Abstract
This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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Rowbottom, D.P. Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem’s thesis revisited. Synthese 177, 139–149 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9643-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9643-4