

HOW TO BE A GRACEFUL FOOTNOTE TO PLATO

Stuart Rosenbaum
Baylor University

My original title was "How Not To Be a Footnote to Plato." That title I now see was wrong. I thought at first I could tell you how not to be a footnote to Plato. What I discovered was that I must tell you how to be the right kind of footnote to Plato, for we are all footnotes to Plato, even Auxier and Hildebrand, both of whom I think probably struggle with their footnote-ness. And probably others among us struggle with our footnote-ness too; I suspect Alastair in his consequentialist exuberance would be reluctant, as would May Sim in her Aristotelianism and Tom Senior in his externalism. And I could mention others who come to mind as I write this. But what has moved me in this general direction is a deep desire to shed what I have seen as the *stigma* of being a footnote to Plato. Surely, I have thought, the unfortunate condition that A.N. Whitehead diagnosed us with is at least optional; but I have concluded that it is not.¹ That's the bad news. The good news is that I have come to believe it possible to be a more rather than less graceful footnote to Plato. Hence, my project here is to explain one way we can be graceful footnotes. There may be other ways, but the way I suggest here strikes me as at least minimally virtuous.

My plan, then, is to explain two dominant ways we can be footnotes to Plato and to endorse one of them as more graceful than the other. There are probably other ways of being footnotes, but the ways I target for attention here strike me as especially useful for some basic decisions about who we are as philosophers. And surely knowing who we are as philosophers is useful. (A story: My historian friends report conversations with strangers in shared aisles of plane trips; when their travel companions discover what the historian does, they inevitably besiege the historian with questions about political and social issues, thinking the historian is likely to be knowledgeable. My own experience in similar situations, probably yours too, is that on discovering that I am a philosopher my travel companions greet me with puzzled, stony silence. Perhaps I would get on better in those situations by saying simply that I'm a footnote to Plato; the silence might be less stony if not still puzzled.) In any case, whatever usefulness there may or may not be in knowing who we are as philosophers, our own psyches would undoubtedly profit from having an account we can give ourselves about who or what we are as philosophers.

Stuart Rosenbaum

I mentioned two dominant ways of being footnotes to Plato. The first way is to embrace the *goal* of Platonism – or at least a commonly accepted account of that goal; that goal is to arrive at a vision of the Good, the True and the Beautiful that makes possible the good life for individuals, for families, communities, societies, and indeed for all humans whatever their cultural, social or ecological conditions. The second way of being a footnote is to embrace the *means* Plato endorses toward achieving that goal: those means are, simply put, those of dialectical inquiry. These are two different ways one can be a footnote to Plato, but philosophers in our vaguely Western tradition are typically footnotes in both ways; they pursue Plato's goal and they pursue it in approximately the same dialectical way Plato did.

Now, I'll admit it seems strange to say about the goal of philosophy that it is seeking of the good, the true and the beautiful; but probably the reason it seems strange is that we don't think of those things as having any kind of unity anymore. When Alastair Norcross and his intellectual brother, Peter Singer, strain dialectically toward defenses of vegetarianism, abortion or infanticide, they do think of themselves as pursuing the truth about the good, but they don't think that pursuit has anything, except perhaps incidentally, to do with the beautiful. (We can quibble here and probably will later, but if Alastair thinks I've turned him into a straw man, let Peter Singer serve as my target; "that one" is not here to complain.) And Tom Senor's externalism has nothing explicitly to do with either the good or the beautiful; he wants to understand the content of the idea of justification, particularly as regards our knowledge of the external world. What the notion of an externalist account of justification has to do with either the good or the beautiful is not obvious and any connection is probably purely accidental. And May Sim's Aristotle also does not seek the unity in that trinity of the good, the true and the beautiful that Plato expects to find. Still, as Emerson (2003, p. 43) remarked, "A wise man will see that Aristotle Platonizes," and perhaps I can appeal to Emerson's authority in defense of my claim that May too is a footnote to Plato.

As I mentioned earlier, I started out wanting not to be a footnote to Plato, but now I want merely to be a more rather than a less graceful footnote. I think I can accomplish that goal – and you can too – by taking more seriously the American intellectual tradition, especially the work of John Dewey. And I'm sure there are other ways of being graceful footnotes to Plato; I don't want to be imperialistic. What makes Dewey especially helpful, however, is his own struggle with this same issue. I think Dewey ended up being a graceful footnote to Plato, but he did not manage what I originally hoped to find in him, a complete avoidance of Plato footnote-hood.

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

What makes Dewey a graceful footnote rather than the awkward one most of us manage to become is his embrace of Plato's goal – a vision of the good, the true and the beautiful – along with his rejection of Plato's means – dialectical inquiry. Before I get down to business (at long last), I'll issue my altar call up-front: you too can become a graceful footnote to Plato rather than the unseemly and awkward footnote most of us manage to become. (Your friends and relatives will still recognize you, but they'll really love you, your sex life will be a lot better and Dewey will be proud of you!)

Down to Business

Start with the cave – I mean that part of Plato's *Republic* that almost everybody knows. Everybody who teaches philosophy is accustomed to drawing pictures of Plato's allegory that represents what philosophy can do for ordinary mortals. The poor ordinary mortals are chained in front of a wall whereon appears shadows of real objects. As long as they remain chained to their places before the wall the ordinary mortals see only shadows that they mistake for realities. Their situation is worse than they know, however, for the shadows they see are cast by a fire that glows and flickers behind them, distorting the shadows thrown quivering on the wall before them. To see reality itself, these unfortunates must free themselves from their chains and become aware of the fire and ordinary objects that are responsible for their formerly inadequate, shadowy, flickering vision of reality. Once they begin to move around and their condition fully dawns on them, they see that things are worse than they thought; they are at the bottom of a deep cave, and the only real light they see is at the distant end of a long, steep, treacherous climb. Upon climbing strenuously to the entry of the cave, they find they see, really see, for the first time real objects illuminated by the real light of the sun. These unfortunates have finally, through unrelenting, determined effort, made their way into the light of the sun that fully illuminates reality. Plato's cave allegory is supposed to reveal your prisoner condition and invite you to break free of your chains and through whatever effort is required to climb into the sunlight.

How does a metaphorical prisoner break free of metaphorical chains and make the metaphorical climb into metaphorical sunlight? What tools are available to help with our prisoners' task? Plato's metaphorical pickaxe is dialectical inquiry; disinterested dialectical pursuit of truth about the conceptual content of ideas is supposed to free ordinary humans from their chains and enables their climb into the sunlight. Plato illustrates the relevant dialectical technique repeatedly; each dialogue targets a specific idea with the goal of freeing Socrates' interlocutors from their particular chains and

Stuart Rosenbaum

shadows. The chains, the shadows, the fire and the climb are metaphors for whatever obscures our understanding of the true realities that may be disclosed only through dialectical inquiry. Dialectic becomes the key to freedom and knowledge, and to the knowledge of goodness, truth and beauty, those controlling ideas at the center of all philosophy.

In our condition as footnotes to Plato, our only release from ignorance is our earnest practice of dialectic. So we philosophers practice dialectic; it gives us our identity. What gives Plato's dialectical technique seriousness is its relevance to life and action. Everybody remembers the example of Euthyphro, the hero of Plato's early dialogue who is shackled deep in the cave. Euthyphro is the benighted young man trying to bring his father to justice for the father's murder of a servant. That Euthyphro is trying to prosecute his own father for murder is just a prelude to the difficulties about to engulf Euthyphro's earnest effort to channel the approval of the gods; the circumstances surrounding the death of the allegedly murdered man, as you know, multiply Euthyphro's dialectical difficulties at the hands of his relentless interlocutor. Euthyphro understands well that righteousness is a demanding business, but he does not grasp the subtleties one must sort through before setting out to achieve righteousness in personal action. Socrates' efforts to elaborate these subtleties with dialectical precision are finally lost on Euthyphro because of his inadequate dialectical skill.

Euthyphro does seem to appreciate the point of Socrates' question, "Do the gods love an action because it is righteous or is an action righteous because the gods love it?" (Most moral philosophers have taken this question to embody the central philosophical point of *Euthyphro* and relish citing it as foundational for their separation of morality from religion.) But Euthyphro finally loses patience with the subtlety of the dialectic required to get to the world of action – in his own case to the prosecution of his father – and the dialogue closes with Euthyphro's escape from Socrates' dialectical clutches: "Another time, Socrates. I must be on my way." (Hamilton, 1961, pp. 169-185)

Our virtue as philosophers, the virtue Euthyphro lacked, is patience. Unlike Euthyphro, we have no place to go; we realize that the subtleties of dialectical inquiry are many and diverse and require unceasing patience. Hence, as philosophers, we ignore the world of action and attend to the demanding dialectical subtleties of our profession.

We are footnotes to Plato because we have the patience to continue searching for the conceptual results we need before we enter the world of life and action. Our philosophical patience (along with our academic appointments!) enables us, unlike Euthyphro, to continue our dialectical

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

pursuits of the true content of various ideas basic to our understanding of how to be good moral people, good cognizers of our world, good politicians, etc. Unlike Plato or Socrates, we don't think our efforts will yield a vision of the good, the true or the beautiful; we don't see our dialectical efforts as leading toward any organic unity of vision. We don't think the truth about good or right action has anything to do with the right way to cognize physical objects or appreciate works of art. We don't think any unity lurks behind our dialectical inquiries into the nature of truth, the nature of justification, the nature of right action, the nature of mind, the nature of art, and so on; we think these things – if we did somehow manage the dialectical understanding that keeps eluding us – are utterly independent of one another. To confirm this fact about ourselves, we need only think of a variety of prominent philosophers and their philosophical pursuits; consider Freddie Ayer, Bertie Russell, Rod Chisholm, Will Sellars, and Al Goldman or Al Plantinga. Our philosophical pursuits, unlike those of Plato and Socrates, have become – to use a political metaphor – Balkanized. We are all specialists of some sort; we are epistemologists, ethicists, metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and so on, and we don't suppose there are any essential connections among these different pursuits. On this score we have parted company with Plato and Socrates, or at least with that part of Platonism that conceives the goal of dialectical inquiry to be a vision of the good, the true and the beautiful.

What we have in common are simply our dialectical strategies, strategies recognizably the same across all of our special interests. These are the same strategies we recognize in Plato's dialogues in the conversations between Socrates and his interlocutors and are the reason we find Plato worth reading and teaching to our introductory philosophy classes. Again, we exemplify Plato's dialectical means, but we no longer aim at Plato's vision of the end he saw as the fruit of those means. We are footnotes in employing Plato's means or dialectical methods but we no longer have as our goal anything like a coherent, organic vision of the good, the true and the beautiful.

Beyond Business as Usual

Few philosophers still talk about the good, the true and the beautiful; it's hard to imagine, for example, telling a stranger in an airplane aisle, one who at least pretended interest in philosophy, that you were pursuing a vision of the good, the true and the beautiful. Not even the most grandiose among us thinks of ourselves so grandiosely; we think more modestly about our pursuits. So we try to understand what it is to be justified in believing there is an airplane we are on or just exactly why it is wrong to lie to our spouse or

Stuart Rosenbaum

whether or not we are really free to pick up our spoon, and so on. Or if we rise to the immodesty of Alastair, we imagine an end to major combat operations against Kantianism. These modest pursuits seem innocuous enough, and of course they are, but I think we pursue them because we think they are in some obscure way deeply relevant to the ways we live our lives, though like Euthyphro we would be hard pressed to give account of that relevance.

Some among us, however, do take seriously the idea that we should guide our lives, individually and communally, by a vision of the good. In *The Souls of Black Folk*, for example, W.E.B. DuBois repeatedly comes back to the idea of the good, the true and the beautiful as a coherent unitary ideal without which we must wander more or less aimlessly guided by a cruel American surrogate for that vision. In DuBois' (2003, p. 63) own words,

What if to the Mammonism of America be added the rising Mammonism of the reborn South, and the Mammonism of this South be reinforced by the budding Mammonism of its half-awakened black millions? Whither, then is the new world quest of Goodness and Beauty and Truth gone glimmering?

In DuBois' view, without a unified vision of the good, we are doomed to inferior surrogates like the pursuit of wealth; like Atalanta in the mythical tale DuBois references, we become seduced by Hippomenes' golden apples. DuBois is as radical an idealist as is Plato, and he believes that realizing the promise of America requires approximately the same coherent unity of vision that Plato's Socrates sought through dialectical, philosophical means. For DuBois, however, gaining that unitary vision requires, instead of dialectical skill, education about who we are historically and culturally along with an imaginative creativity to pursue a future that might more closely approximate the content of our vision of the good.

For DuBois, as for many American philosophers, the promise of America lies in its quest for goodness, beauty and truth, its quest to transcend the grasping, clutching neediness of European humanity. Gold is a poor European surrogate for an effort to realize an American vision of the good that, for DuBois, includes all humanity and that transcends inferior surrogates. The vision is living, especially in DuBois' work, and it should guide us toward an inclusive, edifying future. One sees an approximation of that vision in many classical American thinkers, including Whitman, Thoreau, Emerson, and of course James and Dewey in whom the force is particularly strong. But these thinkers, as did DuBois, turned their backs on the conventional, Platonist means of philosophical dialectic for pursuing the

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

coherent action-guiding vision of the good.² All these thinkers looked (metaphorically) “West” rather than “East;” their vision was shaped not by an Anglo-European philosophy that clung to the dialectical pursuit of elusive conceptual essences, but by an experience of their world as malleable and amenable to their hopes and dreams. Like DuBois, these American thinkers already had an approximation of the organic unity of vision that DuBois describes using Plato’s account of the goal of philosophy. DuBois, along with these classical American thinkers, shared Plato’s vision – organic unity among the good, the true and the beautiful. For these Americans, however, their realization of the visionary goal would be achieved – if it could be achieved – through the work of their hands, and it required no intervening dialectical chores. The American task was to take their vision of the good, the true and the beautiful and to bring that vision into reality out of the raw materials – the social, political, scientific and moral materials – of their natural world.

To cast Plato’s cave analogy so that it might reappear as a metaphor for DuBois and the Americans’ vision of philosophy, one might say that the Americans already had the relevant vision of the goal – they are already walking about in the light of the sun – and their task as Americans is to get that vision to shine into the dark parts of their world, to bring their world into conformity with their vision of the good; their job is to go down into the cave, clean it up and make sure that, using DuBois’ metaphor, Atalanta is not seduced by Hippomenes’ gold.

I should say more about the differences between these classical American thinkers and those I have called Anglo-Europeans. However, here I want to turn toward a question that I think probably should occur to anybody who sees the contrast I’m pointing toward: *Where* do the Americans get their vision of the good, the true and the beautiful? Remember that for Plato that vision is the *result* of disciplined and rigorous practice of dialectical method; it comes from the disciplined practice of dialectic for which Euthyphro, along with Socrates’ other interlocutors, lacks patience. Euthyphro wants to get on with it, to do the things that need doing, the things he knows must be done. Socrates finds Euthyphro lacking precisely because he does not have the patience to practice dialectic until it yields its proper fruit – the vision of the good that can inform action – the right action to be done at the right time in the right way, etc. In DuBois, however, the guiding vision is not a result of any system or method and certainly not an outcome of philosophical dialectic. Dialectical strategies are *not at all* a precursor to achieving the unitary, guiding vision. Our question is this: Where does the guiding vision, easily evident in DuBois, come from?

Stuart Rosenbaum

How do the Americans – DuBois, James, Dewey and others – get *antecedently* to philosophical inquiry what in Plato is gotten only *as a result* of philosophical inquiry?

Getting the Goods

Where does the guiding vision come from for the Americans, for those looking metaphorically west rather than east? Where do Whitman, Emerson, James, DuBois and Dewey get their vision of the good, the true and the beautiful if they don't have to spend their lives in dialectical pursuit of it? Historical narratives can be told about each of these people that suggest interesting answers for each of them. For DuBois, one might begin with his childhood and education in Great Barrington; for James, with his childhood in Schenectady and his extensive travels in Europe; for Dewey, with his childhood and parentage in Burlington. And one finds in their writings compelling accounts of their common vision that are recognizably similar and also suggestive of the unity of vision I'm finding in them.³ So part of the answer lies in their individual biographies, but looking to biography is not enough to account for a shared vision of the good.

The Gift of Grace: Another part of the answer comes quickly, suggested by the idea that the vision is shared. Dewey (1991, p. 186) tells us that the guiding vision that yields the possibilities we hope for in the real world of experience is "a gift of grace." Here is how Dewey puts the point in "Creative Democracy, The Task Before Us":

[W]e have now to recreate by deliberate and determined endeavor the kind of democracy which in its origin one hundred and fifty years ago was largely the product of a fortunate combination of men and circumstances. We have lived for a long time upon the heritage that came to us from the happy conjunction of men and events in an earlier day. The present state of the world is more than a reminder that we have now to put forth every energy of our own to prove worthy of our heritage. (Dewey, 2003, p. 92)

Dewey expresses gratitude throughout his work for the historical circumstances that make democracy possible, but he does not see those circumstances as in any way inevitable or as in any way a "natural" fruit of historical progress toward an ideal end that might have been predicted in advance by somebody with sufficient knowledge of human nature and society; it is a *gift of grace*. We may think of Dewey's use of this evidently religious terminology as a retrogression to his Congregationalist childhood or as a slip of the tongue; what matters is that it makes obvious his commitment

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

to the guiding vision of democratic society as historically fortuitous, a result of serendipity or happenstance, or again using his own words, a gift of grace. (One might tell a long story here and several intellectual historians have done so.) The vision is decidedly not in any way "natural" and it is not an inevitable outcome of philosophical inquiry. The vision just happens, and we are its beneficiaries; we are grateful for and we profit from the expressions of that vision that pulse strongly throughout the American centuries in our philosophers, our poets and our artists.

Our job as beneficiaries of the vision is the work of putting it into practice in our lives and our communities and negotiating it into the changed conditions produced by the passage of time. The practice of dialectic that seems so critical to achieving the guiding vision in Plato in the Americans falls away, and we have now, in Dewey's words, to "recover philosophy" from its dialectical captivity.

There is more philosophically, however, to this gift of grace than appears in its apparently evasive slighting of those values that are the targets of Plato's dialectical quest, a quest that ultimately ends in that consummatory vision of the good, the true and the beautiful. Where is the righteousness that Socrates and Euthyphro sought? Where is the Justice that is the quest of *The Republic*? Where is the love that is the quest of *Symposium*? Where is the courage that is the quest of *Laches*? Where is the virtue that is the target of *Meno*? Where is the knowledge that is the target of *Theaetetus*? Similar questions can be asked about each of Plato's dialogues. If the vision of the good, the true and the beautiful is for the Americans a gift of grace, then what does that vision look like and how does one recognize it if one sets aside the dialectical strategies of Platonism? This question is just the question of how one recognizes, apart from the dialectical strategies I have said the Americans shun, the good, the true and the beautiful; it is also the question how one recognizes righteousness, justice, love, courage, and knowledge as well as the other components of the vision of the good that Plato aims at in those dialogues. Apart from Plato's means, how is recognition of these ideals possible?

Consummatory Experience: Most of the American thinkers are, at best, cagey about this issue. Or they are evasive or they don't see that the issue is of great significance for an understanding of what philosophy is or can become. (That it is of significance is evident in, for example, our generally thinking of Whitman, Thoreau or Emerson not as *philosophers* but rather as literary figures of some strange sort, and the complementary treatment of them by departments of English as not really literary figures either.) James sees its importance and occasionally gives it a go; in "Pragmatism's

Stuart Rosenbaum

Conception of Truth,” for example, he tries to say what truth is – one of those big ideas close to the center of Plato’s concerns – in a way that respects pragmatism’s commitment to putting experience rather than dialectic at the center of philosophy. But the American philosopher who gets this issue right and explains it cleanly and systematically is Dewey.

Remember that the content of the guiding vision is a gift of grace, not any result of intellectual effort or dialectical achievement. The content of any gift, as we all know, is *known through experience*. So we ask: what experiences yield up a vision of goodness, of truth or of beauty? If we think of the content of our guiding vision as a gift, as does Dewey, then how may we see the contents of that gift in our experience? How do we get the vision apart from dialectical strategies of philosophy that remain residues in our character as footnotes to Plato? This is the question of how we might think about goodness, truth and beauty, or for that matter about any of the large ideas that shape the contents of Plato’s dialogues, as given in experience, as seen in experience or as resulting from human engagement in the world of experience. To see such ideas as intimately embedded in human experience is to see them as transcending the dialectical strategies on exhibit in Plato’s dialogues. Where in experience do we find them?.

Dewey answers this question explicitly in almost all of his works; I recommend especially *Art as Experience* because it exhibits well the coherence and unity of approach in Dewey’s thought about traditional issues of philosophical significance. Dewey there shows how we may understand all human phenomena, no matter how subtle and complex they may appear, to be rooted in human experience. But to cut straight to the heart of our issue and find a direct answer to our question, there is no better source than Dewey’s (1938) *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. I’ll treat you here to a moderately lengthy passage from that work wherein Dewey addresses explicitly the concepts that constitute the vision, those of goodness, truth and beauty.

The actual basis of these absolutes is appreciation of concrete consummatory ends. In the case of intellectual, esthetic and moral experiences, the objective completion of certain unsettled existential conditions is brought about with such integrity that the final situation is possessed of peculiar excellence. There is the judgment “This is true, beautiful, good” in an emphatic sense. Generalizations are finally framed on the ground of a number of such concrete realizations. Being true, beautiful, or good, is recognized as a common character of subject-matters in spite of great

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

differences in their actual constituents. They have, however, no meaning save as they indicate that certain subject-matters are outstanding consummatory completions of certain types of previously indeterminate situations by means of the execution of appropriate operations. Good, true, beautiful, are, in other words, abstract nouns designating characters which belong to three kinds of actually attained ends in their consummatory capacity. (Dewey, 1986, p. 341)

Examples of these kinds of consummatory experience abound. I'll mention one cited by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn quotes Wolfgang Pauli from the time Pauli was puzzling about the issues that led to Heisenberg's quantum mechanics: "At the moment physics is again terribly confused. In any case, it is too difficult for me, and I wish I had been a movie comedian or something of the sort and had never heard of physics." Less than five months later, Pauli wrote, "Heisenberg's type of mechanics has again given me hope and joy in life." (Kuhn, 1962, p. 84) Pauli had what Dewey calls a consummatory experience, one of those exemplary ones that are not completely unusual and one that is vaguely typical of a whole bunch of experiences. I hope we have all had such experiences. I have. As experiences, they stand out against the context of life in memorable ways, which is why Dewey puts them at the center of his account of the experience of the vision. And such experiences cannot be predicted or engendered through any reliable technique such as the dialectical method Plato made central to philosophy.

The vision in Dewey is a gift of grace; it comes unbidden in something like the way Heisenberg's quantum mechanics came to Pauli. When the vision comes in its full particularity, as it must, it becomes definitive for those to whom it comes. Hence, not only Dewey, but also DuBois, James and the other American thinkers for whom the possibilities of experience are the heart of the philosophical matter turn their backs on the Platonist strategies of dialectical inquiry into essences that typifies most contemporary philosophy. They seek to recover philosophy from its dialectical captivity and hope to bring it closer to the worlds of our colleagues who seek to make our world a better place.

I'll conclude with what must remain here an obscure reference that takes us back to Plato. At the conclusion of *Meno*, wherein Socrates pursues the issue whether or not virtue can be taught, Socrates himself intimates that virtue transcends dialectical inquiry in a way that at least coheres with Dewey's talk about a gift of grace; Socrates says at the end of that dialogue that virtue is "a gift of the gods," a reasonable approximation of Dewey's

Stuart Rosenbaum

claim that the guiding vision is “a gift of grace.” Much more remains to be said about these issues, but I’ll save the more for another occasion and thank you for your attention on this one.

Notes

¹ Here is what Whitehead (1979, p. 39) says in *Process and Reality*: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”

² Tomas Hibbs, a colleague at Baylor, has published an interesting essay assimilating DuBois to Socrates in the sense that he sees both DuBois and Socrates serving similar cultural roles and as doing so because they both engage in Socratic questioning. I’m not sure that I disagree with Hibbs here, but I insist at least that DuBois shuns the kind of Socratic questioning that is typical of the dialectic of Plato’s dialogues; the philosophical dialectic that I here characterize as Plato’s means to his vision of the good I believe DuBois deliberately resists. See Hibbs (2008, pp. 35-58).

³ In DuBois, the unity of the vision is evident in many places; the selection from *Darkwater* in my *Pragmatism and Religion* exhibits it strongly. In James, one sees it in “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” and in Dewey, one sees the vision almost everywhere once one gets the idea that somehow it’s there; *Art as Experience* is probably the most explicit statement in a single volume.

References

- Dewey, John. (1989). *Art as Experience* in *John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 10 Art as Experience*. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Dewey, John. (1991). *Freedom and Culture*, in *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 13: 1938-1939*. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Dewey, John. (1986). *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, vol. 12, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- DuBois, W.E.B. (2003). *Darkwater*. In Stuart Rosenbaum (ed.), *Pragmatism and Religion*. Bloomington, IL: Illinois University Press.
- DuBois, W.E.B. (2003). *The Souls of Black Folk*. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics.
- Emerson, Ralph W. (2003). *Circles*. In Stuart Rosenbaum (ed.), *Pragmatism and Religion*. Bloomington, IL: Illinois University Press.
- Hamilton, Edith and Huntington Cairns. (1961). *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hibbs, Thomas. (2008). W.E.B. DuBois and Socratic Questioning. *Expositions* 2.1.
- James, William. (1982). Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth. In H.S. Thayer (ed.), *Pragmatism: The Classic Writings*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co.

How to be a Graceful Footnote to Plato

- Kuhn, Thomas. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rosenbaum, Stuart (ed.). (2003). *Pragmatism and Religion*. Bloomington, IL: Illinois University Press.
- Whitehead, Alfred North. (1979). *Process and Reality*. New York: Free Press.

SOUTHWEST PHILOSOPHY REVIEW

Vol. 25, No. 1

January, 2009

ARTICLES

STUART ROSENBAUM

HOW TO BE A GRACEFUL FOOTNOTE TO PLATO

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Jonathan Edwards as Proto-Pragmatist and John Dewey as Post-Theological Calvinist

Stuart Rosenbaum

I come to this conference with what I might characterize as a "sense of the heart," a sense that Jonathan Edwards was more than a person of his time, more than an Enlightenment Calvinist who was trying to hold in coherence his scientific and his theological worlds. And I admit that this sense is inspired by Perry Miller's treatment of Edwards in his 1949 biography;¹ this sense finds further confirmation in recent work by Douglas Anderson.² I realize that Miller's exposition is controversial, but having encountered some other treatments of Edwards, I remain impressed by Miller's conception of Edwards. The sense of the heart I bring is a diffuse one, one I can try to identify only by standards that are disreputable in many areas of philosophy: by techniques of association many may be inclined to think fallacious. Nevertheless, such techniques are all that are available to me, and I find them interesting and at least worth conversation.

Begin with the idea of grace, and start out on what looks to be completely neutral—it may even appear irrelevant—ground. Elie Wiesel's book, *Night*, is a description of his experiences as a young Polish Jew during the horror of the 1940s holocaust that enveloped all of European Jewry. Though Wiesel's story is well known, his crushing, God-extinguishing experiences have become rare in our American part of the world. Not rare for us, however, are theological puzzles, admittedly lacking in psychological power, but of the sort that defeated Wiesel's faith. The response of the Christian, Francois Mauriac, to Wiesel's story, which is printed as the foreword to Wiesel's book, is relevant:

And I, who believe that God is love, what answer could I give my young questioner . . . ? What did I say to him? Did I speak of that other Jew, his brother, who may have resembled him—the Crucified, whose Cross has conquered the world? Did I affirm that the stumbling block to his faith was the cornerstone of mine, and that the conformity between the Cross and the suffering of men was in my eyes the key to that impenetrable mystery whereon the faith of his childhood had perished? . . . We do not know the worth of one single drop of blood, one single tear. All is grace. If the Eternal is the Eternal, the last word for each one of us belongs to Him. This is what I should have told this Jewish child. But I could only embrace him, weeping.³

Mauriac's acknowledgement that all is grace is his honest Christian response to the Jewish child for whom God no longer existed. For Jonathan Edwards, too, the inscrutability of Divine grace was essential in his thought about God. Edwards could have had no more theologically substantial a response to Wiesel's experience than did Mauriac. Edwards' work centered on finding a theological way to think about himself, and about all of humanity, in social, cultural, and natural contexts that were no more consonant with natural human hopes than were the more contemporary contexts of Wiesel and Mauriac. Even though one's enemies in Edwards' world did not have the military power of the twentieth century, the uncertainties of daily life were enormous. (All of Edwards' children survived to adulthood, an almost unheard of happenstance in the early eighteenth century; only two of Cotton Mather's fifteen children survived to adulthood.)

Given Edwards' commitments to Lockean empiricism and Newtonian naturalism, his steadfastness in seeking to elaborate a theological account of grace coherent with that empiricism and naturalism is quite natural. The empiricist passivity of individuals in their cognition of the world parallels their powerlessness in the hands of God,⁴ and the deterministic Newtonian physics supports well Edwards'

refusal of Arminian heresies in whatever guise they might present themselves. Not only the uncertain benevolence of the natural world that supported life in the early eighteenth century, but also the dominant intellectual tendencies of his age supported in Edwards' thought an idea of grace recognizably similar to the one to which Francois Mauriac had recourse in the twentieth century. Mauriac's words, "all is grace," would have suited Edwards.

Edwards' intellectual problem, or if you prefer, his theological or philosophical problem, was to find a place for divine grace in his scientific world. His solution to this problem was to locate divine grace in the particular habits of the elect, in their distinctive ways of being in the natural world and in their communities. The elect were those whose characters were infused with religious affections, those who understood that Christ was the telos of history and who lived that understanding, those whom God infused with his own modes of perception and understanding.⁵ Although this conception of divine grace indeed cohered with Edwards' scientific world, it presented grave epistemological problems for earnest Calvinists, of whom none was more earnest than Edwards. Who were the elect? Who evidenced genuine religious affections? Who lived their understanding of Christ as the *telos* of history? These problems Edwards apparently struggled with all of his life. Anderson puts Edwards' dilemma this way:

[W]e may reveal through our beliefs and actions the traits of salvation, but we cannot *know* that we are saved; at best we become hermeneuts of the religious affections.⁶

These particular epistemological problems are, by contrast with the typical epistemological problems of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy, distinctive in the American intellectual context. Their distinctiveness is largely a function of their focus on the affections, the habits, and the character of individuals who are seeking to make sense of their own lives and their own communities.

Who among us is elect? Who among us has religious affections? These questions find no answers—indeed, they are not even asked—in the work of any of the prominent rationalists or empiricists of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. For those traditional epistemologists, the being of God, and God's relationship to the world, are the only epistemological questions. For Edwards, the being of God and God's relationship to the world are, relatively speaking, settled issues; urgent for him is the issue of individual relationships to God and how one may discern the quality of those relationships.

Edwards' concern with the epistemology of individual relationships to God signals his significance for American pragmatism; it signals the primary respect in which he is a "proto-pragmatist." How does Edwards' epistemology of individuality signal this significance? Hold that question and cut to John Dewey.

Richard Rorty and Alan Ryan have recently praised Dewey's 1892 essay, "Christianity and Democracy." Let me quote from Rorty the passages he singles out for attention:

It must have seemed strange to the University of Michigan's Christian Students Association to be told, in 1892, that "God is essentially and only the self-revealing" and that "the revelation is complete only as men come to realize him."

Dewey spelled out what he meant by going on to say, "Had Jesus Christ made an absolute, detailed and explicit statement upon all the facts of life, that statement would not have had meaning—it would have not been revelation—until men began to realize in their own action the truth that he declared—until they themselves began to live it."⁷

Rorty's way of seeing Dewey's 1892 perspective on Christianity is perhaps distinguishable from, but is recognizably similar to, that of Jonathan Edwards' response to his own epistemological problem about individual relationships to God:

One can detect the meaning of Jesus Christ for individuals only to the extent that they begin to live that meaning in their lives, and such meaning exists at all for individuals only to the extent that they live that meaning in their relationships and in their communities. Dewey is appealing to the test of practice. An idea, a value, or an ideal has traction in an individual life only to the extent that an individual lives that idea, value, or ideal in ways that concretely acknowledge or manifest that idea, value, or ideal. John Dewey's 1892 test of the meaningfulness of Christianity to any individual is whether that individual's practice, habits, and character conform to Christianity's historical exemplar, Jesus Christ. In the words of Bruce Kuklick, explicating Jonathan Edwards' account of grace,

God related to individuals through human experience, and he became, through Christ, the reason for behavior. For the elect, Christ, the personal wisdom of God, was the telos of history.⁸

Edwards' epistemological focus on individuality, on the need to discern "gracious affections," commitments to specific concretely exemplified Christian ideals of habit and character, signals his proto-pragmatism. Dewey's 1892 commitment to testing individual character in habit and action signals his pragmatism (or perhaps only his own proto-pragmatism, if we take seriously the effort by many scholars to divide Dewey into an earlier idealistic period and a later pragmatic period). In any case, Dewey's later, and more systematic treatment of these same issues reveals his own full-blown pragmatism.

In his later work, Dewey abandons earlier efforts to hold together some remnant of creedal Christianity with his commitments to science and democracy. Instead, Dewey seeks to practice his understanding of Christianity, meaning that, for Dewey, Christianity "morphs" into democracy. But to say that Christianity metamorphoses into democracy is not to say that it mutates into democracy. A mutation is a change in which something essential or significant is left behind;

a metamorphosis is a change in which nothing essential or significant is left behind. Dewey's democracy is as filled with Dewey's Christianity of practice as his Christianity is filled with his democracy. Democracy, in Dewey's conception of it, is Christianity in practice; it is the systematic practice of Christianity in our moral, political, social, and cultural worlds. Nothing is left behind. Or is it?

Before trying to answer this question, let us take a quick look at Dewey's democracy in order to see how it signifies his Christianity. The 1939 talk on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, published as "Creative Democracy, the Task Before Us," shows us Dewey's large understanding of democracy:

Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed. That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, or material or cultural wealth. This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper unless it is put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents and relations of daily life. . . . The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has.⁹

The faith in human nature of which Dewey speaks must be "put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents and relations of daily life." The test of whether one has "the democratic faith" is the test of practice: what are the attitudes one displays toward one's fellows? One believes that "every human being . . . has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has" only if one has, or cultivates

in oneself and seeks to inculcate in others, habits and dispositions of behavior toward others that support this democratic faith. The essential issue for Dewey in the question of democratic faith is the test of practice. What does one do? What is one disposed to do? What does one seek to encourage in others? At this point in his thought, Dewey is unwaveringly committed to the Peircean, pragmatic understanding of belief as habit of action. Faith of any kind has become a matter of practice, of habit, tendency, and disposition.

The question of whether this democratic faith Dewey expresses so eloquently and forcefully is identical with, or approximates, Christian faith is the question of whether Dewey's commitment to Christianity has metamorphosed into his commitment to democracy, an interesting and important question that I believe should be answered in the affirmative. Here, however, I do not pursue that issue, for our central focus at this point is on Edwards as a proto-pragmatist.

Returning to Edwards, I note that the defining question of his *Religious Affections* is the question how to identify recipients of grace. For Edwards, the only clue we have in our efforts to answer this question is the practice of those recipients, their habits, tendencies, and dispositions to behave in gracious ways. Here is Kuklick's account:

For Edwards, Christian practice evidenced gracious affections. But such practice was not simply behavioral change. It was impossible to know certainly if someone had received grace. The sinful heart might always deceive. Sinners might not be just hypocrites but also self-deceivers. Nonetheless, the saved would act differently, and in describing this grace-infused behavior Edwards most clearly collapsed the distinction between reflection and sensation, between inner and outer, affection and understanding, mind and the world.¹⁰

In his emphasis on practice, following Kuklick's account closely, Edwards "collapsed the distinction between reflection and sensation, between inner and outer, affection and understanding, mind and the world." I do not think there is a tremendous gap, if indeed there is any gap at all, between collapsing these distinctions and thinking of belief or faith as a matter of how one is in the world, or as a matter of habit, disposition, and tendency to behave in specific ways in one's world. The apparent gap between the Calvinist and the pragmatist on the issue of what it means to be a person in the world, to have a certain kind of faith and to have certain beliefs, has now become very narrow indeed. The test of grace, of belief, of faith, is the test of practice, in Edwards as well as in Dewey. Edwards' turn toward practice in addressing his personal epistemological questions is a turn similar to the one made again and again in the American context in the centuries following him.¹¹ Admittedly, later thinkers became more intentionally concrete and practical in their reaction against the theoretical issues of epistemology and metaphysics that dominated the European intellectual scene. Peirce, James, and Dewey took on the Europeans very aggressively, and they were rewarded with equally aggressive reactions against their thought. Nevertheless, in Edwards' distinctive turn toward practice as a cornerstone of his thought, one does see the makings of an incipient pragmatism, a proto-pragmatism.

Recall now in conclusion the question whether Dewey left something behind when his Christianity metamorphosed into his democracy. Here again, I think we can read Dewey as a systematic purveyor of the Calvinism distinctively expressed by Edwards, though admittedly in Dewey that Calvinism has become distinctively a-theological. But the a-theological Calvinistic democracy into which Dewey's Christianity metamorphosed gives evidence of a fuller flowering of Edwards' ideas of God's sovereignty and grace.

What might Dewey have left behind when his Christianity metamorphosed into his democracy? The natural answer to this question is that he left behind the specifically Christian supernaturalism that appears in all the standard creeds of

the Church—in the Apostle's Creed, in the Nicene Creed, and in the Confession of Dort to which Edwards subscribed. That Dewey left behind the supernaturalism of the Christian metaphysical tradition is not in question. He did. The question is whether his leaving it behind was a leaving behind of something in some sense "essential."

I think Dewey's leaving behind Christian supernaturalism may be seen as a symptom of two possibly unique characteristics of Dewey's religious perspective. The first characteristic is that Dewey takes more seriously than any previous thinker the idea that practice is the "bottom line" in understanding personal commitments. The fullness of Dewey's commitment to understanding humanity in terms of organic habit, tendency, and disposition is one that leaves behind any fragment of hiddenness of personality or character; no longer may we think of ourselves or of others as hidden behind veils or guises that conceal our real selves. Our real selves are what we do, or more modestly, our real selves are what we tend to do, are disposed to do, or what we habitually do; our real selves are a matter of our organic practices that make us who we are in the worlds we inhabit. The souls or minds of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy have disappeared and no longer provide any theological or philosophical solace for those who might be worried about their eternal destinies. Ontology can no longer posture as a source of comfort to the fully human creatures of God's natural world. Dewey's commitment to practice is, in this respect, simply a more systematic recourse to the same idea of practice that finds expression in Edwards' *Religious Affections*: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

The second unique characteristic of Dewey's religious perspective is that his God has become, conceptually speaking, a God of practice. "The Unity of all Ideal Ends" is Dewey's characterization of God in *A Common Faith*. As mysterious as Dewey's account of God is to those accustomed to thinking of God as "The Being than which no Greater can be Conceived," it nonetheless has the virtue of pointing toward the significance of human practice for the religious

life. The point of the religious life, for Dewey, is to live toward God, and his very concept of God expresses that point. The Anselmian formulation is no better than a distraction from that understanding of the point of the religious life, for it mires one in epistemological and ontological conundrums. But Dewey, as much as Edwards, sees that the whole point of the religious life, of the Christian life, is Christian practice or taking Christ as the *telos* of one's life. Dewey's embrace of the deep morality of democracy is his taking of Christ as the *telos* of life.

Although the concept of God changes in Dewey's account, the sovereignty of God remains. Christian practice, the practice that sees Christ as the *telos* of life, is strongly preserved in Dewey's democracy and in his concept of God. Finally, Dewey would embrace, as wholeheartedly as would Edwards, Francois Mauriac's words: "All is grace. If the eternal is the eternal, the last word for each one of us belongs to him."

STUART E. ROSENBAUM received the B.A. from Baylor University (Waco, Tex.), the M.A. from the University of Nebraska, and the Ph.D. from Brown University. He is professor of philosophy at Baylor University. He has published widely on various issues in social and applied ethics and pragmatism, one of his central interests. He has recently completed a monograph, *The Reflective Life: An Introduction to Pragmatic Moral Thought*.

NOTES

¹ Perry Miller, *Jonathan Edwards* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949).

² See Douglas Anderson, "Awakening in the Everyday: Experiencing the Religious in the American Philosophical Tradition," in *Pragmatism and Religion*, ed. Stuart Rosenbaum (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2003), 143–152.

³ Elie Wiesel, *Night* (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), foreword, x.

⁴ But see Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 18. Kuklick says that Edwards "emended Locke to give the mind constructive powers."

⁵ Kuklick, 18.

⁶ Anderson, 143.

⁷ Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism," in *Pragmatism and Religion*, ed. Stuart Rosenbaum (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 122.

⁸ Kuklick, 19.

⁹ Reprinted in Rosenbaum, *Pragmatism and Religion*, 91–96. See p. 93.

¹⁰ Kuklick, 19.

¹¹ See for example the essay by Perry Miller, "From Edwards to Emerson," in his *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 184–203.

PRAGMATISM AND
THE REFLECTIVE LIFE

STUART
ROSENBAUM

Contents

Preface	ix
1 Introduction	1
2 Pragmatism	23
3 From Moral Theory to the Reflective Life	41
4 The Reflective Life	63
5 Ideals	87
6 Deliberation	107
7 Education	133
8 Ecumenism	157
Bibliography	185
Index	193
About the Author	197

Preface

I came to American philosophy comparatively late in my academic career. Only after I had been teaching philosophy for several years did I begin to read around among the American philosophers. I am grateful to Richard Rorty for providing the stimulus—an NEH summer seminar at Princeton University—that stirred my interest in American philosophy. I had a slow start of it, but Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* I found especially challenging to my analytic propensities; at the same time it invited me to revisit the submerged dimensions of sentiment I had reluctantly come to believe irrelevant to real philosophy. I had deluded myself into believing that the pursuit of truth was an intellectual pursuit that would tolerate no interference from the heart.

The American tradition, in virtually all of its prominent personalities, let me see that philosophy need not be solely an intellectual pursuit but that it should enable, in Dewey's words, a "recovery of philosophy" for human life. The American tradition lets us be whole persons; it invites our joys and sorrows, our loves and hopes, and our physical and psychological needs to be fully integrated into proper philosophical inquiry. Within the American context literature and art become acutely relevant to the practice of philosophy. William James and John Dewey make this inclusive spirit—a determination to respect philosophically all varieties of human creativity—explicit repeatedly throughout their philosophical work. In James's "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," philosophers become "statesmen" whose primary tools are "novels and dramas of the deeper sort, . . . sermons, . . . books on statecraft and philanthropy and social and economical reform."¹ James's academic training was in medicine

and psychology, and he aspired as a youth to become an artist; his philosophy respects the whole person he himself became. And John Dewey made aesthetics the cornerstone of his entire philosophical perspective; for Dewey, the creativity evident in artistic activity was the key to understanding what life was about—and what philosophy should be about.² I especially appreciate the closing sentences of the second chapter of Dewey's *Art as Experience*:

Ultimately there are but two philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art. This is the philosophy of Shakespeare and Keats.³

The autobiographical dimension to this book comes in its account of how one might move from the intellectualist enterprises of most current philosophy toward a more integrated style of inquiry that seeks greater unity of head and heart. In this way, the book stands in gentle opposition to the spirit of Richard Rorty's essay, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids." My own metaphorical Trotsky has always been my conviction that there is a truth to life that transcends individuals' idiomatic efforts to give their lives form and substance; I got this "Trotsky" during my youth from my grandfather and from the Southern Baptist church I grew up in on the meager outskirts of Dallas, Texas. My own metaphorical Wild Orchids has been a love of literature and poetry that refused to leave me even as I trekked determinedly through the landscape of analytic philosophy. Richard Rorty, through his gentle yet insistent disavowals of the goals of analytic philosophy, gave substance to my desire to bring together in thought my own metaphorical Trotsky and my own metaphorical Wild Orchids. This book is a partial account of my effort. (I do agree with Rorty that there *need* be no harmony between individuals' "Trotsky's" and their "Wild Orchids," but I hope such harmony is possible, and I hope too that this book may be a small example of that possibility.)⁴

The book is about pragmatism and especially about pragmatism's moral perspective. This focus will be puzzling to many who take morality seriously, for many see pragmatism as being a particularly degraded form of intellectual perspective, one that *could not* yield any fulsome understanding of morality. I disagree. Maybe because of my late introduction to it, I see pragmatism as a compelling development out of the context of Western intellectual history. As American democracy has proven to be, in principle at least, a particularly attractive development on the world's social and political scene, so American pragmatism will prove to be a particularly attractive development on the world's intellectual scene. Since I have this conviction, I have had mixed feelings about using the

term "pragmatism," precisely because it has appeared to many serious intellectuals to be an effort to read into the intellectual world the kind of "bottom-line" mentality characteristic of American corporate and political life. As John McDermott has put this point, "if Richard Nixon was a pragmatist, then the rest of us are called to be something different, something better."⁵ Unfortunately the intellectual content of the American pragmatist tradition has become a caricature, a straw man, for those who want to make their own "ideological hay."

The best way to displace the caricature and the straw man is to offer engagement with the real thing. American intellectuals need to find again their own intellectual tradition; they need to engage the primary sources of American intellectual life if they are to understand the content of American pragmatism. In this volume I have chosen to respect the distinction between the caricature of pragmatism and the real thing partly by giving up the adjective "pragmatic" to popular caricature and reserving the adjective "pragmatist" for what I conceive as the real thing. Whenever I write about the content of the American tradition of pragmatism, I use the adjective "pragmatist," and I have shunned entirely the use of "pragmatic"; I give over the term "pragmatic" to descriptions of more or less shady politicians and businesspeople, and generally to "bottom-line" mentalities. And of course I hope this volume may supply some motivation once again to engage primary sources in the American pragmatist tradition.

In addition to Richard Rorty, two other contemporary philosophers have been greatly significant in my personal development. One is Richard Bernstein, the "Tigger" of contemporary American philosophy in contrast to Richard Rorty's "Eeyore." Bernstein exudes the intensely ecumenical character of the American tradition, not only in the intellectual perspectives he takes but also in the breadth of his interests. The other is Ernest Sosa, my dissertation mentor, who taught me in ways of which I am sure he was unaware that, in the words of Emerson, "character is higher than intellect"; I am grateful for his manifold example. Also important to me have been members of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and especially John McDermott, friend and colleague ninety miles to the south whom I see too infrequently. Duane Cady has been a friend and helpful professional colleague since our time in graduate school, as has my philosopher brother, Stephen. I am grateful to Bob Baird, Bill Cooper, and Bud Duncan for their constancy as colleagues in the Baylor philosophy department. Finally, I appreciate Baylor University's patient confidence in granting me time for research and writing, especially a sabbatical leave during which I was able to complete the manuscript, and also Amy Antoninka who assisted my writing and research on a summer research grant from Baylor University.

NOTES

1. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1956), 210.
2. See Dewey's *Art as Experience* in *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989).
3. *Art as Experience* (1934), vol. 10 of *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 41.
4. Rorty's autobiographical essay appears in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 3-20. All philosophers and aspiring philosophers should read this essay; as a description of philosophical psychology it is unmatched.
5. "Pragmatic Sensibility: The Morality of Experience," in *New Directions in Ethics*, ed. Joseph DeMarco and Richard Fox (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 114.