Abstract
From a logical point of view, permissibility can be reduced to possibility by introducing demands which can be met. The alleged reduction is circular from a philosophical perspective, however, because demands are fundamentally deontic. This paper solves this problem by replacing demands which can be met with rules which can be satisfied and violated.
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Notes
Note, however, that an operator like ‘It ought to be the case that’ is non-trivially different to O. I gloss over this, for convenience, here.
In any given case, demands in dimension A which are not relevant will be vacuously satisfied or satisfied in the background.
Prima facie, a more controversial consequence is that it cannot be legally necessary to do something unless it is also physically possible. As we will see, however, all my view requires is that if there is part of the legally possible that is not subsumed by any other form of possibility, then that part of the legally possible is normatively defunct. So even if it is accepted that it can be legally necessary to do X when it is physically impossible to do X, it would not be legally obligatory.
Note the desirable consequence that one can obey an ethical rule for non-ethical reasons.
Note we can individuate the type of a reason by the end to which it is directed, generally, because ‘doing what some demander wants’ can be an end.
A related issue, which I avoid for the sake of clarity, is whether one can play chess, say, without intending to do so. The account here is consistent with the view that one cannot.
I am grateful to Peter Baumann for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Rowbottom, D.P. Permissibility and Violable Rules. Philosophia 36, 367–374 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9113-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9113-5