Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x24gv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-05T11:03:51.671Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

In Defense of a Probabilistic Theory of Causality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Deborah A. Rosen
Deborah A. Rosen*
Affiliation:
University of New Orleans
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 604 - 613
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for providing me two invaluable opportunities for intensive study: at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in the summer of 1975 and at Yale as a fellow in residence for the academic year 1977–1978. My work would not have proceeded without the generous support of the Endowment, the congenial atmosphere at the Stanford Center and at Yale, and the gracious support of friends and colleagues among whom I would like especially to thank Carolyn Morillo, Suzanne Pharr, Don Hanks, and Tom Benson.

References

[1] Anscombe, G. E. M. “Causality and Determination.” In Causation and Conditionals. Edited by Sosa, E. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. pp. 63–81.Google Scholar
[2] Hesslow, G. “Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to Causality.” Philosophy of Science 43 (1976): 290–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Rosen, D. A. “An Argument for the Logical Notion of a Memory Trace.” Philosophy of Science 42 (1975): 1–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Suppes, P. A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1970.Google Scholar