CommentaryColor, Mental Location, and the Visual Field☆
References (12)
The location problem for color subjectivism
Consciousness and Cognition
(2001)Three varieties of visual field
Philosophical psychology
(1996)A theory of sentience
(2000)Color and illusion
Color for philosophers: Unweaving the rainbow
(1993)
Cited by (12)
The ineffability of qualia and the word-anchoring problem
2005, Language SciencesCitation Excerpt :As discussed previously (Musacchio, 2002), the encoding of colors—the reflectance properties—of objects is only partially isomorphic, because the phenomenal experiences produced by objective colors can be mimicked by several spectrally different metamers. Metamers are spectral frequency-intensity sets (Section 3.2.1) that match a particular color experience (Rosenthal, 2001; Ross, 2001). Organisms with retinal cones of spectral sensitivities different from ours would easily detect the flaws of the metamers imitation, and realize that we have imperfect senses that do not portray reality as it is.
Qualitative character and sensory representation
2002, Consciousness and CognitionQUALITY-SPACE FUNCTIONALISM ABOUT COLOR
2021, Journal of PhilosophyThe knowledge argument
2019, The Knowledge ArgumentNaturalizing grounding: How theories of ground can engage science
2018, Philosophy CompassA defense of holistic representationalism
2018, Mind and Language
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Commentary on P. W. Ross (2001). The location problem for color subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition,10(1), 42–58.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to David M. Rosenthal, Graduate School, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016-4309.