be seen in the myth-structure of perfected beings/attributes: beauty perfected in Aphrodite is not far from the abstracted version in the Form of at least one type of Beautiful. Greek Mythology seems a likely influence in the structure of and experience with the Theory of Forms ('experience' as natural revelation from the Archetypal structure in Plato's personal unconscious).

"Now consider the language game for the Beautiful—it hooks into a reality at least as important as the actual world. Does this not make it 'true' given your conditions?

Wittgenstein was again rubbing his chin as he responded,

"No. The world to which language games must correspond is the actual world of object/attribute-perceptions. You may have hit upon an 'important reality.' Your 'important reality' is hypothetical and subjective in a way that the actual world of object/attribute-perceptions is not. A language game cannot be considered true when it hooks into a reality that is only psychological and therefore not directly demonstrable. At least, it seems problematic. But even if it could be considered so, the reality you suggest is not the reality Plato claims for his Realm of Forms. Plato asserts an objective actual realm outside of and independent of yours and my psyches.

"Your primordial reality is as insubstantial as Plato's Realm of Forms in the following manner: We only see, hear, or know object/attribute-perceptions. Similarly, the primordial reality, as well as the Realm of Forms, relies on inference from metaphors presented. The metaphors include actual-world object-perceptions as ingredients, which attributes are rearranged to generate the metaphor. We cannot get beyond the actual world of object-perception, because by definition what is beyond it is what we cannot perceive. In such areas we can only speculate. Mental objects are indeed experienced and therefore real; however, they are not actual, that is, not actual-world object/attribute perceptions.

"If language games hook into nothing (the result of talking about that which we cannot perceive), then we are talking nonsense. We talk about that which can have no objective meaning in our language. In this sense, the Theory of Forms and the Realm of the Forms have no coherence in the actual world. That is, their names hook into only mental images, images that have no corresponding actual referent. Meaning was ascribed to them as a result of the 'Platonic Inductive Fallacy of the Theory of Forms,' as the author of this paper would say.

Wittgenstein turned again to Plato,

"Mr. Jung's comments helped clarify the totality of your predicament. As long as you claim an objectively actual status for the Realm of the Forms, you carry the mental image of the Form of the Beautiful unavoidably into your Inductive Fallacy. Now, if you say that your Theory of Forms is true, and that it is true that a Form may be an abstract amalgam of your 'beauty' language game repertoire compiled by your psyche, generated by your primordial imagination, existing only in your mind, then I concede that your Theory of Forms can be true. However, I have not heard you say that. Therefore, as shown by your Inductive Fal-

lacy, and because of the failure of your language game for the Beautiful, the Theory of Forms must be false."

Plato seemed a little troubled. But he looked upon a nearby rose and smiled, "Nevertheless, the flower has beauty."

REAL VS. ACTUAL: A CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS VS. THE METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF ABSTRACT OBJECTS

First of all, of course, there is no such thing as perfect objectivity or perfect subjectivity.

Comments on "Objective" and "Subjective" Reality

There is no perfect objectivity, because there is no way to obtain any type of knowledge or any detail of knowledge without using the mind, and the mind does not function without the mind's peculiar faculties, filters, and ways of producing thoughts and organizing data—including the faculty of imagination that people employ to try to envisage knowledge without these filters and organizations. An attempted picture of such perfectly objective knowledge would still be framed in the patterns available to the human faculty of imagination.

There is no perfect subjectivity, because as soon as one experiences in common any one of the five senses, or shares an awareness of time, or acknowledges the existence of another human being, or learns anything whatsoever from any other person, or has a single piece of any idea in common with any other person, one ceases to be perfectly subjective.

A scale of degrees lies between perfect objectivity and perfect subjectivity in which all knowledge falls more or less closer to one end or the other.

It may seem that perfect objectivity and perfect subjectivity (and a precise centerpoint between the two) are perhaps *logically* possible conditions of knowledge. But such logical, hypothetical conditions are themselves abstract objects of thought (constructs) that do not refer to anything in the actual world. The moniker "perfect objectivity" refers to an object of mind, not to what it purports to refer to, such as a fact independent of human thought or feeling. "The 'objective' world of science is but an *interpretation* of the world of our immediate experience" (Madison 44).

A motivation underlying scientism, for example, is to achieve a perfectly objective description of the world. P. F. Strawson refers to this position as naturalism (*Skepticism and Naturalism*). This, of course, is a valid and important undertaking. The mistake (made by reductive naturalists) is to categorize this effort's results as "more real" or more valid than everyday descriptions of the world. The fact is that scientific results are more useful in some areas, and everyday results are more useful in other areas.

In scientism, the reductive naturalist's dismissal of everyday descriptions is idle for two reasons: 1. The reason Strawson gives, that our everyday descriptions of the real world are inevitable, they serve important purposes, that is, we cannot live without them; and, 2. The reductive naturalist's scientific descriptions, as well as the layperson's everyday descriptions, are infused with—and only exist because of—the mind's peculiar faculties, filters, and ways of producing thoughts and organizing data. Since our society happens to value objectivity, scientific descriptions are valued more because they are *more objective* than everyday descriptions. That *value* is a cultural value, not a metaphysical value. And while scientific descriptions are usually more objective, they also are infused with some measure of subjectivity. As Strawson points out, a hard-line scientific view is to dismiss everyday descriptions as illusory. But that condemnation returns to haunt scientism, which is itself only more or less objective, and is itself less important in some areas than everyday descriptions (e.g., avoiding an accident in a vehicle, one does not have time for a scientific analysis of the physical scenario).

Defining an "Abstract Object"

This brings us back to the issue of the abstract object in the following sense: What kind of view is best for accurately describing the nature of an "abstract object"? Here the naturalist view has little to offer, for when we use the term "abstract object" we are not talking about the mind's physicalistic properties, we are talking about an experience of consciousness that does not directly hook into the actual world. But everyday descriptions are fickle on this topic, they tend to ascribe vague notions of "reality" to some abstract objects (e.g., "god," just as Plato ascribed reality to the Form of the Good), and other vague notions of artificiality to others (e.g., 'unicorn'). What we need is something more analytical.

What we must analyze is not a naturalist description of physical properties. Rather, we must borrow from the everyday description of "abstract object" as conscious experience and extend that type of description. This is an undertaking fraught with peril because we are beginning with an everyday sort of description,

in an attempt to achieve a *more objective* result. Fortunately, this is not a first attempt—extending and analyzing everyday descriptions is the standard method of inquiry in the philosophies of language and mind, and, for that matter, in most of philosophy.

Is an abstract object real? Speaking of *where* such objects (Platonic Forms, gods, possible worlds, numbers, ideas) might exist has inspired the creation of a variety of metaphysical "places," while others have said they exist only in the mind, while still others (e.g., Gilbert Ryle) say they simply do not exist anywhere. "'Where do the things and happenings exist which people imagine existing?' is to try to answer a spurious question. They do not exist anywhere" (Ryle 116). Gilbert Ryle suggests that "toying with ideas" is useful, and in fact that it is a more sophisticated exercise than actually *believing in* the ideas' existence; however, that the "sentences in which the propositions entertained are expressed…are being mock-used" and that such sentences always appear in quote marks (137). Derogatory terms such as 'Platonic Realism' and 'Fido-Fido principle' referred to the position more or less that abstract objects exist. (A good summary of this controversy is found in Carnap, 68–85.)

A Solution from Robert Stalnaker's 'Real' vs. 'Actual' Argument

The vague notions and precarious definitions of "exist" and "real" are a formidable obstacle. Robert Stalnaker provides a solution in his distinction between "real" and "actual." Stalnaker is analyzing the metaphysical status of abstract objects we call "possible worlds"; but we will extend his distinction to abstract objects in general. This is not really a stretch, in fact, it fits in neatly with Stalnaker's argument, since possible worlds themselves are abstract objects, and as he points out, the propositions associated with possible worlds are abstract objects (460).

Two key elements in Stalnaker's "moderate realism" are the distinction between "real" and "actual," and the indexical analysis of "actual." For the present description of abstract objects, we are concerned with the real-actual distinction, but do not need the subsequent step of an indexical analysis of 'actual' (that the metaphysical and ontological status of complex abstract objects such as possible worlds is world-relative).

The effect of this moderate realism is as follows: The abstract object is real, but not actual. Unicorns are real, but not actual. God is real, but not actual. Stalnaker aligns "real" with "exist" (456, 459). This leads to the conclusion that "the

abstract object 'god' exists." In everyday language this becomes abbreviated into the phrase "God exists." Just as "properties can exist uninstantiated" (457), particulars (objects) that exist and are real may be uninstantiated; *while particulars that are actual must be instantiated.*

As noted earlier, this is an analysis of the conscious experience, not of the naturalist's description of physical properties (for it may be said that the physical properties of the abstract object 'god' are both real and actual, inasmuch as there could be observable chemical properties in the brain that form a certain way that is associated with the subject having the concept of god—but then that would mean the abstract object 'god' only refers to those actual chemical properties, not an actual separate being). There are potential "speech acts and propositional attitudes" underlying abstract objects (460): those acts and attitudes exist, and the objects of propositional attitudes exist. Therefore, abstract objects exist (464). But we must exclude from our ontology any assertion of full-blooded objects analogous to the abstract object instantiated in the actual world (458–459).

The description helps us see what we are talking about when we say abstract objects are real, that they exist, but that they are not actual. Referring to points earlier in this paper, abstract objects are not actual because they have no instantiation in our present universe. Two abstract objects such as 'god' and 'unicorn' may have vastly different underlying propositional attitudes, and may have vastly different effects in society and the lives of individuals, but they are equally real, and equally nonactual.

A religious person may assert that the existence of god is an *a priori* truth (a very different propositional attitude than what underlies most people's concept of unicorns). Obviously this *a priori* assertion cannot be even more or less objectively justified, nor do most people attempt to objectively justify it. But what can be objectively justified is the existence of 'god' as an *a posteriori* necessary truth.

Here Saul Kripke helps us with his innovative realignment—where necessary truth once only seemed compatible with *a priori* notions: Kripke demonstrates the importance of recognizing necessary truth in conjunction with *a posteriori* notions. By recognizing 'after the fact' the underlying propositional attitudes of an abstract object—the amalgamated construction of 'god-attributes' and *then* the experiencing of 'god'—one obtains grounds for showing *a posteriori* necessary truth of god's real existence. Existence of the abstract object itself becomes a necessary truth. "God-attributes" and certain propositional attitudes exist and are real in conscious experience—then named "God," hence, necessary after the fact (*a posteriori*).

Maintaining Kripke's notion of *a posteriori* necessary truth; however, still falls short of allowing an *ontology* where abstract objects are *actual*. This moderate realism "treats [abstract objects] as more than a convenient myth or a notational shortcut, but less than [actual]" (Stalnaker 464). It should be noted, though, that abstract objects are the very ingredients that can be *used* in myths. (Conversely it should be noted that "to compare metaphysical theorizing with mythical story-telling is not to degrade the former" [Madison 125]. As discussed earlier in this paper, study of myth constitutes one of the most productive studies of human psychology and experiential reality.)

But where objects of myth and nonmyth converge can be a fuzzy set. An excellent example in current religious theory, of maintaining the reality of 'god,' while refraining from mythmaking, is the view of Bishop Shelby Spong who asks "What was the human need that caused us to create God in our own image in the first place?" (50) And, while maintaining a conscious experience with god, he concludes "There is no God external to life" (70). This may seem to defeat the point of religious belief; however, it serves well to accurately characterize the distinction between 'real' and 'actual': an analysis of abstract objects is an analysis of conscious experience rather than a Cartesian analysis of metaphysics, or an analysis of naturalism's physical properties. Myth is real, conscious experience is real, though their contents do not necessarily refer to things actual. There is no further need to elaborate any ontology or any metaphysics of abstract objects. As Stalnaker implies (463–464), this ontological status for abstract objects is not tentative, nor wanting more assertive statements about existence: abstract objects exist, they are real, but they are not actual. And as Myles Burnyeat says regarding Stalnaker's conclusions, "this is a perfectly satisfactory position at which to rest" (Stalnaker 450).

While abstract objects share the same *metaphysical* and *ontological* status (non-actual), that is not to say that the abstract object 'unicorn' is *the same as* the abstract object 'god.' I chose these two examples for the very reason that they seem so different, and indeed have very different functions in everyday use. What makes them different requires further analysis.

In the sense of meaning discussed by Strawson, there seems to be a very different "communication-intention" ("Meaning and Truth") when one talks about god, versus when one talks about unicorns—and this is not just because they are different objects, but because they are different *types* of abstract objects. The linguistic meaning involved in utterances of 'god' and 'unicorn' must be explained in terms of communication-intention *and* the all-important underlying propositional elements. A discussion of syntactic and semantic rules, and truth-condi-

tions, is not necessary here, and they are 'intentionally' omitted. What matters is to understand that the two abstract objects have very different types of meaning when uttered and to analyze this qualitative difference. We will find that 'god' comprises a very different and more powerful conjunction of properties than the conjunction of properties that make up 'unicorn.' (see more on "conjunction of properties" in Carnap, 244).

Epistemological Difference

The overarching purpose is to elucidate the nature of abstract objects. This has been accomplished to the extent of their metaphysical and ontological status. But this analysis cannot be complete until we see how these two abstract objects (god and unicorns) can seem to be very different types of objects, with very different types of meaning, with very different effects in conscious experience. Paradoxically, as noted, they share the same metaphysical and ontological status; however, they have a very different *epistemological* status. And this is the key difference.

We have very intimate understanding in our conscious experience of feelings and attributes such as love, honor, compassion, power, knowledge, creativity, and consciousness itself. These intimately known qualities are the very building blocks and propositional elements of our construct of the abstract object 'god.' We have no such intimate understanding in our conscious experience of the qualities that comprise the abstract object 'unicorn.' There is important differentiation between the propositions and the propositional attitudes. Communication-intentions in uttering 'god' invoke these intimately known qualities. The communication-intention in uttering 'unicorn' generally has no such relevance or psychological impact, because that construct contains no such intimately familiar building blocks.

The utterance "god" generally entails references to elements of a concept that is relevant to the speaker's conscious experience, and by a conventionally established meaning-system, more or less similarly relevant to the audience's conscious experience as well. This is not a theological assertion—atheists, agnostics, and people of faith alike recognize the communication-intention, whether or not they accept the everyday description of the "existence of god." Furthermore, as established earlier, we are no longer discussing an "actual" being; rather, we are now talking about the abstract object 'god' which exists solely by virtue of the associated underlying potential speech acts and propositional attitudes, irrespective of whether the person of faith accepts this level of moderate realism. The convention "believe in god" is not the same as having an intimate understanding with

the concept of god. One can "have a concept" and still "not believe." Conversely, a person of faith may indeed mean an *actual* being, but the truth-conditions at issue in the statement "God is actual" are not relevant to this chapter's discussion. You have to die to possibly learn the answer to that question. This discussion strictly differentiates the two epistemological types of abstract objects ('god' and 'unicorn').

By following the linguistic analysis set forth in chapter 1 of this paper, one can enumerate the attributes collectively amalgamated to form a concept of god, and enumerate the attributes amalgamated to form the concept of a unicorn, and trace the process of the two formulations. The former derive from human attributes and deep feelings, the latter do not. It is our intimate knowledge and familiarity with 'god'-attributes—and lack of such knowledge and familiarity with 'unicorn'-attributes—that make the two abstract objects obtain a different epistemological status.

Understanding common assumptions underlying the way *percepts* (perceptions of objects/qualities) connect to *sensibilia* (objects persisting independent of perception) and to *qualia* (universal qualities), helps clarify the radical difference between 'god' and "unicorn." 'Unicorn' comprises a re-juxtaposition of *external qualia* taken from various percepts from external sensibilia. 'God' comprises a re-juxtaposition of internal human attributes we might call analogous to *qualia*, or, "internal qualia." (See Ayer's "Construction" for a fuller discussion of percepts, sensibilia, and qualia.) As enumerated earlier, "internal qualia" in this case would include attributes such as love, honor, compassion, power, knowledge, creativity, and consciousness itself. Thus, 'god' emerges more or less organically from internal qualia, while 'unicorn' is a pastiche of external qualia.

The presumptive move taken from percept to sensibilia is a common move when one is talking about, say, a table (Ayer 321). We assume that the kitchen table is still there when we're not looking at it, and by the mind's natural tendency to induction, we assume that there are a lot of tables throughout human societies. Further, what follows is an amalgamation of attributes that make up the concept of "table." There is no such set of percepts (from the actual world) of unicorns or god from which to make such a presumptive move. There are only "external percepts" of non-unicorn attributes re-juxtaposed to "invent" unicorn. There are only "internal percepts" of human attributes re-juxtaposed to "invent" god, whether or not this is a conscious act of invention. And the god-attributes derive from actual human qualities, which combine to form the abstract object 'god.' The appropriate presumptive move in the latter case is to posit an abstract object 'god,' as discussed earlier, as a legitimately *real* entity. But a further *inap-*

propriate presumptive move is to posit an actual being, which the abstract object refers to: This would fall under the inductive fallacy described in chapter 1. "In this way the objects are severed from the actual percepts from which they have been abstracted and are even regarded as being causally responsible for them" (Ayer, "Construction" 340). Here, Ayer refers to the fallacy of using attributes to construct an abstract object, then afterwards asserting that the abstract object caused the attributes. All metaphysical and ontological theories ascribing an analogous *actual objective existence* to abstract objects (and there are many) commit this same inductive fallacy. This paper affirms Stalnaker's solution, showing that an abstract object is real, it exists, but is not actual.

As a final note to this section, I would like to emphasize that this analysis has no theological import. Given what the human mind can know, there can be no true proposition positing an actual god; however, that fact has no bearing on whether there is an actual god, that might correlate to a "real god" that exists in our conscious experience: just that such an *actual* god cannot be objectively asserted *in a true proposition* today. I leave it to theologians to argue (and people of faith to believe) whether metaphysically there is an *actual* god (qua Kantian neumenon) that lives independently of human minds, beyond the *real* god that exists only in real conscious experience. The idea of faith exists because an objective proof for or against the existence of such an *actual* god is impossible.

CONCLUSION

Abstract objects are constructed using building blocks taken from conscious experiences, and themselves become part of conscious experience. Sometimes they refer to actual objects (e.g., table). Sometimes they do not refer to actual objects (e.g., god and unicorns). There is a seemingly ineluctable tendency to posit actual existence to certain kinds of abstract objects, to posit an actual referent (e.g., god, or Plato's assertion of Forms). This tendency occurs most vividly, apparently for psychological reasons, when the abstract object is constructed from inner human qualities.

Ontologically, abstract objects are real but not actual. All abstract objects share the same metaphysical and ontological status, though they do not all share the same epistemological status. The abstract object 'god' features a special epistemological aspect in the sense that 'god' includes qualities intimately known and felt in conscious experience, and additionally perhaps qualities from subconscious or unconscious origins.

For whatever reasons, certain abstract objects are harder to "give up" than others. They need not be "given up," but rather, in the interest of pursuing an accurate picture, recognized for what they are. Abstract objects have such an impact on individuals and societies psychologically and behaviorally, there must be something real about them. Now we have a method for postulating their reality and existence. Perhaps more important, we can see that what distinguishes *types* of abstract objects—wherein we assign *value* to abstract objects; as well as explaining how we think and feel about certain abstract objects—is *not* related to their metaphysical or ontological status, but rather to their epistemological status.

2

Formation of the Concept of the Work of Art as an Abstract Object

INTRODUCTION

Elements such as beauty, subtlety, coherence, and irony mingle in the reader's sensibilities, which bring one to call a piece of literature a "work of art." These elements begin as qualities experienced in reading. Then they are rarefied intellectually into some coherent whole that obtains of a peculiar attitude, which can be called an "aesthetic attitude" or "the attitude of seeing something as a work of art" (Wollheim 137). These are included in the propositional attitudes underlying the object specifically *as* a work of art.

When we speak of the all-encompassing abstract object that is the concept of a "work of art"; such elements as irony no longer refer to a quality in a given paragraph of a text, but rather a concept of effective irony. All of the elements that make up a work of art, when rarefied intellectually, likewise exist in a generalized, conceptual form. In this rarefied state, the work of art is an ideal form. A problem that must be dealt with in order to talk coherently about works of art is exactly what such an ideal form is made of. Is it an artifice merely contrived as a critical device? Or, is the idealized work of art part of a powerful reality of its own kind, able to inspire believable, passionate feeling? The "reality of its own kind" needs much clarification. At the outset, the epistemological status of this idealized form demands some investigation. The process and result will be similar to the analysis of Plato's Ideal Form. But the ultimate purpose in this case is to establish a ground for distinguishing when revision changes a work of art so much that a separate and distinct work of art is created. The final chapter will take on the application of this work-of-art theory—using Henry James's "Daisy Miller: a

Study" and *Daisy Miller.* ("Daisy Miller: a Study" will be referred to as Daisy-1. *Daisy Miller* will be referred to as Daisy-2.)

LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF TANSELLE'S IDEAL WORK OF ART

To get at what constitutes enough revision in a work to qualify it for the status of a separate work of art, a thorough understanding of what a work of art is made of must be developed. Only then can meaningful assertions or distinctions be made. It will be illustrated that the idea of a work of art is largely subjective. Concordantly, there are limits to how objective any such assertions or distinctions can be. Those limits need to be clarified.

In order to say that a revision constitutes a separate work of art, and to say that a particular character in a novella is of a wholly different type in the revision (which will be argued later), an understanding of degrees of objectivity and subjectivity must be laid out. An understanding must be reached of what "objective" and "subjective" have to do with the idea of a work of art.

As a center point for clarifying what is meant by "work of art," the textual and literary critic G. Thomas Tanselle will be referred to in helping gain the perspective needed to understand the ultimate assertions of this paper in their proper light.

For present purposes, Tanselle serves as foil. It is in the objectivity of the concept of the work of art where the main contrast lies between Tanselle's view and the view taken in this book. The position taken in this book is that the work of art is a concept more subjective than that described by Tanselle. But in that very contrast lies the usefulness in invoking a Tansellean model. The importance of rejecting strict objective *actuality* in the idea of a work of art will be clarified.

Tanselle's view of a work of art will be the model in the present linguistic analysis of how objects are named, concepts are formed, and ideals are created (ideal abstract objects such as works of art). This same linguistic process will tie into Henry James's creation of the revised Daisy Miller by analyzing the idealization process behind the creation of Daisy-2.

The Tansellean Work of Art is Similar to the Platonic Form, but Different

A work of art for Tanselle is an impalpable, unknowable perfect ideal of which the texts we encounter in actual documents are like Platonic shadows, inexact reproductions. The *actual* is denigrated, the *ideal* is elevated. The work itself is an otherworldly Form. "Those texts, being reports of works, must always be suspect; and, no matter how many of them we have, we never have enough information to enable us to know with certainty what the works consist of" (Tanselle 69). The text is an "imaginative construction based on [the work]" (Tanselle 68). The work of art is unchanging, it resides in a permanent, impenetrable location, where only the "real work" can reside, "hovering somehow behind the physical text" (Tanselle 14, 15).

How in Tanselle's mind does the ideal Form of a work of art emerge? In this case, attributes such as 'subtlety,' 'irony' and 'beauty' are applied to the perceived object (document of a text, and thereby to the text). Showing the way the attribute is applied to the text linguistically will help show the process by which Tanselle comes to create the idea of an unknowable form (and then "encounter" that idea-form, instead of encountering what I will claim in the following chapter is the real work of art) which fully obtains of the perfection of that combination of attributes that constitute a work of art. Tanselle has shadowy "encounters" with his abstracted perfect Form—only in wistful incompleteness because of his self-imposed constraint of never being able to fully encounter the unchanging ideal Form that he calls the real work of art. Then the same process may be applied to each individual attribute (ironic, subtle, beautiful, coherent, polished, clever, etc.) each of which becomes rarefied and may be an element contributing to the whole work of art.

Combining these different elements as they appear each in various manifestations stimulates Tanselle to reflect upon the idea of the work of art itself, a predicate that provokes reflection on a higher, generalized form. That is, the accumulation of many manifestations of "art" qualities attributed to a works, each in different ways, begins to congeal into something ultimate, an ultimate form of the ideal "work of art."

Tanselle takes a compositional element that in some way strikes him as aesthetic, artistic, or appeals to his sensibility in a certain way, and names that attribute "irony," "subtlety," "universality," "humaneness," or "cleverness." After a series of object-perceptions and instances of their aesthetic attributes, he builds a variety, or repertoire, of characteristics of what lend artistry to a work. The

word "subtle" is a name attached to a particular attribute that appeals to Tanselle's sensibilities in a certain way and is attendant to the object-perception (e.g., the instance of a paragraph in a text observed in a document).

This is an attribute-perception colored by an aesthetic attitude. So now the word "subtle" is a name attached to a particular type of attribute-perception. The sense of subtlety in elements of a text is obtained by comparison with other elements, compositional qualities observed that do not appeal to Tanselle's sensibilities in that certain way. Contrasts in experienced specific documents initially define subtlety, as well as other attributes. What subconsciously develops as *the combined compositional and aesthetic elements that achieve my concept of the work of art* collapses to *work of art*. Terms such as "aesthetically refined" or "compositionally rigorous" are not necessarily consciously articulated and may underlie phrases such as "well written," or "a good novel."

Many members of a readership may share the new compound name, "work or art," meaning all the elements and attributes that together appeal to all the readers' sensibilities in a certain way. They share the connection between the name and the combination of attributes—the characteristics that make a work artistic. (Of course no two people share such meanings exactly or completely.)

Naming "work of art" is like asserting a proposition as follows: The object-perception I call a work containing certain attribute-perceptions I call "artistic" occur in the world, and further, they occur together in the thing I'm pointing to. The thing pointed to is an object-perception: a document of a text, like a novella. Once attributes have been assigned to the object, it is an aesthetic object/attribute-perception.

Naming "work of art" involves applying a compound name which entails the above (complex) proposition. The name carries "true meaning" if and only if the name corresponds to the actual world, in this case, the actual world of writing, of literature, of books.

For "true meaning," the described state of affairs must correspond to the observed state of affairs in the world. In other words, the name is accurate if the proposition it entails is true (i.e., corresponds to a state of affairs in the actual world).

After experiences with many aesthetic object/attribute-perceptions, Tanselle obtains his particular repertoire of manifestations of art. Tanselle accumulates this repertoire from a (unconscious) series of true complex propositions, or a series of compound names that include an application of the name of, say, the various types of the attribute "irony," merging together and ascribed to the name of the object (text), which transforms a text into a work of art. Each such experi-

ence involves a new correlation between the name and the thing named and is now part of his repertoire of "irony," which in turn expands his repertoire of "work of art."

What I mean by each experience involves a new correlation between the name and the thing named is, for example, as follows: the things ironic are ironic in various ways, each attribute-perception "ironic" is different each time—each event adds to the total of events where "irony" corresponds to the real world of literary works, each event in a different way. Each new manifestation of irony develops a new connection between the name "ironic" and the type of irony observed, and contributes to Tanselle's repertoire of "true meanings" of irony in actual-world texts, and therefore, again, expands his repertoire of true meanings of "work of art."

Thus the repertoire of names of types of irony (in conjunction with the other elements of composition that make up a work of art), along with the composite repertoire of the name "work of art," is built. The utterance of the compound name "irony," or the doubly compound name "work of art," in the absence of the object/attribute-perception referred to, conjures up an object of reflection or mental image of what the name refers to.

The *referent* (of the name "work of art") was a combined material object/ attribute-perception, an actual-world work, like the text or document of a novella, but now changes to an image, or a concept—not an actual-world work (or text or document). In other words, perception triggers development of a naming process, and, in turn, uttering the name triggers formation of a concept (concept of a work of art) in conjunction with the mental image invoked. This is similar but different from the Platonic Form vs. actual-object separation, because of the following:

Platonic ontology of an abstract-object Form comprises

1. actual-world object

2. the object's attributes that can be individually named

3. the constructed Ideal Form that corresponds to an attribute (e.g. 'Beauty')

Tanselle's aesthetic ontology of an abstract-object work of art comprises

1. actual-world object

2. the object's attributes that can be individually named

3. an aesthetic experience with the object, which experience stimulates one to ascribe the status of 'art' to the object (an idea developed more fully later in this book)

4. the constructed Ideal Form that corresponds to the whole artistic object (i.e. work of art)

A Nonsensical Result

The created formal concept, in turn, acts as the standard by which subsequent object/attribute-perceptions are judged. A number of readings of a given novella can be easily drawn into the formal concept of the ultimate version of that novella, existing in and of itself, independent of the actual text (in mind only). This process is indifferent to whether the reader's view of such an ultimate version is associated with being the closest to the author's intentions, or with being the optimal collaboration as a social text, or with being the best private interpretation projecting the reader's aesthetic values.

This created abstraction is for Tanselle a "pre-existing entity" (Tanselle 19). This pre-existing entity then gets credit for causing the aesthetic qualities in the individual actual literary texts. This mental gymnastic helps Tanselle say that the ideal form has a higher level of reality. This is precisely the process that A. J. Ayer refers to: "In this way the objects are severed from the actual percepts from which they have been abstracted and are even regarded as being causally responsible for them" ("Construction" 340).

Tanselle asserts that the ideal work of art exists in its own reality beyond human cognition. "…we can never know when [works of art] are realized" (Tanselle 18). We can never know for sure what they consist of. The *logical conclusion* of Tanselle's line is that no one could ever know, in the history of literature, if they ever had experienced a single word of a real work of art. They are "forever indistinct" (Tanselle 30). This is a nonsensical result.

Experiences Happen, People Name Them

"Work of art" is a name people stamped onto something that people did and do experience. Language cannot refer to something not experienced. Experiences happen, people name them. The trick is to extract and analyze exactly *what* is referred to when someone claims to be naming something that cannot be experienced, to unearth exactly what *is* actually experienced and named.

Sorting out where, in fact, a work of art is located and in what it consists will be pursued in the following section. First, we should understand, or at least have an explanation for, why the above-described linguistic process so ineluctably occurs, why the inductive fallacy of positing objective *actuality* to any mythic or Platonic or Tansellean Form so naturally and commonly occurs.

The power of the mental image may persuade one (such as Tanselle) to conclude by induction (though one may not be aware of the induction process) that this mental image (of a work of art) is true, that is, carries "true meaning," corresponds with something in an objective location. This is a false conclusion because one cannot point to any ideal work of art in an objective realm outside of human minds.

But the falseness only follows from a very strict, hard-line realist view of "what is," and from Tanselle's claim that the work of art does exist in an actual location outside of the human mind. If the objective actuality of the ideal is a fallacy of induction, it is the same inductive fallacy Plato committed when he posited objective reality in his Form of The Good, or that one commits in positing an objectively actual god (whether the actual God exists or not, it's still a fallacy). These are useful parallels considering the religious-like passion and mystery invoked in Tanselle's experience with the work of art.

A Realm of Unsolved Language Games

It is a small step from the inductive conclusion of any objectively real "form" to an actual location (e.g., Tanselle's "hovering behind the text" as an actual location, "Realm of Forms" as an actual location, "Heaven" as an actual location). Such locations accommodate generalized, rarefied forms gathered and rearranged from all the object- and attribute-perceptions pertinent to the given ideal. In such locations, attribute-perceptions are rearranged and float around detached from any object-perceptions (i.e., a realm of unsolved language games).

Or, the floating attribute-perceptions are attached to concepts of objects, or images of objects: a problematic game our minds play since *as* concepts, such objects consist in nothing other than attributes in thought.

In other words, the process of accumulating (through the sensibilities and senses) a repertoire of qualities, connecting them in an ideal combination to create an abstract object, giving the ideal a name and thinking of the ideal as "real" and the process of the person having a relationship with that ideal; is the same inductive process in the three cases: 1) Ideal object of a work of art; 2) Ideal Platonic Form; 3) Ideal Being as God.

Because the idealized object as a whole (work as constituted of all instances of artistic quality) is rarefied, pure, Tanselle may ascribe higher value to it than to actual-world experiences. These seem to be necessary outcomes of the one inductive leap to positing an ideal form in an optimal construction. (It may be characterized as a "leap of faith to believing.") Tanselle may even have a "more real" passion for a "more real" work of art which affords the luxury of "more real" pleasure or fulfillment. This is a powerful abstract object indeed. Like the abstract object "god," the abstract object "work of art" comprises elements of deeply felt conscious experiences.

If one feels fulfilled, who cares about fallacies and illusions? Abstract passion supersedes worldly unreliable relations. Worldly relations are flawed, changing, even interchangeable pieces patched onto the higher reality of relation to an ideal. Abstract aesthetic passion for Tanselleans may be more powerful than a given aesthetic experience with a literary document. That is, contemplation of an abstract work of art hovering "above" (in one's mind) a given novelistic document may bring greater fulfillment than the aesthetic experience happening during an hour's reading of that document on a Sunday evening. This "illusion," this "more real fulfillment," would (perhaps) be lost if one did not *believe in* the abstract ideal as an actual entity out "there" to be interacted with.

Applying Carl Jung's Psychological Urge to the Rarefied Work of Art

Some (perhaps including Tanselle) may need, as opposed to want, a relation to an ideal construct. This assertion needs further investigation to justify why such an abstract passion should be so strong as to preclude what one would think of as preferable, such as a more human, or actual-world passion, aesthetic or otherwise. The Jungian archetype-urges discussed earlier apply equally to the projection-experience with the ideal aesthetic object: Grabbing onto unchanging 'work of art' amid a sea of fluctuating literary criticisms and unreliable interpretations.

Indeed, Tanselle demonstrates that he is acutely conscious of this anxiety, this dread of disorder. One looks to the work of art "to find patterns, and thus truth and beauty, in what had seemed the chaos of life" (Tanselle 12). The permanent work saves us from the "destructiveness of time and thus to create order out of chaos" (Tanselle 25). And again, experience with art gives "direction to the 'rage for order'…to find undreamed-of patterns in the chaos" (Tanselle 68).

Given acceptance of structures of the mind and conceptual reality as part of human experience (even though not strictly objective actual-world experience), a

kind of experience equally as substantial as experience with the actual world, one must be granted at least the possibility of being passionately moved in an abstract pursuit of that ideal. Such a construction as an ideal work of art, and one's relation to it, may indeed fulfill important urges, as important perhaps as the needs for mythology and religion; and in Plato's intellectual passion for his Realm of Forms. This abstract passion certainly entails difficulties, or perhaps wistful near-fulfillments, such as Plato's shadows on a cave wall, or the Apostle Paul's seeing in a mirror darkly, or Tanselle's "inability to know what in fact any work consists of" (Tanselle 30).

The ideal abstract object is created (or "experienced" in Jungian terms) from a set of percepts encountering actual literary documents, and processed through sensibility and inductive reflection, thus rarefied into heightened experiences with abstract objects and called abstract works of art (Tanselle is creator); so a Platonic Form is created from a set of sense data processed and rarefied into a perfect Form (Platonist is creator); and so too a Christian God is created from a set of human characteristics processed and rarefied into a perfect being named 'god.'

Religious construction is interestingly drawn from in James's own ideal construction in the character of Daisy-2, which will be noted in the final chapter. These three processes of abstract creation are shown here as similar, or parallel, in order to validate and support, for instance, Tanselle's decision (or urge) to posit such entities as *objectively real* entities and then engage in powerful, meaningful, fulfilling relationships with those objects.

In this light, it is not farfetched that aesthetic sensibility might become its own religion. As discussed earlier, these abstract objects are indeed real, constructed with elements intimately known in conscious experience. As a result, they have a special epistemological status. They exist; however, positing of abstract ideals as ontologically or metaphysically actual is an inductive fallacy.

Elements in an ideal, such as a work of art, can be seen as a pure linguistic process of naming and concept forming, a kind of fluid conceptual reality where images hover like ghosts. These ghosts may be part of subliminal, Jungian myth-structures which suggest to the reader's consciousness a need for construction. For a hard-line realist these abstract objects are contrived human artifice. For a moderate realist (e.g., Stalnaker) such objects are real, they exist, they comprise intimately known qualities from our conscious experience, but they are not objectively actual. For some, these certain abstract objects and the creative urge constitute deep truths, though they are too ephemeral to demonstrate clearly.

The Refined Self and the Higher Connection

There is, in these abstract passions, an element of self-denial in, and self-elevation above, the actual world for the sake of adherence to the ideal construct. An ideal's demand for self denial establishes a different mind set. The world contains only inferior objects. The mind can only approximate real art or real beauty. So an elite, elevated, special ability to at least vaguely commune with the "real" objects is assumed. Such a refined view of one's self is not easy to give up on merely rational grounds.

Tanselle's passion is his relation to his own construction of an abstract, rarefied concept of the work of art. In a broader sense, his passion is another name for that psychological region in which the ideal work of art is constructed and resides (a region the same as, or like that in which, a Platonic form or a Christian god might reside in a different mind).

Losing the Actual Object, but Gaining a Real Experience

In the following section, the possibility will be explored whereby achieving such meaning does not require positing a metaphysically actual status to the ideal form or the abstract object. One need not make false assertions to have meaningful experiences.

Positing an Ideal work of art is not necessary to a heightened experience with an aesthetic object—it is not necessary to imagine an object that is "higher" than the actual-world object. The aesthetic object may be admitted as a subjective construct and still retain status in one's values as having a deeper meaning than object/attribute-perceptions lacking aesthetic merit. In other words, deeper fulfillment (or simply "other" fulfillment) need not be derived from something that contains *a priori* meaning, but rather, importance is created by one's self, the meaning (that the aesthetic object offers) being the aesthetic experience *itself,* not an unknowable object.

The meaning is generated *by the conscious mind* when the object, through perception and through processing of the perception in one's sensibilities, is brought into the mind through the mind's aesthetic faculty. That act of sensing the artifact while simultaneously perceiving a work of art *is* the aesthetic experience.

Perceiving a work of art occurs while sensing certain objects because the aesthetic faculty is an integrated part of the mind. It is "an inherent way" of perceiving. That works of art can be largely agreed upon and related to successfully by

large groups of people, seems to testify to some commonality in aesthetic sensibility, in the mental, structural urge to exercise the aesthetic faculty. (Certain literary "camps" are certainly based on such shared sensibilities, or overlapping correspondences between names and the elements in aesthetic or philosophical construction that are named.) But an objectively shared sensibility or urge, even a collectively agreed-upon aesthetic object, does not bring the construct into objective actuality in the strictest sense, although there is some measure of objectivity in a loose sense obtained by human experience partly shared with other individuals. A work of art, in any sense, remains a linguistic artifice that is largely, or at least partly, subjective.

3

The Source of Meaning in a Work of Art

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter posited an aesthetic ontology in which one element was "an aesthetic experience with the object, which experience stimulates one to ascribe the status of 'art' to the object." This chapter explicates that element.

Conscious creation of the ideal in art was a salient feature of a late-nineteenth-century literary movement known as *aestheticism*, the theory of art described and asserted by contemporaries of Henry James: Walter Pater, and later Oscar Wilde. Such a creation of ideals is, in art, the constituting of an aesthetic object. Although Wilde's development of Pater's aestheticism was discredited on moral grounds, its intellectual and critical grounds were important enough to influence Henry James' later works and his later revisions of earlier works.

This consideration of aestheticism proposes to 1) show aestheticist stylistic influences as defining differences between the 1878 and 1909 versions; 2) show striking similarities with a present-day aesthetic theory, phenomenological aesthetics, which helps lend credibility to nineteenth-century aestheticism as influential in James' later work; and 3) provide an apt frame of reference in which this paper defines the terminology of, and makes claims about, works of art. The two aesthetic approaches (aestheticism and phenomenological aesthetics) are so alike as to be two terms for the same theory. The old aesthetic (aestheticism) influenced James' revisions—the new aesthetic (phenomenological aesthetics) sets the stage for this paper's assertions that the revision of the 1878 story "Daisy Miller: a Study" constitutes a new and distinct work of art in the 1909 novella *Daisy Miller.*

The earlier analysis of abstract objects, then of aesthetic objects/works of art, and now of phenomenological aesthetics, are all necessary to show exactly what is

being asserted in claiming that "Daisy Miller: a Study" and *Daisy Miller* are two separate works of art: such a claim is understood to be an epistemological claim, and in part a subjective claim, since it has been shown (by an analysis of the inductive fallacy of habitually associating objective existence with names) *that a work of art has no objective metaphysical existence*. It is important to put this distinction (epistemological versus metaphysical) in a critical, historical context. But first it may be helpful to understand what kind of objections were first leveled against aestheticism, so that we may dismiss them as possible criticisms of the present comparison and use of phenomenological aesthetics. Aestheticism is key, here, because it influenced the revision under analysis, and because it works hand in hand with phenomenological aesthetic theory to clarify the epistemological status of a work of art.

MORALITY

One of the most influential twentieth-century critics, T. S. Eliot, refers to "aestheticism" as something to be "accused of" ("Arnold and Pater" 354). He discusses Walter Pater's and Oscar Wilde's age as suffering a "dissolution of thought" ("Arnold and Pater" 356). In evaluating *The Renaissance,* Pater's most influential book, Eliot continues, "I do not believe that Pater, in this book, has influenced a single first-rate mind of a later generation. His view of art impressed itself upon a number of writers in the 'nineties, and propagated some confusion between life and art which is not wholly irresponsible for some untidy lives. The theory (if it can be called a theory) of 'art for art's sake' never was and never can be valid for the spectator, reader or auditor" ("Arnold and Pater" 356).

Yet in 1909 when the *New York Edition* came out, James responded to George Bernard Shaw by asserting, "the imagination leads a life of its own" (*The Master* 374). Shaw had exhorted James "that art should be didactic" (*The Master* 374). James continued that "you could give victory to one side just as artistically as to the other" (*The Master* 375). Further, "The only obligation," James says of the novel, "is that it be interesting" ("Art of Fiction" 394).

Though James, perhaps, did not especially like Wilde, he gathered ideas from Wilde's aesthetic expressions on the merit of the idea rather than on an opinion about the person. It may be said that James had a policy of abiding by none other than Eliot's advice (before Eliot gave it) better than Eliot himself when Eliot averred: "The critic, if he is to justify his existence, should endeavor to discipline his personal prejudices and cranks in the common pursuit of true judgment.

When we find that quite the contrary prevails, we begin to suspect that the critic owes his livelihood to the violence and extremity of his opposition to other critics" ("Function of Criticism" 69). Indeed, how both James and Wilde would agree! As Wilde's character Lord Henry Wotton points out, "We are not sent into the world to air our moral prejudices" (*Picture* 88). And, art exists in its own world and takes no sides (*The Master* 374, 375), ideas James developed in the 1880s. As for Eliot's "untidy lives," James considered a life constructed from art not only tidy, but essential. In response to Wells' utilitarian view of art, James uttered his famous assertion, "'Art *makes* life, makes interest, makes importance' adding that he knew of no substitute whatever for, 'the force and beauty of its process'" (*The Master* 536).

More in keeping with Victorian rather than with modern thinking, Eliot projected ethical and theological criteria onto literary criticism. "Literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint [and] moral judgments of literary works are made only according to the moral code accepted by each generation" ("Religion and Literature" 97). It should be noted that no such criteria are considered in the present analysis. Rejecting moral criteria in art shows another instance of aestheticism's influence on Henry James. For amid Victorian England it was aestheticism that first removed morality from judgments of art.

Aestheticists such as Wilde (and some not formally considered aestheticists such as Henry James) rejected morality as a criterion for judgment of literary works altogether. It rings as a before-the-fact direct response to the later Eliot that James wonders, "what is the meaning of your morality? Will you not explain how a novel can be either moral or immoral? We are discussing the Art of Fiction; questions of art are questions of execution; questions of morality are quite another affair" ("Art of Fiction" 410, 411). Or, in more Wildean epigrammatic terms, "There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all" (*Picture* 3). To translate the same statement back into Jamesean terms, "There are bad novels and good novels, but that is the only distinction in which I see any meaning" ("Art of Fiction" 401). Part of what goes into the composition of a "good novel" for James is, indeed, "moral energy," but in an interesting sense. "The essence of moral energy is to survey the whole field" ("Art of Fiction" 411). As James explains it, moral energy means having the courage to include in the novel the very things society may call immoral, just as they occur in life, to make the work correspond to actual life. The exclusion of actual-life elements on the grounds that they are immoral, the "cautious silence on certain subjects," is to James "moral timidity" ("Art of Fiction" 411).

What constitutes "well written" (or in James' words, a "good novel") is a subjective judgment that attains some measure of objectivity when overlapping or correlative correspondences occur in people's naming and concept-formation, according to partly shared sensibilities.

SEMIOTICS

As shown by the linguistic analysis of the inductive fallacy in the Tansellean model, the work of art has no objective metaphysical meaning or status. But such an assertion conflicts with one of the most influential early twentieth-century semiotic models: the Saussurean structure. Laying the foundations for later twentieth-century aesthetic semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure placed inherent meaning in an abstract objective structure which was impalpable, or impenetrably cloaked behind the text of the work of art (anticipations of Tanselle). The meaning available in literature, for Saussure, is in that underlying structure (the langue), not in the content, phrasing (the parole), etc., of the expression itself. (The idea of the langue as structure-behind-the-text came from an analogy between sentence structure and the group of sentences that make up a text, or the "sentence-text analogy" [Sheriff, p.3].) This highly objectivist trend discounted the text itself almost completely (Saussure 14, 172). Since there is no way to engage in any direct experience with such a structure (its existence is only a hypothesis), there can be no aesthetic experience with the hypothesized, ephemeral work of art. Nor can there be any meaning in an experience with the words, the phrasing, of a document, such as a novel. Despite this dreary state of affairs, Saussure's influence reached over generations until it was effectively reversed by Jacques Derrida.

Derrida does not specifically endorse any theory of art, subjective, objective, or otherwise. Nevertheless, he helps us on our way to positing that aesthetic meaning lies completely in subjective experience with the text (as manifested in a document). Meaning is produced only after the fact of, or in the act of, encountering a text. Derrida is concerned with showing that all interpretation, all meaning, is derivative of any text, that there is no cause of meaning preceding the text in an a priori objective realm or structure. For the present purpose, only a brief summary of a few points need be recounted.

For Derrida, any interpretation of any text is a closure of free play, a suspension of possibilities. The outcome of this suspension is ideality. Meaning resides in a text only inasmuch as meaning has been idealized from the use of signs in the text. (This seems presaged by Wilde, "Aestheticism is the search after the signs of

the beautiful. It is the science of the beautiful through which men seek the correlation of the arts" [Ellmann 159]). Wilde would agree with Derrida that "the beautiful" is an idealized concept derivative of experience, unlike Plato's ideal or Saussure's structure which existed independent of human experience.

There is no a priori truth: theological, literary, aesthetic, or otherwise. If beauty exists in literary art, it is only by virtue of authors and readers, who have some shared sensibility, idealizing a concept of aesthetic quality, manifesting it in style and content, which closes off and excludes other possible relations of signs that might have effected something other than a work of art, or that might have effected a different complex of qualities than that specifically experienced in the given text.

Thus Derrida's free play of difference makes meaning only possible for an individual in a particular experience with a text. This experience with language, as used, can produce ideality. Idealized meaning follows after an experience with the text. Saussure's mistake was to claim that idealized meaning (such as in his langue) was an a priori premise to the text and the experience. Derrida supported an alternative to Saussure's dominance as an obstacle to aestheticism, and thus to phenomenological aesthetics, and thus as an objection to the framework established in this paper by which the work of art is defined.

For purposes of this paper, this is where Derrida leaves off, notes Sheriff: "As Jonathan Culler has pointed out, 'Derrida has not dealt directly with topics such as the task of literary criticism, the methods of analyzing literary language, or the nature of literary meaning'" (Sheriff 45). Derrida strictly refers to text in general, not literary text.

The aestheticists' perspicacity lay in understanding that ideality does not exist on its own, does not precede, but rather is produced by, the making of and experience with the text. The crux for an aestheticist lies in an attitude towards this process. Beauty exists in literary art not just as part of, but a fortiori because of, people's habit of idealizing aesthetic quality and expressing it with intensity. That is what makes art. It is the very existence of art to create ideality. It is aestheticism to recognize the idealizing process and relish in it. Henry James understood this. What "constitutes [the novel's] value is greater or less according to the intensity of impression. The form, it seems to me, is to be appreciated after the fact. Then in a word we can enjoy one of the most charming of pleasures" ("Art of Fiction" 394, 395), which takes us into the realm of aestheticism, and then to phenomenological aesthetics.

HENRY JAMES AS AESTHETE

Fundamental theoretical opposition to a subjective approach is cleared away. However, we have not yet seen the above-promised theory that specifically reaffirms aestheticism. That reaffirmation will be presented below in the phenomenological aesthetics section. Before we look at such a theory, this section will review aestheticism for later comparison with phenomenological aesthetics. While serving that purpose this section also identifies the later James as a practicing aestheticist, having been influenced by aestheticism between 1878 and 1909.

James had mixed feelings, mostly negative, about aestheticism in 1878, as is discussed in Richard Ellmann's essay, "Henry James Among the Aesthetes." James had read Walter Pater's *Renaissance*, and first found it written "more eloquently than coherently" (Ellmann 133). James had even, "blamed the 'excessive enthusiasm' of the aesthetes on their 'lack of real aesthetic discrimination'" (Ellmann 139). In the intervening years, James read Huysmans' *A Rebours*, debated with Oscar Wilde, lived through the aesthetic '80s and the Decadent '90s, developed a greater appreciation for Pater (Horne 433,4), and experimented with aestheticism in many of his own works.

Perhaps the most appropriate way to proceed is to present an aestheticist in his own style: in a series of Wilde's epigrams that serve as samples of aestheticism. "The object of art is not simple truth, but complex beauty [and] when art surrenders her imaginative medium, she surrenders everything" (*Decay* 302). "Those who find beautiful meanings in beautiful things are the cultivated. They are the elect to whom beautiful things mean only beauty [and] No artist desires to prove anything. All art is quite useless" (*Picture* 3,4). "Art never expresses anything but itself" (*Decay* 319). "Life imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life" (*Decay* 320).

Such an aesthetic reverberates in James' "Art makes life, makes interest, makes importance," and art takes no sides, as cited above. And as Eliot attacked Wilde, H. G. Wells attacked James' view "that the novel could be an aesthetic and artistic end in itself" (*The Master*, 496). And speaking of the women in James' life as well as in his fiction, "they belonged to a single line of fantasy—life into art," and "He [James] could worship a younger woman in a utopia of the mind" (*The Master* 110, 111). For James, "Composition alone was 'positive beauty', he would say, and art preserved life" (*The Master* 295). This held true even in historical biography where one would consider "facts" of optimum value. In biography, according to James, fact as well as form was retouched, as, "life in its raw state was inartistic" (*The Master*, 457.)

From using aestheticism in negative ways in his early years, James "came back to aestheticism for the last time in 1904" (Ellmann 148). It is in this year that "James holds out hope that aestheticism will yet find a more convincing advocate, as if Pater and Wilde, Huysmans, and D'Annunzio had all written in vain. It isn't fanciful to suggest that Henry James probably thought of himself as that more convincing advocate" (Ellmann 149). Furthermore, in writing the *Golden Bowl* during this same year, "James might well feel that in this novel he was remixing the ingredients of aestheticism to show how they might be more gainfully employed than they had been in the past" (Ellmann 149). By 1904, "James makes the fastidiousness of aestheticism and its insistence upon beauty central to life's concerns rather than opposed or peripheral to them" (Ellmann 149). The idealization of beauty, purity, innocence, and the ideal in poetry, are central themes in aestheticism. Further, James' statement that "Art makes life, makes interest, makes importance" follows from Wilde's "Aestheticism is…the search after the secret of life" and "the secret of life is art" (*Oscar Wilde* 159, 166). Extending what Ellmann says, I suggest that 1904 was *not* the last time James came back to aestheticism. He resumed this development from 1906 to 1909 in his revisions for the 1909 collection. James certainly echoes the aestheticist's fastidiousness in his tone in a letter of instruction to Scribner's regarding his later revisions: "I beg the Compositors to *adhere irremoveably* to my punctuation and *never* to insert death-dealing commas" [James's italics] (Horne 433).

AESTHETICISM AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

To find the present-day critical-aesthetic reaffirmation of aestheticism, we will look at another branch of literary criticism: phenomenological aesthetics, and the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden.

Roman Ingarden presents a picture that ties in closely with aestheticism in a number of ways. "The literary work of art is an aesthetic object" (McCormick 11). This idea links Ingarden with aestheticists immediately, as the idea has not attracted many proponents until recently. Ingarden's aesthetic object is not a so-called actual object. Yet the aesthetic object is none-the-less real. It is real in our experience, because our aesthetic experience has nothing necessarily to do with the "actual" object, only (or primarily) with the aesthetic object. Ingarden, in setting aesthetics apart from physical or linguistic investigation, notes, "Hence, one who begins with a purely investigating cognition of a work of art as a real object,

[e.g., grammatical structure, artifact] instead of constituting this object in an aesthetic experience and experiencing its peculiar visage, will never succeed in obtaining for himself a knowledge of aesthetic values" (Ingarden 128). The key phrase is "and experiencing its peculiar visage." An aesthetic object cannot be studied as an archaeologist studies a dig to gather data. The value resides in the experience with aesthetic qualities (or lack thereof). Further, "The matter presents itself quite differently [from experience with actual objects] in the pretty complicated process which will be here called an 'aesthetic experience'" (Ingarden 110). So it seems that to overlook the "complex beauty" of the aesthetic experience is to overlook the "imaginative medium," to "not succeed."

An archaeological dig, for instance, is a real object from which physical evidence provides data. However, "The reality of an object isn't thus necessary for the accomplishment of an aesthetic experience, because the occurrence of reality as a particular moment of the object perceived does not influence our aesthetic delight or aversion in any way" (Ingarden 108). James might agree, in that "artists live not in the data of their lives but in the ways in which they express themselves" (Edel, *The Master* 149). And, as we have noted, for James only art gives importance, interest, and positive beauty. And we remember James' response to G. B. Shaw in that the imagination leads a life of its own. Ingarden takes this line even further: "it is not in every case of aesthetic perception that one must start from the perception of a real object" (Ingarden 108). A mental image may initiate the constituting of an aesthetic object, though indirectly such images may be pieced together (rearranged) from perceptions.

Ingarden speaks of various ways in which a "harmony of qualities is obtained. The harmony of qualities [in an aesthetic experience] is the final *principle of the creation and of the existence* of an aesthetic object" (Ingarden 125). For Wilde, what follows from discounting actual objects (actual objects are incidental) to valuing idealized aesthetic quality in art, is a general devaluing of the real world. And indeed, we find in Ingarden, "though we continue feeling in the world, the conviction of the existence of the real world, which constantly colours all our actuality, withdraws somehow into shade, loses its importance and strength," and in the "aesthetic experience there may occur a peculiar phenomenon of a quasi-oblivion of the real world" (Ingarden 116).

Aestheticism, in the senses of idealized beauty and subjective experience with art, surfaces more as we look further into Ingarden's phenomenology. "One has to grasp the qualities aesthetically valuable and to bind them synthetically with one another in order to succeed, in this way, in grasping the *whole* of the harmony of those qualities, and, at that time only—in a peculiar emotional contem-

plation—to *give oneself up to the charm* of the beauty of the constituted 'aesthetic object'" (Ingarden 112). We find in Ingarden the idealized object, and thus, idealized beauty. This is almost a restatement of James's "most charming of pleasures," in "appreciating after the fact" the "form" which offers "intensity of impression."

Ingarden's tone seems at times imitative of James, but also of aestheticists such as Wilde. The affinity of Ingarden, Pater, Wilde and James is apparent in the idea of the type of person who is most in touch with aesthetic discernment. Ingarden speaks of the aesthetic experience depending upon the percipient's "emotional and intellectual type, his aesthetic as well as general culture," and; "his aesthetic susceptibility" (Ingarden 132). For Walter Pater, "Our education becomes complete in proportion as our susceptibility to these impressions increases in depth and variety" (xix). These might be the "elect to whom [as Wilde notes] beautiful things mean only beauty." James as well, regarding the production of art (by which the appreciation of art follows), asserts his own version of the cultivated percipient. "In proportion as that intelligence is fine will the novel, the picture, the statue partake of the substance of beauty and truth" ("Art of Fiction" 412).

Ingarden goes on to what 1890s readers might have viewed as a competitive extravagance with Wildean sensation: "the preliminary aesthetic emotion is full of dynamism—eagerness for satiation that we could be 'ravished' by it" (Ingarden 115). He goes on to describe, in the percipient's interaction with the aesthetic object as "a moment of 'intoxication'—almost similar to getting intoxicated with the smell of flowers" (Ingarden 119).

Perhaps as good a statement as James or any aestheticist ever made to summarize his view of art for art's sake is made by Ingarden. "The value of an aesthetic object is not the value of a means leading to an end" (Ingarden 127). Richard Wollheim echoes this sentiment, suggesting among "essential characteristics of a work of art…that it must not be inherently valuable" (139). The value of the aesthetic object is the end in itself, and generated by the percipient. In response to anticipated criticism of passive contemplation of qualities, Ingarden argues, "On the contrary, it is a phase of a very active, intensive, and creative life of an individual, that these activities do not evoke any changes in the surrounding real world, nor are they 'calculated' to do so" (Ingarden 118). As James put it, art's only obligation is to be interesting. As Wilde put it, "Quite useless." Ingarden, Pater, Wilde, Wollheim and James seem to say in unison: "art for art's sake."

CONCLUSION

From a different time, and from a different intellectual milieu, Ingarden particularly has arrived at an aesthetic position strikingly similar to that of 1890s aestheticism. The aesthetic object, the work of art, is an object in the mind, a harmonious set of qualities (complex beauty) valued as meaningful according to its peculiar visage as constituted by the individual's sensibility.

The constituted complex beauty becomes the stimulus to which the aesthetic appreciator responds. Thus the meaning in the work of art is determined by the intensity or the quality of the effect of the constituted complex beauty (work of art) on the percipient. Meaning and value are generated by the percipient.

Phenomenological aesthetics provides a useful setting in which aestheticism can be seen as continuing today.

The work of art is an abstract object that is not metaphysically or ontologically actual, nor is it intended to be. Nevertheless it is intensely real, existing in the peculiar conscious experience we call an aesthetic experience. The abstract object "work of art" comprises elements intimately known in conscious experience and therefore obtains a special epistemological status (that is, this status = an abstract object constructed from intimately known, and deeply felt, qualities—there is no other name for this epistemological status). Hard-line *realists'* dismissal of this object and this experience as illusory is idle because the construction never intended claims to objective actuality. Conversely, hard-line *idealists'* claims to objective actuality for works of art are unnecessary because it is enough—in fact it is everything—to say that *one has an aesthetic experience*. Meaning, value, and feeling are generated by the percipient experiencing the aesthetic object.

4

Linguistic Construction

INTRODUCTION

There are two principal versions of Henry James' *Daisy Miller*: "Daisy Miller: a Study" published in *Cornhill Magazine* in 1878 and his later revised *Daisy Miller* published in the *New York Edition* in 1909. The latter version was greatly revised. It will be argued that the two versions are indeed separate works of art.

Chapter 1 is an analysis of the linguistic process of naming and concept forming. This chapter analyzes how and why ideal forms such as works of art, and ideal characters in fiction, are created. Included in this analysis is a possible explanation for a human need for idealization through language. The processes of creation are shown to be similar between the linguistic construction of a work of art and the linguistic construction of symbolic ideal types of characters.

Daisy Miller (in the revised version) will be illustrated as an example of such a symbolic ideal type. This analysis also clarifies in what manner the character Daisy Miller in the original and the character Daisy Miller in the revision are to be asserted as different types. These two Daisy Millers are shown to be different in that Daisy is a constituted actual-world character in "Daisy Miller: a Study" while the revised Daisy is a re-constituted Ideal of American innocence in *Daisy Miller,* instead of a representation of a believable person.

The "Actual World" of the Novella

"Actual-world" is a confusing term applied to a novella. Actual world in this paper means the objective world posited by the novella to represent the world we live in—"the author's projected world" (*Golden Bowl* 13)—inasmuch as it is a plausible representation of what is normally referred to as the world, that is, the facts of the environment presented and perceived. This is a distinction between what in the novella accurately pictures actual-world experience and what in the

novella does not depict actual-world experience. This is *not* a distinction between actual world vs. fictional world of the novel. The novella's fictional world achieves "actual representation" insofar as that world corresponds to, or hooks into, the actual world around us: what James calls "truth of detail" ("Art of Fiction" 399).

In Daisy-2, actual-world qualities are taken out of natural relation and rearranged for a nonhuman effect. This detailed linguistic analysis shows the extremity of the difference between the two characters, which difference plays a substantial part in the assertion that the two versions are separate works of art. This linguistic analysis also helps clarify what is meant in this paper by the term "work of art."

Chapter 2 will complete the explanation, in phenomenological terms and in aestheticist terms, of what is meant by a work of art, building on the foundation of ideal concept forming laid in chapter 1. The concept of a work of art has been invoked historically with various meanings, various levels of objectivity, and with various epistemological and metaphysical connotations. Chapter 2 invokes a phenomenological aesthetic which has much in common with the late-nineteenth-century aestheticism that influenced Henry James' own theory of art. This will tie together phenomenological aesthetics with James' aestheticist influences and lead to a better understanding of the forces at work in the 1909 revision of *Daisy Miller*. Wherein lies the meaning, the value, and the status of a work of art is essential to making clear what is meant in any assertion about a work of art, and those factors will be clarified in the phenomenological-aestheticist-Jamesean combination of aesthetic theory.

Given this framework, chapter 3 will introduce textual evidence to show exactly what language changes lead to the significant difference between Daisy Miller in the original and Daisy Miller in the revision: the former is a plausibly real-life character, the latter is a re-constituted ideal form made of a refined combination of qualities of innocence. Textual evidence will show dehumanization in the revision by James' removal of Daisy-2's volition, location in time and space, sexual identity, and in changing the way she is referred to in the text from a "her" to an "it." Also, differences in the over all style of composition reflect aestheticist influences in James' life between 1878 and 1909. The 1909 version is shown to be an aestheticist work. Chapter 3 will also include a brief look at some pertinent critical articles.

THE HEROINE OF *DAISY MILLER*

The process described earlier—in the three examples of idealized and rarefied construction, that is, the process of perceiving-naming-concept forming and then intersecting and reconstituting concepts from attribute-perceptions into concepts from concepts—is directly pertinent to James' construction of Daisy-2. She is a construction from James' accumulated repertoire of various kinds of innocence. That repertoire is put together in James' mind from instances of object-attribute perceptions in his actual-world experience.

Qualities such as provincial, unsophisticated, naive, guileless, straightforward and inexperienced define actual-world, nineteenth-century American innocence for James. Those elements are rarefied intellectually by him into a conglomerate, ideal form called "American innocence."

James engages in the process of moving from the perception of an object (such as an instance of innocent behavior) to his internal perception of an ideal form. The attribute "innocence" is applied to the perceived object, an "instance of a certain behavior," thus: Combining different types of innocence, different manifestations as they appear in various social interactions, stimulates James to reflect upon the idea of innocence itself. That is, that many manifestations of qualities attributed to innocent behavior accumulate. Those many qualities are themselves defining parts of the convention "innocence." That accumulation of diverse qualities begins to congeal into something harmonious and ultimate, an ultimate form of the ideal "innocence."

Then the ideal form becomes the standard in judging innocence in subsequent observations of behavior.

Daisy partakes of a social element that in some way strikes James as guileless, naive, straightforward, etc., and he classifies those attributes under the name "innocence." After a series of such object-perceptions, and attendant identifications of instances of innocence, he builds a variety, or repertoire, of characteristics of what lend innocence to a character. The word "innocence" soon names a particular harmonious set of attributes—including guilelessness, naiveté, and disinterestedness—that coincides with James' formed (but always reforming) idea of innocence in a certain way. That set of harmonious attributes is attendant to a given object-perception (e.g., the instance of behavior observed). The various senses of innocence as elements of the character are obtained by comparison with other elements and behaviors observed that do not coincide with James' idea of innocence in that certain way. Contrasts in the real world thus invite James to

more exactly define innocence and differentiate it from disingenuousness or cynicism.

James may now share with the reader the new compound name, "innocence," meaning all of those more specific attribute-names combined. They share the connection between the name and the attribute—the characteristics that make Daisy Miller innocent. Clarifying the concepts further are the "not innocent" traits he has also noted.

After experiences with many object-perceptions with attendant attribute-perceptions, James constructs the 1909 Daisy from the above-mentioned repertoire of manifestations of innocence.

Having before him the amalgam of images "innocent" and "not innocent," he has available a set of images taken together in contemplation, and set intersection ensues. Developing the idea of the Daisy he will picture, James extracts and keeps only the elements that all have "innocence" in common. James then generalizes the elements, and creates an abstraction combining the various types only of "innocence" as they connect with social object-perceptions. He names the combination "the ideal form of the object of an innocent young woman behaving in American society," or "innocence," or "Daisy Miller." By definition now, the created abstraction Daisy-2 can never *not* appeal to the sensibilities as an innocent quality.

Rather than the object/attribute-perception leading to naming and forming a concept which triggers a mental image; James' new mental image (created abstraction) leads to naming the image, e.g., "Daisy Miller" (instead of naming the material object/attribute-perception), and developing an abstract concept which, in turn, triggers another mental image arising from the concept. Soon, Daisy is divorced from the realities that gave rise to the notion of innocence. Her innocence becomes abstract.

The former naming process (*qua* object/attribute-perception) corresponds to the real world around James from which he drew actual-world fictional characters like Winterbourne, or the heroine of "Daisy Miller: a Study." The latter involved a naming process (*qua* created abstraction) corresponding only to concepts in James' mind, not to the real world. Hence, James did not consult the real world directly in constructing Daisy-2, rather, he consulted abstract ideals.

There is no danger of the inductive fallacy in this case, as there are no instances on record of assertions of the objective existence of Daisy—as perfect being of innocence—in the real world. If there were, however, the idealized mental image would be something like the virgin Mary, only Daisy would be the Mother of Innocence. But Daisy would have the twist of being a Protestant puri-

tan martyr, in the corrupt Catholic old world, perhaps an anti-saint. It would be both ironic and appropriate that she contracted malaria in the Coliseum, where Christians met the lions, and was martyred in Rome (and buried in the Protestant cemetery there). Daisy takes on mythic and prophetic form, at the moment she is breathing in the pestilential air, saying, "Well, he looks at us as one of the old lions or tigers may have looked at the Christian martyrs!" (*New York* 85). A minute later she adds, "He saw me and he cuts me dead!" (*New York* 86). It is Innocence personified who is "cut," literally an idea that soon dies.

Language, as one mental structure itself, functions in *Daisy Miller* to complete immanent myth-structure in readers on two levels: 1) providing an ideal of innocence incarnate, and 2) effecting the creation of an abstract work of art, distinctly different from the realistic one that preceded it.

THE HEROINE OF "DAISY MILLER: A STUDY"

From the point of view of the linguistic method described in sections 1 and 2, the heroine in "Daisy Miller: a Study" is constructed very differently. Object-attribute perceptions from young American women's characteristics are named, the names uttered produce concepts, and the concepts (still corresponding with actual-world experience) are mixed and matched: but mixed and matched in a way retaining actual-world-like variety and actual-world-like relations. Such a variety of qualities is combined so that they do not seem rearranged by the artist, in the sense that they seem taken straight from experience with life to produce the fictional character. "As people feel life, so they will feel the art that is most closely related to it" ("Art of Fiction" 405).

The fictional character, Daisy Miller-1, is an amalgam of attributes diverse enough to be considered an accurate, or approximate, picture of an actual-world human being.

TWO DIFFERENT CONJUNCTIONS OF PROPERTIES: DAISY-1 AND DAISY-2

When a novella contains as its apparent heroine a known, or inferred, character such as a 20-year-old young woman from late-nineteenth-century America, the question arises at what point does the construction shift from actually addressing a character corresponding plausibly to the real world, embodying actual-world-

like characteristics, to addressing a psychological construct of an idealized charac-
ter which has only abstract, detached relations with other characters (regardless of
whether other characters are "actual-world" or not) and the surrounding society.
The answer is that, "the measure of reality is very difficult to fix" ("Art of Fiction"
397), and, in fact, there is no such definable point.

But as gray as the area may be, the heroine of "Daisy Miller: a Study" and the
heroine of *Daisy Miller* lie on opposite sides of that gray area. "In proportion as in
what [art] offers us we see life *without* rearrangement do we feel that we are
touching the truth; in proportion as we see it *with* rearrangement do we feel that
we are being put off with a…convention" ("Art of Fiction" 405). Daisy-2 is such
a convention. Daisy-1 is not.

Daisy Miller was meant to depict neither an actual-world character in Daisy-2
nor an actual-world relationship between Daisy-2 and Giovanelli or Winter-
bourne (except inasmuch as actual people sometimes project abstracted ideal con-
ceptions onto other people, but this again is a departure from true meaning in
naming perceptions). As James shifts from Daisy-1, years later, to Daisy-2, he
shifts his concern from presenting an actual-world scenario of conflict when an
American girl (Daisy-1) with American ways—such as independence from oth-
ers' opinions, free thinking and spontaneous behavior, all against social mores
accepted by people around her—enters the old world; to presenting an American
ideal (innocence or Daisy-2) mingling in non-innocent European society.

Such an ideal (Daisy-2) is unnatural and out of place when transplanted to the
old world (as in fact the *character* would also be even in an American social set-
ting). Daisy-2 cannot be maintained in a society made up of very different ideals
and conventions, so that the American ideal of innocence, unsupported, must
collapse. This ill-fitting ideal is symbolized in Winterbourne's comment to Daisy
in the 1909 revision: "American flirting is a purely American silliness; it has—in
its ineptitude of innocence—no place in *this* system" (*Daisy Miller* 71). The idea
dies. The literal death of Daisy-2 is the symbolic death of the American ideal of
innocence in Europe in *Daisy Miller*. It is not a tragedy as in the 1878 work, but
a poetic social picture clothed in symbolic terms.

The important point here is that the ideal-forming linguistic/myth process
described earlier in this chapter pertaining to Daisy occurs only in *Daisy Miller*. It
does not occur in "Daisy Miller: a Study." Daisy-1, in "Daisy Miller: a Study," is
not constituted solely out of an accumulated repertoire of instances of innocence.
She is not an ideal, rather, she is an actual-world character, one who obtains of a
true proposition, in that in her case the name "Daisy" corresponds, at least
approximately, to actual-world characters. The variety of her characteristics corre-

sponds approximately to the kind of diversity of characteristics found in actual-world people. In Jamesean terms, Daisy-1 is not "rearranged."

That "Daisy Miller: a Study" and *Daisy Miller* are two separate works of art is supported by the analysis in this chapter showing that Daisy-1 and Daisy-2 are themselves separate types of construction. The textual evidence supporting such a claim will be presented in chapter 3.

CONCLUSION

To sort out what complex beauty we are talking about in James' work, some distinctions must be reviewed and reiterated.

Daisy Miller-2 is a constituted idealized form, an amalgam of various manifestations of ideal innocence. As a whole she does not correspond to anything in the real world. She is rearranged.

Daisy Miller-1 is a constituted character in fiction, one that does correspond to the kinds of combinations of characteristics one could expect to find in an actual-world character. She is not rearranged.

Both works of art, *Daisy Miller* and "Daisy Miller: a Study," are idealized forms—the ideal form we call "work of art"—constituted of myriad less general forms and aesthetic qualities, taking shape by virtue of selective elements of composition. They are "art" only inasmuch as they are encountered by a set of sensibilities in a certain way, say by one of James' "fine intelligences." Only as assimilated in a set of (preferably "susceptible") sensibilities after perception is the name "art" applied to a text. Thus a constituted object we call "art" occurs as largely subjective. Therefore, each work of art, or aesthetic object, is a discrete entity, but discrete only in mind, not in a hypothetical objective realm of works of art, that is, not in an objectively real concept-location outside of human minds.

That "Daisy Miller: a Study" and *Daisy Miller* are two separate works of art is a subjective claim, though it may be called loosely objective inasmuch as there may be those with overlapping correspondences between naming and concept-formation (according to partly shared sensibilities) who will concur with the claim.

Such a claim, in fact, is made quite subjectively, without presenting much evidence, by James' biographer Leon Edel. Edel's claim specifically pertains to *Portrait of a Lady*. But Edel implies that the "net effect of James's revisions" is similar for James' early works in general which were revised for the

New York Edition (*The Master* 329). Speaking of *Portrait*, "the rewriting has been so subtle and skilful as to create a new novel. The New York Edition becomes a separate and unique entity" (*The Master* 329). Perhaps the 1909 Henry James would agree, for even more subjective reasons: "'How sickly I used to write!'" (*The Master* 329).

To perhaps enlarge the group of adherents to the claim pertaining to the two Daisy Millers, and to broaden the objectivity of the claim, to whatever extent that is possible, further argument and textual evidence will be presented in the following chapter. This evidence will illustrate differences of a number of kinds between the two works.

5

Application of the "Work of Art as Abstract Object" on Two Works of Art: Henry James's "Daisy Miller: a Study" and Henry James's Daisy Miller

INTRODUCTION

For this chapter, I conducted a complete collation of the two works—the 1878 *Cornhill Magazine* appearance of "Daisy Miller: a Study" and the 1909 New York Edition publication of the novella *Daisy Miller*—comparing line by line, every word and punctuation.

The themes that run through the various articles examined later in this chapter concerning Henry James' *Daisy Miller* are: an American lack of cultivation, purity, an ideal of innocence (poetic, archetypal, natural, supernatural, indigenous, instinctive, etc.), the clash of American and European manners, evil, nature versus sophistication, independence versus conformity to convention, exuberance versus restraint, and varying statements regarding Daisy's morality. There appears to be fairly wide agreement that Daisy-2 embodies an ideal of innocence, an American girl elevated to the stature of pure poetry, objectified. (However, the distinction between Daisy-1 and Daisy-2 is not pursued.) This is Daisy's primary condition and characteristic. It becomes a contrasting view to posit Daisy as an independent American girl, which, however, is adduced by one of the articles considered here.

Independence is a quality more appropriately ascribed to Daisy-1. The notable failure of the articles is that none pursue, or even address, the contrast between

the original and the revision established by 1) the former's more even distribution of qualities with independence as a salient characteristic, and 2) the latter's development of a more exclusive poetical ideal of innocence.

The articles vary in their interpretations of James' intentions regarding Daisy's death. But the question becomes reduced to whether the cause of death was social-moral incaution (which happens to entail hygienic incaution in the circumstances of the narrative) or merely hygienic incaution alone. She contracted malaria, but contracted it under the midnight moon with a man in the Coliseum, *sans chaperon*. In light of the strictly symbolic status (not an actual-world character) of Daisy-2 already posited by this paper, the moral question can only pertain to Daisy-1.

Most of the articles at least mention the controversy surrounding the novella, "an outrage on American girlhood" (*New York* v), the division among readers between pro-Millers and anti-Millers. This controversy began after the novella originally came out in the United States, appearing first in unauthorized versions in periodicals (*Bibliography of Henry James* 39), and then published by Harper and Brothers in 1878.

First in this chapter I will present textual evidence, bringing home the two-works assertion. In the second section, "Critical Reviews," I will briefly discuss each of the critical articles. In the subsequent section, "Critical Reviews in Perspective," I will discuss some implications that, though alluded to, are never fully developed in the articles. The two ideas among those mentioned above which are most important in the "Perspective" section will be 1) the tension between independence and innocence and 2) the sundry ideals of innocence.

Also important is the manner in which ideals are worked into the text. James' aestheticism illustrated in the preceding chapter, and the sense of it visible in the textual revision reviewed in this chapter, help sort out the ideal as worked into the text. This chapter completes the argument that "Daisy Miller: a Study" is a separate work of art from *Daisy Miller*.

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

This section divides textual evidence into groups according to its use in serving a particular purpose. One of the most important supports for the claim that Daisy-2 is a differently constituted, nonhuman form is the evidence that shows that the kind of form-constituting process—analyzed in earlier in this book—is in fact

reflected in the text. It is interesting to keep in mind aestheticist influences in the style of the revisions.

The importance of names cannot be overestimated. They are the primary indication we have of what it is we are talking about. References to Daisy herself in the revision which exsanguinate her and reconstitute her as an ideal in many cases rename her, change her status from a "her" to an "it." "[T]he young girl" becomes "the charming creature" (681.10, 8).[Parenthetical references comparing text differences show first the *Cornhill* reference in decimal form (page.line number) followed by a comma and then the *New York Edition* reference (page number only). Where quotes are given from text occurring in only one of the two works, page numbers from both works are given to show where the surrounding text occurs in the other. Page numbers for "Daisy Miller: a Study" vary widely because it was originally published in two parts: The first installation began on page 678 of *Cornhill* magazine, and the second installation began on page 44.]

At one point, "her" evaporates into "the strange little creature" (53.31, 63). Our "Unknown young lady" becomes a "wandering maiden" (684.3, 15). "[T]his young girl" becomes "this charming apparition" (685.16, 17). She is degenderized in the more subtle, but telling change from a "young girl" to a "young person" (686.9, 19). The "very nice young girl" becomes a "very innocent girl" (688.34-.35, 25). In text not occurring in the original, Winterbourne thinks of her as an "exquisite little fatalist" (690.5-.6, 27). Again, "Miss Miller" becomes a "charming creature" (697.10, 42). In another manifestation, she is not merely "Daisy Miller," but Winterbourne's "little friend the child of nature" (44.35, 46).

Daisy's human status is removed in the revision by a number of less direct, but just as effective, devices. Adjectives are applied to her which hyperbolicize her ideal, poetic qualities, such as "sweetness," or "innocence." Her actions and thoughts are described in otherworldly terms. Further, human characteristics are removed, such as volition, location in time and space, sexual identity, and relation to other humans. These kinds of changes in Daisy in the revision sometimes refer directly to Daisy and other times to other characters who are talking to or about Daisy.

Daisy looking at a stick her brother is holding changes from "she rested her eyes upon the" to "she gave her sweet eyes to the" (681.28, 9). The verb "glanced," when applied in scenes of a woman glancing at a man normally carries a lot of possibilities in connotation, some of them sexual. But those possibilities are eliminated when "The young lady glanced at him again" changes to "She glanced at him with lovely remoteness" (681.33, 9). Sexual overtones are lost, but Daisy's location in time and space relative to both Winterbourne and the reader

fades as well. She is in relation to nothing. A subtle change occurs once romantic tension seems lost in Winterbourne when, instead of having "pursued, a little embarrassed," he rather "pursued with a slight drop of assurance" (681.35-36, 9). When Randolph, Daisy's brother, addresses Winterbourne and Daisy in a garden, a scene of interaction converts to a scene of shades when "[he] loudly inquired" changes to "[he] asked of all the echoes" (681.44, 10).

In text not occurring in the original, while Winterbourne and Daisy are still in the garden, the narrator depicts Winterbourne as generalizing his interlocutress: "She might be cold, she might be austere…he had already so generalized [that] what the most 'distant' American girls did [was to] show how rigidly unapproachable they were." This leads into text that does have its counterpart in the original, where Daisy is "evidently [not] fluttered" changes to "Clearly [not] fluttered." (The remotest possibility of emotional ambiguity is thus removed.) Rather, again in text only in the revision, "she was composed of charming little parts that made no *ensemble*" (682.6-.8, 10, 11). Here Winterbourne is trying to make heads or tales of Daisy as a human being. But Daisy is not forthcoming with evidence of human elements. She is not a human ensemble of qualities. The effort, as we will see, leaves Winterbourne muddled and mystified.

"Daisy Miller: a Study" gives an impression of a heroine who flouts conventions, certainly with awareness and volition. In text not occurring in the original, such flouting is no longer a possible volition, Daisy-2 "having no idea whatever of 'form'" (682.10, 11). In context, social form is what is meant here by "form." In the original, Daisy gives Winterbourne "the benefit of her glance…this glance was perfectly direct and unshrinking," which changes to "the benefit of her attention that act unqualified by the faintest shadow of reserve" (682.12-13, 11).

We find "her lively eyes and light, slightly monotonous smile" transformed into "her frank gay eyes and clear rather uniform smile" (684.37, 16). Then, where "the young girl's eyes were singularly modest and fresh," they were revised so that "her expression was as decently limpid as the very cleanest water" (682.14, 11). Body parts, such as eyes, disappear, and human freshness changes to an inanimate, limpid, clean water. When she does get her eyes back, they change from "wonderfully pretty eyes" to "the very prettiest conceivable" (682.16, 11). No longer wonderful, they are perfect, an ideal. Where Winterbourne, while interacting with Daisy, "had a great relish for feminine beauty; he was addicted to observing and analyzing it," he changes, with Daisy-2, to taking "a great interest generally in that range of effects and was addicted to noting and, as it were, recording them" (682.18-.20, 11). "Feminine beauty" fades into an indistinct "range of effects." Saying, in the original, that her beauty, "was not exactly

expressive" is expanded in the revision to that it "wasn't pointedly—what point, on earth, could she ever make?—expressive" (682.21, 11). Of course, she could never be on earth! Nevertheless, her beauty in the original "was eminently delicate," in the revision, "it offered such a collection of small finenesses and neatnesses" (682.21, 11). Her beauty became a collection of rarefied attributes. Here, in the revision, Winterbourne is deconstructing the repertoire of attributes that went into James' construction of Daisy-2.

Daisy "was a coquette." But in the revision, Daisy "would have had her own experience of the action of her charms, as she would certainly have acquired a resulting confidence" (682.21, 11,12). Referring to her utterances, "this was said" blossoms into "this flower was gathered" (682.30-.31, 12). Little human acts of volition such as "standing up and walking about; but she presently sat down" are reconstituted as, "hanging round, but she none the less resignedly, after a little, dropped to the bench" (682.35-36, 12).

Daisy's rough edges continue to be smoothed out from a problematical "deucedly sociable" to being "tremendously easy" (685.3, 17). An "unscrupulous young person" becomes inoffensively "an expert young person" (685.6, 17). When she speaks "very placidly" it mellows further into speaking "with all serenity" (686.4, 19). And then "with the same placidity" fades into "without a shadow of emotion" (686.8, 19). Indeed, she is merely a shadow of a person, but vivid as a symbol.

From the active, emotional response that "she was offended," the revision gives it passively and emotionlessly that "she had been drawn back" (686.11, 19). And where once "she only stood there laughing," revised, "she only remained an elegant image of free light irony" (694.36, 37). Here we find explicit articulation of the process outlined in chapter 1. Daisy-1 is human, laughing. Daisy-2 is the expression of mental images of rarefied elements (such as irony, as long as its free and light, not conflicting with innocence). Faced with a coquette, Winterbourne had been only "puzzled." Faced with a Platonic form, he is "quite mystified" (695.29, 38).

From hopes, in the original, of some kind of human attachment, including a sexual one, Winterbourne changes to hoping nothing, hardly even thinking of anything beyond going for a walk. First, "he felt as if there were something romantic going forward. He could have believed he was going to elope with her." Then revised, there is only "the note of some small sweet strain of romance, not intense but clear and sweet. He could believe he was *really* going 'off' with her" (695.42-.44, 39). The "romance" in the revision is merely of an adventure to a castle, as opposed to the connotations of "something romantic going forward."

And in the revision, going off is simply going off to the castle for the day, very different from thinking of eloping. The one involves sex, intrigue, tension, variety; the other involves innocence.

When Daisy-1 "was not fluttered," Daisy-2 "was clearly not at all in a nervous flutter—as she should have been to match *his* tension" (696.11-.12, 40). The added wording removes interaction: his tension, already reduced from the tension in the original, is here completely one-sided. James removes the possibility of interpreting Daisy as affected by human factors such as nervousness, or as seen in previous cites, any emotion at all. When Daisy talks, it is no longer "charming garrulity," which might involve an interlocutor, but rather an isolated "charming innocent prattle" (696.20, 40). Further removal of human interaction occurs in a scene where she "was exchanging greetings," clearly emphasizing interaction, changes to: she "was engaged in some pretty babble" (45.23, 47). In that same scene, her "reproaches" become "silver shafts" (47.17, 51); and our poor disembodied Daisy loses "her brilliant little face" and grows a "shining bloom" (47.38-.39, 52).

The de-sexing of Daisy is accomplished not just by descriptions of herself, but by removing gender-specific qualities and possibly romantic qualities in her wooer, Giovanelli. In fact, if it were not for the original version, Giovanelli would probably never have been characterized as a wooer at all. Originally lending tension and sexual possibilities to the narrative, in the revision Giovanelli metamorphoses into a silly cardboard prop.

It should be noted that James was meticulously correct in pronoun usage (as in other kinds of usage) and would never refer to a person as "that," unless he intended the nonperson connotation to be inferred. Other pronouns such as "it" take over in the revision as well. As Giovanelli first appears to us in the original, he was a "little man standing nursing his cane" but then became a "little figure that stood nursing its cane." The description continues, "He had a handsome face [and flowers] in his button-hole" changes to "It had a handsome face [and flowers] in its buttonhole." Finally the effect culminates in Winterbourne's jealous response, "Do you mean to speak to that man?" becomes "Do you mean to speak to that thing?" (49.42-.46, 56).

As sexual threat, or sexual hope, Giovanelli is further wiped away when he fades from having "a brilliant smile, an intelligent eye" to having "seemed to shine, in his coxcombical way" (50.23, 57). As in Daisy, body parts are removed, which removes connotations of bodily interaction, or as James would say, intercourse. His status as a "clever imitation of [a gentleman]" falls as well. In the revision he "isn't even a very plausible imitation of one" (50.39, 58).

In a scene where Daisy is being remonstrated for being seen in public with Giovanelli, he is depicted originally as "laughing very agreeably." The depiction is revised to "laughing irresponsibly" (52.33, 62). "Giovanelli" changes into "the girl's attendant admirer" (54.37, 66). At a party where in the original Giovanelli sang, in the revision he did not sing, but "warbled" (56.17-.18, 69). The "brilliant little Roman" becomes the "glossy little Roman" (58.20, 74). And again, Daisy's "cavalier" is, in the revision, reduced to "her coxcomb of the Corso" (59.5-.6, 75).

Part of Daisy-1's moral ambiguity derives from moral imputations from at least partly sympathetic characters in Mrs. Costello and Mrs. Walker. After the revisions, Daisy-2 is saved from moral question because the caricaturing of Mrs. Costello and Mrs. Walker discredits them as moral voices. In the revision, these women receive less sympathetic description and become so exaggeratedly nasty towards Daisy-2 that the reader must side with Daisy-2. There is no ambiguity.

Mrs. Costello, who is Winterbourne's aunt, undergoes a revised view of the Millers, from "they are very common" to "they're horribly common" (687.5, 23). Again, from telling Winterbourne that Daisy "is very common" Costello is revised to say "she's of the last crudity" (688.4, 23). And from a "dreadful girl" Daisy is thought "a horror" (688.45, 25). Our heroine, in the original, is fairly called by Costello a "young person" but in revision the intolerant old aunt calls our heroine a "little abomination" (698.29, 44). Speaking of Daisy's Italian friends, who include Giovanelli, Costello's reference to "her foreigners" becomes "her unmistakably low foreigners" (44.21, 45-46).

When Mrs. Walker wants to know who Daisy plans to go out with, in the original, she "asked," but in the revision she more imposingly "asked without mercy" (48.20, 53). Rather than telling Daisy "don't walk off," Walker is revised to warn her, "don't prowl off" (48.27, 53). From "That girl" Daisy becomes for Walker, "that crazy girl" (51.26, 59). And where, in the original, Walker already made Daisy out to be "crazy," she is revised to "reckless" (51.33, 60). At her party, where Walker has publicly slighted Daisy, text which does not occur in the original at all is added: "But this lady's [Walker's] face was also as a stone" (58.16, 74).

Aesthetic influences in the revision are clear enough in the placements of the words such as "charming," "sweet," and expressions such as, "limpid as the very cleanest water" as rarefying human descriptions, Daisy's face reconstituted as a shining bloom and her utterances characterized as flowers gathered, a person transformed into a creature or an apparition, people becoming echoes, emotions

in terms of shadows, and again, "she remained an elegant image of free light irony."

An impalpable, unprovable, yet important point, if the reader is familiar with aestheticist works, is that the over all aesthetic experience that most readers will have with the work of art, *Daisy Miller*, is of a distinctly aestheticist flavor. The experience with "Daisy Miller: a Study" is not.

CRITICAL REVIEWS

Viola Dunbar's article, "The Revision of *Daisy Miller*," notes James' discovery that "my supposedly typical little figure was of course pure poetry" (*New York* viii). He no longer viewed Daisy as typical, but rather as an "idealized treatment of the American girl" (Dunbar 311). Dunbar's point is that by subtle revisions, James destroys all opposition to Daisy, manipulates the reader into having to sympathize with her. That point is certainly true, as we have seen.

Dunbar as well gives a few textual samples to contrast the *New York* with the *Cornhill* versions. These samples have now been expanded (in the preceding section of this chapter) to give a complete picture of the important differences. To summarize, the changes in the *New York Edition* achieve the following: Winterbourne clearly sided more with Daisy (against Mrs. Costello and Mrs. Walker who represent "society") which reduces the reader's moral dilemma, because fewer faults occur in Daisy, and this facilitates greater sympathy with the heroine; Winterbourne still does not like Daisy's behavior (in the revision), so her absence of faults prevents Winterbourne from being able to blame her. As a result, Winterbourne is more "muddled" and "mystified" in the revision than in the original. Giovanelli is reduced from the status of man and wooer to hopeless, innocuous straw thing that is no threat to Daisy: it is no longer incaution for Daisy to be around him because, in the revision, he becomes harmless; Mrs. Costello and Mrs. Walker are made much more acrimonious such that the reader dislikes them, and therefore sympathizes all the more with Daisy, viewing Daisy as an innocent victim of the scorn of bitter old women. The surrounding characters are changed to reduce hints of human fault in Daisy which were present in the *Cornhill* version. To complete the picture, Daisy is bloodless and remote. Daisy is emended with more strikingly poetic phrases, postures and images. She has been made a poetic ideal of innocence.

This examination of James' revisions seems to lead to a conclusion that Dunbar does not reach. She concludes that James intended to "make the reader feel

more deeply the pathos of appealing innocence misjudged by inflexible formalism" (Dunbar 316-317). But how does one feel *more* deeply about a character who has been made less deep and more simplistic? Daisy becomes dehumanized, made into an abstraction. Complex, ambiguous human interaction is removed among the characters. A sharper delineation is drawn between good and evil, black and white. The melodrama has been undercut, the humanity of the narrative rendered superficial. There remains perhaps a sentimental sadness in the death of pure innocence; however, human sympathy and human impact are undermined. And even sentimental sadness seems silly amid so much hyperbole and caricature.

Edward Stone's article, "A Further Note on *Daisy Miller* and Cherbuliez," focuses primarily on James' indebtedness to Cherbuliez' novel, *Paule Méré*. The reference to *Paul Méré* in the text of *Daisy Miller* functions to "imply disapproval of Mrs. Costello's snobbery" (Stone 214). The initiated reader, says Stone, would have understood the parallel situations and therefore would not be outraged at James' treatment of the American girl.

Stone acknowledges that the influence on the final version of *Daisy Miller* was likely less conscious. Though the indictment of Mrs. Costello's snobbery is more pronounced in the *New York Edition*, the characterization of Daisy is less human. For the analogy with *Paule Méré* to work, the heroine must be human. One of the heroines of *Paule Méré* exclaims, "Why cannot a French novelist draw, with any approach to verisimilitude, a young girl brought up in the Anglo-Saxon fashion?" (Stone 216). For better or worse, accomplishing verisimilitude of character appears to have been on James' mind more in 1878 than in 1909.

Carol Ohmann's article, "*Daisy Miller*: A Study in Changing Intentions," finds today's readers invoking Daisy "as one of our familiars in the assurance that she will come and be recognized, as an American figure both vital and prototypical" (Ohmann 1). Ohmann is the champion of viewing Daisy as a truly American type. This is interesting in that James expressly disavows that Daisy is such, as we have seen above, in his preface to the *New York Edition*. However, James also notes that this is something he should have seen when he wrote "Daisy Miller: a Study." Again, "[M]y supposedly typical little figure was of course pure poetry, and had never been anything else." (*New York* viii), and in discussing the omission of the subtitle, "a Study," he adds that it "ought from the first to have been apparent to me, that my little exhibition is made to no degree whatever in critical but, quite inordinately and extravagantly, in poetical terms" (*New York* vi).

Of course, quite opposed to never having "been anything else," Daisy *had* been something else in "Daisy Miller: a Study"—she had been identifiable as

human. Indeed, we know that the idea for the story came to James from a friend's daughter, "a child of nature and freedom [who] had 'picked up' by the wayside a good-looking Roman" (*New York* vi). Undoubtedly, the germ of the idea for the story was less concrete in James' mind during the revisions thirty years later. In fact, upon revision he had no recollection of why he called the original "a Study" (*New York* vi). We see James' intention, but we do not know that James necessarily intended any intense emotion. It may be that James did intend more emotion to be evoked by the increased poetical terms, as opposed to what he calls critical terms. We do not know, but in any event, the type of intense emotion is in question.

Emotion evoked from sympathy with a human character, one that corresponds to actual-world experience, to "truth in detail," is very different from purely aesthetic emotion evoked from an aesthetic experience with a poetic ideal of beauty in innocence. "Daisy Miller: a Study" evokes the emotion of human sympathy in addition to the emotion of aesthetic experience in the work of art, where as *Daisy Miller* can only evoke a poetic intensity of aesthetic experience. Critical terms, as James uses the phrase, may seem odd here equated with seeing more human dimensions and ambiguities. But these are most likely the critical terms in James' "Art of Fiction" (evinced in the previous chapters) by which James stresses the importance of correspondence with real life.

Ohmann, it seems, views the passage of years, and changing values, as precluding contemporary readers from being outraged or insulted. This is very likely true. But the exsanguinated and remote constitution of the revised heroine leaves little room for outrage anyway. It might also be noted that Ohmann cites from the *Cornhill* version, in which Daisy, in fact, is a more typical American girl and less an idealized object. Contemporary readers are, perhaps, less easily offended and more likely to enjoy Daisy's cheeky display of independence in the *Cornhill* version.

Ohmann posits that the novella begins as, "a comic portrayal of different ways of living, different manners" (Ohmann 4), contrasting European and American mores, but ends as a metaphysical portrait of purity and nature personified in Daisy. In the second part, even in the *Cornhill* version, "Daisy is not identified with a particular society, but simply and wholly with the natural world" (Ohmann 8). But here we remember that James viewed American society as being rustic and unsophisticated, very like the simple, natural world (*Hawthorne* 10). Ohmann thinks this shift (from manners to metaphysics) interrupts the rhythm of the narrative, though it serves a purpose: it makes Daisy's death more palatable, in fact, inevitable. "Once Daisy is identified with the world of nature, we see that

she is subject to its laws of process. Her very beauty becomes a reminder of mortality" (Ohmann 9).

It is interesting that the crux of the shift is in that, without the shift, the reader is lead to conclude that social indiscretion is the cause of Daisy's death. The heightened ideal, the pure poetry of Daisy, must be pursued to enable the reader to see her death as natural physically (medically), but not a natural result morally, not deserved. This may be the case of James' intention, and it would partly explain the heightened ideality of Daisy in the *New York Edition*, in the aftermath of thirty years of readers judging and condemning Daisy. In fact, Ohmann suggests that such heightening of ideality in the 1909 revision supports her suggestion of the need for the ideal to be emphasized in order to affirm Daisy's moral purity and reconcile her death.

Like Dunbar, Ohmann concludes that the heightened poetic artifice of the ideal, "adds to the emotional appeal [and] intensifies our response to his story" (Ohmann 11). I make the same objection to this conclusion as I made to Dunbar's conclusion. Characters as objectified and idealized conventions leave the character nonhuman. There is less in the character for human readers to identify with—less evoking of reader sympathy. Indeed, as quoted earlier, James would agree with my objection: "As people feel life, so they will feel the art that is most closely related to it." And further, James objects to any tampering with the accuracy with which fictional characters retain actual-world qualities, "In proportion as in what [art] offers us we see life *without* rearrangement do we feel that we are touching the truth; in proportion as we see it *with* rearrangement do we feel that we are being put off with a convention" ("Art of Fiction" 405).

In *Daisy Miller*, the human condition is not represented and, as noted earlier, the character *is* a convention: ideal innocence. Perhaps one difference in reaction to "Daisy Miller: a Study," between an anti-Miller and a pro-Miller, lies in one being interested in moral purity, the other in moral complexity. The latter obtains more of what we have seen James call "moral energy."

Ohmann also states that, "These revisions [for the *New York Edition*] are occasional and do not essentially change *Daisy Miller*" (Ohmann 11). This assertion runs counter to all the evidence we have seen.

Annette Kar, in her article, "Archetypes of American Innocence: Lydia Blood and Daisy Miller," speaks of a kind of indigenous principle of supernatural innocence: "inviolable innocence compounded with instinctive moral judgment" (Kar 32). Part of the charm of this American principle is that those who partake of it, enjoy "a sublime ignorance of it" (Kar 32). It is instinctive and unselfconscious.

This is true only of the revised Daisy-2, as one revision we have seen depicts her as all ignorant of social forms. This is as heightened an ideal as we have met.

Kar also stresses the battle between individuality and conformity to social conventions. Daisy's identity will be lost if she submits to old-world social conventions. This emphasis is refreshing if applied to Daisy-1 (Kar does not make that distinction), yet Kar's view is extreme compared with the views of the other articles. To retain her identity against social pressure, Daisy is "rebelling against its conventions, and defying its time-honored codes of behavior" (Kar 35). However, Daisy-2 has become another convention, a piece of poetic artifice.

Kar's interpretation of defiant rebel is at odds with her own interpretation of heightened ideal (she does not delineate them between the two versions). One laments that, from Kar's views, in the single work of art, though Daisy retains her identity in defying convention, she loses it in her metamorphosis to pure poetry. But this conflict is easily reconciled once it is understood that Daisy-1, whose innocence is ambiguous, is the independent and rebellious one who acts with typical American assumptions of freedom of behavior, the one who does not lose her identity; while Daisy-2 has only a symbolic identity from the beginning and is purely a constructed ideal, poetic form.

Kar wishes to make the point that because Winterbourne is "involved in each step that leads to the final outcome [and] seeks Daisy out at her home and openly indicates an interest in her future, [that Winterbourne is] actively implicated in [her] fate" (Kar 36). Kar goes on to discuss moral principle in Winterbourne's perception of Daisy. Winterbourne, says Kar, has never experienced this type of woman before, and therefore he is muddled in trying to apply any familiar European moral principle to her. Furthermore, Winterbourne wanted "knowledge-ableness" (Kar 38), in Daisy. Daisy triumphs over this knowledgeableness requirement with her own "instinctive moral judgment" (Kar 38), that comes with ideal innocence. This explains why her ultimate innocence is a revelation to Winterbourne. He had not the instinct or the indigenous understanding. One begins to feel the awesomeness of this lofty innocence, to wonder whether we can blame Winterbourne for misjudging, when, one suspects, his experience was limited to humans. Applying human experience to an apotheosis of innocence would baffle anyone.

Indeed, innocence as serious in human terms at all, whether exonerating Daisy, or glorifying American ideals, may be making much ado about nothing. We know from Edel's biography that James had little use for American innocence in his own life. "Henry had finally abandoned his American innocence" (*Middle Years* 237). There is a notable differentiation between morality and inno-

cence which seems to reveal a deprecatory attitude towards Daisy. "Henry was ceasing to believe that Americans were composed of finer moral fibre than the Europeans. He still believed that their innocence had great charm; nevertheless he now discerned in this innocence a claustrophobic ignorance. Worse still, a need to impose it upon others" (*Middle Years* 240). In the United States, a "large juvenility is stamped upon the face of things" (*Hawthorne* 10). And we know that when presented with the idea that "Daisy Miller: a Study" might be an "outrage on American girlhood," he thought the idea had (characteristically for James) a "bewildering intensity" (*New York* v, vi). We have also seen how the revision is rife with caricature and hyperbole. While speaking to Daisy-1 Winterbourne warns, "Flirting is a purely American custom; it doesn't exist here," but James revised this speech to: "American flirting is a purely American silliness; it has—in its ineptitude of innocence—no place in *this* system" (57.15-.16, 71). The revision reflects annoyance with American innocence and with its effects in Daisy's behavior. Innocence is an ideal, but it may not be such a great ideal. It may be that the revision, in response to a provincial naiveté in Americans taking their morality so seriously, James amused himself by taking the object of outrage and turning it into a light ironical carnival of manners, filled with comic hyperbole. By overblowing it to make it small, James deflated responses of moral umbrage and outrage. We need the woman in the gondola, James' companion who he quotes in his preface, to remind us that James has, "by poetic artifice, not only led our judgement of it astray, but made *any* judgement quite impossible" (*New York* vii).

CRITICAL REVIEWS IN PERSPECTIVE

All of these articles leave one contemplating innocence, moral rightness, as antithetical to conventional society, sophisticated sin. In fact, one begins contemplating a good deal in terms of either/or; good/evil; black/white. This seems a superficial contemplation, which is troubling when it refers to a subtle and complex psychological realist such as Henry James.

The view taken by this paper is that "Daisy Miller: a Study" does invoke a common human experience after all: Humans, such as Winterbourne, attempting to reach an ideal, always fall short. It is common human experience to sometimes feel close to achieving some form of ideal, perhaps an ideal relationship, then only to fall again upon the defects and unpredictableness of one's, and others', humanity. In *Daisy Miller*, the ideal of innocence does not fall short, but as

an ideal it (Daisy-2) is unreachable by humans. Therefore an ideal relationship must fall short, must remain the farthest thing from possibility. Daisy-2 is unreachable by Winterbourne, Giovanelli, or any other character. She remains remote from human interaction. She is not human.

It might be noted that the only article in which Daisy's independence is a major issue is Kar's, where Daisy must rebel against conventions and defy expectations in order to retain her identity. Independence is a human struggle. The more a pure ideal of innocence is stressed, the less significant a human struggle for independence becomes. Ironically, Kar also posits the most extreme characterizations of innocence-as-ideal in *Daisy-1*: the inviolable and ideal principle that really only applies to Daisy-2. As Dunbar shows, to achieve the pure ideal, the human struggle is all but exscinded (which occurs in the revision). The concept of pure, poetic innocence pervades the revised atmosphere. The question of independence becomes a nonissue as James implies finally that Daisy-2 is not a human character.

Daisy-2 no longer faces much challenge from Winterbourne—he is less critical and more muddled. Daisy-2 no longer need worry about charges from the Costellos and Walkers—their aspersions are exaggerated to the point of becoming ridiculous. Such criticisms lose credibility and do not threaten. Daisy-2 has no tension and none of the normal temptations associated with intimacy in her relations with Giovanelli—he is completely transformed from a beautifully singing, handsome man to a warbling thing that nurses its cane, a harmless prop. The drama of ambiguous values, struggles with identity, and human interaction (especially the psychological kind in which James normally relishes) in searching for personal and social meaning are lost in *Daisy Miller*.

"Daisy Miller: a Study," done in what James calls "critical terms," carries tension between the two themes, 1) independence asserting itself, and 2) innocence as victim of scorn, as well as tension in the question of whether Daisy-1 even is innocent. The independence-innocence problem is suggested more by Ohmann's article than by the others. Tension arises in Daisy's relations with her satellite characters more vividly in "Daisy Miller: a Study" than in *Daisy Miller*. One normally deems tension an asset to a narrative. Yet none of the articles considered here promotes this idea, or even notices it as an issue in the revision or in the contrast between versions. Over all, the articles touch on points that, perhaps not intentionally, allude to the problem of the dehumanization of Daisy in the shift from human terms to idealizing terms, but none take up the problem as it pertains to the status of the work, or recognize it as a problem between the original and the revised versions. This contrast, that "Daisy Miller: a Study" contains ten-

sion among its characters and *Daisy Miller* does not, highlights what exactly *is* the issue.

CONCLUSION

In speaking of how *not* to approach writing novels, James warns not to let art be viewed as a "heavenly messenger [that] wings her way outside of life altogether, breathing a superfine air" ("Art of Fiction" 413). And in a critique of Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter*, James faults the book for its poetic terms, its rearrangement of human qualities away from reality: "The faults of the book are, to my sense, a want of reality and an abuse of the fanciful element—of a certain superficial symbolism. The people strike me not as characters, but as representatives, very picturesquely arranged, of a single state of mind; and the interest of the story lies, not in them, but in the situation" (*Hawthorne* 90). But this is precisely what James achieved in his 1909 work, *Daisy Miller*. It would be an indictment if we thought James meant to adhere to his own warnings, to adhere to what he called "truth in detail" ("Art of Fiction" 399), in creating Daisy-2, as a corresponding-to-life character such as Daisy-1. But we must not think such a thing. Rather, *Daisy Miller* is a different experiment: a symbolic analysis of the consequences of artificially injecting an ideal into an (intellectual or social) environment with which the ideal is not compatible, an environment in which such an ideal did not organically evolve, in which an ideal such as American innocence does not naturally reside. In short, innocence is thrown upon foreign soil. That is the overarching symbolism of *Daisy Miller*. Just as James criticized Hawthorne's work, so in James' 1909 work, the interest is in the situation, not in the characters.

Though the experiment is symbolic, it is not entirely serious. It may be a perfectly serious fact that American innocence, as Winterbourne implies, "has no place in this system." But James' treatment of the experiment in the revision introduces so much caricature and hyperbole, elements which succeed in making the revision a funnier work, turn the experiment into something of a comedy, Daisy's death notwithstanding. The idea of comedy is quite consciously entertained between 1878 and 1909 by James as reflected in the title of his 1882 theatrical version: *Daisy Miller: A Comedy in Three Acts*. Indeed, one feels James under the spell of the comedic muse in many of the revisions of 1909.

The intended "figure in the carpet," as it were, may not be easy to pinpoint. As a suspicion of Daisy's courier is revised from the original "I think he smokes," to "I think he smokes in their faces" (688.20, 24), so the effect is radically differ-

ent between the two works. We think James enjoyed watching the smoke go round.

Again we hear from James' companion in the gondola chatting about *Daisy Miller*, "[Y]our pretty perversion of it [*Daisy Miller*], or your unprincipled mystification of our sense of it, does it really too much honour—in spite of which, none the less, as anything charming or touching always to that extent justifies itself, we after a fashion forgive and understand you. But why *waste* your romance?" (*New York* vii). Such self-conscious tones ring with aestheticism. Henry James did indeed return to aestheticism, in the 1909 *Daisy Miller*, with his own "elegant image of free light irony," perhaps a nice way of saying, "he laughed." Clearly in his later years, aestheticism had become a deeply entwined element in James' literary thought, in his writing style.

I suggest that it should be clear that aestheticism in its many forms, as it developed in James' style, was a major contributor to the revision, *Daisy Miller*, that the idealization of beauty in Daisy and in her innocence was an aestheticist device developed over the years between 1878 and 1909 and reconstituted the work.

There are now grounds for asserting that the work, "Daisy Miller: a Study" and the work, *Daisy Miller*, are two distinct works of art with two distinct intentions and results. The former deals with psychological study, getting at meaning through conversation, exploring ambiguities and contrasts of values; while the latter deals with developing, with a lightly (and ironically) constituted aesthetic experience, a symbol of ideal innocence. The revised rapture is with an idea of lost innocence—ironically, with a comic lightness surrounding its death. The idea of passion is aestheticised. One is reminded of the adopted father of aestheticism, John Keats: "Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss" (Keats 345). Daisy-1 experienced life. After being revised and aestheticised, Daisy-2 was the "bold lover" who could never experience a kiss.

Final Comments

One way to fend off misguided objections to an argument is to avoid floundering in a mire of ambiguously defined terms. You cannot clearly lay down an argument until you have clearly laid down the terminology. Term-definition ambiguities, discrepancies, and vagueness cause more disagreements than actual differences of opinion. I have spent a great deal of effort to eliminate any ambiguity or vagueness in the key terms: abstract object, aesthetic object, work of art, subjective, objective, real, actual.

Another weak link in an argument's chain is often that only a "representative selection" of the supporting evidence is collected and presented. In this book I have collected all of the evidence of the differences between the two Daisy Miller texts, and presented all of the differences that have any bearing on the two-works claim. I have allowed for no guesswork in precisely and thoroughly clarifying the differences between the two Daisy Miller works.

I have demonstrated the irrefutable and radical differences in the respective levels of epistemological intimacy and intensity between the two works. The epistemologically defined abstract objects, the aesthetic object as an experience of the mind, and the pervasive conflicts in meaning between the two Daisy Miller texts, demonstrate that the two texts *must* represent two very real and two very separate works of art.

I believe there are a number of rewarding results and very positive outcomes of this book. The oeuvre of Henry James is enriched by recognizing the added variety of aesthetic experience in his works. A working method of determining the status of works of art is developed, as promised in the introduction to this book. Clear terminology is offered in the implementation of the method. Clear ideas and terminology are offered to differentiate the epistemological and metaphysical status of works of art (and abstract objects in general).

In closing, here is a simple outline of the argument of this book:

• Abstract objects are created by language use

- Abstract objects are real, and have a diversity of epistemological statuses depending upon intensity and intimacy of the object-attributes that constitute the abstract object (but all have the same metaphysical status of not actual)

- Aesthetic object is a subset of abstract object (and one with a strong intensity and intimacy of experience)

- A work of art is an aesthetic object

- The subjective sense of a literary work of art is created through objectively traceable language use

- Significantly different language use that changes the intimacy and type of experience, also changes the subjective sense of the work.

- Two works evoking a distinctly different subjective sense (different intensity, intimacy, and other qualities of experience) have distinctly different epistemological statuses, i.e., they must constitute two different real objects in conscious experience.

- Two different epistemologically real aesthetic objects must be two distinct works of art.

- The two Daisy Millers evoke distinctly different subjective senses and experiences, and they are two distinctly different real objects.

- The two Daisy Millers are two separate and distinct works of art.

Bibliography

Ayer, A. J., "Construction of Our Theory of the Physical World". *Philosophy As It Is*. Eds. Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat. London: Penguin, 1979: 311–347.

Ayer, A. J., "One's Knowledge of Other Minds". *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*. Ed. Gustafson, Donald F. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964: 346–364.

Carnap, Rudolf. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". *Modern Philosophy of Language*. Ed. Maria Baghramian. Washington, D. C.: Counterpoint, 1999: 68–85.

Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

_____. *Writing and Difference*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Dunbar, Viola. "The Revision of *Daisy Miller*". *MLA*. LXV (May 1950): 311–317.

Edel, Leon. *A Bibliography of Henry James*. 3d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

_____. "Henry James". *Pamphlets on American Writers*, Number 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960.

_____. *Henry James: A Life*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1985.

_____. *Henry James: The Conquest of London: 1870–1881*. New York: Avon Books, 1978.

_____. *Henry James: The Master: 1901–1916*. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972.

_____. *Henry James: The Middle Years: 1882–1895*. New York: Avon Books, 1978.

_____. *Henry James: The Treacherous Years: 1895–1900*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd., 1971.

_____. *Henry James: The Untried Years: 1843–1870*. New York: Avon Books, 1978.

Eliot, T. S. "Religion and Literature". *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*. Ed. Frank Kermode. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975: 97–106.

Eliot, T. S. "The Function of Criticism". *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*. Ed. Frank Kermode. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1975: 68–76.

Eliot, T. S. "Arnold and Pater". *Selected Essays: 1917–1932*. London: Faber and Faber, 1949: 346–357.

Ellmann, Richard. "Henry James Among the Aesthetes". *a long the riverrun*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989: 132–149.

Ellmann, Richard. *Oscar Wilde*. New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1988.

Huysmans, Joris-Karl. *Against Nature*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1984.

Hoffmann, Charles G. *The Short Novels of Henry James*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957.

Ingarden, Roman. "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object". *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*. Ed. Peter J. McCormick. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985: 107–132.

_____. "The Art of Fiction". *The Portable Henry James*. Ed. Morton Dauwen Zabel. New York: Penguin Books, 1981: 387–414.

_____. *The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces*. London: Charles Scribner's Sons, Ltd., 1962.

_____. "Criticism". *The Portable Henry James*. Ed. Morton Dauwen Zabel. New York: Penguin Books, 1981: 416–422.

_____. "Daisy Miller: A Comedy in Three Acts". Ed. Leon Edel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990: 115–176.

_____. "Daisy Miller: a Study". *Cornhill Magazine*, XXXVII, June 1878: 678–698 and XXXVIII, July 1878: 44–67.

_____. *Daisy Miller: A Study*. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1879 [1878].

_____. *Daisy Miller. The Novels and Tales of Henry James, New York Edition*, Volume XVIII. (First published 1909.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

_____. *Daisy Miller: A Study. An International Episode. Four Meetings*, Vols. I, II. London: Macmillan and Co, 1879.

_____. *Daisy Miller: A Study. An International Episode. Four Meetings*. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1918.

_____. *The Golden Bowl*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982.

_____. *Hawthorne*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963.

_____. *The Portrait of a Lady*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd, 1981.

_____. *Stories of Writers and Artists*. New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation.

Horne, Philip, ed. *Henry James: A Life in Letters*. New York: Viking, 1999.

Jung, Carl G. "The Psychology of the Child Archetype". *Essays on a Science of Mythology*. Trans. R.F.C. Hull. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973: 70–100.

Kripke, Saul. "Identity and Necessity". *Philosophy As It Is*. Eds. Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat. London: Penguin, 1979: 467–513.

Madison, G. B. *The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press: 1990.

Kaplan, Fred. *Henry James: The Imagination of Genius*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992.

Kar, Annette. "Archetypes of American Innocence: Lydia Blood and Daisy Miller". *AQ*. V, 1 (Spring 1953): 31–38.

Keats, John. "Ode on a Grecian Urn". *The Complete Poems*. Ed. John Barnard. London: Penguin Books, 1988: 344–346.

Matthiessen, F. O., ed. *The James Family*. New York: 1947.

McCormick, Peter J. "On Ingarden's Selected Papers in Aesthetics". *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*. Roman Ingarden. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985: 7–16.

Ohmann, Carol. "*Daisy Miller*: A Study in Changing Intentions". *AL*. 36, 1 (March 1964): 3–11.

Pater, Walter. *The Renaissance*. Chicago: Academy Chicago, 1982.

Paul. "The Letters of Paul". *The New Oxford Annotated Bible (RSV)* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977: 1361–1454.

Pepper, Steven. "The Aesthetic Work of Art". *Art and Philosophy: Readings in Aesthetics*. Ed. W. E. Kennick. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964: 108–125.

Plato. "Phaedo". *Collected Dialogues*. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989: 40–98.

_____. "Republic". *Collected Dialogues*. Trans. Paul Shorey. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989: 75–844.

Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of 'Meaning'". *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers,* Vol. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 215–271.

Richardson, Lyon N. "Henry James: Introduction". *Henry James: Representative Selections*. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966 (First published by American Book Company, 1941): ix–cxxvii.

Ryle, Gilbert. "Imagination". *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*. Ed. Gustafson, Donald F. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964: 117–153.

Roditi, Edouard. *Oscar Wilde*. New York: New Directions, 1986.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.

Schopenhauer. "The Platonic Idea as the Object of Art". *The Works of Schopenhauer*. Ed. Will Durant. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1929: 93–158.

Sheriff, John K. *The Fate of Meaning*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Spong, John Shelby, Bishop. *Why Christianity Must Change or Die*. New York: HarperCollins, 1998.

Stalnaker, Robert C. "Possible Worlds". *Philosophy As It Is*. Eds. Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat. London: Penguin, 1979: 447–465.

Stone, Edward. "A Further Note on *Daisy Miller* and Cherbuliez". *PQ*. XXIX, 2 (April 1950): 213–216.

Strawson, P. F. *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

Strawson, P. F. "Persons". *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*. Ed. Gustafson, Donald F. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964: 377–403.

Tanselle, G. Thomas. *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

Wagenknecht, Edward. *Eve and Henry James*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978.

Whissen, Thomas Reed. *The Devil's Advocates: Decadence in Modern Literature*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Wilde, Oscar. "The Critic as Artist". *The Artist as Critic*. Ed. Richard Ellmann. New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1970: 340–408.

_____. "The Decay of Lying". *The Artist as Critic*. Ed. Richard Ellmann. New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1970: 290–320.

_____. *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. New York: Signet Classic, Inc., 1962.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914–1916*. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers,1961.

Wollheim, Richard. "Art as a Form of Life". *Philosophy As It Is*. Eds. Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat. London: Penguin, 1979: 131–159.

Author Biography

Robert Rose-Coutré has been studying philosophy and aesthetics since the early 1980s, and has been a professional editor since the mid 1980s. He has been the editor for scholarly, arts, legal, and software publications. Robert published a novel in 2001, The Marriage Syndrome, under a pseudonym. He has a Master of Arts degree in literature/aesthetics, with additional graduate studies in the philosophy of language. He studied analytical philosophy at Florida State University under world-renowned Professors Jaakko Hintikka (University of Helsinki) and Russell Dancy (Harvard), and German Idealism under Professor William H. Werkmeister (University of Nebraska). Robert Rose-Coutré has been a member of the British Museum Library, Colloquy Society, American Mensa, Intertel Society, and the board of directors for the Anhinga Literary Press.

Mr. Rose-Coutré consulted original texts for this book at the British Museum Library in London. He collated letter by letter the 1878 "Daisy Miller: a Study" against the 1909 *Daisy Miller* and conducted a character-to-character comparison, for this study.