How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical NaturalismHow can we understand the world as a whole instead of separate natural and human realms? Joseph T. Rouse proposes an approach to this classic problem based on radical new conceptions of both philosophical naturalism and scientific practice. Rouse begins with a detailed critique of modern thought on naturalism, from Neurath and Heidegger to Charles Taylor, Thomas Kuhn, and W. V. O. Quine. He identifies two constraints central to a philosophically robust naturalism: it must impose no arbitrarily philosophical restrictions on science, and it must shun even the most subtle appeals to mysterious or supernatural forces. Thus a naturalistic approach requires philosophers to show that their preferred conception of nature is what scientific inquiry discloses, and that their conception of scientific understanding is itself intelligible as part of the natural world. Finally, Rouse draws on feminist science studies and other recent work on causality and discourse to demonstrate the crucial role that closer attention to scientific practice can play in reclaiming naturalism. A bold and ambitious book, How Scientific Practices Matter seeks to provide a viable—yet nontraditional—defense of a naturalistic conception of philosophy and science. Its daring proposals will spark much discussion and debate among philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science. |
Contents
The Dualism of Nature and Normativity | 77 |
Quinean Indeterminacy and Its Implications | 106 |
Feminist Challenges to the Reification of Knowledge | 135 |
Two Concepts of Scientific Practices | 161 |
Perception Action and Discursive Practices | 184 |
Experimentation Theory and the Normativity | 263 |
Natural Necessity and the Normativity | 301 |
Common terms and phrases
agents antinaturalism antinaturalists appropriate argue argument articulated beliefs Brandom capacities Carnap Cartwright causal interactions causal intra-action chap chapter claims conception configuration constitutive construed criticism crucial Dasein Davidson discursive practices distinction domain empirical epistemic epistemological existential commitment experimental explicate express feminist science studies formal Haugeland Heidegger Heidegger's holism human sciences Husserl indeterminacy indeterminacy of translation inferential insistence intelligible intentional intentionality interpretation language linguistic logical manifest material meaning meaningful ment metaphysical modal models natural sciences natural world naturalists necessity Neurath nomological normative accountability normative authority normative force objects observation sentences one's perception and action perspectival perspective phenomena phenomenological philosophical naturalism philosophy of science physical possible prac practical/perceptual protocol protocol sentences Quine Quine's Quinean rational recognize relations representation response role scientific knowledge scientific practices scientific understanding semantic semantic content sense sentences shared significance situation social sociological stake structure surroundings Taylor theoretical theory tion truth unified science utterances