Abstract
It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
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Rowbottom, D.P. The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument. Stud Logica 87, 65–71 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2